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ABSTRACT 
There is increased focus, both in Canada and internationally, on the processes by which 
health care resources are allocated. This study examines a set of resource allocation 
decisions to determine how these decisions are currently being made and identify the 
specific concerns decision makers have about resource allocation in these areas. 
Specifically, the project examines how decisions involving endovascular coiling MRls, 
and powered upper limb prostheses are made in three Canadian provinces: Alberta, 
Newfoundland, and Saskatchewan. The overall aims of the project are: I) to identify how 
these decisions are currently made, 2) to compare how these decisions are made in the 
different service areas and in the different provinces, and 3) to recommend ways to 
improve current allocation processes. 
With its focus on complex allocation processes, the project adopts a case study approach. 
The cases were developed using 43 key informant interviews and reviews of existing 
materials. The study found that many of the reforms proposed in the academic literature 
are often difficult to apply in real world situations, due to the multiple levels of decision 
makers, the transferability of decision making authority across decision makers and 
institutional history. 
Given that the processes for allocating resources are often developed through and in 
response to the unique history and culture of the institutions in question, it is also difficult 
to develop decision aids that are applicable over a wide range of sites. Maintaining 
established and familiar processes, even those not consistent with the types of decision 
II 
aids recommended in the academic literature, may be the most efficient way of allocating 
resources for many organizations. The main implication of these conclusions is that 
improving the processes for allocating resources is likely going to require more 
institutionally-specific and area-of-care-specific reforms than researchers in this area have 
previously proposed. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Problem 
Politicians, government officials, health care managers and health care providers 
constantly face a range of difficult choices about how best to allocate limited financial 
and human health care resources. In Canada, there are numerous pressures on our 
publicly funded health care system to expand both coverage and access to services. Many 
of the main recommendations of the Commission on the Future of Health Care in anada 
(2002) were for an expansion of the services provided . 1 Romanow essentially concluded 
that in order to sustain the values on which our publicly funded health care system is 
based, the system needs to provide more . While Romanow argues for increases in 
coverage, the public seem increasingly concerned about the level of access they have to 
the services which are already covered by public programs (Biendon, Schoen, 0 Rohes, 
Osborn & Scoles, 2002; CMAJ , 2004). Further demands come from various interest and 
disease groups, all hoping to expand funding and extend coverage in their particular area 
of concern. There are increased public expectations about the level of care Canadians 
should receive and how long they should have to wait for it (Commission on the Future of 
Health Care in Canada, 2002). There are also demands arising from the continual array 
of new medical technologies, procedures and pharmaceutics becoming availabl . 
1 The Commiss ion on the Future of Health Care in Canada was headed by Roy Romanow and is often 
referred to as the Romanow Commission . This Commission advocated the expansion of diagnostic 
ervi ces, home care, primary care, the better use of e lectronic hea lth records, improved access to rural 
health and wider coverage for catastrophic drug costs. 

These calls to expand coverage, improve access and provide new services need to be 
balanced by the fiscal capacities of the provinces. Most provincial governments are under 
considerable fiscal pressures, even after the increased fund ing given to them under the 
2003 Health Care Renewal Accord ("Ottawa Sparks," 2004). While the fiscal situation 
across the country shows signs of improving, every province, regional health authori ty 
and hospital still has to choose between which services they wi ll provide and which they 
will not. Such choices are not limited to Canada nor to health care. When financial and 
human resources are scarce and can be employed to achieve a number of social ends, 
choice is always necessary (Fuchs, 1974). Yet choices about the allocation of health care 
resources can leave people in pain and suffering, or even facing death. As Calabresi and 
Bobbitt ( 1978) note, health resource allocation decisions are often 'tragic choices." 
Both Alberta ' s Premier's Advisory Council on Health (2003) and the Supreme Court of 
Canada (Auton v. British Columbia, 2004) have concluded that public Medicare was 
never intended to cover a ll the health care services that Canadians may need. The 
Canada Health Act ( 1984) dictates only that selected "medicall y necessary" services have 
to be covered in order for provincial health plans to receive federa l cost-sharing 
reimbursements. Notwithstanding the intended incomplete coverage of our public health 
insurance system, questions concerning coverage, levels of service and access are at the 
very centre of the debate about its sustainabi lity. On the one hand, if coverage is too 
wide, the financial pressures on the public system may threaten its survival. On the oth r 
hand, if the coverage of services is too narrow, many people will be denied care they 
desperately need. If the level of services is inadequate, Canadians wil l increasingly 
2 
question whether the health care system lives up to its claim of providing comprehensive 
care or even whether a single-tiered public system is worth preserving. 
Decisions about how to invest public funds directed to health care determine which health 
services will be covered and at what levels. In other words, resource allocation decisions 
determine which services are available to Canadians and indirectly how long people have 
to wait to access them. Resource allocations also help determine whether the health care 
system as a whole is able to achieve crucial goals such as maximizing its effect on the 
population 's health, improving on measurable outcomes, and achieving a high level of 
user satisfaction. 
Given its importance, it is not surprising that there already is a great deal written on 
health resource a llocation, both in Canada and internationally. There are over twenty 
books and hundreds of articles written on different aspects of how health care should be 
allocated or rationed. Much of this literature, however, can be classified as either general 
accounts of the problem of health resource allocation, commentaries on previous attempts 
to ration care, examinations of ethical concerns, or proposals for reform. What is missing 
are many empirical accounts examining how resource allocation decisions are made. 
Certain high profile attempts to prioritize services, e.g., in Oregon, New Zealand, 
Netherlands, have been reported on in detail. Selected individual cases of rationing have 
received a good deal of attention (Ham, 1999; Feek, McKean, Henneveld, Barrow, Edgar, 
& Paterson, 1999; Ubel, 200 I ; Supreme Court of Canada, Auton v. British Columbia, 
2004). 
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However health resource allocation decisions are not rare events. While much is wri tten 
on health resource allocation, there remains little insight into how these common, but 
critically important, decisions are regularly made. This lack of knowledge severely limits 
our ability, both as researchers and as Canadians, to suggest improvements in the manner 
in which health care resources are allocated in this country. 
1.2 Approaches to Studying the Problem 
In his book Coping with Uncertainty (1980), David Hunter examined, in great detail, how 
resource a llocation deci sions were made in the late 1970's by two regional health 
authorities in Great Britain. The focus of Hunter' s study was not on health resource 
allocation per se, but rather on testing theories of managerial decision making, 
specifically in the United Kingdom. Much has likely changed, however regarding the 
delivery of health care and the processes for allocating resources since Hunter finished his 
study in 1977. 
In Canada, three groups of researchers have conducted fairly extensive work in the areas 
of resource allocation and priority setting. Douglas Martin, Peter Singer and others 
associated with the Joint Centre for Bioethics at the University of Toronto have used 
Norman Daniel's concept of accountability for reasonableness as a framework for 
evaluating priority setting decisions? Through a series of studies, this group has applied 
the accountability for reasonableness framework to examme the views of hospital 
2 Accountability for reasonableness is described in detail below in section 2.4.7. 
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executives about the level of fairness in their institutions (Reeleder, Martin, Keresztes & 
Singer, 2005), decision-making during the SARS crisis (Be ll , Hyland, DePellegrin, 
Upshur, Bernstein & Martin, 2004), priority setting in hospitals and regional authorities 
(Gibson, Martin & Singer, 2004), drug formulary decisions (Martin, Ho llenberg, Macrae, 
Madden & Singer, 2003) and hospital strategic planning (Martin, Shulman, Santiago-
Sorrell, & Singer, 2003). Martin 's group has identified a number of factors which 
decision makers in Canada consider when allocating health care resources, including 
strategic fit with the organization's goals, "alignment with external directives," c linical 
impact, and the needs of the community (Gibson, Martin & Singer, 2004, p. 2). As 
reported in the interviews for this project, many decision makers recognize the 
accountability for reasonableness approach as a potentia l way of improving priority 
setting within their organizations. 
Another group of researchers who have contributed valuable insight in this area are Craig 
Mitton (U BC) and Cam Donaldson (Newcastle upon Tyne). Through a series of articles 
(Mitton & Donaldson, 2001 ; 2003a; 2003 b; 2003c; 2004; Mitton & Patten, 2004· Mitton, 
Patten, Waldner & Donaldson, 2003 ; Mitton, Donaldson, Waldner & Eagle, 2003 ; Halma 
Mitton, Donaldson, & West, 2004), Mitton, Donaldson and their colleagues have 
advocated and used a program budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA) approach a a 
method for improving health resource allocations.3 Like Martin's group, Mitton and 
Donaldson' s studies provide good insights into how health resource a llocations are made 
and offer another promising method for improving the allocation process. 
3 PBMA is described in detail below in section 2.4.6. 
5 
The third group of Canadian researchers who have completed substantial work in this 
area are Jerry Hurley, John Eyles, Stephen Birch, Mia Giacomini, Brian Hutchison and 
others associated with McMaster University's Centre for Health Economics and Policy 
Analysis (Eyles Birch, Chambers, Hurley & Hutchison, 1991 ; Birch & Chambers, 1993 ; 
Birch, Ryles, Hurley, Hutchison & Chambers, 1993; Eyles & Birch, 1993 ; Birch, Eyles & 
Newbold, 1996; Newbold, Eyles, Birch & Spencer, 1998). Much of their work is focused 
on needs-based models for allocating health care resources. The aim of the needs-based 
approach is to fairly and efficiently allocate resources across populations by accounting 
for health and socio-economic differences between the populations.4 
All three groups study how resource allocation decisions are made in Canada primarily 
from the perspective of their particular conceptual framework, i.e., accountability for 
reasonableness, PBMA, or needs-based models. 5 Similarly, all three groups have 
contributed to our understanding of how resource allocation decisions are made and offer 
plausible recommendations for improving the allocation of health care resources. 
Nevertheless, there is a risk that their empirical investigations are influenced too much by 
their conceptual frameworks. Rather than taking a proposed framework and testing to see 
whether it is applicable within the Canadian context, I propose a more grounded theory 
approach which first tries to determine how allocation decisions are currently being made, 
4 Needs-based models are described in detail below in ection 2.4.3. 
5 One exception is Singer, Martin, Giacomini and Purdy (2000), who do use a grounded theory, case study 
approach to study priority setting within two government advisory panels: the Cancer Care Ontario policy 
advisory committee and the Cardiac Care Network of Ontario expert panel on intracoronary stents and 
abc iximab. 
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without the investigation being guided by a pre-established framework fo r improving 
resource allocation. There is value in clearly determining how these decisions are made 
outside of any consideration of an eva! uati ve framework. As Hunter ( 1980) observes, 
" sensible re forms must depend on knowledge of the world as it is, just as much as on 
knowledge of the world as it ought to be" (p. 4) . It is possible that examining resource 
allocations using a pre-established framework may cause us to overlook other possible 
routes for re form or to overlook difficulties in applying these models within real world 
conditions. It is a lso plausible, g iven the amount of work already completed using these 
established frameworks, that taking a new, more grounded theory approach is the most 
promising way to make further contributions to research in this area. 
1.3 Focus of this Study 
Despite eschewing the use of a pre-establi shed framework, the researcher must still 
provide some focus for the project. Hurley, Cosby, Giacomini and Hutchison (2000) 
have conducted a fairly extensive review of approaches employed for a llocating 
resources, including those used internationally. One of their conclusions is that, 
"The nature of resource allocations in the health sector is too complex for a single, 
over-arching approach. [A future research program in this area] . . . should be 
oriented towards answering a coordinated set o f more focused questions on specific 
aspects o f resource a llocation processes and decis ions . . . . Regardless of the precise 
approach taken, the program needs to focus on particular types of contexts fo r 
resource allocation decisions. . .. While this approach does raise issues of 
generalizability, there is currently enough writing about resource allocations at a 
broad, generic level that useful contributions are more likely to come in moving 
from the particular to the general than vice versa" (pp. 13 -4). 
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This project IS an empirical examination of how resource allocations are made by 
provincial governments and regional health authorities. Following Hurley et al.'s (2000) 
recommendation, rather than conducting a general examination, the project focuses on 
particular cases of resource allocation. The project aims to determine how resource 
allocations are made in three health services areas (acute care, diagnostic testing, and 
rehabilitation) in three provinces. Specifically, it examines how decisions are made in 
Alberta, Newfoundland, and Saskatchewan involving endovascular coiling (a treatment 
for cerebral aneurysms), magnetic resonance imagining (MRI), and powered upper limb 
prostheses. 
Given that the project's aim IS to understand how particular decisions are made in 
different service areas, the project adopts a case study approach. Stake (2005) says that 
" [ c ]ase study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied" (p. 
443). In selecting a case study approach, the researcher needs first to determine why he 
has chosen to study this pmticular set of cases. One of the general aims in selecting the 
cases for this study is to identify areas of care which are likely to be fairly different in 
terms of resource allocation. There are very few references within the health resource 
allocation literature about possible differences in distinct areas of resource allocation. 
Comparing diverse cases of resource allocation should highlight any differences, to the 
extent that they do exist, in how resources are allocated across various areas of care. 
With a focus on endovascular coi ling, MRI, and powered upper limb prostheses, there is a 
good level of variation across the cases. For example, there are differences in who is 
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likely to be the primary advocate fo r expanding coverage, the size of their likely patient 
populations, their potential impact on patients, the strength of evidence for their 
effectiveness, the capital costs involved, and differences in their cost per case treated. In 
all of these cases, however, key factors, such as use of evidence, cost considerations, 
ethical considerations and accountability, are app licable. 
The cases are also all interesting examples of resource allocation in themselves. Each 
ra ises unique issues. With endovascular coil ing, there is the issue of its high sta1t-up 
costs and small patient population balanced against the fact that it is a potentially l i~ -
saving procedure. Decisions around MRis have a greater degree of public and media 
scrutiny than most other service areas. Also w ith MRI , because of its wide range of 
applicabil ity, there is the issue of usage creep, where a MRI machine is purchased to 
serve one patient population, but ends up being used by a wider range of patients because 
of its increased avai lability. With powered upper limb prostheses, there are issues arising 
from the substantial vari ation in public coverage from province to province and its very 
small patient population. 
In their study on hospital care rationing in the United Kingdom and the United States, 
Aaron and Schwartz ( 1984) conclude that the mechanisms of heal th care rationing and the 
public ' s reaction to it is quite different between the countries due, in part, to 
organizational and cultural di fferences between the two health care systems. In 
examining resource allocation decisions in Canada, it is impo1tant to consider the extent 
to which the organizational and cultural differences between provincial health care 
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systems result in different mechanisms of resource allocation. In order to capture any 
inter-provincial variation, the three services selected were examined in three provinces: 
Alberta, Newfoundland, and Saskatchewan. The choice of provinces was based on 
considerations about geographic distribution of the provinces across the country, the size 
of the provinces, the geographic distribution of their populations, structure of their health 
care systems, and the financial strength of the provinces. In order to provide a reasonable 
scope to the project, one regional health authority is focused on in each province. ln 
order to help secure confidentiality, the three regional authorities have been identified as 
Region A (Alberta), Region B (Newfoundland), and Region C (Saskatchewan). All three 
of the regional authorities provide a wide range of health care services, including tertiary 
care. 
Next to determining which cases to study, it is also important to determine the appropriate 
level of focus for the cases. Instead of examining specific decisions, the project focuses 
on the processes and factors used by an organization to make decisions in each particular 
area. In other words, instead of looking at how an organization decided in one instance of 
allocating resources, the focus is on the processes they usually use to make decisions in 
each of the three selected services. Examining general processes, rather than specific 
decisions, allows for sufficient focus while increasing the generalizability of the results. 
Descriptions of the decision making process do, where appropriate, make reference to 
specific allocation decisions in order to accurately describe the process used. 
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Colleen Flood (2002) claims that "the processes decision makers currently use to 
determine what Canada's publicly funded healthcare systems will cover appear 
haphazard, and the principles that guide decision-making seem to be either non-existent 
or not transparent" (para. 2). This research study will contribute to our understanding of 
how resource allocation decisions are made in Canada and about which principles and 
factors are used to guide these decisions. The project will also recommend improvements 
to the way resource allocations are made, either generally or more specifically in the three 
selected service areas. 
1.4 Study Objectives 
The aims ofthis study are: 
(i) To describe how resource allocation decisions are made in the selected 
areas of endovascular coiling, MRis, and powered upper limb prosth ses, 
in three provinces: Alberta, Newfoundland, and Saskatchewan. 
(ii) To identify similarities and differences in the decision making processes 
across the three areas of care and across the three provinces. 
(iii) To consider the likelihood that approaches proposed in the academic 
literature for improving resource allocation would be useful for improving 
decision making in the selected cases. 
(iv) To identify recommendations I best practices which the decision makers 
interviewed during this study have for resource allocation. 
(v) To determine the types of decision aids decision makers would find useful 
in making resource allocation decisions. If possible, develop and pilot any 
decision aids identified as being useful by the decision makers interviewed 
during this study. 
(vi) To make recommendations for improving health resource allocation either 
generally or within the selected cases. 
(vii) To transfer research results to appropriate audiences. 
II 
1.5 Organization of the Dissertation 
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of the relevant 
academic literature. This chapter covers specific issues related to health resource 
allocation, types of health care decisions, key factors often identi fied as important in 
resource allocations, proposed decision approaches fo r allocating resources, and 
background info rmation about the three selected areas of care. The purpose of the 
literature review is to give suffic ient context to the issues around resource allocation to 
allow the reader to fully understand the issues involved in the cases. This literature 
review also identifies key factors in terms of which the cases can be compared. Chapter 3 
provides an overview of the methods used in this study. Chapter 4 examines decision 
making in the three areas of care in Alberta and Health Region A. Chapter 5 examines 
decision making in Newfoundland and Labrador and Health Region B. Chapter 6 
examines decision making in Saskatchewan and Health Region C. Chapter 7 compares 
these cases and identi fies a number of the project's fi ndings. Chapter 8 discusses possible 
decision aids, outlines recommendations, and presents the project ' s knowledge transfer 
strategy. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The chapter is organized as follows: first, several distinct types of health care decisions 
are discussed. These distinctions will be used to help classify the allocation decisions 
identified in the cases. This discussion is followed by an examination of issues often 
raised concerning health resource allocations, including a) definitions of the terms 
rationing, resource allocation, and priority setting, b) the identification of key factors 
often identified as important to resource allocation and c) a review of proposed 
approaches for improving allocation processes. The chapter concludes by reviewing the 
three service areas to be examined. Appendix A provides a general overview of decision 
making within Canadian health care system as a general background for those not 
familiar with the Canadian system. 
2.1 Types of Health Care Decisions 
There are a number of ways to classify health care decisions. Perhaps the most common 
is in terms of macro, meso, and micro decisions. Despite common usage, it is not always 
clear what people refer to when using these terms. The confusion is between whether the 
terms refer to the people making the decisions, e.g., government (macro), health care 
management (meso), individual health care providers (micro), or to what the decision is 
about, e.g. , general government policy impacting on health care (macro), program 
decisions (meso), decisions involving individual patients (micro). For example, van 
Yelder, Severens & Novak (2005) use the terms in the former sense, refi rring to the 
different levels of decision makers. Murry and Elston (2005) use the terms in the latter 
sense, referring to what the decision is about. Others seem to straddle both aspects of the 
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term (e.g., Simpson, Hoffmaster & Dorian, 2005). Thjs conflating of the two meanings 
may seem justified. Both senses of the terms refer to important aspects of health care 
decisions and there is quite often a match between the level of decision maker and the 
subject matter of the decision, i.e., macro-level decision makers most often make macro-
level decisions. There are, however, cases where the differences between the two senses 
are important. For example, the provincial government (i.e. , a macro level decision 
maker) will sometimes make decisions concernmg particular health programs (i.e. , a 
decision about a meso-level topic). 
Lomas ( 1997) further divides macro, meso and micro decisions into six types of decisions 
related to the allocation of resources. These six areas are decisions about 1) funding 
levels, 2) funding arrangements, 3) broad service categories, 4) sp cific services, 5) 
clinical ci rcumstances, and 6) socio-demographic circumstances. These six decision 
areas are presented in Table 2.1, along with a description and example of each. The 
advantage of Lomas' breakdown of allocation decisions is that it more precisely identifies 
the nature of the decision under consideration. 
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Table 2.1: Types of Resource Allocation Decisions6 
Type of Decision Description Example of Possible 
Coverage Question 
Funding Level Macro-level decisions What proportion of the 
concerning the level of provincial budget should be 
funding to the health care directed towards heal th 
sector. care? 
Funding Macro-level decisions Should health care be 
Arrangements concerning broadly how the provided through regional 
health care sector should be health authorities or not? 
organized. 
Broad Service Meso-level decisions How much of the health 
Categories concerning the allocation of care budget should be 
funding across service directed towards acute care? 
areas. Long term care? 
Prevention? 
Specific Services Meso-level decisions Which specific cardiac 
concerning the allocation of procedures should an acute 
funding within one service care hospital offer? What 
area. guidelines should there be 
on ordering an MRI? 
Clinical Micro-level decisions about When should an individual 
Circumstances what treatments a patient patient receive a particular 
should receive. treatment? 
Socio-demographic Micro-level decisions about Should alcoholics be 
Circumstances whether a patient's eligible for liver 
characteristics should transplants? 
influence their level of care. 
A third way of classifying health care decisions is in terms of how these decisions get 
made. Following similar distinctions in political science, Tuohy ( 1999) distinguishes the 
way control over health care is institutionalized as either hierarchical, market, or 
collegia l. Hierarchical decision making is characterized by a central authority setting 
rules for how health care will be delivered. Market decision making refers to the situation 
6 This table is derived from one used in Chafe, R. Nevi lle, D. , Rathwell, T., Deber, R., Kenny, N., 
Nestman, L., et al. (2007). 
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in which health care decision making is driven by the multiple decisions of people buying 
and providers selling health care services. Collegial decision making refers to the 
situation in which health care decision making is primarily driven by the collective 
practice decisions of providers and their self-imposed guidelines. Most health care 
systems have elements of all three types of decision making. Tuohy uses these 
distinctions, however, to describe the nature of an entire health care system. he does not 
apply these distinctions to individual health care decisions. 
In developing a taxonomy of health care decision making, Coyte, Zarnett, and Mitchell 
(2004) distinguish how particular health care decisions are made in terms of how 
centralized the decision making is. Coyte classifies a decision by whether the decision 
making approach is closed-door I top-down, bilateral, or hands-off I bottom-up. Closed-
door I top-down is when a decision making body, e.g. , a provincial government or the 
executive of a regional authority, makes a decision affecting the health care system 
without input from those who they have authority over. Bilateral decisions are decisions 
in which there is some level of negotiation between different groups, e.g. , between the 
provincial and federal government or between providers and regional executives. Hands-
off I bottom-up are decisions made by frontline providers. For example, whether to admit 
a patient to hospital would likely be a hands-off I bottom-up decision, even though it 
impacts on how resources are used within a hospital. 
Table 2. 2 classifies health care decisions in terms of the type of decision, who makes the 
dec ision, and the nature of the decision making. The resource allocation decisions 
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identified in the particular cases wi ll be classified and compared in terms of these three 
characteristics. 
Table 2.2: Classification of Health Care Decisions 
Type of Decision Who Makes the Decision? The Nature of the 
Decision Making 
• Funding Level • Federal Government • Closed-Door I Top-
• Funding • Provincial Down 
Arrangements Government • Bilateral 
• Broad Service • Minister of Health • Hands-Off I Bottom-
Categories • Departmental Up 
• Specific Services Officials 
• Clinical • Regional Health 
Circumstances Boards 
• Socio-demographic • xecutives of 
Circumstances Regional Authorities 
• Program Managers 
• Clinical Chief 
• Providers 
• Patient 
• Others 
There are likely to be numerous decisions concerning endovascular coiling, MRis and 
powered upper arm prostheses which affect how resources are allocated in these three 
areas of care. For example, frontline providers make decisions in all three areas which 
affect the number of patients who receive care. These decisions in part determine the 
level of demand and the overall cost of these programs. The CEOs of regional health 
authorities must decide whether or not to offer a certain program within their 
organizations. There are decisions concerning where within a region to locate services. 
Next to identify ing these various resource allocation decisions within each case, it is 
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useful to determine what type of decision each is. These classifications will help allow 
for better comparisons across the areas of care and across the provinces. 
In order to be clear when using these distinctions, I will use the terms macro, meso, and 
micro to refer to the subject matter of the decision, i.e., general government policy 
impacting on health care (macro), program decisions (meso), and decisions involving 
individual patients (micro). In terms of meso-level decisions, these wou ld include all 
decisions made at the program level , from decisions about how resource should be 
allocated across broad service areas to policies and guidelines made within the clinical 
departments. 
While I have chosen to consider macro, meso and micro distinctions as referring to the 
type of decisions, rather than the type of decision maker, it is important to consider who 
makes the decision. This study wi ll determine if there are differences in who has 
responsibility for making different decisions across the cases. Those likely to have 
decision making authority in various areas a re the federal government, provincial 
government, Minister of Health, provincial officials, the boards of the regional health 
authorities, executives of the regional authorities, program managers, clinical chief, 
providers or patients. 
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2.2 Issues in Resource Allocation 
There are a number of debates in the literature about the allocation of health care 
resources. This section reviews four of these debates. The first is about how to define the 
terms rationing, resource a llocation, and priority setting. There are various definitions 
proposed in the literature. Related to the definition of rationing, there is a second debate 
about whether health care rationing is necessary. The third debate is whether physicians, 
as advocates for their patients, should be involved in rationing care. Finally, the question 
has arisen whether health care resources should be allocated through an explicit, public 
process or implicitly, as is often currently the case. The main purpose of this section is 
not to answer definitely the questions involved in these long running debates, but to 
provide an overview of the main issues in each debate as part of the overall background 
for this project. 
2.2.1 Rationing, Resource Allocation, and Priority Setting 
There is some debate over the meaning of the terms rationing, resource allocation and 
priority setting. Some writers see no difference in the meaning of the terms (Bell et al., 
2004; Gibson, Mitton, Martin, Donaldson, & Singer, 2006; Hall, 1994; Reeleder et al. , 
2005). Others see c lear di fferences in their meanings (McKneall y, Dickens, Meslin and 
inger, 1997). Many of the other debates about health resource allocation depend on how 
these terms are defined. For example, the question of whether health care rationing is 
necessary depends to a large extent on what is meant by rationing. 
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Given its negative connotations, it is perhaps not surprising that most debate is about the 
definition of rationing. Some writers define rationing as a type of distribution of health 
care resources. For example, Churchill ( I987) defines rationing as " the equitable 
di stribution of scarce resources" (Quoted in Ubel, 200 I, p. I2). I-I adorn and Brook ( 199 I) 
define rationing as the "societal toleration of inequitable access ... to services deemed 
necessary" (p. 333 I ). Aaron and Schwartz ( I990) adopt a more market-orientated 
definition, defining rationing as "denial of commodities to those who have the money to 
buy them" (p. 247). In terms of health care, this definition would refer primarily to 
limitations on private sector financing of care. Reiman (1990a) defines it as "the 
de liberative and systematic denial of certain kinds of services, even when they are known 
to be beneficial because they are deemed to be too expensive" (p. 1809). Brook and Lohn 
( I986) de fine rationing as "any set of activities that determines who gets needed medical 
care when resources are insufficient to provide for all" (Quoted in Ubel, 2000, p.I2). 
Norheim ( 1999) defines rationing as "the withholding of potentially beneficial health care 
through financial or organizational features of the healthcare system in question." 
Ubel (200 I) identifies three main fault lines which divide definitions of rationing. The 
first is whether the activity is explici t or not. Some definitions define rationing as 
occurring only in those cases where there is an explicit process for limiting care (e.g., 
Re iman 1990a). Secondly, definitions differ as to whether rationing requires that 
resources are absolutely scarce, i.e., whether there is simply not enough resources in the 
society to meet demand, e.g. , with the need for live organs, or whether it is a choice not to 
use more resources for health care, even though they are possibly available. Thirdly, 
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definitions of rationing differ over whether the services being rationed simply need to be 
beneficial or whether they have to be necessary to the continuance of life to be considered 
as rationing. Although concluding that "rationing is a word . .. with no single " correct" 
meaning" (p. 13), Ubel adopts an expansive definition where rationing occurs whether or 
not it is done explicitly, regardless of whether there is an absolute scarcity of resources 
and regardless of whether the services are necessary to save the person' s life. 
All of these definitions of rationing include the idea of deprivation, in that at the very 
least, beneficial care is not being provided because of considerations about the use of 
resources. There is also usually some notion of choice involved in the definitions, in the 
sense that the resources and technical ability could ideally be made available to provide 
this beneficial care. For example, we do not think of it as a case of rationing if physicians 
simply do not know how to treat a condition. Often the choice to limit care is made by 
people representing wider social concerns, e.g., a regional health authority, even if their 
choices ultimately impact on the care an individual patient receives. Finally, there is a 
sense that rationing actually affects people, i.e., that there really are people who are being 
denied care. For the purposes of this thesis, rationing is defined as limiting a person from 
getting beneficial care due to wider societal concerns about the resources required to 
provide that care. This definition shares the expansive view of rationing adopted by Ubel 
(2001 ) . 
The other two terms which need to be defined are resource allocation and priority setting. 
McK.neally, et a!. ( 1997) define resource allocation as "the distribution of goods and 
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services to programs and people" (p. 167) and this definition w ill be employed in this 
study. For the purposes of this thesis, priority setting is defined as the act of ranking, by 
whatever means, a set of options. With regard to health care resources, priority setting 
would be concerned with ranking or determining how much reso urces should be directed 
for providing different health care services. 
1 he confusion over the terms rationing, resource allocation and priority setting comes 
from the close connection between the three activities in regard to health care. Allocating 
health care resources often results in cases of rationing. If a regional authority is not 
allocating sufficient funds to a particular program, in the act of allocating resources, it is 
also rationing care . In fact, all cases of rationing are also cases of resource allocation. 
Yet not a ll resource allocation decisions are examples of rationing, because it is possible 
that suffic ient resources are allocated to a program to provide beneficial care to a ll the 
patients who need that program or that there are programs in which care is not limited by 
wider societal concerns about the use of resources. Even if there are no actual examples 
of these cases, their possibility does allow for a conceptual d istinction to be made 
between the two terms. 
Similarly, a ll resource allocations are priority setting exercises. In the act of a llocating 
resources, decision makers are also prioritizing w hich services to fund. But it is possible 
to priori tize serv ices without actually allocating resources. A clinical department can 
prioritize its service requests and this ranking can be ignored by the executive of a 
regional authority. A health care institution can go through a priority setting exercise and 
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the results of the exercise can be simply rejected, so that the exercise has no affect on how 
resources are distributed. Priority setting exercises do not always affect the distribution 
of resources, but resource allocation decision do. 
Chart 2.1 portrays the relationship between the terms rationing, resource allocation and 
priority setting in terms of their scope. Priority setting captures the widest range of 
activities, because it includes cases of resource allocation and rationing, but it also 
includes other cases of priority setting which do not affect resource allocations. Resource 
allocation is the second widest in scope, for it includes cases of rationing and some cases 
which are not examples of rationing. Rationing has the least wide application, being a 
sub-class, or a consequence, of resource allocation and, therefore, also a type of priority 
setting. 
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Chart 2.1: The Relationship of Rationing, Resource Allocation and Priority Setting 
2.2.2 The Necessity of Health Care Rationing 
Rationing 
Allocating 
Resources 
Priority 
Setting 
Hadorn and Brook ( 199 1) identify two types of rationing problems. The firs t is when a 
specific resource is absolutely scarce, such as with live organs, so that there is simply not 
enough of the resource available within the society to meet the demand fo r it. The second 
rationing problem concerns the amount of resources available fo r provid ing health care 
more generall y. The debate about the necessity of health care rationing is primarily 
concerned w ith the second type of rationing problem. The debate essentially deals with 
two questions. The first is : Is there a shortage of health care resources so that providers 
are forced to deny some people beneficial care? In other words, is there an absolute limit, 
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so that society could not provide everyone care even if it tried? The second question is: 
Even if this shortage of resources currently exists, is there a way to provide sufficient 
resources so as to avoid rationing care in the future? 
Three factors have given rise to the question of whether we need to ration health care. 
The first is the greater role played by third party payers. Befor the Second World War, 
most health care costs were paid directly by the patient to the provider. Health care 
resources were primarily distributed by market forces. People received the health care 
they were willing and able to pay for. In the Uni ted States, during the war, companies 
which were forced to comply with wage and price controls began to offer expanded 
health bene fits as a way to attract workers. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Blue Cross and 
Blue Shie ld insurance plans began and rapidly expanded. In the 1960s, the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs were launched. In Canada, the move towards a third party payer was 
even more dramatic and comprehensive (Tuohy, 1999). By the early 1970s, provincial 
insurance plans paid for most hospital and physician services. The rise of third party 
payers shie lded the user of health care resources from their full cost, which were 
collectively borne by the people enrolled in the same insurance or health care plan. In 
terms of increased equity and accessibi lity to treatments, thi arrangement was a great 
step forward . It separated, or partially separated, one ' s ability to pay from one' s ability to 
get care. Health care resources were no longer d istributed solely in terms of a person' s 
financial means, so that many people could now receive services they would not be able 
to afford directly by themselves. Another affect of the rise of third party payers was that 
it made the provision of medical treatments more of a societal concern. The rise of 
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collective payment schemes, which defused the costs of health care to the individual, also 
made the individual 's health care a collective concern. 
The second factor impacting on the need for rationing was the expansion and 
technological advancement of the medical treatments offered. The practice of medicine 
has gone through tremendous changes during the last fifty years. The technologies used 
for treating diseases have become much more sophisticated, effective and costly. There 
are more drug therapies available. Many illnesses and injuries from which people 
previously died are now curable. There is a greater focus on treating chronic diseases . 
There is also a seemingly endless stream of new medical technologies brought to the 
market every year, many of which offer the promise of extending and improving people's 
lives, although sometimes at a very high financial cost. 
The third factor which enhanced the focus on rationing is the dramatic increase in health 
care costs. Increasing costs are partly the result of the expansion in the type of treatments 
offered, but other factors , such as expanded access and the aging of the population, also 
adversely affect costs. For the past three decades, the cost of providing care has increased 
faster than the rate of growth in the overall economy so that an ever greater proportion of 
our GDP now goes to health care. This trend is ultimately unsustainable (Arron and 
Schwartz, 1990; Thurow, 1984; Ubel, 2001 ). The rising cost of health care increases the 
financial pressures on third party payers. Faced with rising health care costs and 
budgetary shortfalls, these third party payers have begun to look for ways to slow 
expenditures. Before the 1970s, there was little talk of explicitly rationing health care. 
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Previous to this period, the main focus in Canada and the United States was actually on 
expanding access to care. However, with the combined rise of third party payers, the 
development of expensive new treatments, rising health care costs, and slowing economic 
growth, cost containment is now a major concern. 
Angell ( 1993) and Boyle ( 1984) argue that preoccupation w ith cutting health care 
spending is misguided . They contend that there are enough resources available to provide 
everyone beneficial care and ultimately avoid rationing if we, as a society, only use our 
resources intelligently. With reference to the United States, Angell points out the health 
care system "is embedded in a society that routinely spends billions and billions on such 
goods as tobacco, television ads, and cosmetics. Clearly, we as a society aren 't fac ing 
scarcity; instead we are facing the inefficient and frivolous use of vast resources" (p. 
284). The same claims can be made about Canada. Even though Canada spends 
approximately I 0% of its GDP on health care, th is is not to say it does not have the 
resources to increase its spending on health care. Given the importance of health care, it 
may not be unreasonable to spend 15% or 20% of GDP on care. This increased spending 
could presumably allow for enough resources so that we wou ld not have to ration care. 
Boyle and A ngell ' s point is that a resource shortage is not the problem. It is an issue how 
resources get distributed throughout the society that results in the need for rationing. 
Rich, Western societies have enough resources to provide beneficial health care to all 
the ir citizens; a ll they have to do is direct more of their wealth to health care. 
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Supporters of this argument hold that even if more resources are not directed towards 
health care, we can still avoid rationing. Angell ( 1993; 2000) and Reiman ( 1990a) argue 
that the focus on rationing overshadows other areas of cost savings which may make 
rationing unnecessary. Health care costs could be contained by removing tests and 
procedures which are not beneficial to patients. This could be accomplished by 
improving evaluation of new and existing treatments, revising fee schedules so as not to 
encourage the increased prescription of services, and working to reduce procedures 
performed solely to avoid possible lawsuits, i.e. , defensive medicine. The argument is 
that we have enough resources to avoid rationing even if we do not put more resources 
into the health care system, as long as we focus those resources in the right areas. 
Others dispute this line of argument. Arron and Schwartz ( 1990) point to the rate of 
innovation, the price mechanisms within the health care system and the aging population 
as factors which will continue to increase demand and the overall cost of health care. 
Arron and Schwartz also say that any gains from the type of reforms which Angell and 
Reiman suggest are likely not going to be sufficient to control costs over the long term. 
Kenny (2002) points to trends which result in a potentially endless demand for health care 
services including the increased belief in the wonders of technology, the medicalization 
of ever increasing areas of our li ves, the blurr ing line between medically necessary 
procedures and procedures desi red only to enhance someone' s life style, the increase in 
patient ' s knowledge about new and experimenta l treatments, and the sensationalism of 
media cover of miracle cures. Kenny holds no amount of resources wi ll give all the 
28 
possible health benefits of medical science to all people for the ever expanding number of 
conditions which could be addressed. 
Others dispute the claim that we can avoid making difficult rationing decisions more from 
an economics perspective. Thurow (1984) holds that, 
"Although there is no magic formula for determining a precise limit on what a 
country can afford to spend for health care, there is a limit. Every dollar spent on 
health care is a dollar that cannot be spent on something else. No set of 
expenditures can rise faster than the gross national product forever. At some point, 
health care expenditures must slow down to the rate of growth of the gross national 
product" (p. 1569). 
Weinstein (200 I) makes a simi lar argument by equating health care spending with the 
standard economic argument of the commons. The idea is that if everyone continues to 
use as much health care as they can, soon all the available resources wi ll be used and 
rationing will be forced upon us. Although both Thurow and Weinstein ' s arguments are 
based partly on abstract theory, they do rely on the common sense point that if individuals 
are unconstrained in their health spending, especia lly given the hi gh costs of these 
procedures and the demand drivers identified by Kenny (2002), we will be one day in a 
situation where we will have to ration care, regardless of measures like the ones Angell 
and Reiman recommend. 
Whether or not rationing is necessary at a societal level, we need to recognize that 
individual heal th care organizations, regional health boards, and local hospitals do face 
ra tioning decisions on a constant basis. In fact , Ubel (200 I) concludes that health care 
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rationing is already " ubiquitous" (p. 137) in Western medicine. Even if unnecessary care 
is removed or if more resources are directed towards health care, there will still be the 
need to make tough decisions about which people should get scare resources, especially at 
the hospital or regional level. There may be sufficient resources in society to avoid 
rationing, but allocating these resources to health would require substantial shifts in 
resources away from other areas and it is not likely to happen. Whether or not it IS 
necessary, we can expect rationing to continue within our current health care system. 
2.2.3 Physicians and Rationing 
Another key debate is the role physicians should play in rationing health care. Physicians 
have a great deal of influence over health care demand. Leaf (1984) estimates that 
between 70% and 80% of health care exp nditures are determined by physicians. Often 
physicians present themselves as being sol ly advocates for their patients. Under this 
ideal advocate model, physicians work only to serve the best medical interest of their 
patients. When deciding on a treatment strategy, a physician ' s only concern is for 
de livering " the best treatments and outcomes which are medically possible" on a patient 
by patient basis (Daniels, 1987, p. 69). The ideal advocate model entails focusing solely 
on providing what is most beneficial for each patient, separate from any concern about 
how the treatment may affect the resources available for other patients or the position of 
third parties. 
In recent years, there has been a challenge to this traditional model of the physician-
patient relationship. For many, the role of the physi ian has changed from someone who 
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acts solely in the interest of the patient to someone who has obligations both to the patient 
and to other interested parties (Leaf, 1984; McKneally, Dickens, Meslin, and Singer, 
1997; Thurow, 1984; Ubel, 2000; Weinstein, 200 I). The physician has seemingly gained 
the added responsibility of partially managing, and rationing, the amount of medical 
resources used. In providing care, the physician is asked not only to determine whether 
the treatment is medically beneficial to their patients, but also consider how treatments, 
particularly their costs, will affect other patients and society more generally. The threat to 
the ideal advocate model is not internal to it. It is not that there is some contradiction or 
something unethical per se in doctors aiming only to serve the best interest of their 
patients. In fact, there is seemingly something ethically disturbing with types of bedside 
rationing which say that physicians should do less than their very best for their patients in 
order to sav money. Those who oppose the ideal advocate model argue that it misses the 
fact that physicians do make decisions which affect the amount of medical resources left 
for other people and that this fact too needs to be considered in making clinical decisions 
(Hall, 1994; Mechanic, 1997; Menzel, 1993; Ozar, 1987; Weinstein, 2001). It is not that 
there is anything wrong with the ideal advocate model itself. It is just that it is no longer 
feasible given the climate of economic constraint in which health care is currently 
delivered. 
Boyle (1984) argues that the rejection of the ideal advocate model is tantamount to 
doctors learning to say "no" to their patients. He protests that "clearly in adherence to 
the principles of our profession, physicians should not accept a dictate that they will act 
other than in the best interest of the patients under their care" (p. 783). For supporters of 
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the ideal advocate model, it is third party payers who should be responsible for making 
these difficult allocation decisions, not frontline physicians. Al though her argument is 
clearly more applicable to the American health care system and the re lationship between 
physicians and HMOs, Angell (1985 ; 1993) argues bedside rationing is nothing less than 
selling out the entire ethical basis of the physician-patient relationship in order to put th ird 
party payers in a better financial position. 
Much of the debate about whether physicians should ration care rests on the question of 
whether rationing is necessary. Angell (1985; 1993) and Boyle's (1985) arguments 
against physicians rationing care are based to a large extent on their contention that it is 
not necessary to ration care. Whether or not physicians should ultimately be asked to 
ration care, the fact is that physicians do play a role in rationing care (Arron & Schwartz, 
1990) and physicians are already often mindful of resource constraints when prescribing 
treatments (Ubel, 2000). For Ubel, the real debate has moved on to the question of what 
type of supports we should provide physic ians to help them in making rationing 
decisions. 7 
Proponents of bedside rationing argue that rationing is a fact of modern medical li fe. 
Given that rationing does occur, proponents argue that physicians are well suited to play a 
key role in determining how these rationing decisions get made. There are numerous 
7 Ubel (2001) recommends training phys icians in the use of cost-effectiveness analys is. Hall ( 1994) 
suggests we need to develop a system of educational, professional and financial incentives to help fac ilitate 
physician ration in g. 
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reasons why physicians are given a great deal of clinical autonomy. Many of the same 
reasons for granting this clinical autonomy are also reasons why physicians should be 
involved in making rationing decisions. Physicians are the experts in the field and 
therefore best suited to determining the seriousness of a patient's condition. They have 
the most intimate knowledge of their patients ' cases, their concerns and their treatment 
preferences (Mechanic, 1987). Their closeness to the cl inical situation means that they 
are less likely to discount the suffering rationing is causing their patients (Mechanic, 
1987). Every clinical situation depends on a certain level of judgment. Hall (1994) 
argues that "no set of rules [determined outside the specific clinical situation] could 
possibly be detailed enough to capture all of the nuanced and j udgmental aspects of 
medical decision-making" (p. 3 19). Hall also argues, given that rationing does occur, 
letting other groups make these deci sions is "inconsistent with the values of the medical 
professionalism," including respect for professional autonomy (p. 325). 
There are a number of other arguments supporters of bedside rationing raise. Physician 
rationing is seen to be less influenced by interest groups and unfair lobbying (Hall , 1994; 
Mechanic, 1997). Because of the asymmetry of medical knowledge between the patient 
and the physician, patients are never really sure that they are being denied a treatment 
because they do not need it, i.e. , it would not be medically beneficial to them, or because 
of rationing, i.e., the treatment is denied in order to save resources. Although raising 
some ethical concerns, bedside rationing can be used to limit public discontent with 
rationing, as has been the case in the United Kingdom (Arron & Schwarz, 1984; 1990; 
Arron, Schwarz, & Cox, 2005). Finally, if there is to be rationing, physicians will have to 
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play some role in it, for it is physicians who ultimately interpret and implement any 
rationing rules, even if they made by other groups (Hall , 1994). If rationing does occur, 
physicians will be involved. 
2.2.4 Explicit or Implicit Rationing 
Health care rationing can either be done explicitly or implicitly. Coast (1997) defines 
explicit rationing as the rationing of health care so that "decisions about the provision of 
health care are clear, as are the reasons for those decisions" (p. 1118). As the name 
suggests, explicit rationing entai ls that the public know that health care rationing is 
occurring and they know the reasons for why rationing decisions are made and how the e 
decisions are made. Some explicit exercises also allow the public to be involved in 
making the rationing decisions, usually through some type of public participation 
exercise. Explicit rationing fits well with democratic ideals of openness, transparency, 
and public involvement in decision making. Daniels (2000a· 2000b) and Daniels & Sabin 
(1997) argue that such transparency is necessary to ensure that rationing is done fairly. 
McKneally et al. ( 1997) state that "because there is no overarching theory of justice to 
balance competing claims between morally relevant criteria such as need and benefit, fair, 
open and publicly defensible resource allocation procedures are critical" (p. 164). There 
is also the belief that having an explicit process for rationing care may result in a more 
efficient use of our health care resources (Coast, 1997; Mechanic, 1995). 
Implicit rationing occurs when the rationing decisions, the reasons for them or the process 
for making the decisions are not clearly expressed (Coast, 1997). No one advocates that 
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every aspect of the rationing of health care should be done in secret or that we should try 
to disguise rationing decisions as being simply clinical decisions, as sometimes occurs 
(Coast, 1997; Hunter, 1995). Those who support implicit rationing advocate, however, 
that the resource allocation decisions are better made internally within health care 
organizations, by decision makers who have a broader understanding of the implications 
of rationing. 
Those who support implicit rationing also usually point to the practical difficulties of 
explicitly rationing care. For example, Hunter ( 1995) holds that large public debates 
about which services should be covered a re not an effective or sensible way to make such 
decisions. He writes: 
"A national debate that seeks to explore the complex ity of the rationing issue 
amounts to a contradiction in terms. A national debate, aided by a media w hose 
interest in health care stops at waiting lists and hospital and bed closures, is likely 
only to trivialize the issue and allow profess ionals to evade their responsibilities to 
individuals and groups .... Furthermore, an exclusive focus on rationing d iverts 
attention from another di fficult po licy problem, which is the need to be much more 
rigorous in the search fo r cost effective health care" (p. 811 ). 
While Hunter supports transparency in decision making, he sees the nature of the decision 
making process to be too complex and too ' messy' an affair to be effectively performed 
in public. A similar criticism of large explicit rationing exercises is made by Holm 
( 1998), who argues that the principles which are used in these public rationing exercises 
are necessarily too abstract and imprecise to make d ifficult rationing decisions. 
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Supporters of implicit rationing often also support bedside rationing (Hall , 1994· 
Mechanic, 1995; 1997). They argue that physicians are well placed to make rationing 
decisions without adding to the anguish and resentment people would have if they knew 
that they were being denied care solely due to a lack of resources, or what Coast (1997) 
calls "deprivation disutility" (p. I I 18). 
Ham (1995) suggests that implicit rationing " is no longer an option" (p. 1484) due to 
difficulties experts have had in making consistent rationing decisions and the variation in 
practice patterns which result from these inconsistent decisions. For Ham, the public are 
wise to the fact that health care rationing occurs on a regular basis. Furthermore Ham 
(1996) holds " to argue against public discussion is to run the risk of paternalism of the 
worst kind" (p. 184). 
But the argument between explicit and implicit rationing may not be as al l or nothing as it 
is sometimes presented. Hall ( 1994) argues that "any sensible rationing system wi ll 
consist of a mix of the two mechanisms" (p. 316). Likewise, while arguing that there 
needs to be implicit rationing, Mechanic (1997) says that 'explicit decisions have a role 
in setting the fran1ework" for implicit rationing by physicians (p. 87). Physicians have to 
be involved in interpreting rationing rules, even if these rules are determined through an 
explicit and public process. There is also the log istical fact that there are simply too 
many rationing decisions to make them all through some type of explicit process. The 
key question rather seems to be how much of the rationing process is goi ng to be made 
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explicit, rather than whether we should make all rationing decisions through an explicit 
process or not. 
2.3 Factors in Making Resource Allocations 
Different factors are often proposed as being relevant to resource allocation decisions. 
One of the most studied allocation exercises is performed every two years by the state of 
Oregon to determine the services which will be covered by the state's Medicaid program. 
The Oregon Health Services Commission (2005) allocates resources based on the factors 
of expected effectiveness of a health service and the value the communi ty places on the 
service. Deber's four-screen model (Oeber, Narine, Baranek, harpe, Ouvalko, Zlotnik-
Shaul, et al., 1998) considers the factors of ethics, effectiveness, appropriatene s, and 
patient consent. In their study of the views of hospital executives in Ontario, Reeleder et 
al. (2005) found that hospital executives reported need, quali ty of care meeting budgets 
and fit w ith strategic plans as the most important factors when al locating resources. 
Kenny (2002) suggests that there needs to be a clarification of the values underlying our 
health care system before we move to address questions of what the system should cover 
or how resources are a llocated. 
In their survey of resource allocation models, Hurley et al. (2000) identify ten factors 
which are considered by various models. These factors are accountabi lity autonomy, 
effectiveness, efficiency, equity, explicitness of the process, individual responsibi li ty, 
need, participation, and community perspective. Some of these factors , however, are 
more concerned with the appropriateness of a patient receiving a particular procedure, 
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e.g., individual responsibility or autonomy, than a concern with how to allocate resources 
in a particular area of care. Some of the other factors can be seen to overlap. For 
example, the concern for participation can be seen to fall under the idea of accountability. 
This section examines five common factors which seem most relevant to resource 
allocation within regional health authorities: need, effectiveness, cost, ethical 
considerations and accountability. 
2.3.1 Need 
Some decision makers report that need is their most important consideration when 
allocating health care resources (Reeleder et al. , 2005). Nevertheless, defining need IS 
inherently difficult. It is even more problematic to develop a concept of need which can 
help guide the allocation of health care resources. 
The World Health Organization (1946) defines health as "a state of complete physical , 
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity" (para. 2). 
Given this definition of health, any disturbance to well-being could be called a need for 
care. fn his classic overview of medical care management, Donabedian (1973) defines a 
relevant need for the heath care system as "some disturbance in health and well-being' of 
the person (p. 62). Donabedian leaves unclear what would count as such a disturbance.8 
While these definitions of need deriving from a disturbance to well-being would cover a 
great deal , they also seem not to be wide enough. We recognize that the treatments of 
8 Donabedian does latler say that his concept of care " includes situations that cannot be classified as 
morbidity or mortality bul which require care" (p. 70). 
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risk factors, which do not actually address a disturbance in health but conditions which 
could eventually lead to some such disturbance, can also be considered as health care 
needs. In fact, there are many calls for greater focus on treating these risk factors for 
disease (The Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002; Rachlis, 2004). 
One problem with this expanded definition of need, which includes risk factors, is that 
since Health Canada's A New Perspective on the Health of anadians (1974), the scope 
of these risk factors has expanded to include most of the socio-economic features 
affecting a person's life (Health Canada, 2005) . While it may be valuable in some 
circumstances to define health and health care need so broadly, such a broad concept is 
not likely to result in a concept of need that would be of any ass istance in making 
resource a llocation decisions, especiall y within particular areas of care. 
Others have tried to define need not in terms of health status, but in terms of a need for 
health care services. For example, Witter and Ensor ( 1997) define need as what "a person 
requires in terms of health care" (para. 1 ). Ex panding on this defini tion, they go on to say 
that this concept of need includes both the idea of the availability of care and the capacity 
of the person to benefi t from it. The problem with this definition is that it too is not 
specific enough with respect to what should be included as a need for health care. 
Culyer ( 1995) says that a concept of need practical enough to help in discussions about 
resource allocation must meet six conditions: 1) its value-content (which occurs in any 
concept of need) must be made explicit; 2) it is directly derived from the objectives of the 
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particular health system it is applied to; 3) it is capable of being used in deciding equity 
issues; 4) it should be service and person specific; 5) it should have a straight forward link 
to resources and 6) if acted on as a basis for allocating resources, it should not " produce 
manifestly inequitable results" (p. 727). Culyer defines a need for health care as ' the 
minimum amount of resources required to exhaust a person's capacity to benefit" (p. 
728). It is interesting that Culyer advocates localizing the concept of need to a particular 
health system. This leaves the door open for variations in what is considered a need 
depending on the level of resources in the health care system and the health status of the 
population. In the end, however, Culyer' s definition still gives little guidance over which 
services should be funded based on need. There is a circularity here in that we would be 
required first to define a set of 'core' services before we could determine a person ' s 
capacity to benefit from them. For example, a per on would benefit from better housing, 
but it is unclear whether housing should be considered a health care need. Yet helping to 
define which services should be covered is exactly what we hope to use this concept of 
need to do. Culyer also concludes that even granting his concept of need, we are sti ll no 
further in determining whether we should base the distribution of health care resources in 
terms of need, capacity to benefit or some concept of equali ty. 
Instead of need, some health legislation talk of "medically necessary" (Canada Health 
Act, 1986) or " reasonable and necessary" care (U. S. Medicare Act, 1965). In neither the 
Canadian nor the American legislation are these terms defined. In the Canada Health 
Act, "medically necessary" refer to services provided in a hospital or by a physician . In 
the United States, " reasonable and necessary" similarly refers to the services provided by 
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physicians (Gillick, 2004). But such definitions, based on who provides the care, can 
result in very counterintuitive accounts of need . As Eddy ( 1996) points out "an extremely 
expensive, very low-yield diagnostic test provided in a hospital would apparently be 
considered essential by this definition (because it is provided in a hospital), wherea a 
lifesaving antibiotic that could be taken at home would not" (p. 95). 
Another attempt to develop a surrogate concept of medical need is the idea of defining a 
' basic' or 'core' basket of health care services. We may initially consider essential care 
as any care which directly contributes to saving someone's life. However the funding of 
high cost treatments with doubtful chances of success, usually tried only as a last attempt 
to save someone's life, is one of the main issues in dispute with respect to health resource 
allocation. Accepting this rule of rescue approach may mean that other treatments and 
preventive measures which are have a much greater impact on a population's health 
would not be covered. 
Dworkin (2000) and Eddy ( 1996) both propose variants of what may be called average-
citizen-choice concepts of ' basic ' or 'essential ' care. Dworkin holds that justice only 
requires that public coverage be extended to the extent fully-informed, prudent people in 
a fair society, with equal financial resources, would choose to insure themselves for. In 
his view, justice dictates that we should cover basic and effective medical care and 
preventative programs, but the core basket of services need not extend to providing care 
for expensive end-of-life care which has little chance of succe s. Eddy proposes using 
citizen juries to poll what services the average person would be willing to purchase. To 
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account for any variation In mcome, Eddy proposes expressmg costs for coverage in 
terms of the proportion of a workday an average person would have to work to pay for 
coverage rather than in dollar terms. Both Dworkin's and Eddy's concepts have the 
advantage of considering the element of cost in determining what basic coverage should 
be. There is some question, however, what the usefulness of any concept of ' basic ' or 
' essential ' care would have for a health care system like Canada ' s which does not have a 
substantial private market to provide expanded, or second-tier, medical services. 
Another area of concern with the concept of need is that its definition depends a great 
deal on perspective from which it is judged. Health care involves the encounter of at I ast 
two people: a patient and a provider. Both have different concepts of need. Many 
patients feel they need alternative treatments, even though these treatments have not been 
shown through research or believed by most physicians to be effective (Aronson, 2002). 
Direct-to-consumer advertising for pharmaceuticals attempts to make patients believe 
they have a need for a pm1icular drug. Studies have shown (Mintzes, Barer Kravitz, 
Bassett, Lexchin, Kazanjian, et al. , 2003) that direct-to-consumer adve11ising has been 
successful both at getting patients to request advertised drugs and getti ng physicians to 
change their prescription patterns. 
Our health care system has, however, long embraced the idea that the recognition of a 
need should be based on a more objective basis, especially when health needs are to be 
addressed using public funds. This more objective assessment of need usually includes 
the assessment of a medical professional. Yet requiring health care providers to 
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determine a need for medical care is also not without problems. Donabedian ( 1973) 
points out that a physician's concept of need "derives from the manner in which medical 
science defines health and illness and what medical technology has to offer as treatment 
or prevention" (p. 62). This dependence of need on what the medical sciences have to 
offer is clearly not how most patients describe or define their health needs. We could 
perhaps say that providers see need more in terms of the availability of health care 
services, whi le patients see need more in terms of disturbance in health, suffering or loss 
of capabi lities. Donabedian (1973) points out that the initiation of medical care requires 
an agreement between the physician and the patient that medical care is needed. To the 
extent that this idea could be operationalized, it would entail a definition of need based on 
what both a health professional and the patient deemed appropriate. Yet within this 
concept of need, a health care need could only be identified once a person sees a health 
care profes ional. 
2.3.2 Effectiveness 
Health care resources are employed to treat people. If a treatment or diagnostic procedure 
is not effective, i.e., if it does not result in any health benefits, there is no reason to 
provide it or to cover it under public insurance plans. Neumann, Rosen and Weinstein 
(2005) review of U.S. Medicare coverage decisions from 1999 to 2003 found that there 
has been general consistency in term of considering the strength of evidence for the 
intervention ' s effectiveness. Singer et al. (2000) simi larly found that effectiveness was 
the most important fac tor in determining recommendations for coverage of cancer 
treatments by Cancer Care Ontario Policy Advisory Committee. 
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Gold, Siegel, Russell , & Weinste in (1996) define effectiveness as "the extent that they 
[health services] achieve health improvements in real practice setting" (p. 7). This 
de finition underlies some of the diffi culties the criteria of effectiveness raises for resource 
allocation decisions. The restoration of a person ' s lost capacity, the alleviation of a 
person ' s pai n, and the saving of one' s life can all be seen as health improvements. A 
correct diagnosis is key to establishing a proper treatment strategy. Testing a person who 
feels they are suffering from some ailment can provide a health improvement by lowering 
hi s or her level of anxiety, even if it cannot be shown to provide any other measurable 
effects. Providing a treatment which has no demonstrated medical effect, e.g. , Tarantula 
Hispanica (ground-up tarantula), but which a patient believes is beneficial can likewise 
re lieve anxiety and satisfy the patient.9 The question is whether we should be concerned 
with a ll of these types of health improvements when evaluating a treatment ' s 
effectiveness. 
Traditionally, determinations of effecti veness have focused primarily on a treatment' s 
efficacy and its safety, i.e. , can the treatment be shown to have a bene ficial e ffect in 
controlled conditions and is it safe? Fuchs and Garber ( 1990) point out that the meaning 
of effectiveness has been expanded to include wider considerations such as a patient's 
quality of li fe after receiving a treatment, the magnitude of change in a patient's hea lth 
9 For-profit medical institutions have less of a dilemma covering such treatments. If a patient is will ing to 
pay for such treatments, they are increas ingly being provided. For example, Beth Israe l Medical Center in 
New York currently offers Tarantula Hispanica to its patients, even though key hospital officials admit to 
not knowing whether the treatment has any medical effect (Aronson, 2002). 
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status, compansons with other available treatment options, and the satisfaction of the 
patient's treatment preferences. Likewise, Cook and Sackett ( 1994) say a relevant 
calculation of effectiveness should include "measures of harm as well as benefit, to 
integrate patients' v iews on their quali ty of life with and without treatment, and to include 
the economic consequences of the treatment alternatives" (p. 756). 10 
Deber ( 1992) identifi es another two key aspects which need to be included in calculations 
of effecti veness. The first is the magni tude of the benefit. Treatments can be effective in 
di fferent ways, from saving someone's life to relieving someone ' s pain or anxiety. These 
can be ranked in terms of their level of benefit, usually in terms of some disabil ity index 
(e.g., Gold, Siegel, Russell , & Weinstein, 1996). We need also to be mindful of the 
variation in benefi ts within the types of effects. For example, if two treatments both 
relieve pain, but one relieves a greater level of pain, then it has a greater magnitude of 
benefit. Thi s increased benefit is clearl y relevant to the determination of the effectiveness 
of a treatment. 
"I he second aspect Deber (1992) identifies is the probability someone recetvmg a 
treatment would benefi t from it. As Glassman, Model, Kahan, Jacobson, and Peabody 
( 1997) note, "there are few guaranteed outcomes in medical science" (p. 153). We do not 
1° Cook and Sackett ( 1994) go on to say that "but when such analyses have not been done and the only data 
ava ilable are on efficacy, busy clinical readers deserve three sorts of information (complete with their 
confidence interva ls): at least one absolute measure of efficacy (such as the number of patients who would 
need to be treated to prevent one event), the susceptibil ity of control patients to the target outcome (as a 
starting point for extrapolation to their own patients), and (though they could calcu late it from the former 
two) some relative measure of efficacy (such as the re lative risk reduction)" (p. 576). 
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know, for example, before an operation whether it will be a success. We do not know 
before a diagnostic test is completed whether we will conclusively detect anything. 
Glassman et al. (1997) suggests this inherent unpredictability of medicine means we need 
to use " imperfect estimates" of the potential benefit of a treatment (p. 153). This is not to 
say that we cannot rank treatments in terms of their likelihood to succeed. For example, a 
straightforward tonsillectomy is more likely to be successful than a complicated heart-
and-lung transplant. Still the probability of success needs to be considered in determining 
its effectiveness. In considering effectiveness, we need to be mindful of the different 
dimensions or effectiveness: the type of impact, magnitude, and the probability of 
success. 
Hope, Hicks, Reynolds, Crisp and Griffiths ( 1998) include in their concept of 
effectiveness the idea of value, by which they mean the judgment on " how valuable that 
effect is in the re levant individual(s) relative to the value of other treatments" (p. 1 067). 
Essentially, they make explicit the step of evaluating the different types of benefits. 
Hope and colleagues go on to identify three factors which arc relevant to the decisions 
about the value of a benefi t: " the additional length of life that the treatment brings the 
contribution that the intervention makes to the patient's well being, and the level of need 
of those who benefit from the treatment" (p. 1 067). 
Evidence 
Measuring effectiveness requires that there is some agreement on what evidence will be 
accepted for illustrating types of benefits, their magnitudes and a treatment ' s probability 
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of success. Kitson, Harvey and McCormack ( 1 998) identify three sources of evidence 
relevant to medical practices. These sources are research, clinical expertise (or cl inical 
opinion) and patient choice. 
Research findings are often what people have in mind when they think about evidence for 
effectiveness. This tendency has increased wi th the advent of evidence-based medicine 
which aims to increase the influence of research findings on clinical practice (Sackett et 
al. , 1996). Randomized clinical trials are often seen as the gold standard of research 
evidence (CHSRF, 2004). These trials are structured so as to compare one group 
receiving a treatment with a control group who do not. Effectiveness is determined by a 
comparison of the two groups in terms of some outcome measure. This compar ison can 
give an approximation o f the relative benefit of the treatment. One of the key advantages 
of clinical trials is that they not only indicate whether a treatment is better, but they can 
give a quantitative estimate of how much better it is likely to be and what is the 
probability of this benefit (Cook and ackett, 1995). 
The use of clinical tria ls as evidence for effectiveness is not without its problems. 
Clinical trials are expensive and are therefore often limited in scope. Effectiveness is 
only determined against the control group, even though other control groups may be more 
relevant measure, e.g. , those currently taking an alternative treatment versus those only 
taking a placebo. The effectiveness of a treatment may vary over a population, while 
clinical trials often only study a subsection of the population. This limitation must be 
weighed accordingly and often is in making resource allocation decisions. T here are 
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cases in which coverage is only extended to patient populations which resemble the study 
population of a successful clinical trial , e .g., the U.S . Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services' 2003 decision to cover lung-volume-reduction surgery only for selected 
populations (Gillick, 2004). Atkins, Siegel and Slutsky (2005) point to the problems of 
only relying on a limited number of clinical tria ls and the problems that have recently 
arisen in the pharmaceutical industry around not disclosing negati ve trial results. Results 
may be inconclusive. There are often ethical or logistic difficulties which make 
performing clinical trials infeasible. Fuchs and Garber ( 1990) point to the fact that 
randomized control trials usually cannot provide all the information needed to determine 
wider impacts of a treatment. This has led to the use of other types of research beyond 
that captured by clinical trials, including quantitative studies, qualitative studies, and 
ethical assessments. Even including these other methods of research, there is still the 
problem that insufficient evidence exists to properly judge the effectiveness of most 
treatments, including many new technologies. 
The opinions of clinical staff or potentia l patient populations are usuall y not as ri gorously 
determined as research studies. This is not to underestimate their importance. Ki tson, 
Harvey & McCormack ( 1998) note that 
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" if an intervention that is found to be highly effective is rejected by 
clinicians and patients, . .. it is unlikely to be widely take-up. Conversely, 
if cl inical experience and patient preference come out in favour of a 
particular intervention, even though the research evidence is low, then 
there may be more likelihood of it being adopted or continued" (p. 150). 
Clinical staff or a medical advisory group is usually consulted about the effectiveness of 
treatments being considered for coverage. Patients' views may be j udged based on the 
perceptions of decision makers, the view of an advocacy group, or through some type of 
survey. There are also varying degrees to which patients may be involved in the decision 
making process (see Arnstein, 1969). 
Health Technology Assessments 
l-Iealth technology assessments are systemati c reviews of the evidence for the 
effectiveness of a treatment, technology, pharmaceutical, or method of health care 
de livery (Canadian Agency fo r Drugs and Technologies in Health, 2006). Not only do 
health technology assessments cover a wide range of subject matters, there is a good deal 
of variation in what specific health techno logy assessments examine and how they are 
conducted. Battista and Hodge ( 1999) point out that health technology assessments are 
more oriented towards policy than other types of health research. Because they are 
directed towards decision making, they often examine all of the issues which may affect a 
decision, e.g., patient impact, ethical considerations, as well as assess the safety and 
effectiveness of the new technology. For this reason, they are often more 
mul tidiscipl inary in nature than traditiona l research projects. Fuchs and Garber (1990) 
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note that the broader scope of assessments can lead to different levels of reliability of the 
data they are based on. 
There are a number of organizations that perform impartial health technology 
assessments. In Canada, these organizations include the Canadian Agency for Drugs and 
Technologies in Health, Alberta Heritage Foundation for Medical Research, Conseil 
d 'evaluation des technologies de Ia sante (Quebec), the Office for Health Technology 
Assessment (British Columbia) and the Ontario Health Teclmology Advisory Committee. 
Internationally, these organizations include the ational Institute for Clinical Excellence 
(UK), the uroScan (European Union) and the U.S. Agency for Health Care Research and 
Quality. 
While health technology assessments can be useful, there are some shortcomings. Many 
of these problems are shared with other types of research. Health technology assessments 
are not always available at the time the information is needed by decision makers. 
Sometimes the information in the assessments is not relevant to the decision at hand . 
Assessments are also not always decisive. 
Reporting Evidence 
How information is collected and critically appraised is important to determinations of 
effectiveness. Cook and Sackett ( 1995) hold that another pivotal step in measuring 
effectivenes is summarizing the data '·in terms of measures of effect that can be readily 
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appreciated by doctors and other carers" (p. 453). We can also include here decision 
makers involved in making resource allocation decisions. 
Cook and Sackett ( 1995) identify a number of common methods for reporting the relative 
effectiveness of a treatment. These include I) absolute risk reduction, which measures 
the difference in the probabilities of adverse events in the two groups; 2) relative risk, 
which is calculated by the probability of a positive outcome in the active treatment group 
divided by the probability of an event in the control group; 3) relative risk reduction, 
derived by subtracting the re lative risk from one; and 4) an odds ratio, which is 
de termined by dividing the odds of a positive event in the treatment group by the odds of 
a positive event in the control group. Cook and Sackett advocate using the number 
needed to treat as a more meaningful way of to convey the results of research results. 
The number needed to treat is the number of patients who would have to receive a 
treatment in order for there to be one positive outcome. It is calculated by taking the 
reciprocal of absolute risk reduction. Other research groups are exploring alternative 
means of reporting the strength of evidence which may be more easi ly grasped by 
clinicians and decision makers . The Canadian Task Force on Preventive Health Care 
(2003) now use letter grades to illustrate the strength of evidence for particular procedures 
or to show if there is insufficient information to make a recommendation. The GRADE 
Working Group (2004), centered in Norway, are promoting the adoption of a universal 
system for grading the quality of evidence and the strength of recommendations resulting 
from scientific literature. 
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Limitations on the Use of Evidence 
Neumann et a!. ' s (2005) review of recent Medicare decisions identified a number of 
common problems faced in reviewing the evidence for new treatments. These limitations 
include concerns about: the limited amount of available research studies of the treatment 
under consideration (in 68 percent of the cases reviewed); a limited number of patients in 
the studies presented as evidence (in 58 percent of the cases reviewed); a lack of proper 
controls on the studies (in 52 percent of the cases reviewed); the relevance of outcomes 
(in 4 1 percent of the cases reviewed); select bias in the studies (in 28 percent of the cases 
reviewed); and, the length of the studies (in 20 percent of the cases reviewed). 
There is also a clear trade-off between waiting to get more evidence to be sure of a 
treatment 's effecti veness and unnecessarily denying patients a treatment that is beneficial. 
Performing a formal technological assessment or clinical trial costs money and adds to 
the time patients have to wait for new treatments. Fuchs and Garber (1990) point out that 
many decisions about whether to invest in a treatment need to be determined before 
sufficient data is available to determine its effectiveness; or it may become a standard 
practice before sufficien t evaluations of the procedure are studi ed. But great hann can 
result from interventions being accepted before a ll the evidence is in. Atkins, Siegel & 
Slutsky (2005) report that over $2 billion U D was spent and 600 premature death 
occurred because high-dose chemotherapy and bone marrow transplant was not 
suffic iently evaluated before it became a common practice for fighting advanced breast 
cancer. The safety and effectiveness of a treatment is rarely ever conclusively proven. 
52 
Determinations of effectiveness often must rely then on a consideration of many factors , 
often without complete information. 
2.3.3 Cost 
People are often uncomfortable talking about cost as a reason for denying care. Yet it is 
the issue of limited resources, usually expressed in terms of financial costs, which is the 
real problem of health resource allocation. It is because financial and human resources 
are limited that providers need to limit the amount of care they give, rather than just 
meeting all of the requests for care which present themselves. 
Although costs are often expressed in financial terms, there are a range of resources 
required to provide particular treatments. Using these resources to provide for one 
treatment means that they cannot be used in the provision of other types of care. Initial 
capital or equipment costs associated with providing a new treatment need to be 
considered in calculations of cost. Operating expenses, such as staff costs, supplies used 
during the procedure, etc, also should be included. Moreover, there are a number of 
opportunity costs or organizational impacts which should be considered: including the 
unavailability of expert staff for other procedures, space, booking time in operating rooms 
and on other equipment, etc. Often these costs are not easily expressed in financial terms, 
although they may be just as important in making allocation decision and just as limited 
as financial resources. Future impacts of having treated an ailment can also be considered 
in cost calculations (Weinstein and Stason, 1977). Other costs may include the impact on 
the patient and society more generally (Gold , Siegel , Russell , & Weinstein, 1996). 
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Another important aspect of cost considerations is that individuals, governments and 
health care organizations have varying exposures to health care costs. The total cost of a 
disease to a society is not borne equally across the society. In health care systems which 
have a substantial role for third-party payers, either public or private, people do not 
directly bear the full cost of the treatments they receive. Usually people pay only part of 
the cost fo r their treatment, with an insurance plan covering the rest. In the Canadian 
health care context, the provincial and federal governments both partially pay for health 
care. Large providers of care, e.g., hospitals and regional authorities, are usually 
allocated a global budget to cover the cost of the care they provide. From a cost 
perspective, such institutions are often focused on how the provision of care directly 
impacts on their budgets. They may be only secondarily concerned with the impact the 
provision of care (or lack of provision) has on the wider society. Outside extra funding 
directed for a specific project will change the calculation of cost from the point of view of 
a health care provider, even though in absolute terms the cost of providing the care has 
not changed. For example, if there is a provincial program which provides dedicated 
funding for the purchase diagnostic equipment, the direct cost of the equipment to a 
health care provider would be much different than if the provider had to pay the full cost 
of the equipment from its global operating budget. The same can be said for provincial 
governments regarding programs of dedicated funding from the federal government. In 
most cases, it is not total cost of a program, but rather the total cost for them, which is of 
main concern for patients, insurers, providers, regional authorities and governments. 
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2.3.4 Ethical Considerations 
The above review of some of the key factors impacting on resource allocation decisions 
has not discussed what weight are given to each of these factors when making allocation 
decisions. Weighing these factors is a question of what aspects should be given more 
value. As Ubel (2000) points out, even if it is possible to exactly know the cost and 
benefits of interventions, we still need to incorporate public values to set health care 
priorities. Should we aim to maximize the benefits of our investment in health care? 
Should we direct resources primarily to those in the greatest need? Are there cases when 
we should favour providing care for a few over giving a lesser benefit to many? Are 
there personal characteristics, e.g., a patient's age, their level of wealth, their race, or 
gender which should (or should not) influence the distribution of resources? Should the 
distribution of health care resources be influenced by wider societal concerns for equality 
or fairness? Each is a difficult ethical question which may need to be considered when 
al locating resources. The difficulty of answering them is compounded by the fact that, as 
Cookson and Dolan (2000) have found in the U.K., the public seem to have conflicting 
moral intuitions over which of the principles underlying the questions above should guide 
decisions in different cases. 
The ethical concerns about how we allocate resources primarily stem from two sources. 
The first is from the perspective of distributive or social justice. Rawls ( 1971) writes that 
" the primary subject of justice is . . . the way in which the major social institutions 
distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from 
social cooperation" (p. 4). As pointed out by Daniels ( 1984), "a health care system 
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involves a diverse set of institutions which have a maJor impact on the level and 
distribution of our welfare" and thus it is a subject for social justice (p. ix). 
Groups are not indifferent to how the health care system is structured. Different health 
care structures and allocations of resources greatly impact on how the costs and benefits 
of health care are distributed across different sections of a population. It is also the case 
that provision of health care can impact other inequalities. From the perspective of social 
justice, key questions include how the health care system is structured, the mix of 
private/public funding, the roles and duties of health care providers as well as how health 
care resources are distributed (Daniels, 1984). Essentially, as a key part of the basic 
institutions of our society, the health system is the subj ect to the same concerns for 
fairness and justice as are all our major social institutions. The distribution of health care 
is one of the most fundamental ways a society demonstrates how it treats its members. 
The second source of ethical considerations stem from the unique benefits brought about 
by health care. Health care professionals have the power to restore people's lost 
capabilities or reduce their suffering. The question whether people get health services 
can, in many cases, even determine whether a person lives or dies. Because of the 
ultimate importance of health care, how we distribute resources touches on the most 
fundamental questions of moral worth. Hurley (200 1) points out that in most cases 
illnesses and injuries "are unpredictable and largely beyond the control of the individual" 
(p. 235). How should thi s unpredictability of illness affect society ' s duty to provide care? 
If a person engages in activities which increase their ri sk of disease, e.g., smoking, should 
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this be counted against the person when allocating resources? Which personal 
characteristics should we take into account when evaluating which group of patients 
should get coverage? In what way can we deny any treatment to a child with autism, or 
to any other person in need, and still say that it is both just and fair? Under what 
conditions can we chose to treat one person and leave another still suffering? These are 
all difficult ethical choices that are faced when allocating health care. 
Daniels ( 1994) identifies three factors which further compl icate the ethical problems 
re lating to health resource allocation. The fi rst is that health care is not ' sufficiently 
divisible' into small discrete units as, for example. money is. The distribution of health 
care is more likely to result in unequal or ' lumpy' distributions then could possibly be the 
case for other types of resources. Consider an expensive operation. It may be the case 
that not everyone who needs this particular operation is able to get one, but those who do 
receive a substantial benefit. There is no sensible way to divide the operation such that 
everyone gets part of the procedure. Those who receive the operations get the fu ll 
benefit, those who do not get nothing. While we may be able to distribute costs fairly 
equitably across a population, even if we try to di stribute the benefi ts of health care 
equally across the society, in many cases, it is likely to sti ll result in substantial variations 
in benefits because those benefits cannot be divided. 
Daniels ' second factor is that rationing decisions often occur in cases where even those 
who are rejected fo r coverage have legitimate claims that they should receive benefits. In 
other words, the denial of care is not usually based on a rejection of the rightfulness that a 
57 
person should receive care. It is based on other, and perhaps more relevant, criteria. 
Sadly, legitimate claims for care often exceed providers ' capacity to respond. 
The third factor Daniels points to is that "the general distributive principles appealed to 
by claimants as well as by rationers do not by themselves provide adequate reasons for 
choosing among claimants" (p. 27). There are two distinct aspects to this problem. The 
first regards the nature of pluralistic societies. In Western industrialized countries, no 
one philosophical stand point is shared by everyone. In fact, this philosophical, religious 
and moral pluralism is one of the definition features of liberal democratic societies 
(Habermas, 1991 ; Kymlicka, 1999; Rawls, 1993). ln terms of allocating health care 
resources, there is no agreed on philosophical or moral principle to guide moral choices 
(McKneally et a!. , 1997). The second aspect of this problem is that, even if there is 
agreement on a common philosophical position, it is not likely to be specific enough to 
provide much guidance for making resource allocation decisions. For example, if we take 
a utilitarian position (Mill , 1963) which says we should aim to maximize happiness across 
a society, it is still unclear how we should aim to maximize benefits (Daniels, 1994). 
Given people ' s varying capacity to benefit from a particular treatment, how one decides 
this issue can have a substantial effect on how resources are allocated. 
Ethical Recommendations 
There are two different types of ethical recommendations made regarding resource 
allocations. The first type is substantive principles which advocate specific patterns of 
resource allocation. Cookson and Dolan (2000) identify three often proposed principles. 
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The first is resources be allocated according to need, as defined in terms of current illness 
and severity of the illness. On this principle, resources would be directed to those who 
are currently in the most distress, similar to how treatment is allocated in a military triage. 
The second principle is to allocate resources so as to maximize the benefit of these 
resources, much in keeping with utilitarian concepts of justice. The third principle 
embraces egalitarian concepts of justice which aim to use the allocation of health care 
resources to diminish inequalities, either in health status, life-long health prospects or in 
terms of socio-economic inequalities more generally. The problem is that there seems to 
be no consensus for deciding which of these principles should be used in what cases or 
how to solve disputes when these principles conflict. 
Another two substantive ethical claims often made are the appeal to a ' right to health 
care ' and the appeal to ' the rule of rescue." People sometimes claim a right to health care 
based on the fact that health care is of such fundamental importance that governments 
have an obl igation to provide it to their cit izens. By claiming health care as a right, these 
people assert that the responsibility to provide health care should trump most other 
government priorities. Daniels (1984) rejects a right to health care. First, he believes the 
provision of care is not like other right claims, e.g. , the right to free speech or free 
assembly, in that it requires the transfer of resources to individuals. In fact , Daniels 
denies that c laims for health care have the proper nature to be rights claims due to the fact 
that claims of a right to health care are essential claims on resources. 11 Secondly, Daniels 
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points out that claiming that there is a right to health care does not determine the limits of 
health care which may be provided, i.e. , it is too vague of a claim. Finally, partly because 
it is too vague, Daniels claims that the idea of a right to health care is not useful in 
answering difficult allocation questions. 
The rule of rescue is based on the idea that there are cases in which a person is in such 
dire need that they have even further (or strengthened) claim to scare resources. The rule 
of rescue holds that society has a moral duty to do all it can to save someone ' s life. 
McKie and Richardson (2003) say that people often try to follow the rule of rescue when 
there are " identifiable individuals facing avoidable death" (p. 2407). The story of Coby 
Howard, the seven year old boy who died in 1987 while needing a bone marrow 
transplant which was not covered under Oregon's Mediaid program, placed a great deal 
of media and political pressure on the state's rationing plan (see Ubel , 2000). Soon after 
Coby's death, the state began to cover bone marrow transplants. This case illustrates the 
political and emotional power of the rule of rescue. Yet as McKie and Richardson 
conclude, the rule of rescue unfairly favours identifiable patients over those who are 
identified statistically, and favours life-saving treatments over non-life-saving treatments. 
Ultimately, the rule of rescue often runs counter to the most efficient use of health care 
resources. 
II The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled (Gosselin v. Quebec 2002 sec 84) that citizens to do not have 
charter rights to social program benefits, although the court has ruled that social benefits that are provided 
must be provided on an equal bas is (e .g., Eldridge v. British Columbia 1997 SSC 3). 
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The second types of ethical recommendations are procedural, in that they do not make 
direct claims on how resources should be allocated; rather they aim to ensure the process 
by which resource allocation decisions are made is fair. Reeleder et a!. (2005) reports 
that decision makers often see fairness in terms of whether multiple stakeholder 
perspectives were represented. This suggests that a critical mass of public participation is 
required to ensure the fairness of the process. Daniels (Daniels & abin 1997; Daniels 
2000a; 2000b) has developed a concept of what a fair process would be for allocating 
healthcare resources, called 'accountability for reasonableness.' Accountability for 
reasonableness sets out four conditions which should be followed in making resource 
allocation decisions. The first condition is that decisions are made based on reasons that 
'fair-minded' people can agree are relevant given the decision at hand and to decide issues 
through the greatest possible consensus. The second condition is the decision and the 
ra tionale for it should be made publicly accessible. In other words, there needs to be 
transparency concerning how the decision was mad e. Daniels' third condition is that 
there needs to be a mechanism by which decisions can be challenged and revised . The 
final condi tion is that the decision is enforceable by the governing body which makes it. 
2.3.5 Accountability 
In 1998, the then editor of the New England Journal of Medicine , Arnold Reiman, 
announced what he saw as a new era of medical care, which he called the era of 
assessment and accountability. Faced with increasing costs, large variations in the use of 
health services without noticeable effects on health outcomes, and the expansion in the 
range of services avai lable, Reiman argued that we needed to better assess the value we 
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are getting for the health care services we buy and that the patients, providers and payers 
needed to be more accountable for their ro le in the health care sector. 
In Canada, the importance of accountability in health care has increased as the percentage 
of public spending directed towards health care has increased. The Commission on the 
Future of Health Care in Canada (2002) found that "Canadians expressed their deep 
suspicions about the way governments have managed their health care system and where 
the money goes" (p. 63). This suspicion extended to the fact that, in an area where 
federal, provincial and regional authorities all have some say, it is often unclear who is 
responsible fo r making key decisions (Simeon & Cameron, 2002). The Commission 
recommended that the Canada Health Act be amended to include the principle of 
accountabil ity. This sixth principle was to: I ) clari fy the roles and responsibilities of the 
different levels of government in health care decisions; 2) ensure adequate, stable and 
predictable funding; 3) report on how health care funding is spent and 4) report on the 
performance of the health care system. 
Coyte, Zarnett and Mitchell (2004) note that accountability in Canada can be seen either 
in terms of ensuring that funds go to their intended purpose or in terms of documenting 
the level of benefit the funds achieve. Coyte, Zarnett and Mitchell further find that recent 
federal initiatives, directed towards increases accountabil ity, including the increase in 
joint federal/provincial oversight and an increase in targeted funding, lessen provincial 
control over health care decision making. 
62 
Other countries have turned to national commissions to review coverage as an approach 
to insure public accountability. These methods have not, however, seemed to restore 
public confidence in the process. In order to increase its accountabil ity, the U.S. Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services is moving towards adopting a more structured and 
explicit decision making process for making its coverage decisions (Neumann et al. , 
2005). They even release an explanation of their coverage decisions on their website 
(U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2006). Daniels (2000a) points to a 
number of other efforts to develop fa ir, publicly acceptable processes for making 
allocation decisions. These include the active consumer movement in the United States, 
which advocates the establishment of a patients' bill of rights, and the establishment of the 
National Institute fo r Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the U.K. 
Singer et a l. (2000) identify a number of actions which can help to mcrease the 
accountability of the decision making process. These include 
"acknowledging conflicts of interest, providing the opportunity for everyone to 
express views, ensuring that a ll committee members understand the deliberations, 
maintaining honesty, building consensus, ensuring avai labil ity of external expert 
consultation, ensuring appropriate agenda set1ing, maintaining effective chairing, 
and ensuring timeliness in making funding decisions to get effective new 
teclmologies to patients" (pp. 1317 - 1318). 
Singer et a l. (2000) also identifies the ability to appeal a decision as key to proper 
accountability. 
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Accountabil ity is also about the fairness and openness of the decision making process. 
Thus accountability is often closely tied to the ideas of public participation and 
transparency in the decision making process. A wad, Flood and Abelson (2004) argue that 
accountability is important at a ll levels of government in the area of health because so 
many important decisions especially coverage and resource allocation decisions, are 
made at the bureaucratic level. 
2.4 Approaches for Improving Resource Allocation 
A number of approaches for improv ing health resource allocations have been proposed. 
These approaches aim to achieve di fferent goals. Some methods aim to improve 
efficiency. Some proposals aim to make the process of allocating resources more 
transparent and accountable to the public. Others aim to operationalize key ethical 
considerations. In this section, I review rational decision models, service guidelines, 
needs-based capitation models, screen models, cost-effectiveness analysis, program 
budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA), accountability for reasonableness, and calls for 
increased public participation. 
2.4.1 Rational Decision Models 
Rational decision models aim to determine the decision a pure rational decision maker 
would make given a particular set of circumstances (Keefer, Kirkwood, & orner, 2004). 
In other words, these models determine the optimal outcome for a person or organization 
with a particul ar set o f preferences facing a particular set of options. Rational deci ion 
models come in many forms. Decision trees are the most common example. As with 
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decision trees, these models usually first identify all the relevant goals the decision maker 
would like to achieve. The decision maker then rates these goals on a common scale so 
that a decrease in one of goal can be compared against an increase in another. Then all 
the possible policy options (or in our case resource allocations) are considered to see 
which one maximizes the desired outcome. 
Advocates of rational decision models argue they can be widely employed in heal th care, 
from clinical decision making (Weinstein, Fineberg, Elstein, Frazier, Neuhauser, Neutra, 
et al., 1980) to the management of health care facilities (Mi lis, 2005). One of the 
strengths of these models is that they force the decision maker to be very expl ici t in the 
assumptions and the relative value they place on different goals (Oeber & Goel, 1990). 
Rational decision models initially have intuitive appeal. C learl y setting desired goals and 
determining which allocation best achieves them seems to be a straight forward way to 
make better resource allocation decisions. These models also ho ld the promise of clearly 
identifying one allocation as preferable to a ll the others in a way that can be 
communicated to various stakeholders. 
The problem with rational decision models is that it is doubtful that they could handle a 
decision problem as complicated as most resource allocation decisions. Lindblom (1959) 
criticizes rationa l decision models, in part, because they are usually unworkable for real 
world policy decisions. Given all of the different factors involved in most allocation 
decisions, it would be difficult for an organization to explicitly identify all of the goals it 
would like to achieve when allocating resources. It would be equally hard to sensibly and 
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meaningfully convert all of these various goals to a common scale in order to calculate 
the impact of possible allocations. For example, it is difficult to see how decision makers 
can compare on a common scale the advantage of say maintaining workplace morale 
versus improving different areas of care, leading a new research project, or making 
services more convenient for patients. Another of the criticisms Lindholm has of these 
models is that in cases where there are large differences in the types of outcome goals, the 
act of ranking these goals is the same as deciding on which option to chose, making the 
decision model irrelevant. In other words, when there is no obvious basis for comparing 
different goals, we rank these goals only when we make the final decision. 
There are also problems with the amount of information, cost and time that are required to 
construct a large decision model. Decision models have to be applicable for 
organizations which have limited resources to invest not only m programs, but also 
limited resources that can be employed for deciding on resource allocations. Given these 
limited managerial resources, it seems unlikely that decision makers would be amenable 
or able to conduct a time consuming formal decision analysis of their entire budgetary 
processes. The rational decision models may be useful for making small, contained 
allocation decisions, e.g. , between a few options within a particular area of care. Beyond 
this limited use, rational decision models seem unlikely to be helpful in solving resource 
allocation problems at the institutional level. 
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2.4.2 Clinical Practice Guidelines 
Eddy (1996) defines clinical practice guidelines as sets of recommendations which are 
" intended to help practicing physicians to manage their patients" (p. 18). The vagueness 
of this definition stems from the fact that these guidelines can cover any aspect of the 
clinical experience, from making recommendations about how best to treat a particular 
condition to what gifts physicians should take from pharmaceutical companies (Bennett 
& Coll ins, 2002; McGuaran, 2002). In fact, there are currently around 2500 clinical 
practice guidelines available for physicians (Worrall, Chaulk & Freake, 1997). Most of 
these guidelines concern proper treatment options for patients. Regardless of their subject 
matter, these guidelines all aim to inOuence physician practices by making 
recommendations about e ither how the physician should act or what treatment they 
should prescribe in a particular situation. This practical focus can make these guidelines 
quite inOuential , especia lly if they are endorsed by leading medical bodie (Eddy, 1996). 
Clinical practice guidelines have a number of aims. They were first developed to 
improve and standardize care by identify ing what the current best practices are for 
treating certain medical conditions (Ubel, 2000). Eddy ( 1996) points out that many 
physicians do not have sufficient experience with relatively rare conditions. Usually 
based on a systematic review of the literature and expert opinion, guideli nes are a quick 
way to provide the physician with a much larger evidence base from which to make their 
clinical assessment. Guidelines also a im to standardized practice across providers and 
patients thereby avoiding wide variations in practice patterns (Norh im, 1999). 
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Clinical guidelines can be used to control health care demand by putting clear limits on 
which patients should receive particular treatments. Ham ( 1996) suggests England is 
increasingly using guidelines as a means of rationing care. New Zealand has also tried to 
adopt a clinical guidelines approach to rationing. 12 Some of the advantages of using 
guidelines as a means of rationing are that they do not call for the blanket rejection of any 
treatment option, but limit care to cases where there it is likely to have the most benefit. 
Guidelines leave some level of discretion to physicians for determining who falls wi thin 
the guidelines criteria. Eddy (1996) says that guidelines thus act as "scalpels, not meat 
axes" (p. 21) in rationing care. 
There are a number of issues about the use of clinical guidelines as a means of rationing 
care. The first is that guidelines have to be developed and maintained to reflect current 
best practice. This is a time consuming process which often has to be unde11aken in the 
absence of sufficient research evidence (Cooper, 1995; 1-Iadorn, 1990). Another problem 
is that the use of guidelines to ration care will likely conflict with guidelines which aim to 
present best practices. Meeting best practices often result in increasing, rather than 
decreasing, demands for services, especially for high end technology. A third problem 
relates to the fact that guidelines are only useful if practitioners actually adapt their 
clinica l practice to be in line with them. Ham (1999) suggests that there is a "lack of 
knowledge of the best ways of influencing and changing clinical practice and 
implementing research findings" (p. 1484) . Simi larly, Davis and Taylor-Vai ey (1997) 
found that clinical practice guidelines show mixed results in their abi lity to influence 
12 New Zealand 's attempt to use cli nica l guidelines is reviewed in 2.6.2 below. 
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providers' behavior. There is the issue that as a rationing tool, guidelines are only going 
to be successful if physicians accept their role as rationers and embrace guidelines as the 
best way of rationing care (Ubel, 2000). 
Giacomini Cook, treiner, and Anand (200 I) found that 69% of cardiac care guidelines 
include psychosocial factors in their guideline criteria, e ither as risk facto rs or as 
indication of heighten need . These factors include the patient's work status, atti tude, 
mental health and personal habits. Their inclusion raises the issue that certain value 
judgments may be uncritically incorporated into clinical guidelines. The fact that these 
guidelines are explicitly developed does, however, allow for the possibility of public 
di scussion of what psychosocial factors should be considered as relevant, even though 
currently such discussions rarely occurs. This current lack of public discussion may 
re late to another problem with guidelines, i.e. , why guideline are often not seen as a 
legitimate method for denying care. orheim ( 1999) suggests that the problem may be 
that guidelines are developed through a process that neither a llows for public participation 
or is viewed by the public as legitimate. Norhiem says that this leaves the public seeing 
guidelines as only " instruments for unjustified and covert rationing disguised as expert 
recommendations" (p. 1426). He suggest that guidelines whose intent is to ration care 
need to be developed through an explicit process in which the public i informed of th 
reasons for any limitations on care. 
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Regardless of their shortcomings, c linical practice guidelines may be applicable to the 
case studies. This is partly due to their ability to direct various aspects of clinical 
practice and their ability to limit demand. 
2.4.3 Needs-Based Capitation Models 
Another proposal for the improvement of resource a llocations a re capitation models or 
formula-based funding. Capitatio n is a method fo r a llocating resources to health regions 
or service providers based on the populat ion. Often capitation models do not allocate on 
a straight per-capita basis. Rather, they make a llowances to account fo r differences in 
health status and vari ation in the likely usage of health care. These adjustments are often 
based on variations in age, gender, geographic d istribution of population, or other need-
influencing criteria across populations (Eyles & Birch, 1993). The aim of making these 
adjustments is to a llow for bette r health outcomes and more equitable allocations by 
directing greater resources to those serv ing populations with greater need. 
Using data from Ontario, Bedard, Dorland, Gregory and Rosenberg (1999) evaluated the 
di fferent distributions resul ting from di ffe rent capitation models: models which use 
di fferent funding formulas to adjust fo r the re lative needs of the population. They 
conclude that the way in which models adjust for re lati ve need can have substantia l 
effects on the final di stribution. Furthermore, they ho ld that there is no basis for choosing 
one particular model over another, except in terms of the desirabili ty of different final 
di stributions . In other words, there is some level of circularity in that it is the desired 
outcomes which determine the method of weighting the a llocation formula. 
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Capitation models rely on there being some type of regional structure or clear divisions 
between service providers. The ultimate composition of services provided to a population 
will depend as much on the regional allocation decisions as it does to the general 
allocation of resources under the capitation formula. For example, once a region has been 
allocated its share of resources through the capitation model, it then distributes these 
resources across the programs based on some form of priority. There is likely to be 
variation across regions in terms of which programs get funded. These regional 
allocations may even include transferring funds to other regions to cover things like the 
provision of tertiary care. 
Allocation mode ls are not very applicable for the more focused allocation decisions 
which are examined in this project. But they are important methods for allocation 
resources to the health regions in the provinces. In fact, Alberta employs an allocation 
model which will directly affect the amount of resources avai lable for the three areas of 
care examined in that province in this study. 
2.4.4 Screen Models 
Screen models work by setting criteria which must be met in order for a procedure to be 
approved for public coverage. Each criterion can be seen as a screen or sieve the 
procedure has to pass through in order to be approved. Only procedures which pass 
through all the screens are recommended for pub I ic coverage. 
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The Dutch government's Committee for Choices in Health Care proposed a screen model 
as a way of determining which services should be publicly covered. This screen model 
first removes care deemed unnecessary from the community perspective. The second 
sieve requires that care be demonstrated to be effective. The third si ve focuses on the 
efficiency of the treatment. The fourth sieve identifies care that can be left as the 
financial responsibility of the individual (Van de Yen, 1995). 
Another screen model is Deber's four-screen model (Deber et al., 1998). Th is model 
begins with a pre-screen to determine whether services are ethically acceptable. If they 
are ethically acceptable, services are evaluated to determine their level of effectiveness. 
This evaluation shou ld be conducted through expert review. It may be possible that the 
evidence is lacking or inconclusive. In these cases, the model gives a conditional pass to 
the procedure. The second screen examines whether the procedure is appropriate for the 
individual patient being considered. The last two screens set requirements which services 
must meet in terms of public acceptance. The third screen asks whether the patient wants 
and consents to the service, given a consideration of the risks and benefits. The fo UI1h 
screen asks the public whether the service should be covered under the public plan. 
Chart 2.2: Dcber's Four Screen Model 
Pre-Screen Is the treatment ethical? 
Screen 1 Is the treatment effective? 
Screen 2 Is the treatment appropriate for the 
patient? 
Scrcen3 Does the patient want the service? 
Screen 4 Should the public pay for the service? 
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Deber et al. ( 1998) hold that this fourth screen of public approval can be broken down 
into three sub-considerations. The first is cost minimization. Deber et al. says that " [t)his 
criterion is not equivalent to determinations of cost-effectiveness, because it makes no 
effort to determine whether a particular benefit is worth purchasing; rather, it presents the 
far weaker requirement that any benefit purchased (of a specified level of quality, 
timeliness, etc.) be obtained at the lowest possible cost" (p. 523). The second sub-
considerations address social values. The question posed is " are we, as a society, willing 
for people to be denied this particular treatment because of its cost?" Finally, Deber and 
colleagues consider the advancement of medical knowledge in determining whether the 
public should paid for a particular treatment. 
Screen models aim to organize the key factors which should be considered in making 
public coverage decisions. One of the problems with screen models is that they do not 
easily allow for the prioritizing of services once they have passed the screens. These 
models examine services on a one-by-one basis to determine whether a service should be 
covered by a public program. But decision makers often face the situation where too 
many procedures a re determined as acceptable for public coverage. The problem of 
resource allocation is that there are often many options, all of which have merit, but for 
which there are only enough resources to implement one. Thi s is usually wh re most of 
the hard choices regarding resource allocations lie : in determining which ethical, 
effective, appropriate, and desired program actually will receive funding. Deber et a l. 
( 1998) suggest that this problem can be addressed by adjusting the public expectations 
screen of their model by having providers and patients make "microallocations" (p. 526). 
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But this seems to undercut the usefulness of the screen model for making difficult choice 
because it leaves the decision to providers and patients to decide without giving any 
guidance to them. Likewise, screen models are not well suited for dealing with the 
incremental nature of most requests for increased resources. While useful for making 
coverage decisions, screen models do not seem able to offer much assistance with many 
allocation problems, e.g., making budgetary decisions. 
There are other difficulties with Deber's four-screen model. The second screen examines 
whether the treatment is appropriate for particular patients. Unless appropriateness is 
going to be determined by practice guidelines, this screen seems to leave the door open 
for some type of bedside rationing, in that physicians and frontline health care workers 
would determine whether a treatment is publicly covered or not. In terms of order, 
making the second screen appropriateness a lso seems to create problems, given that this 
screen can only be passed once the patient is presented to the health care provider. It is 
not logical to say that this should precede the public ' s deliberation over whether the 
treatment should be publicly covered or not (Hurely et al., 2000). Deber's model also 
does not determine how the public ' s views are to be measured. 
2.4.5 Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
Economic evaluations of interventions only began in the 1960s with cost-benefit analysis 
in the area of public health. Economists would first calculate the cost of a particular 
illness on a society in monetary terms. Cost-benefit analysis would use this 'cost of 
illness' value and compare it with the cost of an immunization or public health program. 
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Weinstein (Buerhaus, 1998) says that sensitivities about expressing health benefits in 
monetary terms lead to the development of cost-effectiveness analysis. In cost-
effectiveness analysis, health outcomes are measured in some type of health unit, usually 
based on some index of quality-adjusted-life-years, and the costs of different 
interventions are measured in dollars. Cost-effecti veness analysis produces a measure of 
the relative value for interventions in terms of their cost for producing a particular amount 
of health improvement. 
The ultimate success in comparmg two treatments m terms of both their cost and 
effectiveness is when one treatment is shown to be both less expensive and provides at 
least the same amount of benefit. In such cases, one treatment can be said to be more 
efficient. When this is not the case, or when calculations compare programs which do not 
easi ly allow for comparison, allocative efficiency should be the goal (Donaldson, Currie 
& Mitton, 2002). In other words, the goal should be to determine an a llocation which 
maximizes the benefits (however, benefits are defined) from a particular investment of 
resources. 
Both Dcber ( 1992) and Donaldson at el. (2002) divide treatment compansons into a 
number of possible options, based on the possible outcomes regarding cost and 
effectiveness. Table 2. 3 reconstructs their tables. 
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Table 2.3: Matrix of Levels of Cost and Effectiveness 
Increased No Change Decreased 
Effectiveness Effectiveness 
Lower Cost YES YES HARD CHOICE 
Equal Cost YES INDIFFERENT NO 
Higher Cost HARD CHOICE NO NO 
By determining the cost and the effectiveness of treatments, it is possible to clarify where 
a decision is on this table and whether the decision is relatively easy to make. orne 
choices are re latively easy. Hard choices for decision makers are those in which positi e 
outcomes regarding cost and effectiveness conflict, e.g., when there is increased 
effecti veness but higher costs or when there is lower costs but with decrea ed 
effectiveness. 
This table has, however, a number of limitations. The first is that it does not give any 
guidance in settling these hard choice decisions beyond identifyi ng them as hard choices. 
Secondly, it cannot be used to easily compare choices between services treating different 
diseases; or when measures of effectiveness are not easily comparable. While this table is 
useful in that it conceptualizes where some of the difficulties lie, there are more powerful 
techniques which are better at making comparisons across di ffe rent types of health care 
interventions and the types of benefits which arises from them. 
Weinstein and Stason ( 1977) say that cost-effectiveness analysis provides "a rational 
framework for decision making" which incorporates information about a treatment ' s 
efficacy, preferences of patients between present and future health benefits, preference 
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about quality of life, longevity of life and cost (p. 717). Cost-effectiveness analysis 
reduces all of this information down to a cost-effectiveness ratio. Cost-effectivenes 
analysis allows then for comparisons between difficult cases, e .g., across different types 
of services and across different types of beneficial health outcomes. 
The nominator of a cost-effectiveness ratio is the cost of providing the intervention. 
Weinstein and Stason (1977) propose that the following be included in calculations of net 
health care costs: I) all direct medical costs, including the cost of hospitalization, 
physician services, medications, laboratory and other services; 2) all costs associated with 
adverse side effects of treatments; 3) savings resulting from the treatment of the disease 
and 4) "the costs of treating diseases that would not have occurred if the patient had not 
lived longer as a result of the original treatment" (p. 718). This calculation of cost is done 
from the societal or total cost perspective. That cost-effectiveness be determined from the 
societal prospective was one of the recomme ndations of the U.S. Panel on Cost-
Effectiveness in Health and Medicine (Russell , Gold, Siegel, Daniels, & Weinstein 
1996). Weinstein and Stason recognize that different groups, e.g. , patients, insurers, 
providers, have different concerns relating to their exposure to cost. They claim that 
other groups can adjust these costs to their own cost exposures by tailoring the formula 
for calculating cost to their own perspective. 
The net health benefit is the dominator of the cost-effectiveness ratio . In order to capture 
not only the amount of time a person may add to their life through a particular 
intervention, but also improvements in their quality of life, some type of quality-adjusted-
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life-year calculation is made. QAL Y measures attempt to fairly account for the improved 
health state of the patient by adjusting the value of the number of years the patient 
survives according to the degree of health improvement resulting from the treatment 
(Edgar, Salek, Shickle, & Cohen, 1999). The basic idea is that the benefits of different 
treatments are translated into a common measure. Although there are variations in how 
these calculations are made, al l of them use a subjective scale to weight different health 
states. This weighting scale is developed based on some type of patient or public survey. 
The scale is then multiplied by the average gain in longevity from the treatment to 
determine the net health benefit. Cost-effectiveness models then usually discount the 
value of future health benefits as compared to more immediate health benefits. The U.S. 
Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine also recommend running sensitivi ty 
analysis by varying key factors to improve the strength of the cost-effectiveness model 
(Russell et a!., 1996). 
Cost-effectiveness analysis is not without its detractors and problems. Weinstein ( 1998) 
reports that cost-effectiveness analysis generally has more impact on fields such as 
pharmaceuticals and prevention programs than in primary care, surgery or diagnostic 
testing. Weinstein reports that diagnostic testing is particularly difficult for co t-
effectiveness analysis due to complexities around accurately estimating the real benefit, 
e.g., determining the role of the tests on future treatment success. Other problems 
associated with cost-effectiveness analysis include the problem of getting reliable data on 
effectiveness. Donaldson et a!. (2002) found difficulties in ensuring all facto rs are taken 
account of in the calcul ations. T here is also a problem with time horizons. Research 
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trials have a specific cut-off time. Cost-effectiveness analysis is calculated over the li fe 
of the patient. This leads to the invariable problem of estimating the effect of a treatment 
beyond the point for which there is any reliable data. 
There are a number of problems associated with equating all conditions to a quality-of-
life scale. The value people place on different health states vary depending on whether 
one is asking people with the disease, populations at risk for the disease or the general 
population (Ubel, 2000). Who is surveyed to establish the scale wi ll greatly affect the 
quality-of- life-measures which are used. Another set of concerns relate to hat cost-
effectiveness analysis leave out, e.g., concerns about equity. Ubel, DeKay, Baron and 
Asch ( 1996) have shown that even many experts in medical decision making, those who 
perform cost-effectiveness analysis, are wi lling to over look cost-effectiveness when it 
conflicts with equity of care. 
These problems notwithstanding, Weinstein and Stason (1977) claim that it is still better 
to use some model for a llocating resources than none at all. Weinstein and Stason also 
suggest that the intent of cost-effectiveness analysis is often misconstrued. For them, 
cost-effectiveness analysis is not a deterministic test or a procedure for neatly deciding 
which treatments to fund and which not to fund. Weinstein says "cost-effectiveness 
analysis is meant to be informative, helpful, and to provide another perspective on a 
decision. But it is not meant to determine the decision" (quoted in Buerhaus, 1998 p. 
226). 
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There are various ways in which the results of a cost-effectiveness analysis can be used in 
allocating resources. Weinstein and Stason ( 1977) suggest that serv ices can be ranked in 
terms of cost-effectiveness and that starting at the top of the list, services are funded until 
the financi al resources are exhausted. This would be similar to how Oregon initially tried 
to prioritize Medicare services. One area where cost-effectiveness analysis does seem to 
have a real impact is on the development of screening programs. For example, in a study 
for the Blue Cross Association, Eddy (1990) showed that there was a steep deterioration 
in the cost-effectiveness if Pap smears are performed more often than once every three 
years. Eddy 's conclusion led Blue Cross to only cover Pap smears once every three 
years. For all its shortcomings, cost-effectiveness analysis forces people to be explicit 
about the beliefs, values and assumptions when they are making allocation decisions. 
But not a ll resource allocations can be clarified by cost-effectiveness analysis. On many 
occasions resource decisions are not primaril y concerned with which option will have the 
greatest impact on patients for the least cost. Often types of resource allocations are 
concerned more with the impact on the organization rather than on the patient population. 
It is also hard to see how many of the relevant factors fo r resource allocation can be 
incorporated into a cost-effectiveness analysis. For example, it is unclear how the risk of 
a department losing its teaching accreditation, staff morale, the benefits of doing research, 
can be included. There are a number of other problems wi th using cost-effectiveness 
analysis. As stated above, published cost-effectiveness analyses are usually presented 
from the societal or tota l cost perspective. The idea is that other users e .g., individual 
health care institutions, can adjust these studies to their own perspective . This is often 
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easter said than done. Many health care institutions simply lack the familiarity and 
expertise with cost-effectiveness to utilize it into their decision making process (Prosser, 
Koplan, Neuman, Weinstein, 2000). These institutions also often fee l that relevant cost-
effectiveness data is rarely available when they need it to evaluate a new service or 
technology (Prosser et al. , 2000). Some even question whether the very nature of cost-
effectiveness is an appropriate decision tool at the institutional level (Langley, 2000). 
While cost-effectiveness may be able to contribute to particular al location decisions, it is 
likely that there are many allocation decisions to which it cannot contribute. 
2.4.6 Program Budgeting and Marginal Analysis (PBMA) 
Program budgeting is commonly used as a means of capping funding in particular areas 
of care. The basic idea is that regional authorities a llocate each clinical or program area a 
funding envelope. It leaves many of the decisions about how best to use that money to 
the doctors and managers working within these areas, who are often in the best position to 
decide priorities. Before clinicians in an area can ask for an increase in funding, they are 
supposed to examine their current expenditures to see if there are services which can be 
cut, reduced or resources 'released ' from their current use. It is the re lease of resources 
from lower priority areas to be used in higher priority ones which is the key to the 
efficiency gains expected from this approach. Mitton and Donaldson (2004) point out 
that resources re leased can come through operational efficiency gai ns, service reductions 
or disinvestments. 
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Program budgeting and marginal analysis can be applied in indiv idual programs of care, 
across a set of programs within the same general service area, or more broadly, across 
major service areas (Mitton and Donaldson, 2004). To do this, decision makers need to 
identify the marginal benefit of the resources used. In other words, the overall program is 
not evaluated. Rather what is evaluated is the incremental benefit of the last amount of 
the resources directed to a program. This follows the standard approach of marginal 
analysis found in economics. As Fuchs ( 1974) explains: 
" In principle, the solution is to be found by applying the economist ' s rule of 
'equality at the marg in .' This means relating the incremental y ield of any particular 
program to the incremental cost of the program and then a llocating resources so that 
the yield per do llar of additional input is the same in a ll programs .. . . Note that 
decisions about expanding or contracting particular programs should be based on 
their respective marginal benefi ts, not their average benefits" (p. 20). 
By companng the marginal benefi ts between programs, decisions can be made as to 
whether the relative sizes of each of the envelopes should be changed. Conceptually, the 
focus is on the benefi t gained from the last dollar spent on a program. The level of 
benefit gained for using this last dollar spent in this program is then compared with the 
benefit which could be gained if the funds were used for other programs, i.e., its 
opportunity cost. In marginal analysis, the opt imal allocation of resources is one for 
which no incremental gains could be realized by shifting resources to another program. 
Economists would describe this optimal allocation as a situation in which the marginal 
benefit of all programs equal their opportunity costs. 
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Mitton and Donaldson (2004) have shown how this approach can be employed within a 
health care institution. They propose that much of the work of identifying new spending 
priorities and areas for resource release be carried out by an advisory panel. This 
advisory panel should have representatives of the various stakeholder groups. Who these 
stakeholders are depends on the scope of the priority setting exercise. Once the panel is 
established, it then needs to develop a set of decision making criteria. These criteria 
should be weighted if at a ll possible to reflect preferences between different goals. Once 
the decision criteria have been identified, a priority list can be developed by explicitly 
rating the services under consideration. Lower scoring priorities would then reallocate 
some of their resources to higher priorities until no more gain can result by reallocating 
resources. 
Mitton and Donaldson's approach does have a number of strengths. First, it builds upon 
the institutional structure of most health care institutions. Many health care institutions 
already use some form of program budgeting. econd, it has the fl exibi lity to be u ed 
either within programs or across an entire organization. Third, it forces programs to 
compete against each other to ensure that resources are used as efficiently as possible. 
There are a lso some shortcomings with this approach, many of which are shared by other 
decision tools. Decision criteria may be hard to agree on and weigh. In their survey of 
resource allocation models, Hurley et al. (2000) identify ten recurring factors which 
proposed resource allocation models generally use. While dec ision makers often report 
these factors as relevant, there are a number of other factors , such as geographic 
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disbursement of services, maintaining accreditation, even issues of space within an 
institution, which often are crucial to how allocation decisions are made. It is hard to see 
how a ll these relevant factors could be accounted for in an a priori list of decision 
criteria. Another problem is that health care may not be a very suitable candidate for 
marginal analysis. Daniels (1994) points out that health care is not sufficiently divisible. 
The distribution of health care is more likely to result in unequal or ' lumpy' distribution 
then could possibly be the case for other types of resources, e.g., money. Many program 
areas do not allow for partial funding. Large capital purchases, for example, the purchase 
of a new MRI scanner, likewise may not easily allow for marginal analysis and 
proportional transfers to funds because the purchase may require the commitment of 
almost all of a health organization an11ual capital budget. Regardless of its sh01tcomings, 
the basic PBMA approach may be promising for assisting in the type of resource 
allocation decisions which we are likely to encounter in the case studies. 
2.4. 7 Accountability for Reasonableness 
Daniels has developed a concept of a fair process for allocating health care resources 
(Daniels & Sabin, 1997; Daniels, 2000a; 2000b). This approach, which he calls 
accountability for reasonableness, is based on setting out the conditions needed for an 
ethically defendable allocation process. There are four conditions. The first is that 
decisions are made based on reasons that fair-minded people can agree are re levant given 
the decision at hand. What reasons are relevant depend on the particular case being 
considered a lthough some of the factors identified in section 2.4 below would certainly 
be relevant to most al location decisions. The second condition is the decision and the 
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rationale for it should be made publicly accessible. In other words, there needs to be 
transparency concerning how and why decisions are made. The third condition i that 
there must be a mechanism by which decisions can be challenged and revised. The final 
condition is that the decision is enforceable by the governing body which makes it. For 
Daniels, any allocation process which meets these four criteria can be considered fair. 
One of the strengths of Daniels ' approach is that it operationalizes the ethical conditions 
which should be followed in justly allocating resources. Martin, Singer and others 
associated with the University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics ha e begun to use 
accountability for reasonableness as a framework for evaluati ng resource allocation 
decisions and to recommend improvements to decis ion making proces es. Recogniz ing 
that fairness is an important goal of any allocation decision this group evaluates priority 
setting exercises in terms of whether they meet Daniel's four conditions. Gaps in an 
organization's accordance w ith either of the conditions indicate areas where there can be 
improvement in their decision making process. Through a series of studies, this group 
has applied the accountability for reasonableness framework to study the vi w of 
hospital executives about the level of fairness in their insti tutions (Reeleder et al., 2005); 
decision-making in the SARS crisis (Bell et al., 2004); priority setting in hospita ls and 
regional authorities (Gibson, Ma11in and Singer, 2004) and in hospita l strategic planning 
(Marin et a l. , 2003) . Ham (1999) has also used accountability fo r reasonableness as a 
framework for evaluating the fairness of allocation processe in the United Kingdom. 
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Accountability for reasonableness is a valuable tool for incorporating ethical 
considerations into the a llocation process. Daniels' four conditions are flexible enough to 
be employed in most decision making situations. For example, it seems likely that 
accountabi li ty for reasonableness can be employed in the case studies. The shortcoming 
is that accountability for reasonableness is not sufficient on its own to settle every 
a llocation problem. Although it helps to ensure that the process is fair, it is unclear how 
accountability for reasonableness by itself can either provide a clearer picture of the 
options under consideration or help determine priorities in a way which increases 
efficiency. At best, accountabi lity for reasonableness can be a partial solution to most 
a llocation dilemmas. 
2.4.8 Public Participation 
Calls for increased public participation in the allocation of health care resources come 
from many different sources. Public participation is seen to increase the accountability 
and transparency of the allocation process (Canadian HIV AIDS Policy Law Review, 
2003). It accords w ith democratic ideals of citizen participation in decision making 
(Abelson & Eyles, 2002). It is argued that public participation may lead to better 
a llocation decisions (Coast, 1997). Ham (1996) sums up the feeling of many when he 
writes, 
"decisions on prionties for communities and whole populations involve value 
judgments that are too important to be left to professionals. It is all the more 
important, therefore, that these decisions involve as wide a set of interests as 
possible. The outcome may not always satisfy the experts, but this is always a risk 
in a democratic process" (p. 184). 
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Essentially, a great deal of health care is delivered through public programs and the 
public have "a legitimate and useful role to play" in determining what these programs 
should and should not provide (Chafe et al., 2007, p. I). 
Public participation in health care is a complicated topic. It is beyond the scope of this 
project to review all of the issues relating to public invo lvement in health care decision 
making. One of the products of the Basket Grant project is a framework for assisting 
decision makers to engage the public about resource allocation decisions (Chafe et a l. 
2007). This framework reviews many of the difficult issues related to involving the 
public in resource allocation decis ions. One of its observations is that public participation 
is never easy and often times it can be impractical. The framework also concludes that 
the decision making organization must provide commitment and resources to support 
public participation. 
2.4.9 Review of Decision Approaches 
One of the goals of this project is to consider the likelihood that approaches proposed in 
the academic literature for improving resource allocation would be useful for improving 
decision making in the selected cases. To help evaluate the likelihood of the proposed 
approaches being applicable, Table 2. 4 summarizes some of the information about the 
different approaches in terms of their aims, conditions, strengths, and weaknes es. The 
table also summarizes any conclusions which can be made about the different approaches. 
Based on thi s review, it appears that clinical practice guidelines, cost-effectiveness 
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analysis, PBMA, accountability for reasonableness, and public pa11icipation are most 
likely to be applicable to the cases under study in this research project. 
Table 2.4: Overview of Decision Approaches 
Goals Conditions Strengths Weaknesses Comments 
Rational Maximize Identify and Explicit in Difficulty Useful only for 
Decision Models outcome weigh outcome desired weighing small 
preferences preferences outcomes preferences; allocation 
Requires a exerci es 
great deal of 
time and 
information 
Clinical Practice Identifies best Develop and Limits care; Labour Maybe 
Guidelines practices; maintain maximize intensive; open applicable to 
Standardize guidelines; benefit; No to unseen case studies 
practice; Physician basket rejection. value bias. 
Limit health acceptance 
care usage 
Needs-Based Allocates Develop Can improve the Formula often Not practical 
Models resources fairly funding efficiency and determined by for program 
and efficiently formula ; fairness of desired allocations, but 
population data allocations outcome may be use ful 
for more 
general 
allocations of 
resources 
Screen Models Ensure Data about Organizes Cannot Most useful 
coverage meet criteria required criteria prioritized; for making 
specified incremental coverage 
criteria resource decisions 
requests 
Cost- Compare Effectiveness Provides the Unfamiliar to Limited 
Effectiveness treatment and cost data; relative worth of many decision application 
Analysis options Public QALY a treatment makers; data 
data requirements 
PBMA Maximize Data about Increases Information; Maybe 
efficiency criteria and efficiency; uses difficulty app licable to 
decis ion maker existing health weighing case tudies 
preferences care structure preferences 
Accountability Operationalizes Set criteria on Operationalizes Not sufficient Maybe 
for ethical the process for faimess to determined applicable to 
Reasonableness considerations; allocating considerations allocations case studies 
accountabi I ity resources 
Public Accountability; Commitment Accords with Some times Maybe 
Participation Accords with and resources democratic impractical ; applicable to 
democratic from the idea ls; May Unable to meet case studies 
ideals decision making improve expectations 
organization decisions 
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2.5 Areas of Care - Case Studies 
As stated in the introduction, three areas of care - endovascular coiling, MRl and powered 
upper arm prostheses - were chosen for this study, in part, because they represent a 
diverse set of health services. This section briefl y describes each area of care and 
includes considerations such as impact, demonstrated effectiveness, estimated cost per 
procedure, and estimated patient population. 
2.5.1 Endovascular Coiling 
Endovascular coiling, sometimes called endovascular neuro-coiling or embolization, was 
sta11ed in the early 1980's by Dr. Guido Guglielmi as a new treatment option for cerebral 
aneurysms. A n aneurysm is a bulging of the artery. Aneurysms are most often found 
along the aorta or in the brain, although renal aneurysms also occur. The most common 
type of aneurysm is a saccular or "berry" aneurysm. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, th is type 
of aneurysm has a neck and usually occurs at points where arteries diverge. Fusiform 
aneurysms, in which there is bulging on both sides of the artery, are less common. 
Aneurysms are also often classified in terms of the ir size, shape and specific location. 
Saccular 
/ 
)' 
• • ;I 
I 
Fus:-Y 
Figure 2.1: Types of Aneurysms 13 
13 The images are from Brain Aneurysms Foundation (2005). 
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An important class of aneurysms is cerebral, or intracranial, which occur in the brain. As 
with other types of unruptured aneurysms, such c rebral aneurysms may show no 
symptoms. If the aneurysm is large enough, it may cause headaches. In severe cases, 
large cerebral aneurysms may cause stroke-like symptoms, such as problems with vision, 
memory, speech, weakness in limbs, or seizures. 
The mam concern with unruptured aneury ms is the risk they pose for breakage or 
leakage. A ruptured aneurysm results in cerebral hemorrhaging, which is a very serious 
medical problem. Higashida (2003) reports that between 30% to 40% of patients who 
suffer a ruptured aneurysm will die. The Department ofNeuroradiology at John Hopkins 
University Hospital (2005) estimates 50% mortality. Another 20% to 35% of patients 
will have moderate to severe brain damage. Given that the more bleeding there is, the 
greater risk there is for the patient, immediate medical care is required for a ruptured 
aneurysm. Cerebral hemorrhaging may result in vasospasm, a narrowing of blood vessels 
in the brain which can result in further brain damage; or hydrocephalus, an increase in 
cerebrospinal fluid which puts increased pressure on the brain. Ruptured cerebral 
aneurysms can also cause hemorrhagic strokes. 
Cerebral aneurysms can occur in all age groups, but the incidence rate increases steadily 
with age. The main risk factors include smoking, previous head injury, and a family 
history of aneurysms. The Brain Aneurysms Foundation (2005), a U.S. based not-for-
profit support group for victims of ruptured or unruptured aneurysms, estimates three 
90 
million Americans have at least one cerebral aneurysm. Higashida (2003) estimates a 
similar prevalence rate, with between 0.5 to 3.0% of these people actually suffering a 
cerebral hemorrhag at some point in their lives. The percentage of these which require 
serious medical attention is much lower. 
If an aneurysm can be detected pnor to rupture, the patient's prognosis JS greatly 
improved. A major rupture is often preceded by a warning leak, which manifests itself as 
an uncharacteristic painful headache. An aneurysm may also be detected prior to rupture 
due to pressure on surrounding nerves or inadvertently through diagnostic tests taken for 
some other reason, e.g., during a magnetic resonance imaging (MRl) or magnetic 
resonance angiography (MRA) on the head. 
There are currently several treatment options for both ruptured and unruptured cerebral 
aneurysms. For small aneurysms, medical therapies, such as smoking cessation and 
blood pressure control, may be sufficient. In some cases, it may be best to stop blood 
Oow through the entire artery lead ing to the aneurysm or to bypass the artery using an 
artery from another part of the body. This is called an occlusion and bypass. Another 
method for treating serious ruptured and unruptured aneurysms is microsurg ical clipping. 
Clipping is a procedure in which the aneurysm is clipped shut, using a device similar to a 
small c lothes pin. The clip stops blood flow to the aneurysm thereby removing the risk of 
rupture or stopping any leakage if the aneurysm has a lready ruptured. This procedure 
requires open brain surgery. 
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Endovascular coiling is a procedure in which the aneurysm is fi lled wi th platinum coi ls, 
thereby blocking the flow of blood to the aneurysm. Endovascular means that the 
procedure is preformed inside the vascular system . The procedure uses a catheter inserted 
in an artery, usually around the groin area, which is led through the vascular system to the 
aneurysm . This catheter packs the aneurysms w ith thin platinum coils which are then 
re leased from the catheter using a small e lectric charge. These coils are often called 
Guglie lmi Detachable Coils (GOC). Although other materials can b used, the softness 
of platinum allows the coils to assume the shape of often irregularly shaped aneurysms 
while posing little threat of rupture. The procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
1 2 3 
Figure 2.2: Endovascular Coiling Procedure 14 
The University of Toronto ' s Brain Vascular Malformation Study Group (2005) reports 
sometimes a mesh stent is used if the neck of an aneurysm is too wide to ensure the coi ls 
14 The images are from Brain Aneurysms Foundation (2005). 
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stay w ithin the aneurysm. The length of surgery varies according to the complexity of the 
case. Generally, the procedure takes approximately two hours. Most individuals recover 
rapidly and are released within a couple of days. 
Endovascular coiling is less invasive than clipping in that it does not require open brain 
surgery . The procedure may be performed under general anesthesia or wi th a local 
anesthetic. Because of advanced age, serious medical problems or other facto rs, some 
people may not be able to undergo open brai n surgery. For these patients, endovascular 
coiling may be their only treatment option. The decision whether to c lip or to coil a 
dangerous aneurysm depends on the size, shape and location of the aneurysm ; the 
condition of the patient; and the patient' s w ishes. 
Research 
To date, there is little research on the effectiveness of endovascular coil ing. The only 
maj or randomized contro l trail , the International Subarachnoid Aneurysm Trial (ISAT), is 
still ongoing. Its preliminary findings (see Molyneux, Kerr, Stratton, Sandercock, C larke, 
Shrimpton, Holman, et a l. , 2002) are that endovascular coil ing is slightly less risky than 
clipping. The trail has so far only examined patients one year after the procedure and 
only patients w ho have ruptured aneurysms. Based on a retrospective analysis, John on 
(2000) found that endovascular coiling is associated with decreased risk of negative 
outcomes, shorter hospital stays and shorter recovery times. The long-term durabil ity of 
coiling, however, is still unknown. Some concerns have been expressed about the 
complications coils could present to any fu ture brain surgery (Brain Aneurysms 
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Foundation, 2005). Broderick (2000) argues that more research is required to support the 
long-term safety and superiority of endovascular coiling. 
Regardless of the lack of sufficient research, endovascular coiling has become fairly 
established as an acceptable method of treating cerebral aneurysms. The University of 
Toronto's Brain Vascular Malformation Study Group (2005) reports that 125,000 
procedures have already been preformed world wide. Interviews conducted as part of this 
project found that not one radiologist, interventionalist radiologist, or neurosurgeon 
questioned the effectiveness of coiling. 
Resource Requirements 
There are two main capital costs involved with the procedure. Endovascular coiling 
requires a special-type angiography suite. 15 General Electric is a leading supplier of these 
biplane angiographies. General Electric also produces computer software that removes 
distortion and which can even specifically monitor either neuro-coils or clips. A biplane 
angiography machine can cost around $3 million, but can also be used for other 
procedures. 
Coils are available in different lengths, diameters and with different characteristics. 
Because of the emergency nature of the procedure, health care providers are required to 
maintain an inventory of coils. An initial inventory of coils can cost around $250,000. 
Boston Scientific (U.S.) and Cook Inc. (U.S .) are the two lead ing suppliers of GDC-
15 Angiography takes X-rays of the arteries and veins to diagnosis problems in the vascu lar system . 
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platinum coils. The coils of both companies are approved for use by Health Canada, the 
Food and Drug Administration (U .S.) and the lnterventiona l Procedures Advisory 
Committee (U.K.). 
Operational costs average around $10,000 per case, which includes the cost of coi ls, 
catheters, wires, stents, and other necessary materials. The platinum coils themselves can 
cost between $4200 to $7000 per procedure. There are advances in the types of coils 
available, which may increase the future cost of coils. Estimates varied in terms of the 
expected patient population from between 1 to 10 cases per I 00,000 annually. 
The procedure reqUtres two radiologists, an anesthesio logist, two nurses and a 
technologist. Neurosurgical back-up team must also be available, al though their co t is 
not usually included in cost calculations of the procedure. 
2.5.2 MRI 
MRI scans are machines which perform non-invasive diagnostic tests. The first MRI scan 
was installed in 1983 at the University of Manchester (U.K.) . Since then, MRI scans 
have quickly become one of the most valuable diagnostic tools for internal examinations. 
Magnetic resonance imaging is possible because of a peculiar way atoms react to 
magnetism. The peculiar effect is that when magnetized , the nuclei can be made to 
release energy in terms of faint radio waves. Cl inical MRI cans work on the hydrogen 
atoms in the body. Hydrogen atoms in different types of tissue produce waves at slightly 
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different frequencies. The MRI scanner works by first using a powerful magnet to align 
the nuclei of some atoms. The machine then hits these nuclei with radio waves to agitate 
them from their alignment to the magnet. When the nuclei return to their a lignment, they 
release energy also in the form of radio waves. The MRI machine records these rad io 
waves. A computer is then used to determine the position of the different atoms and 
generate an image of the inside of the body based on their various positions. 
Unlike tradition x-rays or computed tomography (CT) scans, MRis do not use x-rays. 
Because of the strength of the magnet, there are some risks for patients with metal 
implanted in their body. For example, people with cardiac pacemakers or clips for 
cerebral aneurysms cannot receive MRis. With the exception of these groups, MRis are 
considered fairly safe. 
The rapid spread of MRI technology is due to its non-invasiveness, the type of images it 
can produce, and its wide range of applications. MRis can clearly show soft-tissue and 
can produce any imaging plane. In other words an MRI can produce an image of any 
slice of the body. It can also capture some functional information, include brain function. 
As illustrated in Figure 2.4, MRis can provide fairly detai led images of internal o rgans. 
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Figu re 2.4: MRI Scan of a Head 16 
MRI scans are constantly being improved and applied to new diseases. T he Mayo Clinic 
(2007) says MRI scans can be used for examinations of the brain, neck, spinal cord, 
organs and soft tissues. They also say that MRI scans can helps diagnose central nervous 
system disorders, brain tumors, strokes, brain abnormali ties in people with dementia, 
di seases of the pituitary g land, eye or inner ear tissue abnormalities, damage caused by 
heart attack or heart disease, detect blood vessel blockages, bone and joint infections, 
injuries, degenerative disorders, bone and joint damage, breast cancer and functional 
di sorders in the lungs, liver, pancreas, kidney and spleen. 
Further applications of MRI a re currentl y being assessed. MRJs produce three 
dimensional images. MR angiography suites are now avail able. MRI scans are using 
16 The image is from Wikipedia (2007). 
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stronger magnets which provide more detailed images and reduce scanning time. 
Machines are also being developed which are more patient friendly. 
One of the issues relating to resource allocation relates to the fact that MRI and 
Computed tomography (CT) are both sti ll developing technologies. Each new machine 
come out with ever greater capabilities which can then be used for a wider range of tests. 
As one participant is this study said, 
"so we may just sort of level out on the current technology and its application and, 
all of a sudden, we've gone from a 4-slice to a 64-slice CT, which can now do work 
that previously was done in the angiography suite for cardiology. So now there's an 
entire new layer of tests. So until the technology matures, we're going to be chasing 
after this target wait time for some time here because it continually ... we're not 
dealing with a stable demand." 
In 2003, the last year for which there is StatsCan data, 892,000 Canadians over the age of 
15 had a non-emergency MRI performed. This represents 3.4% of the Canadian adult 
population. As the technology develops and becomes more established, usage patterns 
have changed. CIHI (2006) reports that about 35% of non-emergency MRI scans are now 
for joint and fracture cases. They also report a greater number of MRI scans are 
performed now on a case by case basis. 
It is fair to say that the MRI scans have a high public profile. This is especially true given 
that they are pieces of technical radiological equipment. Politicians commonly debate 
about them. The newspapers give them, and the wait times for them, front page coverage 
without having to explain what they are. orne provinces, e .g. , Alberta and 
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Saskatchewan , post wait times for non-emergencies on their websites. The Fraser 
Institute (See Esmail & Walker, 2005) also offer annual report of wait times for key 
procedures, including MRI machines. 
During the 2003 First Ministers First Ministers' Accord on Health Care Renewal, First 
Ministers established a Diagnostic/Medical Equipment Fund. The fund directed $1 .5 
billion for diagnostic equipment and staff training. This money was to help address 
perceived shortages of MRI machines and decrease the wai t lists for MRis. First 
Ministers also agreed " to report to their citizens on an annual basis on enhancements to 
diagnostic and medical equipment and serv ices, using comparable indicators, and to 
develop the necessary data infrastructure for these reports" (para. 8). 
Resource Requirements 
The estimated cost of an MRl scanner, depending on the model, is between three and four 
million dollars. Philips Electronics (Netherlands) and General Electric (U.S.) are the two 
leading makers of MRI scanners. 
Annual operating cost for one MCI scanner is around one million dollars. The co t in 
Canada usually varies between $300 and $600 on a per case basis. The number of people 
receiving a MRI in Canada varies significantly by province. In 2005, Alberta had the 
highest scan rate at 36.6 per I 000 (CIHI, 2005). Newfoundland had the lowest at 8.5 per 
1000. 
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2.6.3 Powered Upper Arm Prostheses 
The loss of a limb can occur in many ways. Birth-defects, accidents and wars are 
common factors. Upper limb prostheses attempt to compensate for the loss of a hand or 
arm, in terms of both functionality and appearance. We can think of upper limb 
prostheses, however, as more than simply providing someone with a piece of equipment. 
It is better seen as a rehabilitative program which a lso includes counseling and education 
on the use of the prosthesis. This rehabilitative program requires the support of a 
multidisciplinary team - including a prosthetist, an occupational therapist, and engineers -
to design and construct prostheses for the unique needs of individual patients and to help 
prepare amputees for life with the ir prosthesis. 
There are three main types of upper limb prostheses: passive, cable driven and powered. 
Passive prostheses are often used for cosmetic purposes. They aim to relieve some of the 
social stigma of having lost a limb. Limiting social stigma can be of major importance 
for some patients. Passive prostheses may also be used in circumstances where electronic 
prostheses are not viable, e.g. , within water. Some amputees would have two prostheses, 
a powered prosthesis for normal use and a passive one for activities such swimming. 
Cable driven prostheses operate using cables usually attached to the patient's opposite 
shoulder. Moving the shoulder muscles opens a nd closes the prosthetic hand . Powered 
prostheses have battery-power motors, which allow for the opening, closing and turning 
of the prosthetic hand . Sometimes these motors can be controlled either by a switch or 
toggle. This is suitable for patients who, while having a defective limb, still have some 
appendage. Most powered upper limbs are controlled by myoelectric impulses. Sensors 
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in the prosthesis pickup signals from muscle contraction in the stump of the person s 
limb. These signals control the movement of the prosthesis. Powered prostheses are 
usually more comfortable than cable prostheses because they do not require a harness. 
They also have greater pinch strength. Powered prostheses are, however, less effective in 
dirt and water or around elements that may damage the electronics, e.g., grease or certain 
solvents. Some hybrid prostheses use both mechanical and electric elements. 
The success of prostheses is judged by their functionality, comfort, reliability, appearance 
and overall patient satisfaction. A team of health care professionals, including 
prosthetists, need to assess individuals on a case-by-case basis. The prosthesis needs to 
be designed to tit each particular patient based on their unique level of disability. The 
extent of the injury or defect greatly influences the type of prosthesis which may be 
avai lable. Functional prosthetic joints are made for the hand, wrist, elbow and should rs. 
The preferences of the person receiving the prosthesis are also very important in choosing 
the right prosthesis. 
Recent prostheses are constructed to be I ighter, quieter and to have a longer battery life. 
Some prosthetic hands can now detect slippage of objects in their grasp and adjust their 
grip strength to hold the object tighter without breaking it. 
Children face unique challenges with prostheses due to the fact that their bodies are still 
growing. Children quickly out grow their prosthesis. Refittings can be required every 
year or two. In 2004, IWK children's hospital in Halifax surgically implanted an upper 
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arm prosthesis which will expand as the child grows (CBC, 2004). This type of 
prosthesis is still at the experimental stage. 
Coverage for prostheses under public insurance plans varies widely across the country. 
The War Amps are a Canadian charity and support group for amputees. They offer some 
support, both social and financial , to amputees through their Adult Amputee Program and 
their CHAMP Program for patients under 18 years of age. 
Resource Requirements 
The resource requirements for prostheses vary from case to case. Because prostheses are 
individually fit , factors such as the extent of the damage to the limb, the level of ability 
the person has and their preferences in terms of functionality greatly affect the overall 
cost. The overall cost of providing a prosthesis can range from $6000 and $35,000 per 
case. There are numerous companies which supply prostheses. Otto-bock (Germany) 
and Hanger (U.S .) are the two largest suppliers. 
The loss of an upper limb is a fa irly rare occurrence, effecting less than I 00 people per 
I 00,000. A prescription for a powered upper arm prostheses would be relatively rare. 
Although there is some variation in prescription rates across the country, the patient 
population is very small. Less than l person per I 00,000 would receive a new 
myoelectric prosthesis annually in Canada. 
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2.5.4 Overview of Areas of Care 
Table 2. 5 provides an overview of the three areas of care in terms of their potential 
impact on patients, demonstrated effectiveness, estimated cost per procedure, and 
estimated annual patient population. 
Table 2.5: Overview of Areas of Care 
Endovascular MRI Upper Powered 
Coiling Arm Prostheses 
Impact Potential li fe saving Varies depending on Improves 
appl ication functionality and 
self-esteem 
Evidence for Little clinical Well established Wel l established 
Effectiveness research; Accepted technology; Level technology; 
practice by of evidence for Effectiveness 
neurologists and effectiveness varies dependent on 
radiologists depending on compliance of 
application individual patients 
Cost (Est.) $3 million initial $3 to $4 million Between $6000 
investment; $10,000 initial investment; and $35,000 per 
per case. $500 per scan. case 
Annual Patient Between 1 to 20 Between 3600 to Less than I 
Population procedures per 850 scans per prosthesis per 
(Est.) 100,000 I 00,000 100,000 
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CHAPTER3: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the methodological choices made within this project. The topics 
covered include the rationale for choosing a multiple case study approach, the selection 
and structure of the case studies, methods of data collection, a review of issues relating to 
the conduct of qualitative research, the development of data collection instruments, the 
selection of participants, the method of analysis, the method of writing up results, the 
delimitations of the project, a review of ethical considerations, and a knowledge transfer 
strategy for the project. 
3.1 Research Strategy 
The ultimate purpose of this study is to improve the allocation of health care resources, by 
first determining how resource allocations are made, without tying the investigation to a 
pre-determined framework. Following the recommendation of Hurley et al. (2000), it 
was determined that it would be most useful to focus on how resource allocation 
decisions were made in a few selected areas of care, rather than taking a more general 
view of resource allocation. This level of focus still leaves open a number of crucial 
methodological questions. The first question to be addressed is which research strategy to 
use. 
The research strategy must be appropriate for the project 's research objectives. As listed 
in section 1.1 , this project has seven aims. The first six aims can be een as research aims 
and the seventh, transferring research results to interested audiences, as more of an 
operational a im of the project. In choosing a research strategy, consideration needs to be 
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given to what is the best way of addressing each of the six research aims. The knowledge 
transfer strategy for the project, needed to meet its operational aim, is set out in section 
8.3 below. 
Yin (1994) identifies five possible research strategies: experiments, surveys, histories, 
archival analysis, and case studies. Resource allocation decisions have in the past been 
investigated using four of these: experiments (Mitton & Donaldson, 2003a), surveys 
(Reeleder et al., 2005; Deber et al. , 1994; 1995), archival anal ysis (Eyles et al., 199 1; 
Birch & Chambers, 1993; Birch et al., 1993 ; Eyles & Birch, 1993; Birch et al., 1996; 
Newbold et al., 1998), and, most common, case studies (Hunter, 1980; Singer et al. , 2000; 
Mitton & Donaldson, 2001 ; 2003b; 2003c; 2004; Martinet al., 2003 ; Mitton et a l. , 2003 ; 
Bell et al. , 2004; Gibson, Martin & Singer, 2004; Halma et al. , 2004; Mitton & Patten, 
2004; Reeleder et al. , 2005). 
This project follows the lead of many other studies in this area and adopts a case study 
approach. The reasons for this choice include: I) the weakness of the other strategies for 
achieving most of this project's aims, and 2) the appropriateness of the case study 
approach. Experiments are neither sui table nor viable given the type of information the 
project aims to capture and the lack of control the researcher has over decision making 
within health care organizations. Surveys cannot capture the data in sufficient detail nor 
are they good at delineating the type of operation links which this project hopes to 
identify. Because the project is focused on how resource allocation decisions are 
currently made, a historical approach would not be appropriate. While archival analysis 
105 
can help provide some context to the decisions, again, it cannot suffi ciently capture the 
factors which determine how resources are currently allocated within heal th care 
organizations. Yin (1994) writes, "case studies are the preferred strategy when ' how' 
and 'why' questions are being posed, when the investigator has little contro l over events, 
and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context" 
(p .1 ). All three conditions hold for the main subject matter of this project: how selected 
resource allocations are currently made by Canadian health care organizations. 
Determining how resource allocations are made is, however, only one of the aims of this 
proj ect. The second aim is to compare these cases of resource allocation across the 
selected area of care and across the three provinces. It is obvious that this aim requi res 
the use of a multiple case study approach. 
The third research aim, to test th applicability of some of the proposed approaches for 
improving priority setting within the cases selected, also assumes the usc of case studies. 
Eight proposed approaches likely to be applicable to the cases have been identified 
through the literature review: rational decision models, service guidelines, needs-based 
capitation models, screen models, cost-effectiveness analysis program budgeting and 
marginal analysis (PBMA), accountability for reasonableness, and calls for increased 
public participation. The criteria for testing the applicabili ty of these approaches are 
di scussed in Section 3 .1 .3. 
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The fourth and fifth aims of this proj ect are to identify what decision makers think ar 
best practices for allocating resources and what decision aids they would find usefu l for 
making future resource allocation decisions. Yin (1994) identi fies the type of qu stions 
each research strategy is most appropriate in answering. "How" and "why" questions can 
best be answered using a case study approach. For questions which are trying to identify 
what a situation is, or what people's opinions are, a survey approach is more appropriate. 
The aims of identify ing best practices and possible decision aids seem to be of this second 
type of question and therefore may be more sui tably pursued through a survey research 
strategy. As part of the data collection, a ll decision makers were ask to identify any best 
practices around resource allocation and the type of decision aids they would fi nd useful 
in making future resource a llocations. The inclusion of these two questions can be 
considered as a very small survey embedded within the case studies. Because of the 
limited nature of the survey and very close connection to the case studies, these questions 
have been treated in this study has as part of the cases themselves. 
The sixth aim of this project, making recommendations fo r improving the a llocation of 
health care resources, draws together the conclusions reached in achieving the other five 
research aims. 
3.1.1 Selection of Focus 
As stated in the introducti on, the cases were chosen to ensure a level of variabi li ty. This 
variability was partly secured by exami ning cases in different areas of care, e.g., acute 
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care, diagnostics and rehabilitation. Each case also raises unique and interesting resource 
allocation issues. A third consideration was that there was some indication that others 
were interested in how resources were allocated in the selected area. It is clear that other 
cases could have also met these three criteria and may have been examined without 
greatly impacting on the overall direction of the project. 
While all three areas of care met the inclusion criteria, each was ultimately selected for 
different reasons. From May to August 2004, I was a research assistant to Mr. Wayne 
Miller, Director of Research and Planning for Eastern Health. One of the issues 
addressed by the department during this period was whether East m Health should invest 
in an endovascular coiling program. This work provided me with a background on 
endovascular coiling and alerted me to the fact that the issue of whether to establish an 
endovascular coiling program was being faced by other regional health authorities across 
the country. The choice of endovascular coiling built upon work already completed by 
the investigator and took advantage of the insti tutional interest in this area of care. 
MRI was selected because it was a high profile area of care. Diagnostic imaging 
including MRI , was identified as a priority area for funding within the 2003 Health Care 
Accord. It was also known that there are a number of resource allocation issues 
concerning MRI being faced by health care organizations across the country, including 
the attempt to establi sh usage guidelines, decisions around buying new machines, 
decisions a round how machines would be geographically located, and around the 
management of wait times. 
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The decisions to investigate the first two areas were straightfo rward. I Iowever, the 
selection of the third area was more serendipitous. Consideration was given to choosing a 
third area of care outside of the areas of diagnostics and acute care, given that the fi rst 
two cases were in these areas. In early September 2004, I attended a lecture by Dr. Ed 
Biden of the University of New Brunswick ' s Centre for Biomedical Engineering (B iden, 
2004). The lecture gave an overv iew of the Centre ' s work, particularly as it related to the 
development, installation and tra ining fo r powered upper arm prostheses. One area of 
future research Dr. Biden identified was the need to better understand the reasons for 
variation in public health insurance coverage o f powered upper arm prostheses across the 
country. Fo llowing discussions w ith Dr. Biden, and his agreement to provide guidance to 
the project, powered upper arm prostheses was selected as the third area of care to be 
studied. 
3.1.2 Selection of Setting 
Newfoundland was chosen as a province based o n the interest of this province to me and 
the fact that 1 was studying there. Being located in the province had clear advantages 
when arranging for interviews wi th decis ion ma kers. The other two provinces selected 
were Alberta and Saskatchewan. The choice of these two provinces was based on 
consideration about having a good geographic distribution across the country, with two 
Western provinces and one Eastern province; the variations in size of the provinces, e.g, 
Saskatchewan has twice the population of Newfoundland, and AI berta has three times the 
population of Saskatchewan; the geographic distri bution of their populations, with 
Alberta and Saskatchewan having two main urban centre and Newfoundland having only 
109 
one main urban centre; structure of their health care systems, in that they a ll had regional 
health boards; the financial strength of the provinces, with A lberta being in a better 
economic situation compared to the other two provinces; and perceived philosophical 
differences between the provinces, with Alberta being perceived as being more open to 
private sector reforms. 
Because MRI and endovascular coiling are high level medical procedures, in choosing 
regional authorities in each province, consideration was given to those regions which 
provided high level tertiary care. Appropriate health regions in each province were 
identi fied through inte rnet searches and discussions with pol icy researchers in each 
provmce. Given that more than one appropriate region was identified in each province, 
regions were chosen based on practical considerations about conducting the project in 
each province, e.g. , whether a local research contact could be identified within the region. 
All three regions initi a lly contacted agreed to participate in this study . 
3. 1.3 Structure of Cases 
This project starts with the hypothesis that it is useful first to determine how resource 
allocations are made before applying any pre-established framework, which suggests 
taking a more grounded theory approach to examining resource allocation decisions. 
Charmaz (2005) describes grounded theory as a method of focusing on the data " to build 
inducti ve middle-range theories through successive levels of data analysis and conceptual 
development" (p. 507). While more c losely related to grounded theory than most other 
studies of resource allocation, thi s proj ect is not a pure example of grounded theory. Part 
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of the reason is the need for the cases to have some structure before data collection begins 
in order to provide the project with a manageable scope. This need for structure raises 
two important issues. The first is how to delineate what is included in the cases. The 
second is how to structure the cases so that they allow the project to meet its research 
a1ms. 
The first step is to define the cases. How the cases were selected offers good guidance 
here. First of all , the cases relate to resource allocation decision making around acute 
care, diagnostics, and rehabilitation. Given that this is an exploratory study, the 
researcher gave a fairly wide recognition to what was considered as relevant to resource 
allocation decision making in each area. If a decision influenced how funds, equipment, 
or human resources were allocated within either of the program areas or affected the 
access patients had to the service, it was included as relevant. The data collection thus 
captured a good deal of information about the general budgeting processe relating to 
health care in all three provinces. 
The cases can also be defined geographically. Resource a llocations were examined in 
three provinces: Alberta, Newfoundland and Saskatchewan. The cases include both how 
the provincial governments allocated resources and how these resources are further 
allocated within the three regional authorities studied. 
Finally, the cases should be defined temporally. As health care organizations try to 
1mprove their processes for allocating resources, these decision making processes are 
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constantly changing. All the organizations studied identified some current reform relating 
to resource al location which they are trying to enact. Although the decision making 
structure of these organizations are likely to remain fairly similar for some time, strictly 
speaking, the cases in this study only reflect the decision making processes which were in 
place during the period for which data was collected: Alberta (November 2005), 
Newfoundland (March to May 2005), and Saskatchewan (March 2006). 
G iven the variables by which the cases can be c lassified, it is best to say that this study 
examines nine cases, determined by place and area of care and limited by a particular 
period in time. These nine cases are identified in Table 3.1 along with the limiting time 
period. 
Table 3.1: Identification of Nine Cases 
Alberta Newfoundland Saskatchewan 
November 2005 March - May 2005 March 2006 
Endovascular 
Coiling 1 4 7 
MRI 2 5 8 
Powered Upper 
Arm Prosthesis 3 6 9 
The second task is to determine how to structure the cases. Both politica l science and 
health policy studies offer some direction here.17 Brooks (2003) emphasizes the 
17 Allison and Zelikow ( 1999) argue that there are three perspectives from which to describe governmental 
decision making. The Rational Actor Model analyzes events and decisions as if the government acted as 
one, rationa l individual. On this view, events are explained by determining their purpose for the 
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importance of institutional structures, interests and ideas on policy decisions. Pal (200 1) 
focuses on the process by which a policy decision gets made, the content of the policy 
and its effect. Taylor (1978) analyzes health care decision making in terms of the inputs 
or impetus for the policy discussion, the 'withinputs ' within government, the outputs in 
terms of the result of the policy decision and, finally, the wider impact of this policy 
outcome. Hacker's (1997) case study of the failure of the Clinton health plan is 
structured around how the issue came on the policy agenda, the parties involved, their 
interests and the outcomes. 
Specifically regarding cases of health resource allocation, Hope et al. (1998) identify two 
key questions which need to be answered. The first is: what is the process by which a 
decision was made? The second is: w hat are the grounds fo r making the decision? 
Singer et a l. (2000) expands on these two questions and identifies six elements which 
they see as important to cases of resource allocation: I) the institutions in which the 
decision are made, 2) the people who make the decis ions, 3) the factors they consider, 4) 
the reasons for the decisions, 5) the process of decision making, and 6) the appeals 
mechanism for challenging the decisions. 
government as a whole. The Behavioral Model is based on organizational theory. It looks at the logic, 
capacities, culture and procedures of the organizations that constitute the government. Rather than looking 
at purposeful acts, the analysis instead focuses on the outputs of the organizational fu nctions. The 
Governmental Politics Model examines government decision making as the result of bargaining amongst 
players within a decision making organization. On this model , understanding an event requires knowing 
the different bargains made by groups within the government which resulted in a decision. While 
recognizing these di fferent perspectives, it is beyond the scope of this project to consider these different 
models directly as part of the cases. Of these three models, the case studies perhaps most closely re late to 
the Behav ioral Model Approach. 
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Each case in this study will provide an overview of all six of these elements as suggested 
by Singer eta!. (2000). The cases will also review how issues related to the three areas of 
care get on a health care institution's agenda (Hacker, 1997). Because of the focus of this 
study is on decision making processes, rather than specific decisions, some of the other 
factors identified above are not directly applicable, e.g., the impact of policy outcomes. 
The influence of interests, institutions and ideas on resource allocation decision making, 
however, may be captured to some extent in the analysis of the cases. 
The cases will also focus on some selected areas of interest to allow for better 
comparisons across the cases. Yin (I 994) cal ls the examination of specific areas of 
interest within a case study as embedded analysis, as opposed to holistic analysis which 
does not identify before hand specific areas in the cases to focus on. The cases will focus 
on six factors or embedded components. These components were all determined by the 
literature review. The first component is the specific resource allocation decisions faced 
in each of the cases . There are likely to be a number of decisions which affect the 
allocation of resources in the three areas of care. For example, with MRI, there may be 
decisions regarding the purchase of new equipment, the location of new equipment, the 
booking of case, the establishment of usage guidelines, etc. This situation raises a 
number of interesting questions across the cases. Is the same set of issues being faced in 
each area of care? Are there differences in the resource allocation questions faced 
between the provinces wi thin the same area of care? In order to further allow for 
comparison, the allocation quest ions identified in each case will be classified according to 
the classification of health care decisions developed in section 2.2, namely in terms of the 
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type of allocation decision (funding level, funding arrangements, broad service 
categories, specific services, clinical circumstances, socio-demographic circumstances), 
who makes the decision and how the decision is made (closed-door I top-down, bilateral, 
hands-off I bottom-up). 
In Chapter 2, Section 3, five factors were identified which are often con idered when 
evaluating or determining resource allocations. These five factors are identification of 
need, the use of evidence, consideration of cost, ethical issues and accountabi lity. The 
cases are structured to determine how these five factors are handled within each case. 
The six embedded components of the cases are illustrated in chart 3.1. 
Chart 3.1: Embedded Components of Case Studies 
Case 
Overview 
I 
j_ I I I I I 
Allocation Need Use of Cost Ethics Account-
Issues Evidence ability 
This embedded case structure supports the study's research objectives in a number of 
ways. The case structure provides an overview of the decision making process in each 
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case, identifies the resource allocation issues involved and considers how each of these 
four key aspects of resource allocation are addressed. The case structure allows then for a 
fairly broad overview of the resource allocation issues involved, which is one of the key 
aims of this project. The structure also allows for fairly easy comparisons across the nine 
cases. 
The criteria for determining what constitutes a best practice or what would constitute a 
difference between cases is hard to clearly specify. The same can be said for the criteria 
for determining whether the proposed approaches for improving resource allocations are 
applicable to the cases or not. For the applicability of the proposed approaches, the table 
outlining the main features of the different approaches provided in section 2.4.8 gives 
some guidance, but it sti ll does not provide clear criteria. Determining whether 
something is a best practice or whether a proposed approach is applicable to the cases will 
depend to some extent on the judgment of the researcher. A clear case structure, with a 
focus on selected areas, will allow for easier comparisons, thereby better enabling the 
reader to judge the reasonable of the researcher's conclusions. 
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3.2 Data Collection 
Just as previous studies on resource a llocation have used various research strategies, so 
too have they used various data sources. Mitton and Donaldson (2003a) use a 
participatory action approach, augmented by di rect participant observation, interviews 
and focus groups. Reeleder et al. (2005) and Deber et al. (1994; 1995) use questi01maire 
surveys. Halma et a l. (2004) use a pane l involved in the decision making to fo llow 
certain issues through the decision making process and a semi-structured fo llow-up 
survey of panel participants. Mm1in et a l. (2003) and Mielke et al. (2003) use document 
reviews, key informant interv iews, and direct pa11icipant observation. All of these 
methods of data collection are useful m determining different aspects of resource 
allocation dec isions. 
This project seeks to capture the views of senior decision makers and health care 
providers working across numerous sites in three provinces. This si tuation did not make 
it feasible to pursue a participatory action approach. With the range of sites the 
sensitiv ity of the issues being discussed, the likely lack of access and the numerous 
decision making bodies involved, direct observation was also not a viable means of 
collecting similar levels of data across all the cases. 18 Because of the exploratory nature 
of the study and the desire to capture some of the context of the decision making process, 
a survey questionnaire was not seen as being able to provide suffic ient data. 
18 This researcher was invited to view one priority setting sess ion at Eastern Health . Because there was no 
opportuni ty to get consent from participants, these observations were not analyzed as part of this project. 
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This project uses both rev1ews of existing documents and key informant interviews. 
These are the same two data sources used by Bell et a!. (2003) to investigate resource 
allocation. Reviewing existing documents was an obvious source of data. Websites, 
published reports, news releases, annual reports and government legislation all provide 
useful information about the decision making processes. Given the need for further 
information about these processes, much of which was only known by participants 
involved in them, reviewing existing documents was not sufficient. The manner in which 
health care resources are allocated, both across and within regions, is complex, with 
decisions often involving unique factors. Interviews are an excellent way to research 
phenomena which are not confined to simply answers or which answers often have to be 
further explicated. This is one of the reasons Rubin and Rubin (2005) suggest that 
"qualitative interviewing projects are especial ly good at describing social and political 
processes" (p. 3). Discussions with decision makers in the lead up to this project, 
conducted by both myself and my colleagues on the "Building a Public Dialogue" project, 
found that many decision makers also felt interviews were the most appropriate way to 
collect information about how resource allocation decisions are made. 
3.2.1 Issues in Using Qualitative Research 
Having chosen to use interviews as a data source, consideration should to be given to the 
factors which enhance conduct of qualitative research. There is a very large and growing 
literature about the use of qualitative methods. This section will be limited to two key 
topics: I) ensuring rigor in the study, and 2) increasing the generalizability of the research 
results. 
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Rigor 
In this project, the researcher does not directly observe how resource allocation decisions 
are made. The project relies to a great extent on information provided through key 
informant interviews. Dobbin and Gatowski ( 1999) point out that one of the short 
comings of interviews is that they provide only "indirect information filtered through the 
view of those interviewed" (p. 116). In other words, the responses given by the 
interviewees are only their interpretation of the events. Interviewees may forget certain 
details or over emphasize the role of some factors. They may make false statements. The 
researcher then uses this data, long with existing printed material , to make his 
interpretation of how resources are currently allocated within each of the nine cases. The 
account of the decision making processes given in this project are based then on two 
levels of interpretation: the participants' and the researcher's . The fact that the 
conclusions of the project are based on multiple levels of interpretation is not a flaw in the 
project 's design. In fact, it is a common feature of all qualitative research not based on 
direct observation. In order to ensure an acceptable level of rigor, the researcher must 
show that he has appropriately dealt with both levels of interpretation. 
Mays and Pope (1995) say that "the basic strategy to ensure rigour in qualitative research 
is systematic and self conscious research design, data collection, interpretation, and 
communication." (p. II 0). Clearly setting out a detailed research strategy and the 
consistent application of that strategy across all the phases of the project is essential for 
ensuring rigor in qualitative research. Mays and Pope (2000) further suggest a number of 
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techniques to help ensure the rigor of qualitative research. These techniques are: clear 
exposition of methods of data collection and analysis, triangulation, fair dealing, attention 
to negative cases, respondent validation, and reflexivity. 
incorporate all of these techniques. 
This project has tried to 
The first technique Mays and Pope suggest is clear exposition of methods of data 
collection and analysis. This chapter, outlining the methodology of the project, aims to 
be as thorough as possible to ensure that the reader is able to evaluate the steps taken 
throughout the project. Special attention has been given to issues such as how the data 
sources are identified, how the data collection instruments are developed, how 
participants are selected, how the data is analyzed, and how the cases are structured and 
written up. 
The project triangulates data sources, both in terms of the different interviews and across 
different types of data, i.e., interviews and reviews of existing material. There is also 
triangulation in terms of the different professions of the people interviewed e.g ., 
physic ians, regional health authority executive members, and provincial officials. 
Agreement across the di fferent sources of data, cases and professions of interviewe s 
helps verify the validi ty of the interpretations being made. 
The next two techniques Mays and Pope identify are fair dealing and attention to negative 
cases. Fair dealing refers to the need not to rely sole ly on representatives from one group, 
but to get perspectives from various groups on the subject matter. Attention to negative 
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cases means ensuring that cases contrary to the researcher's conclusions are identified and 
discussed . Each case is developed based on a number of interviews. In each case, the 
interviews were with interviewees holding different roles in the decision making 
processes and different professional backgrounds. There are constraints on the use of fair 
dealing for this project, because of the limited number of people involved in the 
allocation of resources in the selected cases. To help ensure that negative cases are 
identified, any disagreements amongst the data about the processes for allocation of 
resources will be identified and discussed in the cases. 
Mays and Pope suggest the use of respondent validation, i.e. , that interview transcripts be 
reviewed by the interviewees to ensure that the information provided is accurate . 1 here 
was some difficulty in carrying out respondent validation for this project. The research r 
did offer roughly a third of the interviewees the option of reviewing the transcripts of 
their inter iews. Only one person was willing to review the information they had 
provided, and then only as a brief e-mail outlining any key points that may be used in this 
thesis report. The researcher felt that this reluctance to review their transcripts was a 
result of the professional time constraints on the interviewees. Because of the reluctance 
to review interview transcripts, the researcher abandoned this method for helping to 
ensure research rigor. 
The final technique Mays and Pope (2000) suggest for improving the rigor of qualitative 
research is reflexivity. Reflexivity requires the researcher to declare their relationship 
and interest in the project. The need for reflexivity within qualitative research arises 
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because of the influence the researcher has on the course and outcome of the project. 
Explicitly declaring the researcher's interest or leanings towards a topic is meant to alert 
the reader to any possible bias on the part of the researcher. The researcher 's 
involvement in this project arose from his involvement on the Building a Public Dialogue 
Framework for Defining the Medicare Basket. The main aim of the Medicare Basket 
project is to develop a framework for engaging the public about Medicare coverage 
decisions. This thesis project is meant to help add to the knowledge generated by the 
Medicare Basket project by examining different issues surrounding public Medicare 
coverage and health resource allocation. 
Generalizability 
This project would be of limited value if the application of its conclusions were 
confirmed only to the nine cases studied . The project aims then to maximize the 
application or generalizability of its conclusions. The idea of generalizability m 
qualitative research is different than statistica l generalizability. Generalizability tn 
qualitative research depends upon the reader recognizing sufficient similari ties between 
the case studied and the cases in which they consider applying the results. Pope and 
Mays (2000) suggest two ways a research project can hope to increase its generalizabili ty. 
The first way is to provide sufficient detail so that the reader is able to j udge whether the 
findings in the study are likely to be applicable in the situation the reader is concerned 
with. This goal of providing sufficient detail to understand how the cases are developed 
has been a constant one throughout the project. Pope and Mays also suggest that cases 
"include as many as possible of the factors that might affect variability of behaviour" (p. 
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54). The main rationale for choosing fairly different areas of care to focus on and to 
examine decisions in three different provinces was to extend the range of divergent 
factors covered by the cases. If conclusions are found to hold across the nine cases, it is 
likely that these conclusions will have wider application fo r other cases of resource 
al location. 
3.2.2 Development of Data Collection Instruments 
This research project is fa irly expans ive, covering mne cases and SIX embedded 
components m each case. In order to gu ide data co llection, the information needs 
required for each case were identified. This identification of information needs was based 
on considerations of the project 's objectives, the structure of the cases, and the literature 
review. Information needs were formulated as questions and put in a table, provided in 
Appendix C. Where applicable, questions were matched w ith discussions of the topic 
found within the academic literature. The table was then used to identi fy the proposed 
data source for answering each question, e .g., interview question, public ly avai lable 
documents, or comparisons across the cases. Efforts were made to identi fy a data source 
for every question. 
Based on this table, an initial set of interview guides were developed. A specific 
interview guide was designed fo r each type of likely participant: I) department head, 
program manager, or clinical chief; 2) senior h alth care manager; 3) members of the 
provincial Department of Health; 4) senior provincial government officials in other 
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relevant department; 5) Ministers or former Ministers of Health; and 6) advisory board or 
expert panel members. An example of each of these guides is provided in Appendix D. 
It became apparent once these guides were developed that they were too long and too 
detailed to be workable in the interviews. In order to make the best use of the 
interviewees' time, the interviews were designed to be completed as quickly and 
efficiently as possible. Given the fact that many of the people who participated in this 
project hold senior positions in the government and the health care sector the aim was to 
complete an interview in approximately one hour. Finally, interviews were meant to 
allow interviewees to have as much control over the direction of the interview as possible 
while still ensuring all relevant topics were covered. 
The initial set of interview guides did not support these objectives. Simplified interview 
guides were developed, usually consisting of no more than ten questions. Questions 
focused on the decision process, the factors considered in making decisions, the five 
embedded elements in the cases and the identification of best practices I decision aids. 
Interview guides were adjusted for each interview to reflect the interviewees ' positions 
and their likely participation in the decision making process around a particular area of 
care. The use of fewer questions, more focused on the likely experiences of the 
individual participants, increased the amount of relevant data received from fairly short 
interviews and allowed for a better flow within the interviews. The researcher also asked 
more probing questions about a topic if more information was required. The revised 
interview guides are provided in Appendix E. 
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3.2.3 Identifying and Contacting the Respondents 
The target population for this study is decision makers and health care providers involved 
in making resource allocation decisions in the three selected areas of care in the three 
provinces. The researcher attempted to interview all persons identified within the target 
population. 
Almost all of the people interviewed were sent an introduction package about the project 
at least a week before their interview. This introduction package included an introductory 
letter a brief project description, a copy of the consent form for their particular province 
and their specific interview guide. The introduction letter outlined the rationale of the 
study, identified the investigator as a graduate student of Memorial University identified 
and provided contact information for his two thesis supervisors, outlined the consent 
process and described the measures taken to ensure the confidentiality of responses. The 
interview guides were included to give the interviewees a better understanding of the type 
of information the researcher was interested in discussing. In the cover letter for those 
who contract was first made by the researcher, it stated that the researcher would contact 
the person by phone on a specific date to hopefully arrange for a mutually convenient 
time for an interview. In some cases circumstances did not allow for the interviewee to 
receive an introduction package before the interview. For example, in two cases, 
interviewees invited another person to their interviews. These people were not known to 
the researcher until the time of the interview. 
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There were sl ight differences in how participants were identified and contacted in each 
province. In Alberta, the local research contact provided a list of relevant persons within 
his health region. After agreeing to the list and securing ethics approval , the researcher 
provided introduction packages to the research contact's executive assistant, who forward 
them to the relevant persons and arranged for interviews. 
Potential interviewees in the Government of Alberta were identified through a search of 
the government 's website (2006). These potential interviewees were then sent 
introduction packages and contacted directly by the researcher to arrange for interviews. 
In some cases, the person initially contacted would suggest a more appropriate person 
within his or her organization to deal with the research request. This person was then 
contacted by phone or mai led an introduction package, depending on whether or not the 
initial person contacted had already forwarded the introduction package he or she had 
received to the person they suggested should participate. 
In Newfoundland, potential interviewees were identified either through first hand 
knowledge· discussions with one of my thesis supervisors, Dr. Doreen Neville; or through 
a search of the websites of the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador (2006) and 
Region B. Some participants identified other possible people of interest. even 
additional possible participants were suggested by interviewees. All of these people were 
invited to participate in this project, but only two agreed to be interviewed. 
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In Saskatchewan, the local research contact and the researcher discussed relevant persons 
within Region C to be interviewed. Potential interviewees were also identified through a 
search of the Government of Saskatchewan' s website (2006). Participants were sent 
introduction packages and contacted by the researcher to an·ange for interviews. One 
participant, when contacted, suggested the researcher also interview another person in 
their department. This person was contacted by phone and interviewed. Another 
participant felt that they were not the most appropriate person to be interviewed within 
the organization and suggested four alternatives. Three of these were deemed to be 
relevant by the researcher and were sent introduction packages. All three agreed to be 
interviewed. 
In Saskatchewan, one participant independently invited two other people to their 
interview. Likewise, in Newfoundland, one participant invited another participant to the 
interview. The addition of these people to the interviews was not known to the researcher 
until he arrived for the interviews. 
The information on the targeting and contacting of participants is summarized in Table 
3.2. 
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Table 3.2 Methods of Identifying and Contacting Target Population 
Alberta Newfoundland Saskatchewan Total 
Dates Nov. 10- 17, March 23 2005 March 13 - 16, 
2005 - 2006 
May 10,2005 
Identified by 
Researcher 4 17 12 33 
Identified by 
Others 13 7 9 29 
Initially Contacted 
by Researcher 6 23 19 48 
Initially Contacted 
by Others II I 2 14 
Total Invited to 
Participate 17 24 2 1 62 
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3.2.4 Consent and Confidentiality 
The project is designed to ensure both the anonymity and confidentiality of all 
participants and their responses. ln an introductory letter, participants were informed of 
the conditions under which they were asked to participate in the project. Participants 
were a lso advised in the introductory letter of the nature of the study, the proposed use of 
the data, that the confidentially of the persons involved would be strictly maintained, that 
their names would only be known by the principal researcher that their participation was 
completely voluntary and that they may refuse to answer any questions they wanted at 
any time. 
Participants were again advised of the terms of their participation before the start of their 
interviews and were asked to sign a consent form outlining their agreed involvement in 
the study. This included the pa11icipants who were not known to the researcher prior to 
the interviews. Consent to be record by audio tape during the interview was sought for all 
interviews. Consent forms for phone interviews were signed by the participant and faxed 
to the researcher before the start of the interviews. Specific consent forms were 
developed for each province. 
Interview tapes interview notes and transcripts were assigned random unique identifiers. 
This identifier prevented others from determining the identities of participants simply by 
looking at the tapes or the transcripts. The data was stored in a locked office and wa 
inputted only on a password protected computer system located in the Division of 
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Community Health of Memorial University. In accordance with university guidelines 
the data will be destroyed after five years. 
Publications and reports resulting from this project will not directly or indirectly identify 
participants nor attribute direct quotes to any specific participant. All direct quotes 
describe the respondent only as "a participant" and will not provide any information 
which could reveal the identity of the participant. 
3.2.5 Interviews 
Rubin and Rubin (2005) outl ine an approach to interviewing they call responsive 
interviewing. The basic elements of this approach are to identify knowledgeable people 
with first-hand experience of the subject matter, listen carefully to them, and ask follow-
up questions during the interviews to ensure as great an understanding as possi ble. This 
approach to interviewing was adopted for this project. 
Rubin and Rubin (2005) a lso emphasize two important aspects of interviewing a t various 
sites, which in this project occurs by interviewing participants from different provinces 
and different organizations. The first aspect relates to the evolving nature of qualitative 
research projects. As initial interviews are conducted and analyzed, initi al findings and 
themes become identified. Interviews in other sites a llow for an opportunity to test these 
evolving themes. In this project, some decision makers in A lberta and askatchewan 
were directly asked for their opinions of tentative conclusions resulting fTom the 
interviews conducted in Newfoundland. Secondly, testing in other sites helps determine 
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the generalizability of a project's findings. If similar results are found in different sites, 
especially if there are significant differences between the sites, the researcher can be 
fairly sure that results are generalizable to other cases. This goal of enhancing 
generalizability was one of the reasons for designing the study to ensure sufficient 
variabi lity across the cases and to examine different provinces. 
Interviews conducted for this project were all semi-structured based on the revised 
interview guides described in section 3.2.2. The purpose of a semi-structured interview is 
to encourage participants to talk freely. This attempt to limit the influence of the 
interviewer needs to be balanced, howe er, by the need to cover particular topics. The 
interviewer allowed the conversation to flow from one topic to another as much as 
possible to allow the participants to say what they wanted to say in the way they wanted 
to say it. The researcher also ensured that all the questions in the interview guide were 
covered during the time allotted for the interview. When required, further probing 
questions were asked to encourage the interviewee to elaborate on a particular topic or 
theme. Interviews ranged in length from around 30 minutes to two hours in length, with 
most lasting approximately 50 minutes. The interview were all conducted by the 
principle researcher, which helped ensure continuity across the interviews. 
Most interviews were conducted in person. It was hoped that in person interviews would 
make the interviewee more comfortable and relaxed . Most interviews were carried out in 
either the decision maker ' s office or other suitable location within their work 
environment. In three cases, interviews were carried out over the phone. If the 
131 
interviewee consented, interviews were tape recorded and additional notes were taken if 
needed. If the interviewee did not consent to a taped interv iew, only notes were taken. 
There were 43 interviews conducted for this project of which 35 were taped and 
transcribed . 
In A lberta, seventeen people were invited to be interviewed, of which fourteen were 
interviewed. The participation rate was 82%. This high participation rate was due in part 
to the work of the local research contact in identi fying and directly contacting participants 
in Capital Health. Nine interviewees consented to having their interviews taped. 
An issue which arose m every provmce was that interviewees, through internal 
communications within their own organizations, found out about other intended 
interviewee . Often this resulted in interviewees from the same department asking to be 
interviewed together. In order to accommodate the wishes of the interviewees, the 
researcher granted these requests. As noted above, in two cases, interviewees 
independently invited others to participate in the interviews. In all of these cases in which 
two or more participants were interviewed together, the interviews were taped. In 
Alberta, whi le nine people agreed to have their interviews taped, there are only six tap 
transcripts because three groups of two people were interviewed together. 
In Newfoundland, 24 people were invited to be interviewed, of which fifteen were 
interviewed. The participation rate was 62.5% . Fourteen interviewees consented to 
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having their interviews taped. Only one group interview, consisting of two people, was 
conducted in Newfoundland, so that there were thirteen interview transcripts. 
In Saskatchewan, 21 people were invited to be interviewed, of which fourteen were 
interviewed. The participation rate was 66.6%. Twelve interviewees consented to having 
their interviews taped. Only one group interview, consisting of four people, was 
conducted, so that there were nine interview transcripts from Saskatchewan. 
Given that these interviews are supposed to inform a number of different case studies, it is 
important to consider also how the interviewees are distributed across decision making 
organizations and across the specific areas of care. Provincial officials generally 
provided an overview of how resources are allocated by the provincial government to the 
regional authorities or gave detai Jed descriptions of relevant provincial progran1s relating 
to the areas of care. Members of the executive of regional authorities provided 
information about how resources were allocated with their organizations. Both provincial 
officials and regional authority executives often also had specific inforn1ation regarding 
how resources were a llocated in the three selected areas of care in their province. At the 
departmental level , interviews were focused on each specific area of care. For example, 
interviews conducted in the rehabilitation department of a regional authority were focused 
so lely on how resources for powered upper arm prostheses are allocated. Because 
endovascular coi ling and MRI were managed in the same department in all three regions 
studies, interviews with professionals in the e departments usually covered both areas. 
The only exception was an interview conducted in Newfoundland with a participant 
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which was focused solely on endovascular coiling. At the departmental level, the people 
interviewed included program managers, clinical chiefs, radiologists, neurosurgeons, 
physiatrists, and prosthetists. 
In Alberta, three provincial officials and seven members of the executive team of Region 
A were interviewed. At the departmental level, three people were interviewed about 
endovascular coiling. The same three people also discussed MRI. Three people were 
interviewed about how resources around powered upper arm prostheses are allocated. 
In Newfoundland, two provincial officials and six members of the executive team of 
Region B were interviewed. At the departmental level, four people were interviewed 
about endovascul ar coiling. Three of these four people also discussed MRI. Three 
people were interviewed about powered upper arm prostheses. 
In Saskatchewan, four provincial officials and four members of the executive team of the 
Region C were interviewed. At the departmental level, two people were interviewed 
about endova cular coiling. The same two people also discussed MRI. Five people were 
interviewed about powered upper arm prostheses. 
A summary of the interview participants is provided m Table 3.3. A breakdown of 
interviews by position is presented in Table 3. -1. 
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Table 3.3 Summary of Interview Participants 
Alberta Newfoundland Saskatchewan Total 
Number Invited 
to Participate 17 24 2 1 62 
Number 
Interviewed 14 15 14 43 
Participation 
Rate 82% 62.5% 66.6% 69% 
Table 3.4 Breakdown of Interviewees by Position 
Alberta Newfoundland Saskatchewan Total 
Provincial 
Officials 3 2 4 9 
Regional 
Executive 6 6 4 16 
Regional 
Departmental 3 4/3 2 9/8 
Level: 
Endovascular 
Coiling/ MRI19 
Regional 
Departmental 2 3 4 9 
Level: 
Power Upper 
Arm Prostheses 
3.2.6 Identifying Existing Documents 
A systematic search strategy for identifying relevant documents was not developed for 
this project. This decision was based on the facts that relevant data was not usually 
located in a searchable database and the information which was published was contained 
19 All of the people interviewed at the departmental level about MRI were also interview about 
endovascular coiling. This is due to the fact that in all three regions both programs are run out of the same 
clinical depa11ments. Only one respondent in Newfoundland talked so lely about endovascular coi ling. 
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in different formats. Thorough searches were made of a number of relevant websites and 
news archives, including those of the interviewees home organizations. There was some 
level of snowballing in the identification of relevant documents, e.g., if documents were 
mentioned in interviews, they were located and reviewed. Over forty documents relating 
to their organizations and resource allocation in the selected areas were also given to 
researcher directly by interviewees. 
3.2. 7 Analysis of Data 
Interview tapes and notes were all transcribed. A ll interview tapes were transcribed by a 
professional transcriber. Interview notes were transcribed by the researcher. Tape 
transcripts aimed to be as close as possible to the actual conversation. Grammar was not 
edited in any way and phrases such as "I know" were kept in. Pauses and inaudible parts 
of the conversation were so marked. During transcription, one tape broke and 
approx imately 30 minutes of interview data was lost. Interview notes were used to 
partially reconstruct what was covered in the lost data. 
Once the interview tapes and notes were transcribed, they were coded. Codes can be 
developed either deductively (a priori) or inductively (a posteriori) (Bowling, 2002). For 
this project, codes were developed mostly deductively, due to the fact that many of the 
key areas of interest had been already identified by the researcher. Themes identified 
from the interviews were also coded. For example, the idea of the "business case" was 
ra ised by a number of pmticipants and a code was developed for this theme. By the end 
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of the project, approximately 100 codes and sub-codes had been developed and used. 
Transcripts were coded using the qualitative research computer program N6. 
A ll of the existing documents identified by the researcher were reviewed. Notes were 
taken of points relevant to the case studies. Where there were disagreements between 
what was said in the interviews and what was described in the existing documents, the 
conflict was identified in the written cases. 
Once a ll tape and note transcriptions were coded and the existing documents reviewed, 
the cases were developed. It had initially been anticipated that nine separate cases would 
be developed (three areas of care in three different provinces) . It soon became apparent 
however that certain decision making processes, e.g. , how provincial governments 
allocate resources, how the regional authorities set their budgets, etc., affect all areas of 
care in a province. In order to avoid repetition, cases were developed by province. Each 
case begins with an overview of the process for a llocating resources in the province and 
in the regional authority. Next a description of the resource allocation in each area of 
care is provided fo llowed by five sections specifically focusing on the five embedded 
elements for each area of care. Given the information provided it was also possible to 
examine how each of the regional authority deals with the issues of evidence, cost, ethical 
considerations and accountability. Each case concludes with a section outlining the best 
practices and helpful decision aids identified in each province. 
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Once the cases were developed, compansons were made across the areas of interest 
identified in the project 's aims. In some cases, these comparisons requi red returning to 
the original transcripts to clarify or expand on some issues. Recommendations were then 
developed based on these comparisons. 
When using direct quotes in the written chapters, the researcher sought to maintain the 
confidentiality of the interviewees. Quotes only identified respondents as participants, or 
in some cases, as a participant from a particular province. Given the small number of 
relevant decision makers in a province, it was felt that further specification would unduly 
threaten the confidentiality of the participants. 
3.3 Delimitations 
Every project needs to set limits on what it wi ll cover and it will not. It is important for 
determining the extent to which a project ' s results can be applied to other context to 
describe these limits and the rationale for them (Jensen, 2005). 
One of the main delimitations of this project is that its scope is confined to the decision 
making processes in three areas of care in three provinces. Some consideration was given 
to doing a fourth province, but it was beyond the resources avai lable for this project. 
While increasing the number of cases, either in terms of the number of provinces studied 
or the areas of care examined, would have increased the generalizabi li ty of the project ' s 
results did provide suffi cient data to meet most of the project ' s aims and permit a good 
level of generalizability to other cases of resource allocation. 
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The project focuses on decision making processes, rather than on specific resource 
allocation decisions. As stated in the introduction, one of the reasons for this delimitation 
is that it hopefully will increase the usefulness of this project ' s results for health care 
organizations. There are, however, likely to be good insights derived from fo llowing how 
specific decisions are made. This project addresses this issue to some extent. In many 
cases, the descriptions the interviewees gave of the decision making proces in an area of 
care focused on specific decisions which made been recently made. 
3.4 Ethical and Operational Approvals 
All required ethical and operational approvals were granted for this project before data 
collection began. One of the complications faced by this project was that separate 
applications for ethical and operational approvals had to be made to each provincial ethics 
board and each region. In order to maintain the confidentiality of participants, only the 
approval letter from the Human Investigation Committee (Memorial) is provided in 
Appendix K. 
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Chapter 4: Alberta 
This chapter examines how resources for the three areas of care are allocated in Alberta. 
The chapter begins by reviewing the decision making structure of Region A. The next 
sections examine resource allocation in the three areas of care, focusing on the embedded 
elements of resource allocation decisions faced , need, use of evidence, cost, 
accountability and ethical considerations for each of the three areas. The final section 
presents the recommendations, proposed decision tools, and the challenges identified 
during the interviews in Alberta. In order to provide further context Appendix B 
presents genera l demographic, economic, and health care spending data for the three 
provinces and the three regions. 
4.1 Regional Structure 
In 1995, Alberta's health system was restructured with the creation of nine regional health 
authoriti es. These regional authorities deliver a wide range of health services, including 
acute care, long-term care, home care, health promotion and prevention activities . There 
are also two province-wide health authorities . The Alberta Cancer Board provides cancer 
services for the entire province. The Alberta Mental Health Board governs services and 
programs in the area of mental health. Mental health programs are delivered through th 
nine regional health authorities. 
Alberta has little direct provincial government program funding in the area of health care, 
usually limited to specialized services provided by only one or two regions for the entire 
province. These are high cost, complex services which include transplants, neurosurgery, 
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and neonatal ICU. In some cases, e.g., around some orthopedic procedures, the services 
have to be performed first and then funding is forwarded to the region . In other ca es, 
annual allotments are made to the providing regions. 
Provincial government funding is primarily provided as global funding to the regions. 
These global budgets are determined using a per capita based formula, with some 
adjusters for demographic differences between the regions (Alberta Health and Wellness, 
2007). One participant reported that the adoption of formula-based funding was driven 
by concerns with equity, simplicity, transparency and objectivity. The same participant 
said the adoption of formula-based funding was also driven by a conscious choice by 
Alberta Health and Wellness not to micro-manage health care spending. 
Adjustment payments are made when care is provided to patients away from their home 
region. Conceptually, what occurs is that the provincial government takes funding away 
fTom the home region to compensate the region which provided the care. The transfer of 
funds , however, does not occur until the provincial budget two years forward. This 
requires that the provider region carries the cost of care for two years before they are 
compensated for it. Costs are usually 'owed ' from the rural regions to more urban 
regions. One respondent reported that often the provincial government will not penalize 
the region from which the patient originated due to the size of the costs involved and a 
concern to allow for some budgetary stability. A respondent from Region A said that, 
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" there is some attractiveness for us to provide services to patients from 
other regions because it increases our cost, but it also increases our 
revenue. So, hopefully, at some point that balances out. It doesn't always 
because there isn't always a direct relationship to our cost, but... it's close 
enough that it supports us doing that." 
In other words, it is in the interest of the regions to take on these transferred cases because 
it increases their overall level of resources in future year. 
Table 4.1: Regional Structure (Alberta) 
Number of health regions 9 regional authorities + 2 
in the province province-wide boards for 
cancer care and mental 
health 
Current health regions 1995 
established 
Scope of regions Acute care, long-term care, 
home care, health promotion 
and prevention activities 
Method of funding Primarily formula-based, 
global budgeting. Targeted 
funding to certain regions for 
providing high-level care. 
4.2 Region A 20 
Region A provides acute care, long term care, home care and public health services. It 
serves both an urban and rural population. In 2005-6, Region A had revenues of over $2 
20 In order to help ensure confidentiali ty of the region, rough approximations of the data are provided, not 
exact numbers. The approx imations are general enough so that the data could apply to more than one 
Health Region in Alberta and still provide a fa irly accurate indication of the region 's size and financial 
strength. The information in this section is based on information provided on Region A' s website. 
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billion or approximately $2400 for every person in the region . For 2006-2007, the region 
received an increase in its operating budget of approximately 6%. 
4.2.1 Governance Structure 
Region A is governed by a board of community members, appointed by the Minister of 
Alberta Health and Wellness. The board's responsibilities are set out in provincial 
legislation. These responsibilities include setting health priorities for the region, ensuring 
reasonable access to care and hiring a CEO. The board also releases a publicly avai lable 
annual report on the activities of the region, although this report is primarily written by 
the region 's executive team. The board is supported in its duties by a number of board 
committees which review particular aspects of the region 's operations. 
Because the health regions are fairly large the provincial government requires that every 
health region in Alberta has Community Health Councils which are to provide the board 
with a more localized community perspective. Region A has a number of Community 
Health Councils. The members of these councils are nominated by their local 
communities or by the person themselves. Region A's board selects which nominees will 
serve on the Councils. These Community Health Councils make presentations to the 
board throughout the year to outline the concerns of their local communities. This input 
is meant to help guide the region's operational and strategic planning . 
The CEO is delegated authority by the board to oversee the region ' s operations. Working 
with the board, the CEO will determine the reg ion ' s strategic goals. The CEO is 
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supported by a semor executive team, which meet to approve strategic planning 
initiatives, set budgets and deal with other issues of concern to the region. Under the 
CEO, there is an Executi ve Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Health 
Services, who is responsible for coordinating and managing health care operations. 
Vice-presidents are responsible for the main corporate functions of the region, e .g., 
physician affairs, finance, human resources. There are also two types of COO within 
Region A. Some COOs are responsible for specific program areas. Others are 
responsible for specific sites, e .g., the major hospitals. These COOs are all members of 
the executive team and all report to the COO of Health Services. Many executive team 
members have responsibility for more than one COO portfolio. 
The use of COOs for specific sites partially reflects the management structure before 
regionalization. Maintaining some level of site-based accountability creates a more 
complicated management structure than m a purely regional system, in which all 
programs are managed on a regional basis. While adding to the organizational 
complexity, participants supported maintaining some level of site management. This 
management structure does at times provide some tensions within the organization and 
can be challenging to the executive. Participants from the executive team thought that 
being challenged by site and regional perspectives was generally benefi cial. Maintaining 
site-based management is seen as increasing communication throughout the organization. 
Also, as one participant said, site-based management 
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"is a structure that people in Alberta were used to for the last hundred years, and 
maintaining it has allowed the organization to remain operationally very strong, 
based on the historical continuance about how things were done." 
Another important reason for maintaining some level of site-based accountability is the 
hospital foundations. Each major hospital site has its own health care foundation which 
helps raise money dedicated to that site. These foundations had relationships with these 
hospitals before the creation of Region A. By maintaining some of autonomy, the 
hospitals are able to maintain their relationship with their hospital foundation. The 
executive sometimes approach these foundations with larger capital purchase, usually for 
more cutting edge technology. The contribution of these foundations can be substantial. 
The goal is to balance elements of site-based and regional program management to ensure 
that the organization is working as efficiently as possible. 
Clinical chiefs and program managers all report to the COO who has responsibility for 
their program area. Clinical chiefs also report to the Vice-president of Medical Affairs , 
who is the head physician for the region. Figure 4.1 reviews of Region A' s senior 
governance structure. 
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Clinical Chiefs and 
Program Managers 
Figure 4.1: Region's A Decision Structure 
Table 4. 2 summarizes some of the information presented in the previous two sections 
about Region A ' s financial status and management structure. 
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Table 4.2: Region A Financial Data and Management Structure 
Total Revenue $2 billion 
Revenue per capita $2400 
Increase in operate 6% 
costs (2006-2007) 
Management Regional programs and site-
Structure based 
4.3 Resource Allocation at Region A 
The budgeting process starts by examining the previous year ' s budget. Zero-base 
budgeting, which tries to allocate all avai lable resources without any consideration for 
how these funds were allocated in the past, is not used. Working from the previous 
budget, the executive would identify areas of change in the coming year for the region. 
The executive would identify any added cost pressures, such as inflation, population 
increases or changes in staffing levels. The executive also try and identify what changes 
need to be made across the region, e.g., how many new physicians need to be recruited, 
what changes need to be made in the number of beds or what changes are needed to the 
amount of resources going into particular programs. 
Operating and capital budgeting are two independent activities at Region A. They are 
supported by two different offices within the region's finance department. The operating 
budget and capital budget are also considered separately by the executive. There is some 
level of cross referencing within the two processes. A decision for which there are both 
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substantial capital costs and substantial operating costs would be linked to some extent. 
In the capital budgeting process, the executive would ask whether there are sufficient 
operating funds for the program. In the operating budgeting process, the question would 
be asked whether the capital costs are budgeted for. Although the budgeting occurs 
through two different processes, there has never been a case where either the capital or 
the operat ing side of a request gets funded and not the other. The processes are 
independent, but how priorities are set and how resources are ultimately allocated is 
generally the same for both budgets and is carried out by the same set of decision makers. 
Region A has both site-based and program-based portfolios. In terms of budgeting, both 
are seen as programs with their specific costs. It is just that some programs are service 
based, some are facility based. Once funds are allocated to programs, they may further be 
allocated to the different sites which provide services. An example of how this type of 
program allocation to sites occurs is outlined in section 4 .5 below, which deals with 
resource allocation within the Diagnostic Imaging program. 
Within Region A, on the operational side, there has been a movement over the past few 
years towards activity-based budgeting. In activity budgeting, funds are allocated to a 
program to perform a specified amount of service activity. One participant described 
activity-based funding as essential ly telling the programs "here's how much money [you 
have] .. . here's what we expect to deliver for this amount of money." Almost all 
operational budgeting at Region A is now tied to performance activity. Any major 
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vanances m service delivery need to be explained to the executive by the program 
leadership team. 
Sources of Requests for Additional Resources 
Requests for more resources come to the executive from numerous source . There are 
priorities the executive have themselves. Provincial initiatives or guidelines influence the 
prioritie at the regional level, e.g. , there are provincial guidelines around wait times for 
certain services. The region's board identifies priori ties and strategic goals which the 
organization is to pursue. The e board priorities will partially reflect the requests they 
receive from the ommunity Health Council . Each program area has processes in place 
by which their COOs receive input from their program managers and their medical 
leadership about priorities within their specific program areas. There are " business 
driven" priorities. For example, some regions have responsibility to provide certain types 
of care to other regions which may influence priorities. Internal organizational pressure , 
e.g., wait time measures, other operational measures, staff retirements, influence 
priorities. Then there are issues around technology and service developments. These 
sources of priority requests are summarized in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: Sources of Requests for Increased Resources 
The Budgeting Process 
The budgeting process begins in either late August or early September. At the initial 
meeting, the executive table their priorities for each specific program in their portfolio. 
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The CEO would present any regional priorities, identified either by the region s board or 
provincial government. Physician recruitment for the year would be discussed, due to its 
impact on resources. The executive are also concerned with how resources are distributed 
across the sites within the regions. As part of the budgeting process, one or two programs 
are selected for review each year. The executive may adjust the budget of the program as 
to where the services are being provided, as opposed to the historic distribution . 
Sometimes these adjustments require the infusion of new funds. 
Factors InOuencing Budget Priorities 
There would be some discussion throughout the priority setting process between the 
region's CFO and the representatives from Alberta Health and Wellness about the likely 
size of any increase in the region's budget for the coming year. Although the exact 
budget allocation for the region is not known until the provincial budget day, the 
executive usually have a good sense of the size of any increase ahead of time and use this 
information to help determine their request for resources. The budgeting process is a 
balancing of the requests the executive receives with what is likely to be the increase in 
resources for the coming year. As one participant said, it's up to the executive, with 
support of the finance department, "to actually distill all of those [requests] and come up 
with a game plan as to what we're going to try to do in the next year, recognizing that 
things come along even during the year that you [cannot predict]." 
umerous factors are considered by the executive in making the region ' s priority list, 
depending on the type of program under consideration. Table 4. 3 lists some of the types 
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of factors participants mentioned which influence priority setting. All of the participants 
identified clinical need or what is in the best interest of the patient as the most important 
factor in driving priority setting. Institutional impact was also mentioned as a key driving 
factor by most participants. Other facto rs relate to the numerous sources of requests and 
pressures on the executive, e.g., board priorities, provincial ini tiatives, needs identified by 
the different program areas. Sometimes gaps in service are identified, e.g., preparedness 
for avian influenza, which need to be addressed. 
Table 4.3 : Factors Identified as Determining Budget Priorities 
• Clinical need I Best interest of the patient 
• Expected clinical need I Clinical trends 
• Cost I Institutional impact 
• Operational pressures (Waiting Lists I Wait 
Times) 
• Historical performance 
• Board priorities 
• Provincial guidelines 
• Provincial I National initiatives 
• New program areas I Gaps in service 
• Needs ident ified by frontline staff 
• Population changes 
• Technology I Changes in clinical practice 
• Practices at other centers of excellence 
• taff issues 
• Staff expectations 
Two other fac to rs were identified by pa1 icipants that are not often mentioned in the 
academic literature. The first relates to the conception of the regional authority held by 
its staff. Frontline providers have perceptions about the capabi lit ies their health region 
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should have. As one participant said regarding a PET scan, "clearly, a region the size of 
ours [Region A] should have a PET scan." In large regional authorities, there are greater 
expectations to have the latest technology. Providers expect that a regional authority of a 
particular size should be able to provide access to a certain level and type of care. 
Although it is hard to measure, this conception of what capabilities a regional authority 
should have likely has a powerful influence on priority setting, especia lly at the 
depar1mental level where providers are more involved. 
The second factor relates to the ability of requests on the budgetary agenda to ul timately 
get filled . There is a sense that once a request gets on the agenda, they will at some point 
get funded. There are a number of reasons why requests which remain on the agenda 
may ultimately get filled . It could b that there is enough merit fo r the request to be 
maintained on the agenda, but it is simply a question of there being higher priorities. The 
request may rightfully become the organization' s highest priority in later budget cycles, 
once preceding higher priorities have been fulfilled. Yet it may also be the case that a 
request gets filled partly out of a sense of budgetary fatigue, where the issue is raised so 
often that it fina lly gets seen as an issue which needs to be addressed, outside of the merit 
the request may have. 
For new projects, a fairly thorough case needs to be made to the executive before it is 
approved. The case would include an account of the project' s total impact on th 
organization, including total cost, purchase price of equipment, cost of service contracts, 
staffing costs, setup costs, required renovations, where the program and equipment are 
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going to be located. Most importantly, the case has to be made in terms of its impact on 
patients. Other information may be required depending on what concerns the executive 
have. Requests for new programs or major expansions of an existing program thus 
usually require a substantial amount of documentation. 
With the release of the provincial budget, usually in March, the region finds out what 
additional resources it will receive in the coming fi scal year. The total amount requested 
for additional services is always greater than the amount of addition resources the region 
can expect to receive. For example, for the 2006 - 2007 budget year, Region A received 
only around 35% o f the amount of additional funding it requested. 
At the regional level, the second phase of the budgeting process is to prioritize the ini tial 
list of requests in terms of the amount of funds actually received. Again the executive 
tries to determine, from a regional perspective, which requests are most important to 
fulfill. As one participant said, 
" it's not an exact science but our process continually evolves so this is how 
we're doing it this year and it's built on previous years. It always gets a bit 
better and more refined ; but, remember, we're still a young organization. 
We're only 10 years old - very complex and j ust beginning to have 
available the kind of information that we need to help us make these kind 
of decisions." 
Again each member of the executive makes their case for increases in their area of 
responsibility. The executive as a group work until they come to a consensus about how 
funds will be allocated across the diffe rent programs and generally within programs. 
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Only after the executive have determined the budget for the region do the programs find 
out what level of funding they will receive and what new programs have been approved. 
The executive would also identify what increased level of activity it expects the program 
to produce with the new funds. Figure 4.3 provides an overview of Region A ' s priority 
setting and resource allocation cycle. 
Provincial Government 
Priorities 
Frontline Requests 
PRIORITY 
SETTING 
Develop Budget Request 
(Sept. to Dec.) 
Provincial 
Budget 
(Dec.to Mar.) 
Allocation of Health 
Care Funding 
RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION 
Finalizing Region' Budget 
(From March) 
Figure 4.3: Priority Setting and Resource Allocation Cycle at Region A 
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Region A's finance department conducts mid-year budget reviews to determine how the 
organization is performing financiall y, to determine any problem areas and try to correct 
them before the beginning ofthe next budget cycle. 
Procurement 
Region A has a fairl y sophisticated procurement process in place. Procurement is 
standardized across program areas. As one participant points out, "we're spending publ ic 
dollars so we are required to have processes which [can pass] under the scrutiny of the 
Auditor General and so our processes for that are very clearly laid out." All purchasing is 
managed through a contracting office in the department of Materials Management. Whi le 
the contracting office manages the entire procurement process, the physicians and 
managers in the program areas are closely involved. 
Once the need for a p1ece of equipment has been identified and a budget allocation 
committed to the purchase of new equipment, the contracting office contact the leadership 
team of the program the equipment is for to begin the planning stage. End-users would 
determine the required specifications for the new equipment. Based on the input of the 
end-users, the contracting office would develop a request-for-proposal (RFP) and forward 
it to the appropriate vendors. Once RFP have been received, the contracting office 
would send the cli nical and technical aspects of the RFPs to the program leadership team 
for them to assess the different options and shortlist which equipment they find 
acceptable. The contracting office retains the financial parts of the RFPs. Once the 
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program team has identified the options which are acceptable from a technical and 
clinical basis, the contracting office reviews the financial details of the RFPs for the 
acceptable equipment. The contracting office would then consult with the program 
leadership team to validate the value of the different options. A recommendation would 
then be made to the CFO to purchase a particular piece of equipment, based on its value 
and technical acceptability. Figure 4. 4 outlines the basic steps in the procurement 
process. 
Need -+ Budget -+ I. Planning -+ 2. RFP -+ 3. Assessment -+ 4. Purchase 
ldenti fied Committed (Specification) I Decision 
Procurement 
Figure 4.4: The Procurement Process 
4.4 Resource Allocation Issues at Region A 
The executive of Region A are ultimately responsible for all the resource allocations 
made wi thin their region. In determining the region ' s budget, the executive would 
allocate resources across the different program areas. It would also make program level 
decisions which have a substanti al impact on the region's operations or have substantial 
costs associated with them. For example, large shifts in program expenditures would 
require executive approval. The executive may also decide on any issue which is 
particularly contentious and in this way the executive could be involved in decisions 
concerning the care individual patients receive. 
157 
On one level, the executive' s decision making can be described as closed-door I top-
down, in that it is only the executive who makes the decision and its decisions are then 
imposed on the other levels of the region. But the budgeting process is also very open in 
terms of the level of input the executive receive from a range of stakeholders, including 
frontline providers, program managers, their board, the Community Health Councils, and 
the provincial government. While the executive make decisions which are ultimately 
imposed on their entire organization, there is a real attempt to bri ng in as many 
perspectives as possible in making these decisions. There IS then some level of 
inclusiveness to the executive's decision making. 
4.4.1 Region A and Need 
At the executive level, need was mostly determined by the rep011s of staff and other 
stakeholders. Internal data, particularly around wait times, was also mentioned as another 
indicator of need . No participant reported the use of formal needs assessments, even for 
setting general regional priorities. 
4.4.2 Region A and Evidence 
Decision makers fe lt that Region A does a fa irly good job of using evidence in decision 
making, although there is some variation across programs. As one participant said, the 
leadership of a program "wouldn't be out there suggesting we should do it unless there's 
good documented proof that it is viable." The amount of evidence required by the 
executive would depend on the type of procedure under consideration. As another 
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participant said " there has to be a lot more documented evidence before we' ll go and fi nd 
new modality ; but to use something added on the same modality, I think that level of 
documentation is much less." The level of evidence required would also be affected by 
the executive ' s level of familiarity with the technology, the issues surrounding it, its 
likely institutional impact and the cost associated with it. Sometimes procedures go 
ahead without proper evidence, but the usage is seen as part of being an academic 
research centre. It is accepted that in an academic research environment, there are going 
to be procedures attempted which do not have to have significant evidence behind them 
for part of the job of an academic teaching institution is sometimes to help produce the 
relevant evidence. This role as an academic teaching environment needs to be balanced 
with the goal of being an evidence-based organization. This type of investigative 
adoption of new technology would usually be done on a small scale first and then 
expanded if it is shown to be beneficial. Most times this decision to expand an innovative 
program would include, if not a formal cost-effectiveness study at least some 
consideration of the costs associated w ith a new procedure. At Region A, there is 
currently a review of all programs being conducted looking at best management practices, 
including the different programs' use of evidence. Also, as described below, Region A 
has recently established an Office of Health Innovation to help coordinate some of the 
evaluation and assessment work of new technologies. 
The use of evidence also touches on information management w ithin the organization. 
Most decisions are driven by internal operating data. One participant suggested that there 
is a need to improve the use of the information they have in order to make better 
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decisions. The improved use of internal data requires capturing the internal data and 
presenting it in a way which is useful to decision makers. One participant rated Region A 
use of internal information as "okay, but clearly there's ways that we can improve." 
4.4.3 Region A and Cost 
In terms of cost, participants focused almost executi vely on budget impact. There was 
little consideration of cost-effectiveness mentioned in any of the discussions. The use of 
cost-effectiveness info rmation in making funding decisions may increase with the new 
Office of Health Innovation which aims to conduct more internal evaluations before 
programs and procedures are started. For Region A what was in the best interest of the 
patient was reported as a more dominate consideration than what would be the most cost-
effective means of treating the patient. 
Costing is primari ly done using historical internal data from the programs. Region A also 
has a department of finance which keeps track of the financia l expenditures. This 
department conducts bi -annual reviews of program spending to ensure that cost estimates 
are not missed ; or if they are missed, financia l discrepancies can be addressed earlier on. 
4.4.4 Region A and Accountability 
As a government agency, Region A is bound by numerous government regulations which 
are meant to help ensure accountability to the public. In accordance with the Government 
Accountability Act (1995) and Regional Health Authorities Act ( 1995), Region A 's board 
re leases publicly available annual reports and three-year strategic business plans. These 
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reports are written by the management of Region A, but are approved by the board. The 
reports set out the financial performance of the region, their operational performance, and 
the strategic goals of the region going forward. The budgeting and procurement 
processes at Region A are reviewable by the provincial auditor general and are therefore 
well documented and done in accordance with wider government guidelines. Because of 
the boards and the CEO's positions are ultimate ly dependent on the Minister of Alberta 
Health and Wellness, who is elected, there is also general political accountability through 
the provincial election process. 
Provincial regulations require that Region A have Community Health Councils, which 
he lp present the views and concerns of local communities to the board. These 
Community Health Councils, as described above, are appointed by the board themselves. 
The Councils sometimes do small surveys in their communities or hold consul tation 
sessions with local citizens. These Councils seems to be the fu ll extent of public 
participation in decision making at Region A. The role of the public participation at 
Region A is limited to being consultative. 
Within Region A itself, discussion around accountability was tied to programs balancing 
their budgets and meeting activi ty targets . Another benefit of activity-based budgeting is 
that it focuses operations on performance indicators. The improved use and carefully 
monitoring of these performance indicators, as one participant said the " horrendously 
careful monitored at times," allows the region to show the connection between where 
funds are directed and output. As another participant said, " if somebody gets an extra 
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million dollars to revamp their day surgery so that they can extend their hours at their day 
surgery clinic and allow that many more OR cases to go through, then they bloody well 
better show that there are more cases." This focus on measurable results is driven both by 
a concern to use resources efficiently, but also to clearly show what resources are being 
spent on. 
The role of people was also identified as important factor for ensuring accountability. As 
one participant said, it is important that " the leadership of people being consistent, being 
forthright and just coming in and doing the best job that they can." This participant went 
on to say that " it's not always perfect and, you know, we do make mistakes; and when 
that happens then, hopefully, we catch it early and then we do a course correction. We 
make a change. We pause and then we take another run at it. " In terms of accountability 
and resource allocation generally, as another participant said " I think at the executive 
level and having Vice-Presidents or Chief Operating Officers that have the skills set in the 
leadership and the abilities to do this work is key." Other participants also seemed very 
cognizant of their ultimate responsibility to the public and of their responsibility to use 
public money wisely. 
Measures to ensure accountability at Region A can be seen then as being both process-
based and character-based, with a good deal of government oversight and transparency, 
but little direct public involvement. 
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4.4.5 Region A and Ethics 
There was little direct discussion of the ethi cal aspects of the resource allocation 
decisions at Region A. Participants identified a number of its corporate values, including 
the "wise use of resources." Region A does have a Cl inical Ethics Committee, which 
sometimes evaluates clinical policies from an ethical perspective. Some of the hospi tal 
sites have their own ethics committees. Region A sometimes brings in outside ethical 
experti se. While there is a good deal of concern fo r ethics within the region, the region 
does not appear to have explicitly looked at the allocation of resources, especially at the 
executive level, solely from an ethical perspective. 
4.4.6 Initiatives for Improving Resource Allocation at Region A 
There are a number of initiatives currently underway within Region A which participants 
report as improving the region' s abil ity to allocate resources more efficiently. 
Better Physician Recrui tment 
Labour costs and staff recruitment have a major impact on how resources are a llocated 
within a regional health authority and on future health costs. In particular, physician 
recruitment can have a fa irly substantial impact on resource allocations . Medical staff 
come at a high expense, both in terms of salary and required support, e.g. , need for 
support staff, requests to purchase new equipment or to provide new services. It is also 
di ffi cult to reduce staff levels once people have been hired. Another problem with 
physician recruitment, as reported by one participant, is that it is hard to get good 
comparisons with what is happening in other regions, so that it is diffi cul t to benchmark 
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the costs associated with new physicians. Region A is currently trying to improve how it 
costs physician recruitment. The vice-president of medical affairs, the COO of the site 
involved, and the medical director for each site now review the impact of physician 
recruitment on a site by site basis. Frontline c linicians are also being brought in more to 
help with the costing of physician recruitment. 
Electronic Health Record (EHR) 
Region A has established and is expanding its electronic health record system. The 
system al lows authorized staff to have real-time access to parts of the patient' s medical 
record . Information contained in the system includes personal registration information, 
tests results, current medications, known allergies, operations and surgeon reports. The 
system also links to the provincial Pharmaceutical Information Network. Next to being a 
tool for ensuring the more efficient use of resources, e.g., avoiding the duplication of 
tests, participants report that the EHR can be used to give the management team better 
information on system usage and help formulate that information is in a form which is 
more useful to decision makers. 
Office of Health Innovation 
In spring of 2003 , Region A established an Office of Health Innovation. The Office of 
Health Innovation has two main goals. The firs t is to evaluate some technologies before 
they get established across the reg ion. The second is to act as a point of contact for other 
organizations concern d with the development and evaluation of new health technologies. 
This would include groups like the Alberta Heritage Foundation for Medical Research, 
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CADTH, the National Drug Review, etc. This point of contact can also be used by 
private sector companies looking to work with the region to develop new products. The 
primary concern would be to work with Alberta-based companies. 
The plan is fo r assessments to be carried out by the cl inical staff with support from the 
O ffice of Health Innovation; or the Office may take on the assessment itself. The Office 
also hopes to be more fo rward thinking than other HTA units. The assessment would 
involve checking with experts, benchmarking with other leading institut ions rather than 
just re lying on published research findings. Any existing research evidence would also be 
evaluated. These components are a ll part of the initial assessment, which can be used to 
he lp decision makers decide whether to invest in the new technology. 
The Pharmaceuticals and Therapeutics Committee 
Region A ha a pharmaceuticals and therapeutics committee which reviews high-cost 
drugs that may be used by the region. This committee looks at both the cl inical efficiency 
and the financial impact of new treatment options. The clinical effi ciency and the 
fi nancial impact are considered by di fferent groups. As one participant said, this i so 
"you don't have your doctors making advice on pay or no pay. They just say, yeah, it 
works for this, thi s, this and this . It's better than the old one or it's an altemativ to 
surgery or whatever." The finance side of the committee would then consider whether 
the level of benefi t is su ffic ient to j ustify the investment. 
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4.4. 7 Overview of Resource Allocation at the Executive Level of Region A 
In order to assist in the comparison of decision making across the regions, the information 
presented in sections 4.4 to section 4.4.6 is summarized in Table 4. 4. 
Table 4.4: Overview of Resource Allocation at the Executive Level of Region A 
Resource Allocation Across program areas; within programs and occasionally, in 
Decisions clinical circumstances. Inclusive, but ultimately closed-
door, top-down. 
Need Determined by staff, stakeholder reports and internal data. 
Evidence Varies depending on issue under consideration. New and 
innovative technologies usually require a good deal of 
information. Sometimes innovative procedures are allowed 
in order to evaluate them. Internal data and expert opinion 
are important types of evidence. 
Cost Primarily concerned with budget impact, determined 
primarily by internal data. 
Accountability General government structure; annual reports ; use of 
activity-based program budgeting, the character and skills of 
the region's leadership team, and meeting budget targets. 
Ethics Ethical concerns consider, but no ethical audit of the 
al location of health care resources. 
Innovations for • Better physician recruitment 
Improving Resource • EHR 
Allocation 
• Office of Health Innovation 
• The Pharmaceuticals and Therapeutics Committee 
4.5 Resource Allocation within the Diagnostics Program21 
At Region A, endovascular coiling and MRI are both budgeted through the Diagnostics 
Program. It is useful to begin our discussion of resource allocation in these two areas by 
examining how resources are allocated within this program generally. 
21 The exact name of the program is not used to help ensure the confidentiality ofthe region . 
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Decision Structure 
The Diagnostics Program IS responsible for providing diagnostic services throughout 
Region A. The Diagnostics Program runs over 200 major pieces of diagnostic equipment 
across numerous sites. They have capabilities in most modalities of diagnostic imaging. 
There are around I 00 radiologists in the Diagnostics Program, making it one of the 
largest diagnostic imaging departments in the country. 
The Diagnostics program is led by a Regional Admi nistrative Director for Diagnostics 
and a Clinical Director. The Administrative Director reports to the COO for Diagnostics, 
who is a member of the senior executive team. Although Diagnostics is a regional 
program, it is delivered at the different hospital sites. The leadership team of the program 
is supported by program coordinators at each site. The leadership team is a lso supported 
by a number of liaison groups. These liaison groups are mostly organized around 
different modalities, e.g. , MRis, CTs, ultrasound. There is a lso a liaison group 
responsible for quality, which will occasionally review protocol procedures across the 
program. These liaison groups would consist of site program coordinators, some 
management staff and frontline radiologis ts. These groups meet on a fairly regu lar basis. 
Their discussions would be focused on very practical issues related to their specific 
modalities, e.g., how to standardize specific procedures across all sites. These liaison 
groups would also identify needs relating to their specific modality to the Administrative 
Director and C linical Director. The program leadership also bring frontline staff d irectl y 
into the decision making process when they are required . For example, front line staff 
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would be brought into discussions about th purchase of new equipment. Frontl ine staff 
is also encouraged to identify changes in usage trends or ways of improving service to the 
attention of the program' s leadership team. Any staff member can informally identify 
concerns to the leadership team. The decision structure aims to al low for fairly good 
communication from frontline staff to the program leadership, which is sometimes 
challenging given the size of the program and the fact that it is spread across numerou 
sites. The programs decision structure is outlined in Figure -1.5. 
Chief perating Officer for Diagnostics 
Administrative Director - Diagnostics ~-7 Clinical Director - Diagnostics 
Liaison Groups (by Modali ty and for Quality) 
Program Coordinators 
Frontline Staff 
Figure 4.5: Division Making Structure of the Diagnostics Program 
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Priority Setting 
As one participant said, priority setting within Diagnostics focuses on trying to determine 
what is " reasonable to ask" for within Region A's annual budgeting process. The 
program leadership team listens to reque ts from radiologists, examines the current 
operational ituation, e.g., wait times, and considers the region's likely budget 
environment. Budget requests are greatl y inOuenced by previous budget allocations and 
service levels. Generally, funding would follow the pattern of previous years. Priority 
setting would only be done around expected increases in funding. The Administrative 
Director and the C linical Director would determine the program's budget priorities and 
submit them to COO for Diagnostics. There would be ongoing di cussions between the 
Administrative Director, the Clinical Director and the COO before a priority list is put 
forward to ensure its acceptability to the COO. 
In setting priorities for the coming year, Diagnostics puts forward both a capital budget 
and an operational budget. AI though these are two separate budgets, Diagnostics is 
moving more towards making requests which reflect the total cost of doing business, 
including cost items such as capital costs, operating costs, warranties and service 
contracts. In making requests for new purchases like an MRI , which require both an 
expansion of operational costs and capita l expenditures, there would certainly be some 
cross referencing between the two budgeting process. The operational side of a request 
would not get filled without the capital purchase also getting approved; and visa versa. 
For the operational budget, budget a llocations are tied to activity levels, as they are for all 
programs at Region A. Increases in resources are tied to increa es in the expected activity 
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for the coming year. For example, a certain amount of money could be directed to 
Diagnostics to do a specified increased number of MRI scans. 
The COO for Diagnostics would bring Diagnostics requests to the executive. The request 
represents what the COO feels is a reasonable investment in diagnostic equipment and 
what activity levels there should be to meet the expected demand for the coming year. 
This request would be based on current activity levels, historical perfo rmance and 
prospective growth, wait lists, and priority programs within the region. Externa l factors 
would also be considered, such as the expectations arising out of provincial and federal 
government initiatives and provincially established service targets. Sometimes the 
evidence supporting the clinical effectiveness of a new program may also be presented to 
the executive. This inclusion of clinical evidence is an increasing trend within Region A. 
It is the opinion of more than one partic ipant that the current diagnostic modalities are 
essentially proven and well known technologies, so that there is little need to present 
evidence to support their effectiveness within the budgeting process. 
At the conclusion of the region' s budget process, the leadership of Diagnostics will be 
advised whether their budget has been changed, whether any capital purchases have been 
approved, and of expected changes in their acti vity levels. The budget allocation will 
then be allocated by the leadership of Diagnostics to the various hospi tal sites within 
Region A which provide diagnostic services. 
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Once the decision has been made by the executive to buy a new piece of diagnostic 
equipment, like an MRJ, there is a published protocol which is used to guide the 
procurement process. Diagnostics would work with the Department of Materials 
Management to set up a team to develop a RFP. This team would involve people from 
the Materia ls Management and frontline staff from Diagnostics. As one participant said, 
"in terms of an imaging perspective, [when developing an RFP] we always work in 
a team ... because no one person of it has all the information, ... I think that's 
sometimes unrecognized outside of imaging - how complex making sure that you 
get the right pieces to the equipment is and how important it is for Imaging 
[Services] to be in the process from beginning to end." 
The RFP would specify the clinical and technical requirements wanted by Diagnostics. 
The rest of the process would follow the same procedure for procurement described 
above in the section 4 .3. 
4.6 Endovascular Coiling in Alberta 
Endovascular ceilings have been performed at Region A for about eight years. No 
estimate for the number of patients annually receiving endovascular ceilings at Region A 
was given. The patient population was described as fairly stable from year to year and 
small. In 2005, the region began a formal endovascular coiling program. Previously, 
patients were primarily coi led when the neurosurgeon felt that the patient was too ill to 
undergo open brain surgery. Now interventional radiologists and neurosurgeons are 
trying to be more proactive in determining which patients would be best served by ei ther 
coiling or clipping. In setting up a formal program, the region hired an outcomes nurse 
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and established a follow-up clinic to monitor patients. The new program allows for a 
single point of entry for patients who need endovascular coilings so that they can be 
better followed through the system . 
The need for a formal endovascular coiling program was identi fied internally by fron tline 
staff. Starting thi s program was a multi-year initiative. While Diagnostics did not know 
exactly when they were going to get the go-ahead from the executive to implement the 
program , endovascular coiling had been moving in the direction of establishing a program 
for sometime. As one participant remarked, "so part of being successful [in establishing 
an Endovascular Coiling program] is probably [the result of] having the stam ina." 
There were a number of issues around the development of an endovascular coiling 
program. There were some political and jurisdictional issues between the interventional 
radiologists and neurosurgeons regarding the management of cases. Part of the problem 
re lated to the way the two sets of physicians are paid. Neurosurgeons can bill fo r the 
clipping of aneurysms as a surgery. The radiologists do not have the same billing options 
available to them for coilings. Radiolog ists also do not have hospital beds and cannot 
admit patients in hospita l. The question became whether the patients should be admitted 
through the neurology depat1ment even though they were primarily be ing treated by the 
interventional radiologist. One participant pointed out that this is part of a wider problem 
as innovations in radiology begin to challenge the traditional way medicine has been 
de livered and managed. While the program has now been established, participants admit 
that there are still some operational details which need to be worked out between the 
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interventional radiologists and neurosurgeons to make the management of patients run 
more smoothly. Both groups supported, however, the creation of an endovascular coiling 
program at Region A. 
4.6.1 Resource Allocation for Endovascular Coiling 
The budgeting for Endovascular Coiling is set through the Diagnostics program as part of 
Reg ion A's annual operating and capital budgeting processes. One participant described 
the budgeting of the endovascular coiling program as being "quite straightforward." 
C linical need is the driving factor for the endovascular coiling budget. The budgeting 
process begins by estimating the likely patient population needing coi ls in the coming 
year. This estimate would be based on the expected annual number of cerebral 
hemorrhage I aneurysm cases and the percentage of these ca es which would likely be 
coiled. The previous year ' s usage would be looked at as a guide. Any trends in usage 
over a period of years would also be examined, e.g., is there a higher percentage 
aneurysms patients receiving coils? The budgeting in this area is fairly straightforward 
because the population requiring major treatment for cerebral hemorrhage I aneurysms is 
fairly stable from year to year, which therefore allows for a fairly accurately prediction of 
the case load for the coming year. The executive agree to budget for a certain number of 
coi lings cases annually as part of Diagnostics annual operating budget. This budget 
allocat ion is supposed to be sufficient to meet the entire need for endovascular coiling in 
the region. It could be said that the program is thus fully funded, in that the budget is set 
to meet the total demand. If their case estimate for the year is missed, Diagnostics wi ll 
look at the reasons why their estimate was off and make a revised estimate for the 
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following year. In some cases, an explanation of why the estimate is off would have to be 
made to the region 's finance department. 
From the point of view of the region, the choice to either c lip or coil a cerebral aneurysm 
should be cost neutral. But at Region A, this is not the case. From a budgetary point of 
view, cerebral aneurysms have been traditiona l treated in the neurology and surgery 
departments. Coilings are done by radiologists. Ideally, the cost for providing the coil ing 
should be transferred from the neurology and surgery department to the Diagnostics 
program. In order for this to occur, neurology or surgery would need to not use the 
resources, e.g., staff, O.R. time, for other procedures. This has not occurred. Because of 
wait times for other services, other surgery patients use the resources which were saved 
by the cerebral aneurysm being treated by the radiologist. From the regional point of 
view, coiling increases the cost of Diagnostics, but do not show offsetting cost savings in 
other departments. There are gains, however, to the region in terms of lower wai t times 
for OR procedures. 
Endovascular coi ling requires two main capital expenditures. The first is for the initial 
inventory of coils needed to be in place before performing the procedure. Given the 
length of time Region A has been performing endovascular coi ling, none of the current 
participants were involved in the o ri g inal discussion about the purchase of an inventory of 
coils. The cost of replacing coils is included in the cost provided for performing each 
case. 
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The second major capital purchase for endovascular coiling is of a bi-plane angiograph. 
Region A's bi-plane angiograph was purchased solely through funds raised by a 
charitable foundation . The purchase of a bi-plane angiograph was thus outside the capital 
budgeting process. 
4.6.2 Resource Allocation Issues around Endovascular Coiling 
From a resource allocation perspective, one of the interesting aspects of endovascular 
coiling at Region A is that there appears to be no rationing of the service. Physician 
opinion of what is in the best interest of the patient seems to be the driving, if not the 
only, factor taken into consideration. As reported by one participant, if a patient is best 
served by endovascular coiling, they receive it. Although the program is funded through 
Region A ' s budgeting process and annual activity levels set, for practical purposes, 
decision making in this area is solely determined by physician mirco-level, clinical 
circumstance decisions. Because the decision to coil or not is made by the consensus of 
a team of physicians, decision making at the micro-level also seems to be an example of 
collegial decision making. Having a lready addressed the capi tal costs and the human 
resources i sues related to coiling, for Region A, resource allocation in this area has 
primarily become an exercise in estimating demand for the coming year, which is 
implified by the fact that the annual patient population is fairly stable. 
4.6.3 Endovascular Coiling and Evidence 
Research evidence for the effectiveness of endovascular coiling was not considered. 
Given that the procedure has been performed at Region A for a number of years, all the 
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participants interviewed on this topic fe lt satisfied that the benefits of endovascular 
coiling have been clearly established. 
The main resource allocation question facing Region A for endovascular coiling is how 
many coilings to budget for in a g iven year. The decision to coil an aneurysm or not is a 
joint decision of the neurosurgeons and the interventional radiologists. The researcher 
did not have the opportunity to talk to either a neurosurgeon or an interventional 
radiologist at Region A to discuss how cases are chosen for coiling or not. It is thus not 
known what evidence is used in making these treatment decisions. From all indications, 
this decision is made by a consensus of the team of physicians based on their professional 
opinion of what is in the best interest of the patient. 
In terms of budgeting for endovascular coilings, the key from the perspective of 
Diagnostics is to determine the expected number of cases in the coming year. Internal 
program data is used to identify the number of cerebral aneurysm I cerebral 
hemorrhaging cases performed in previous years; the percentage of these cases which 
were treated by endovascular coiling; and any trends in treatments for these cases, e.g. , is 
an increasing percentage of patients being treated by coiling. This data is used to predict 
the expected number of cases for the coming year. 
4.6.4 Endovascular Coiling and Cost 
Participants repeatedly said that the decision whether to clip or coil a cerebral aneurysms 
or cerebral hemorrhaging cases was based solely the clinical opinion of the medical staff. 
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Cost differences between the two procedures were never considered. It fo llows that there 
is seemingly no consideration of cost-effectiveness of the diffe rent procedures in making 
resource allocation decisions at Region A. Costing for budgeting purposes is based on 
internal costing data, adjusted for any known increases in operational costs fo r the coming 
year. 
4.6.5 Endovascular Coiling and Accountability 
There are no special accountability measures for the endovascular coiling. Physicians are 
given the full responsibility to make what they see is the best decision for their patient. 
Oversight for the program is provided through the leadership team of Diagnostics and 
through Region A s operating and capital budgeting processes. 
4.6.6 Endovascular Coiling and Ethics 
Because there is no rationing of service in thi s area and there are no restrictions on who 
has access to the serv ice, beyond the restrictions placed on who is eligible for care within 
the region, many o f the main ethical concerns about resource a llocation are not 
applicable. There is no fo rmal po licy in place not to provide serv ices to particular types 
of patients, e.g. elderly . rt could not be determined by thi s researcher whether such 
factors are taken into consideration by the frontline staff when determining how best to 
treat a patient. It would seem, however, that this would be less of an issue fo r coi li ng as 
opposed to clipping, which is physically more demanding on the patient. There is a wider 
ethical concern about why there appears to be no rationing in this area of care while other 
areas of care there is rationing. Presumably it has to do with the seriousness of th 
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patient's condition; the small number of patients needing the procedure; in some cases, 
the Jack of other viable treatment options; and the relatively low costs of the procedure 
compared to other treatment options, especially once the main capital costs are addressed. 
4.6.7 Overview of Endovascular Coiling 
Table 4.5 provides overview of how the six component elements are handled by Region 
A's endovascular coiling program. 
Table 4.5: Overview of Endovascular Coiling 
Resource Allocation Decisions 
Usage Small, but stable 
--~----~L-~~~----~ 
Clinical circu 
rationing of c 
team allocated 
endovascular 
--~~~~--~------~ 
Determined b~ 
~------~~--~----~ 
Clinical circumstances of patients. Seen as 
Need 
Evidence 
an effective treatment. 
--------------------~ ~C_o_st ____________________________ ~_A_n_a_l~y_si_s_o_f_i_n ____ ~~~----~~e_d_a_ta_.~ 
Accountabi lity No measures s 
~----~~~--------~ 
Ethics Few ethical issues. 
--------------------~ 
4. 7 MRI in Alberta 
There are currently 19 MRI machines operating within the public health care system in 
A lberta (Alberta Health and Wellness website, 2007). In 2005, Alberta ' s scan rate was 
the highest in the country at 36.6 scans for every 1,000 people in the province (CIHI, 
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2005). The average cost of providing a MRI scan within the publ ic health care system is 
currently $535 (Health and Wellness website, 2007). 
Provincial committees have previously attempted to develop a provincial strategy around 
diagnostic imaging. These committees focused primarily on MRI and CT. In 200 I, the 
province's Imaging Advisory Committee (200 I) released a report which exam ined the 
current state of MRl ; modeled future demand, machine capacity and human resource 
availability; and made recommendations a imed at a llowing the province to meet future 
MRI demand. Among the Imagining Advisory Committee's recommendations were fo r 
the province to improve access, develop standard province-wide guidelines around MRI 
usage, to train more MRJ technicians and to maintain a MRI scan rate of 24 scans per 
1,000. 
A lthough the provincial government is committed to the scan rate of 24 scans per I 000 
and to acting on some of the Imagining Advisory Committee's other recommendations 
(Alberta Health and We llness, News Release, 200I ), not much came of the Committee ' s 
report after its re lease. One respondent reported that "unfortunately, not a lo t of that 
[from the Imaging Advisory Committee] has translated into actual action; and in the end, 
we always come up to the same issue - significant investment req uired to achieve what 
the pre ferred vision of the future is." This investment was identi fied as being needed to 
address the issues around the recapitalization of equipment and wai t lists. The attempts at 
an overa ll provincial M Rl strategy did not come with targeted fund ing for increasing 
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imaging capacity. Without targeted investment coming from the province, most of the 
key decisions regarding MRI capacity are made by the individual health regions. 
There are not any current attempts to develop a provincial MRJ or diagnostic imaging 
strategy. The Imaging Advisory Committee also no longer appears to be in existence. 
The current situation is one where it has fallen to the regions to determine their MRI 
needs, but MRI usage and wait times measures are closely watched by Alberta Health and 
Wellness. There are agreements between the regions and the provinces regarding wait 
times for MRis. Alberta Health and Wellness publicly reports updated wait times and 
number of MRI scans by region through the Alberta Waitlist Registry website (2006). 
The province has a lso made a number of targeted investments in the area of MRI to help 
address the wait time issues over the past few years. These investments have included the 
purchase of new machines and paying private companies to perform scans in order to 
address waiting li sts. 
MRI in Region A 
In 2002, the provincial government gave the regions substantial funding targeted for new 
MRI machines. Region A received three new machines. These machines more than 
doubled their MRI capacity but, because of pent-up demand, one participant rep011ed that 
wait times actually tripled . Physicians who would not order a MRI scan for a patient 
given what they saw as significant wait times, with the new machines, began ordering the 
tests. The participant said it is not that this was illegitimate application of MRI by the 
physicians, it is just that the system could not handle all of the legitimate uses of the 
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technology, and this legitimate demand is gomg to grow as the capability of the 
technology expands. Region A currently performs around 35,000 MRI scans annually 
across its various sites. 
4. 7.1 Resource Allocation for MRI 
The decision whether to expand MRI capacity within a particular region is primarily 
made by the regional authori ties themselves. This is especially true for the larger health 
regions, who have large enough annual budgets to handle purchasing an MRI without 
having to request additional funds from the province. 
The budgeting for MRl is done through the Diagnostics program as part of Region A's 
annual operating and capital budgeting processes. Capital requests for MRI would be 
brought forward to the executive in one of two cases. The first is when it is deemed that 
an existing MRI machine is outdated and needs to be replaced . The second is when an 
additional MRI is needed in order to increase the region's MRI capacity. Capacity 
increases would be recommended when existing MRI capacity cannot meet the desired 
operational output. Usually the executive would be aware of the need for a new MRI 
well before a request is brought forward as part of the budgeting process. There has also 
been some work done by Diagnostics, in cooperation with a business school in Alberta, to 
model future MRI demand for the region. Although fairly preliminary, this work is meant 
to help bring some long-term planning to MRI capital expenditures. 
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-------------- ----- -----
In terms of current MRI capacity, there are plans to expand the hours of operations of 
some ofthe MRis in the region. Diagnostics will a lso probably soon request another MRI 
machine. This is an issue which is currently be ing discussed with Diagnostics ' MRJ 
liaison group. Outside of this possible request for another MRI, one of the Region ' s 
charitable foundations has an on-going campaign to purchase an Intra-operative MRJ . 
On the operational side, Diagnostics submit a request annually fo r funds to perfo rm a 
specified number of MRI scans fo r the budget year. MRI scans fi t well with the activity-
based operational budgeting approach used by Region A. Diagnostics know the number 
of scans it is currently doing with five machines running at a set number of hours. It can 
roughly determine their remaining MRI capacity, i.e. , the number of increased scans they 
can perform on their existing five machines. Based on its current wait li st, Diagnostics 
can also determine the number of scans required to achieve their present wait time target. 
The region allocates a set amount for each MRI scan, regard less of its level of difficulty. 
There are numerous factors which impact on MRI usage. In determining the appropriate 
budget request for MRI, Diagnostics try to identi fy these fac tors and estimate their likely 
impact. As one participant said, "you keep layering what kind of activity does each of 
those factors translate into ." The budgeting begins with the previous year' s allocation. 
As a baseline, Diagnostics would hope to do the same number of scans, in the same areas, 
as the previous year. There are numerous factors which need to be considered in 
de termining a reasonable request for increased activi ty. There is significant population 
growth in the region; the population is aging; there are board priorities, e.g. , the creation 
of additional acute care beds, which will increase the demand fo r M RI ; demands from 
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radiologists. There are issues related to technological and software improvements which 
expand the capabilities of the equipment. More capabilities mean that there are more 
cases which could benefit from an MRI. In other words, increased capabili ties equal 
increased demand. Other significant dri vers for MRI are wait times and waiting lists. 
Requests for increased resources for MRI would include measures aimed at meeting 
prov incially set targets for MRJ wait times. All of the factors identified in the participant 
interviews as possibly affecting the requested amount of MRI activity are listed in Table 
4.6. 
Table 4.6: Factors identified in determining MRJ Requests 
• Historical performance 
• Clinical need 
• Expected clinical need 
• Operational pressures (waiting lists I wait times) 
• Provincial I regional guide lines 
• Needs identified by frontline staff 
• Impacts from other programs 
• Impact ofboard priorities 
• Existing MRl capacity 
• Status of current MRJ scanners 
• Population changes 
• Technology changes 
• Changes in clinical practice regarding the use of 
MRI 
• Practices at other centers of excellence 
One of the umque 1ssues for Diagnostics is that MRI usage often gets impacted by 
activities in other parts of the organization. At Region A, they have stopped trying to deal 
w ith these external impacts as once off or specific issues outside of the budgeting proces . 
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Expansions in other areas of care which will impact on Diagnostics are identified as 
additional cost drivers as part of their normal budget submission. For example, as the 
province and the r gion focus on expanding stroke or cardiology care, investments in 
these areas will be identified by Diagnostics in their budget submis ion as factors 
increasing MRI demand. If there i significant growth in a program which impacts on 
Diagnostics, the program may still make a special request outside of the budget process to 
address that area. 
Taking the current activity levels , wait lists, regional priorities, historical performance, 
growth, etc. , the COO for Diagnostics would make the case to the senior executive team 
for a certain increase in the MRI budget to allow for a set number of more scans. The 
case made to the executive would be very much based on the factors which Diagnostics 
identified in determining their requested amount of activity. The executive are not likely 
to approve the total requested increase, but rather only a portion of the request. 
Al location of MRI Activity across Sites 
Diagnostics is a regional program. Region A, however, still has a hea y site-based focu . 
With MRJ , there has been a move to look at it more as a purely regional service. 
Diagnostics are in the process of developing a centralized booking system, so that 
requisitioning physicians can either request a specific site or the first available slot in the 
region. Sti ll , once the annual budget is given to the program, the budget n eds to be 
allocated by Diagnostics across sites. If the executive approve 5000 more MRI scans for 
the region, it sti ll needs to be determined which sites will these additional scans be 
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performed at. It also needs to be determined how much extra funding each si te is going to 
be given to do those scans. Factors which are considered include whether there is still 
equipment capacity at particular sites. If a site does not have additional capacity, it 
cannot do additional scans. If there is still capacity, the question becomes whether to pay 
that site the full cost of a scan, or is only a variable cost given to that site, based on the 
assumption that they still have staff capacity to do the scans without having to incur 
higher staffing costs. There are productivity differences between sites depending on the 
type of cases which are being done. Although the region pays Diagnostics the same 
amount for each MRI scan, pediatric cases take longer; more acute patients take longer. 
There are variations in productivity for MRI machine and for MRI techs. These 
variations need to be factored in when determining how resources are allocated. The 
program leadership would determine the MRI schedule at each site by weighing up these 
various factors. 
Guidelines for MRI 
There have been guidelines on the usage of MRis in some of the hospitals in Region A 
dated back before the region was created. There are two types of guidel ines for MRis. 
One type tries to determine MRI as the most appropriate test for a specific condition. The 
second type identifies appropriate patient wait times. Regarding the fi rst type of MRI 
guidelines, there was some work done in A lberta around when an MRI should be made 
available to a patient. Ordering physicians were meant to check the guidelines before 
ordering a MRI to ensure it is the most appropriate modality for the specific condi tion. 
Given the wide range of conditions which may utilize a MRI and varying severities of 
185 
these conditions, all of which needed to be identified and categorized, the guidelines 
quickly became too complex to be easily usable. One participant said that what is needed 
is a system of electric ordering which could identify symptoms and disease conditions of 
the patient and match them to the most appropriate modality. Otherwise, a usage 
guideline system is not v iable. The guidelines are simply too complex for frontli ne 
physicians to use and it would be too much work for a radiologist to review and 
reschedule tests. Another issue identified is that such explicit usage guidelines tend to 
increase usage, as guidelines of appropriateness tend to report a wider range of 
appropriate usages than are cuiTently in use. Guidelines could thus increase demand, 
rather than limit MRI usage. 
Rather than developing guidelines on MRl usage, Region A uses a syst m in which the 
radiologist reviews a ll requisition orders to screen out inappropriate usage. The 
radiologist also tries to determine which patients are most likely to benefit from acces ing 
a MRI scan. If the information on the requisition is not adequate it is sent back to the 
physician who submitted it. There are types of cases for which the radiologist will not fill 
MRI requisitions except under special circumstances, e.g. breast exams for low risk 
cancer screemng. Participants felt that having radiologists review requisition orders was 
an effective and workable way to limit the inappropriate use of MRI scans. Previous 
reviews of the appropriateness of the usage of MRls within Region A did not identi fy 
hi gh levels of inappropriate usage. 
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Guidelines around wait times for MRI are developed by the province as part of its Wait 
T ime Registry. Cases are divided by urgency. Every requisition is looked at by a 
radiologist to determine its category of priority. There are four categories of priority, 
each determined by clinical drivers. There are guidelines around the wait time for a scan 
for each of the fou r categories. The criteria for urgency are identified on the Region A 
website. Alberta's Wait Time Registry website (2006) identifies the targeted wait time 
for each urgency category and the actual wait time by site and region throughout the 
province. The wait time target for a priority one scan is one week. The wait time target 
for a priority two scan is one month . The wait time target for a priority three scan is three 
months. Priority four is an e lectively scheduled follow-up exam. The province and the 
region have agreed to meet these wait time targets, but the region is not currently meeting 
any of these wait time targets. 
4.7.2 Resource Allocation Issues around MRI 
Region A faces a number of resource allocation questions regarding MRI. There are 
executive level decisions regarding the number of MRI scans to perform and whether to 
invest in new equipment. The leadership team faces the question about how to allocate 
resources aero s the various MRI s ites. The leadership team and s ite coordinators need to 
determ ine how cases are booked across conditions and patient type. There are Issues 
around the use of guidelines as a means of limiting or managing demand. 
A lthough there are numerous allocation decisions, the situation can be summarized as one 
in w hich the ex cuti ve determine the supply of MRI scans for the reg ion. The phy ician 
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and radiologists determine the demand. This determination of demand includes factors 
which increase demand (requisitions by physicians) and those whihc limit demand 
(scanning of requisitions by radiologists). The physicians themselves determine which 
cases require an MRI or not. Because of the wide applicability of the technology, there 
will be for the foreseeable future greater demand than supply. This mismatch in supply 
and demand is reflected in wait times for MRI scans, which the province has set targets to 
meet in order to ensure that the supply - demand equation does not get too far out of line, 
due in part to the political importance ofwait times for MRI. The other decisions around 
MRI within the Diagnostics program aim to maximize the efficiency of MRI resources. 
Different types of decision making are used in allocating MRI resources at Region A. 
The supply is determined hierarchically by the executive, but they are very mindful and 
try to accommodate physicians' requests. The allocation of resources across sites and the 
booking of cases are also done top-down by the leadership team of Diagnostics. The 
demand is determined bilaterally by the physicians. The determining of reque ts for 
additional resources could be best described as collegial at first, but becoming more 
hierarchical as the process moves forward. 
These resource allocation decisions, whom is responsible for making them and how the 
decisions are made are summarized in Table ../. 7. 
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Table 4.7: MRI Resource Allocation Decisions at Region A 
Resource Allocation Decision Maker Type of Decision Making 
Decisions 
Determine wait time Executive I Alberta Health Closed-door, top-down 
Guidelines and Wellness 
Determine the number of Executive Inclusive, but ultimately 
MRI scans to perform closed-door, top-down 
regionally 
Determine whether to invest 
in new equipment 
Allocate resources across Diagnostics Leadership Team Closed-door, top-down 
sites 
Determine MRI needs for the Diagnostics Leadership Bilateral 
Region Team, MRI Liaison Group 
Book cases Diagnostics Leadership Bilateral 
Team, radiologists and site 
coordinators. 
Determine whether to fil l Radiologists Clinical circumstances 
MRI requisitions 
Determine whether to order Physicians Clinical circumstances 
anMRI 
4.7.3 MRI and Evidence 
Numerous participants reported that they felt MRI is a known technology and there was 
little need to provide evidence of its effectiveness. One of the issues around MRI is that 
it is a developing technology which is constantly gaining in its capacities and its 
application. The range of application is determined by radiologists and front line 
physicians who order MRI scans. In terms of what evidence this expansion of MRI 
application is based on, it is somewhat unclear. One participant said that practice at 
centers of excellence, i.e., renowned hospitals in their field , is one driving force. 
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Because of the nature of the technology, Region A is able to fairly accurately determine 
its MR1 capacity, i.e. , the total number of MRI scans it can do across all sites; and its 
remaining MRI capacity, i.e. , total MRI capacity minus current usage. These figures are 
determined using internal operational data. 
Determining the demand for MRI is more difficult because of the numerous factors which 
impact on MRI demand. Many ofthese factors , e.g., changes in population, impacts from 
over programs, are hard to accurately quantify. Internal data is used to some extent. So 
too is the best judgment of leadership of Diagnostics as to the likely impact of some of 
these figu res. 
Wait times and the amount of scans performed are reported to the Alberta Wait Time 
registry based on internal operational data. 
4.7.4 MRJ and Cost 
The region sets a fixed amount which is gives Diagnostics for each MRI scan. This 
amount is set by internal costing data, adjusted for any known increases in operational 
costs for the coming year. There were no reports of using cost-effectiveness of different 
modalities in determining resource allocation decisions. 
4. 7.5 MRI and Accountab il ity 
Physicians are given the responsibility to make what they see as the best decision for their 
patient. Radiologists scan each requisition before it is filled to determine both its 
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appropriateness and its priority. Budgetary over ight for the program is provided through 
the leadership team of Diagnostics and through Region A's operating and capital 
budgeting processes. 
In terms of accountabi lity for meeting the demand for MRI, the regional is required by the 
province to publish updated data of the current wait times for MRI by sites and by region. 
The province also requires that the number of scan performed in each quarter is also 
reported by sites and by the region as a whole. 
4. 7.6 MRI and Ethics 
The discussions about the ethics ofMRI a llocation focused always on accountability, e.g. , 
the actions taken to make sure that usage is appropriate and that the process for allocating 
MRI resources and wait times for MRI are transparent to the public. There was no ethical 
audit of how MRI resources are allocation across the population. 
4. 7. 7 Overview of MRI 
Table 4. 8 provides an overview of how the five component factors are handled by R gion 
A's MRI program. 
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Table 4.8 Overview of MRJ 
Need Determined by internal usage data and management 's 
judgment of the impact of the numerous factors impacting 
on MRI demand. 
Evidence While it is recognized as a technology which is expanding 
both in capabilities and range of use, it is generally seen as 
an accepted, familiar technology. No use of research on 
effectiveness. 
Cost Analysis of internal costing and usage data. 
Accountabi lity Alberta Wait Time Registry; public reporting of usage data 
by region and site; Activity Budgeting. 
Ethics Little ethical considerations. 
4.8 Powered Upper Arm Prostheses in Alberta 
Powered upper arm prostheses raise three key issues relating to resource a llocation. The 
first is the prescription of a powered upper arm prosthesis. The second is around 
coverage and pay ing for the prosthesis. Third, there is the issue of how the providers of 
prosthetics a llocate resources within their programs. These three issues are addressed in 
order. 
4.8.1 Getting a Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis 
To get a powered upper arm prosthesis in Alberta, a patient would first meet with a 
physician. A fter consulting with the patient, if the physician thought that a prosthesis is 
suitable for the patient, the physician would refer the patient to a prosthetist or amputee 
clinic. A team of a physician, prosthetist, physiotherapist and, maybe, the funders would 
determine what would be the best option for the patients. As one participant said there i 
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a team of experts in the different fields, " there is back and forth to come up with a 
reasonable determination of need." Partially this decision requires a team approach 
because of the number of different factors involved in determining what is in the best 
interest of the particular patient, given that in prosthetics most cases need individualized 
solutions. There is no set method for determining who is best suited for a myoelectric 
prosthesis, but as one participant said, "a whole lot of factors come in but I have to tell 
you - it's most probably just experience, I guess [which determines which patients are 
recommended for myoelectrics]." As another participant said, the goal is to " identify 
what's going to be the absolute best piece of equipment for that person - you don't want to 
waste any money or someone else's money - and then help them to identify who might be 
possible sources of funding for that... for their device." 
One of the biggest factors influencing resource allocation decisions around powered 
upper arm prostheses in Alberta is the very small number of patients who receive them. 
Two participants in the management of a large rehabilitation faci lity reported never 
having even seen one. One of these participants has over ten years experience working in 
rehabilitation in Alberta. A nother participant reported her institution sees one person 
with every couple of years needing a myoelectric upper arm prosthesis. This would be in 
line with another participant's estimate of around two or three new cases of people 
receiving upper arm myoelectric prostheses annually for the entire province. 
Beyond the fact that only a very small proportion of the general population faces upper 
extremity loss, there are a number of other reasons for the small patient population. 
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There are physiological issues related to having sufficient muscular activity to control 
movement of the prostheses. Patients also need the cognitive ability to be able to control 
their muscle activity. There are issues relating to patient choice. Most participants found 
that not everyone wants a myoelectric prosthesis. Conventional prostheses are often seen 
as more functional and easier to learn how to use and are therefore seen as preferable for 
many patients. There are issues relating to access to staff trained in providing upper arm 
prostheses. Due to the small numbers of patients, few prosthetists in the province work 
with powered upper arm prostheses. Occupational therapists and physiotherapists are not 
always available to train recipients of new myoelectric prostheses. ot every 
occupational therapist is trained to work with myoelectric prostheses. There were 
problems identified with the current level of technology. One physiatrist reported that 
functional outcomes with myoelectrics have not always been good. As another 
participant said " the dexterity of the hand is hard to replicate, even for myoelectrics." 
Patients also have issues around the weight of the prostheses. Many patients find learning 
tasks with the other undamaged arm or a prosthesis w ith the trad itional grip much easier. 
The consensus amongst participants was that technology has developed so that it is a 
better alternative, but it is still not to the point where a great percentage of patients would 
benefi t from powered upper arm prostheses. 
Tied to the lack of functionality, there are issues around compliance. There is a general 
sense amongst the participants that many people do not use their myoelectric prostheses 
because they do not find them functional enough. Patients need to show the abi lity to be 
ab le to learn how to use a powered upper arm prosthesis, as well as a pattern of 
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compliance, before most physicians and prosthetists would recommend a powered 
prosthesis. Given all of these factors , as one participant said, for the prostheses 
community myoelectric prosthesis "is probably not the number one choice." This 
opinion by the team of people providing and paying for the prosthesis also certainly 
influences patient demand. The factors limiting the use of power upper arm prostheses 
are summarized in Table 4. 9. 
Table 4.9: Factors Limiting the Use of Powered Upper Arm Prostheses 
• Patient choice 
• Difficulty accessing trained staff 
• Functionality 
• Compliance 
• Difficulty of training 
• Other preferable options 
• Prosthetists seeing little benefit to the patient 
• Prosthetists not convinced of likely compliance 
• Lack of coverage I cost 
4.8.2 Coverage for Powered Upper Arm Prostheses in Alberta 
Coverage for powered upper arm prostheses is provided for through a patchwork of 
programs. Most people in the province are covered for powered upper arm prostheses 
through one of these programs, with the exclusion of some seniors. There are, however, 
variations in the level of coverage within each program. Alberta does not have universal 
coverage for the full cost of powered upper arm prostheses. 
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Alberta Aids of Daily Living Program (AADL) is the provincial program which provides 
coverage for basic medical equipment, including prostheses. The program is run through 
the provincial department of Seniors and Community Supports. The program is open to 
all Alberta residents who have a long-term disability or an illness lasting at least six 
months. Clients are assessed individually to determine their level of benefit. Clients are 
required to pay 25 per cent of the cost of benefits to a maximum of $500 per family per 
benefit year. Exemptions for these costs can be applied for. People over 65 years of age 
are also exempt from these costs. There are benefit limits set by the AADL program, 
depending on the type of device required. The AADL program does not cover training 
costs associated with new equipment. 
With upper arm prostheses, AADL offers two levels of coverage. AADL provides full 
coverage for conventional prosthetic devices. The program does not provide full funding 
for powered upper arm prostheses. Coverage and benefit levels for myoelectrics are 
determined by the Manager of Prosthetics and Orthotics. Currently, there is a limit of 
$6000 towards the cost of a myoelectric prosthesis. This benefit level is currently being 
reviewed. 
For people over sixty-five years old, prostheses are covered through Alberta Blue Cross 
for Seniors Program, which is a privately-run insurance program the premiums for which 
are paid by Alberta Health and Wellness. This program explicitly excludes all 
myoelectric prostheses from coverage (Alberta Health and Wellness website, 2007). 
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Alberta Blue Cross for Seniors Program does provide full coverage for all other types of 
prostheses. 
Workers ' Compensation Board - Alberta (WCBA) provides coverage for employees hurt 
at work. WCBA has no " preset limits to treat or lessen the effects of injuries and 
encourage return to work" (WCBA website, 2006). If a physician, prosthetist, and the 
WCBA case adjudicator agree that a myoelectric prosthesis is in the best interest of the 
client, WCBA will pay for the full cost of the prostheses and for training. WCBA will 
also compensate the person for lost wages which result from their injury. 
Some patients have private insurance, e.g. , employee health plans. Some patients are 
covered by other people's private insurance, e.g., as in the case of an auto accident. The 
level of benefit depends on the coverage associated with the policy. Residents in Alberta 
are also eligible for either the War Amps - CHAMP Program (for those under 18) and 
War Amps - Adult Amputee Program (for those over 18). First Nations and Inuit 
Canadians are fully covered for myoelectric prostheses under Health Canada ' s Non-
Insured Health Benefits (NTHB) program. 
In Alberta, people under 18 years old are usually fully covered by War Amps for 
myoelectric prostheses. In the case of a person under 18 years old, what would usually 
occur is that they would access the $6000 of coverage through the AADL and War Amps 
would cover the rest of the cost for a myoelectric. For people 18 to 65 years old, there is 
partial coverage through the AADL program and the War Amps - Adult Amputee 
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Program. There is full coverage if the person suffers the loss of an arm at work or is 
involved in an automobile accident in which they are covered by private insurance. 
Residents over 65 years of age seem to have little coverage for powered upper arm 
prostheses in Alberta. First ations and Inuit peoples have full coverage. Table -1. 10 
summarizes the coverage given through the various programs for powered upper arm 
prosth ses in Alberta. 
Table 4.10: Coverage for Powered Upper Arm Prosthese in Alberta 
Program Who is Eligible? Coverage 
AADL Residents in Alberta (under 65, Up to $6000 coverage (with 
with some restrictions) up to a $500 co-pay) 
Alberta Blue Cross Residents in Albe11a (over 65) No Coverage 
for Seniors Program 
WC BA Employees injured at work Full Coverage 
Private insurance Depends on Policy Depends on Policy 
War Amps - CHAMP People up to 18 years of age. Full Coverage 
Program 
War Amps - Adult People over 18 of age. 15 % towards the cost of 
Amputee Program prosthesis up to $1500.00 
once every three years 
Non-Insured Health First Nations and Inuit Dissent Full Coverage 
Benefits (NIHB) 
4.8.3 Coverage within AADL 
Manag rs in the AADL program continually examine the benefit limit set for devices 
within their specific program areas. The need for changes in coverage is identified by 
patients, managers, and providers. When the need for a proposed benefit change is 
identified, the division manager would discuss the likely impact of any changes wi th the 
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AADL program's director. This discussion would include considerations of the avai lable 
options, the expected number of cases affected, and the expected net cost of the changes 
to the program. If the program director supports the proposed changes, they are 
submitted to the deputy minister of Seniors and Community Supports for approval. These 
requests to change coverage would often be made as part of the wider provincial 
government budgeting process. There have also been cases where coverage has changed, 
but where additional costs to cover the changes had to be recouped from other program 
areas. The benefit level is set in provincial legislation so there is no flexibility on the part 
of managers to adjust the benefi t to individual cases once the benefit limit has been set. 
AADL's coverage of myoelectric prostheses has been an evolving process. In early 1991 , 
the AADL program began letting the patient decide whether they wanted either a 
conventional prosthesis or a myoelectric, but the program only paid up to the cost of the 
conventional prosthesis. This situation often left a significant fund ing gap to be covered 
by the patient who would benefit from a myoelectric prosthesis. In 2003, AADL raised 
the benefit limit for myoelectrics to $6000. While a significant improvement, this amount 
still did not cover the full cost of myoelectric prostheses. In 2005, AADL again reviewed 
its myoelectric benefits to see if their program was giving sufficient assistance. This 
review was partially done by consulting with the prosthetists. The main issue examined 
was the cost of powered upper arm prostheses to the cl ient. There was some concern 
identified by the prosthetists about the substantial gap in funding which still ex ists. 
AADL is in the process of readjusting its benefit limit to address this fund ing gap for 
powered upper arm prostheses. 
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The AADL program has clear criteria regarding the funding of powered upper arm 
prostheses. Seniors are not eligible for funding. This restriction was put in place because 
of the unlikelihood that seniors would complete the training needed to learn how to use a 
myoelectric prosthesis. Adults must show a demonstrated use of a conventional 
prosthesis continuously for at least a year but before being considered for funding. There 
are some exceptions which may be considered. A patient who is mentally functional and 
clearly desires a myoelectric prosthesis right away may be funded without showing a 
demonstrated use of a conventional prosthesis. All exceptions would be determined on a 
case by case basis by the AADL program manager. Children also need to demonstrated 
use of a conventional prosthesis continuously for at least a year before being considered 
for a myoelectric prosthesis. Prostheses are not funded for anyone under the age of two. 
Patients who decided they do not like their myoelectric prosthesis must wait two years 
before receiving funding for a conventional prosthesis. Finally, a prosthetists needs to 
agree that the person would benefit from having a myoelectric prosthesis. 
While the AADL fund the prosthesis, they work with outside partners to provide all their 
prostheses services. There are 25 private prosthetic clinics which AADL contracts with 
in Alberta. AADL also contract some work out to the regional authorities, including 
Region A. With all of these providers, AADL sets the prices they will pay for equipment 
and installation time. Materials are paid-for at cost, plus a small mark-up to allow for 
shipping and handling costs. Prosthetist labour costs are paid on an hourly rate, so that 
there is no advantage to the prosthetist to use more expensive materials than are needed. 
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Regardless of the fixed pncmg, the working relationship between the AADL and its 
partners appears to be quite good. 
4.8.4 The Allocation of Resources in the Prosthetics Division 
Unlike endovascular coiling and MRI, powered upper arm prostheses are not primarily 
installed or serviced through the regional health authorities in Alberta. Some of the 
health regions do have programs which can fit powered upper arm prostheses. For 
example, Region A has a facility which does offer powered upper arm prostheses 
serv1ces. But most of the prostheses work in the province is perfo rmed by independent 
prostheti sts in private clinics. 
In Region A, prosthetics is a division of the rehabilitation program. Given the small 
number of myoelectrics Region A install , and the fact that their cost is paid for by third 
parties, participants reported that they face no real issues around the allocation of 
resources fo r myoelectric prostheses. In fact, the prostheses program aims to be not just 
cost recovery, but rather to be profit generating. Resource allocation issues that do occur 
for the prostheses division, including for myoelectrics, are often about the distribution of 
staff time across different rehabi I itation programs. 
Prosthetics make its request for resources to the COO of Rehabil itation as part of Region 
A' s regular budgeting process, s imilar to the process identified above for Diagnostics. 
Region A 's r habilitation program uses a check list to evaluate requests from the specific 
division, including prostheses. Requests for additional resources would be also supported 
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by the business case for additional resources. This business case would identify why the 
request is getting put forward , compare national or provincial benchmarks, the results that 
would come from additional resources, and what clinical best practices there are. 
Changes in service volumes would also be looked at. 
Most of the costs in the area of rehabilitation are human resource costs, so that funding is 
not as flexible as they may be in other areas. Rehabilitation has also not trad itionally 
gotten substantial new funding beyond what is required to cover inflationary pressures. 
Sometimes new money comes from provincial wide initiatives, e.g., Alberta Health and 
Wellness ' focus on hips and knees. But as one participant said, " it's not like the dollars 
that come [are] sort of lying there, wondering how do I use it. It's more where can you 
trim, where can you increase efficiency and what not, so in terms of a llocating resources 
to the programs, there isn't as much flexibili ty as one might think." As another 
participant said "we could be more efficient and that might create some resources that we 
could a llocate ... most of it is resource re-allocation." In terms of resource allocation for 
the program , the focus has primarily been on improving the efficient use of resources in 
order to provide better patient care. This improved efficiency has often been through the 
redesign of programs to allow for savings. 
Region A's rehabilitation facil ity has a practical ethics group. This group can be 
consulted about hard decisions which need to be made, including resource a llocation 
decisions, but the ethics group would be mostly involved in cases involving individual 
patients. 
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4.8.5 Resource Allocation Issues around Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis 
There are three main questions concerning resource allocation and powered upper arm 
prostheses in Alberta. The first is the question of who should receive a powered upper 
arm prosthesis. This decision is a clinical circumstance decision based on the consensus 
of the team of providers. This team would include a physician, prosthetist, and other 
professional staff. This decision would be an example of collegial decision making. 
The second question relates to the coverage of powered upper arm pro theses. Alberta 
does not have universal coverage for the full cost of powered upp r arm prostheses. 
Coverage for powered upper arm prostheses is provided for through a number of 
programs. There is little communication between these programs to ensure that all people 
are fully funded for their prostheses. 
Within the AADL program, the benefit limit for myoelectrics is currently being 
readjusted, but is st ill expected to leave a substantial gap between the cost of myoelectric 
prostheses and the maximum benefit under the program. Coverage decisions are made by 
the deputy Minister for Seniors and Community Supports, through discussion with the 
AADL program director and Manager of Prosthetics and Orthotics. The coverage 
decision is a program level, top-down, closed-door decision. How coverage decisions 
are made with the other funding programs was not examined. 
The third question examined was how resources were allocated around the prosthetics 
program of Region A. They repo11ed that there was li ttle concern with how resources are 
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allocated around powered upper arm prostheses, due to the fact that the cost of providing 
care is paid for by third-party insurers and that there are so few installed. 
4.8.6 Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis and Evidence 
Powered upper arm prostheses are seen as a proven technology and there is little concern 
expressed about their effectiveness. In terms of w ho receives a myoelectric prostheses, 
there are a number of factors looked at. These factors primarily focus on determining the 
abili ty of the patient to wear a myoelectric arm, the likelihood that he or she will benefit 
from a myoelectric prosthesis, and the likelihood of his or her continued use of the 
prosthesis. The information about all of these factors comes from discussions and 
examinations with the patient. 
In terms of coverage of myoelectric prostheses at AADL, the information is based on 
di scussion with prosthetists and costing information from suppliers. Internal data is used 
to determine the likely patient population. The internal costing and usage data is used to 
de termine likely financia l impact of any changes in the benefit limit wi ll have for the 
program. 
4.8.7 Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis and Cost 
Because of the small number of people requiring myoelectric prostheses, there is no 
consideration of cost-effectiveness. For budgeting purposed, the net cost of equipment is 
calculated by examining internal data, checking with suppliers and through discussion 
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with prosthetists. For the AADL program, labour costs are fixed through negotiations 
with the prosthetists on an hourly rate. 
4.8.8 Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis and Accountability 
The decision to provide a myoelectric prosthesis is based on a consensus decision made 
by a group of providers, all who abide by their professional standards. 
1 he AADL program must abide by all government accountability legislation. AADL 
(2006) have manuals which clear specifies the program policies as well as the policies 
associated with the specific type of device provided, including prostheses. AADL does 
have a Program Analysis & Accountability Unit which reviews complaints about any 
aspects of the program, including coverage issues. 
4.8.9 Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis and Ethics 
There are some concerns with age-based rationing for myoelectric prostheses in Alberta. 
Currently people over 65 years of age are excluded from myoelectric coverage under the 
AADL and the Alberta Blue Cross for Seniors Programs. The reason for this restriction is 
that it is felt that it is unlikely that someone over 65 years of age would go through the 
training to learn how to use a myoelectric limb. The practical effect of this restriction is 
greatly minimized by the fact that the vast majority of people face upper extremity loss 
before the age of 65. 
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The rehabilitation facility in Region A does have a practical ethics group which can be 
brought it to consult on difficult resource allocation discisions, although this is done 
primarily on a case by case basis. It was not known whether the group dealt with a case 
of myoelectric prosthesis, but a participant doubted it given the very smal l number of 
myelectric patients seen by Region A. 
4.8.1 0 Overview of Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis 
Table 4. 11 provides an overview of how the component factors are handled by Region A 
for power upper arm prosthesis. 
Table 4.11: Overview of Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis 
Usage 2 to 3 annually for province 
Resource Allocation Decisions 
I) Prescription I) Cl inical circumstances, collegial. 
2) Coverage (AADL) 2) Program specific, top-down, closed-door 
3) Region A 3) None 
Need Determined by us'!&e data. 
Evidence Clinical circumstances of patients. Seen as 
an effective treatment. 
Cost Internal data and vendor su_2I)_lied data. 
Accountability Professional standards and general 
government accountability requirements. 
AADL has a unit which examines 
complaints about the program. 
Ethics Age-based restrictions on care. 
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4.9 Best Practices Identified in Alberta 
There were a number of best practices which participants identified in Alberta. A number 
of participants identified the important of the experiences and skills which decision 
makers possess. One participant identified that it was good for decision makers to have 
frontline experience, so that they are able to understand the clinical experience better. 
Related to this, another participant suggested that decision makers work more closely 
with frontline staff, to better understand their issues. Teamwork was seen as an important 
element by many participants. As one participant said, " I would describe budgeting or 
budget allocations as an art and a science . .. . it takes a lot of people working together to 
get the best results. And so doing this as a team and having a highly functiona l team are 
key ingredients to it." Many participants said that they felt that there was good 
communication between the programs and the executive within Region A regarding needs 
and funding priorities at the program level. A management structure and an 
organizational culture which allow for good communication between the staff and the 
executive team are seen as key strengths for improving resource allocation. Activity 
budgeting was something that participants thought was both good as a method for 
resource allocation and something participants thought Region A was good at doing. 
Activity budgets also allow for a clear comparison across sites within the organization, to 
identify inconsistency in the level of care. Tied to this activity budgeting approach, there 
was a sense that programs where getting better understanding their activity drivers and 
therefore better predicting their future demand. In terms of bring in new information into 
the organization, one participant emphasized the role of going to conferences for letting 
the organization see new ways of may be organizing care. 
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More standardization and familiarity with processes were identified as a positive step for 
improving resource allocation. As one participant said the process of allocating resources 
are good, especially 
"where everybody knows the rules. Everybody knows the information they have to 
collect and everybody knows they have to buy into it. I mean, to me, those are the 
aids because, I mean, it's a difficult process to go through. I think everybody would 
struggle with it. You never know if you've gotten the answer right, but you need to 
come out of it with an organization that is committed to making it work and to me 
it's that process ... " 
Related to process stability is stability of personale within the resource allocation process. 
As one participant said, Region A has " been fortunate to have very stable leadership at 
the executive level in this region and very limited turnover. That is huge." 
Regionalization was also identified as beneficial for resource allocation. One of the 
purported benefits of regionalization was to improve resource allocation across the 
regions. It has certainly changed the discussion at the decision making table. As one 
participant described the situation, "as a region we cover everything from public health to 
community care to long term care to the acute care side to the diagnostics. . . . it goes on 
forever. " Although regionalization does add a level of complexity, it also gives the 
region more control in how they best allocation resources across these program areas. If a 
region, like Region A, decides that investing in long-term care beds is the best way to 
address problems in their emergency rooms, they have the ability to do that. As the 
participant further said, "it's complex. I mean, there's no formula to any of this but those 
are some of the factors that we take into consideration, and that's part of the leverage that 
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we can attain from being a regional system .... Under the old structure where we were 
individual hospitals, we didn't have the opportunity to invest in home care or invest in 
continuing care or invest in promotion to avoid and reduce the pressure on the acute side. 
We do now as a region." 
The ability to transfer resources across program areas raises the issue of greater resources 
for prevention and health promotion. Although regional structures do allow for the 
opportunity to invest greater resources into prevention, the choice between investments in 
prevention and acute care remains difficult. As one participant said, regardless of the 
logic of reducing demand, "it's still very difficult to invest on the promotion side because 
it's really a double investment. You still have to do the treatment and the promotion 
investment doesn't benefit the side until maybe 20 years out." This double investment 
issue is certainly a problem for those who see better resource allocation tied to increased 
resources for prevention and health promotion. 
Two participants mentioned Alber1a Provincial Stroke Strategy ' s four pillars approach 
could to be usefully applied to resource allocation. This approach is based on explicitly 
looking at funding for a treatment area in four distinct phrases: I) prevention I health 
promotion, 2) acute care, 3) rehabilitation and community care, and 4) service evaluation. 
As the participant describes the approach, "the Heart and Stroke Foundation have 
committed 20 million new dollars to this project provincially, but they have decided to do 
is they've allocated that 20 million dollars amongst the four pillars." The goal, as the 
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participant describes is " to force the a llocation of resources to address the different 
aspects of the disease group." 
The best practices identified by participants in Alberta are listed in Table 4.12. 
Table 4.12: Best Practices Identified in Alberta 
• Decision makers having frontline I clinical 
expenence 
• Decision makers working more closely with 
frontline staff 
• Good communication structures I open 
organizational culture 
• Working in teams 
• Activity budgeting 
• Identi fying drivers of demand 
• Going to conferences to identify future trends 
• Familiar processes 
• Four pillar approach 
4.9.1 Decision Aids Identified in Alberta 
One of the initia l goals of this project was to identi fy and develop relevant decis ion aids. 
Some decision a ids for resource a llocation were used in Albe1ia. For example, the 
rehabilitation facility reviewed in Region A uses a check list to help prioritize their 
budget requests. There is also some movement wi thin Region A to use more standard 
processes around making resource allocation requests. Most participants, however, 
expressed doubts about the appl icability of any type of decision aid due to the variation in 
resource a llocation requests and the various factors involved in different decisions. 
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4.9.2 Challenges Identified in Alberta 
A number of challenges were identified to improving resource allocation. Some of these 
challenges relate to the problem of resource allocation generally. Some of the challenge 
relate more specifically to Alberta and Region A. 
One problem identified related to legitimate needs. As one pmiicipant noted, all of the 
programs areas put forward requests which are legitimate, centered on delivering the best 
care possible to the patients in their particular program area. The question for the 
executive is how to determine whose need is the most crucial. In making resource 
allocation decisions, the executive are clearly leaving certain people without care they 
would benefit from. This problem is at the crux of the difficulties around resource 
allocation decisions. 
Knowledge translation is another area of concern. The problem arises partly because of 
the hierarchical decision making structure in health reg ions. As the allocation requests 
move towards the executive, they become further and further removed from people with 
expert knowledge in the area of concern. As one member of the executive team said " I 
then have to not only learn it [an item requested within their program portfolio] and 
understand it well enough to make a reasoned presentation to my executive colleagues, 
but they have to understand it enough to be able to make priority investment decisions." 
There is a challenge then about how to describe program requests in sufficient detail to 
allow for their meaningful consideration, without overwhelming decision makers. 
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Another communication problem identified relates to how frontline staff are kept 
informed of the region ' s budgetary situation. There are difficulties here because of the 
length of time budgeting takes, between six to eight months, and the size of the health 
regions. The size of the region makes it difficult to communicate to the staff the specific 
factors involved in budget decisions or what the resource expectations should be for the 
organization going forward . One participant suggested, there needs to be a way to portray 
"a simpler, easier-to-understand, display of the big picture" [throughout the organization]. 
Managing expectations can be difficult within Alberta's financial environment. Given the 
media reports about provincial budget surpluses and prosperity checks, the staff and the 
public do not feel that there is, or should be, a shortage of health care resources. One 
participant suggested a number of ways to mange these expectations within the 
organization. One is to involve program managers and clinical staff more in managing 
the budgets for their programs. Working with budgets will allow managers and physician 
leaders to understand what kind of resources they have to work with to deliver a certain 
level of service. Greater involvement also allows the managers and physicians to be 
accountable for a certain amount of resources, thereby creating greater accountability 
across the organization. The executive also need to communicate the overall financial 
situation of the organization to the program managers and physicians. This need to 
communicate the region 's financial situation to the frontline staffs ties back to the 
challenge of how best to do this. 
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A number of participants discussed the idea of better gauging institutional impact, even if 
they did not use this exact term. In particular, there was the feel ing that there are not 
sufficient capabilities in determining the impacts of new technologies. Often it is unclear 
what impacts a technology may have on the organization until it is adopted. For example, 
as one participant said, "with something as complex as an MRI machine, it is very hard 
for lay people, including decision makers to understand the impact of new technology." 
Issues here include how is the new technology going to impact on professional dynamics 
within the hospital setting? What other services will be affected by the introduction of a 
new technology? How will investments in a technology save money later down the road? 
It is somewhat unclear how an organization could better evaluate these impacts. 
The issue of annual budgets was raised by a couple of participants. There were two 
aspects to the issue . The first was the budgetary instability and the difficulty this caused 
for long term plmming. The second was the amount of time that goes into budgeting. As 
one participant said, " Just even 3 years [of stable funding]! Oh my goodness, the level of 
complexity that would be taken out of the system is enormous because every year you go 
through this [budgeting process] and the hours and energy that goes into this budget 
allocation and it's unbelievable. Honestly, it's unbelievable." 
Some participants felt that there was sti ll too much political and media influence on how 
resources are a llocated. As one participant said "you would hope that the money goes to 
where the evidence is .. . while, you know, reality is money goes to what makes the 
head line." There is also a feeling that while the priorities are often based on evidence at 
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the program level, as the budgeting process continues, and some facto rs become 
considered, the influence of evidence decreases. As the same participant said 
"we believe that the best way to make our case at Executive is to have some 
evidence behind it. Then all these other extrinsic things come to play, and it 
becomes a political decision, not an evidence-based decision. We work with our 
Chief Operating Officer very closely and we come up to some agreement and we 
try and base our agreements on best evidence, after that it's out of hands and 
evidence generally falls by the wayside." 
There were also problems identified relating to the mismatch of the budget cycle and 
funding flows. As one participant said, "we never get the money actually into our budget 
until usually well into the year. We need that money to hire the staff and we need to hire 
the staff before you can do the work. So we're always behind." The difficulties 
associated with mismatch in cycles is made worse by Region A use of activity budgeting. 
As the participant continued, "because we're activity funded, they say you're going to do 
so many exams. Well , you need the staff in place to do those exams. Well , if the money 
doesn't flow, you can't hire the staff so you can't do the numbers. So then when you come 
up to the budgeting process again, they get mad because you didn't reach your target, and 
you can't reach your target because you can't hire the staff until you get the money. o 
it's a Catch-22." 
There were a number of other areas of concern identi fied. Region A does do some 
benchmarking. This is usually done within the program areas themselves. Sti ll it is an 
area one participant suggested needed to be improved on. Better evaluation of programs 
was also identified. Regarding technological assessments, one participant said 'the 
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technology changes so quickly that I don't worry about the assessment as much as the 
impact." One of the problems with doing assessments is that the technology is never 
stable. By the completion of an assessment, a similar, but slightly different technique 
may come about which will need to be assessed somewhat differently. This gr atly 
diminishes the value of health technology assessments in making resource allocation 
decisions. While there is the need to involve a team of people in resource allocation 
decisions, given the size of an organization, like Region A, there are also problems 
associated with bringing too many people into the decision making process. Conferences 
were identified as a good way for a health region to keep informed of new trends in 
different areas of care, but they are also an important source of demand. Sometimes this 
demand is not thoroughly evaluated. As one participant said, "of course our wonderful 
doctors and ET nurses were at a big conference, saw the presentation, said we have to 
have this." Finally, another difficulty for improving resource allocation relates to the 
feeling that resources are often already accounted for, so that there is not many options in 
how resources are allocated. "Everything is tied to everything," so that there is, as one 
pa11icipant said, " not a whole lot of wiggle room" in how resources are spend. All of the 
challenges identified in lberta are listed in Table 4.1 3. 
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Table 4.13: Challenges Identified in Alberta 
• Legitimate needs 
• Knowledge translation 
• Keeping staff informed of budget situation 
• Managing expectations 
• Gauging institutional impact 
• Mismatch of budget and funding cycles 
• Annual budgeting 
• Too much political influence 
• Better benchmarking and evaluation 
• The speed of technological advancement 
• Involving too many people 
• Conferences 
• Resource already accounted for 
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Chapter 5: Newfoundland 
This chapter examines the three cases in N ewfo undland. It fo llows the structure of the 
previous chapter on Alberta. It begins by first reviewing the dec ision structure of Region 
B before moving to examine decision making in the three areas of care. As in the 
previous chapter, there are subsections focusing on the embedded elements of resource 
allocation decisions, need, use of evidence, cost, ethical considerations and accountability 
for Region B and each of the three areas of care. The fi na l section discusses the 
recommendations, decision tools, and the cha llenges identified during the interviews in 
Newfoundland. 
5.1 Regional Structure 
ewfoundland has a regional health structure governing the de li very of both health care 
and social services. In 2005, the province consolidated its health and social services 
boards from fourteen boards, which were de fined both regionally and in terms of specific 
serv ice areas, to four integrated boards, which offer a fu ll range of acute care, long-term 
care, mental health, rehabilitation, health promotion, preventative care and social 
serv tces. 
The health regions ' operational costs are primarily funded through global budgets they 
receive from the provincial Department of Health and Community Services (DHCS). In 
some cases, the DHCS may earmark funds fo r particular initiatives within the region. In 
fact, there has been an increased use of targeted funding in recent years. The Health 
Accord money was a particular example of targeted funding, where the DHCS asked the 
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health region ' s to provide a list of spending priorities in the five specific areas as a part of 
the usual budgeting process. The health regions also have access to some other, much 
smaller, sources of revenue. These include payments for services provided for 
Newfoundland and Labrador Workplace Health and Sa fety and from their charitable 
foundations. 
The region's capita l budgets are determined somewhat di fferently. There are three types 
of capital requests which come from the health regions: I) for medical equipment, 2) for 
repairs, maintenance to their facilities, and 3) for new fac ilities. Based on the fi nancial 
situation of the province, Treasury Board will normally allocate a nominal amount fo r 
each of the three categories. New large capital projects would be approved by the cabinet 
as part of the prov incial budgeting process. 
The region's annual global budget is set by the DHCS and the provincial cabinet through 
the provincial budgeting progress. There is a good deal of back and forth between the 
health region, DHCS and Treasury Board throughout the budgetary process. One way to 
think of the connection is that the region, the DHCS and Treasury Board are a ll setting 
their independent budgets, but that these budgets are greatly influenced by the budgets of 
the other institutional levels. The provincial budget is greatly affected by changes in the 
amount o f funds the provincial government directs towards health. The health regions 
have a great impact on the government 's overall health care spending. It is, however, the 
provincial budget which determines the amount of funding the regions have to spend. 
One of the reasons for so much interaction across the three institutional levels is that the 
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success of the budgetary process depends on the three budgets, i. e., the province' s, 
DHCS 's, and the health region's, being aligned. DHCS and Treasury Board officials said 
that they have sufficient understanding of the utilization needs and uses of funds by the 
four regions to negate the usefulness of adopting any type of formula-based funding. In 
fact, the DHCS said that often they have detailed data on the region' s budgets on a line-
by-line basis to guide any budgetary decisions. The distribution of services and 
population across the province also make formula-based fund ing problematic. 
DHCS begin by examining their previous year' s budget on departmental program basis. 
At the departmental basis, funding to the health regions is seen as one program area. 
DHCS would receive some guidance from "I reasury Board officials about the expected 
levels of inflation and a rough estimate of any changes in the s ize of the department' s 
budget for the coming year. DHCS would then adj ust their budget request for any likely 
changes in the costs associated with the program over the year, e.g., population changes, 
inflation, addition of new services, salary increases based on co llective agreements. 
The department would then ask the health regions to submit their budgetary requests. 
DHCS would also give the region some guidance about the likely size of any changes to 
their budgets for the coming year. The region would adjust their priorities to better match 
the amount of funds likely to be available. It is likely that there would be discussions 
between the department and the health region about the level of service delivery and the 
trade-offs that would have to be made at d ifferent levels of funding. If the region is going 
to get less money than the previous years, the region would then determine the areas and 
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programs it proposes to cut. The department would then look at this list and determine 
which programs it would like to continue to support, sometimes by providing funds to 
ensure a particular serv ice remains available. The region would submit its request for 
new resources to the DHCS. DHC would then finalize its budgetary request and submit 
it to Treasury Board, who analyze it and forward it to the provincial cabinet. 
As a part of its budget request, DHCS would include the requests from the boards. The 
department would specifY to Treasury Board which parts of the regions' requests it 
recommends funding. The DHCS would also outline what the implications in terms of 
service delivery at different levels of funding. As one departmental official said, the 
submission to Treasury Board, and ultimately cabinet, would be framed around the trade-
offs that have to be made at different levels of funding for the different programs. 1 he 
idea is to provide the cabinet with clear choices in terms of the level of funding to the 
different programs and what the implications of those decisions will be. The cabinet 
would not generally become involved in decisions concerning specific boards. Any 
major expenditure, e.g., the creation of a new program or the purchase of a MRI, would 
usually require cabinet approval. The cabinet may also become involved in issues that it 
considers politically sensitive. For example, the issue of where to locate MRI resources 
across the province would likely be made by the provincial cabinet. 
The regions are expected to review requests to provide new services, especially new 
services which require substantial funding, with the DHCS. 'I he health regions would 
review the evidence for new services it is requesting funding for. If the region' s 
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executive concludes there is sufficient evidence to support, the region then makes their 
case for starting the serv ice to the provincial government. These requests are rev iewed by 
the medical and program staff within the DHCS. Their task would be to firs t review the 
actual need for a service. If there is agreement on the need for the service, the department 
would then determine the level of funding to be provided for the new service. The 
departmental investigation is very much patient focused. As one departmental official 
said, " we get all kinds of requests for funding and what we try to bring it back to it i that 
cl ient or patient being served by service." There is also a consideration of the costs and 
of w hether the public are being best served "by the money being spend in this way." 
There is a challenge that sometimes the g roup who make the most noise get their request 
fill ed. The use of evidence is seen as a way to better assess the most rational way 
forward . Regardless of the strength of requests, they also have to meet with cabinet 
priorities. Strong evidence-based analysis sometimes is overruled at the cabinet level by 
economic, political or regional issues. 
In March, the provincial cabinet sets the provincial budget, including DHC ' s 
departmental budget, for the coming fiscal year. Once it knows its budgetary allocation 
DHCS would then do some further analysis and allocate resources for each program, 
including each health region. The regions are then informed of the total size of their 
global budget for the coming year. The department would also communicate to the 
region any operational goals the cabinet o r the department expect the region to meet. 
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It is the health regions, as the de li verers of care, who are responsible for meeting their 
operational outcomes. Yet DHCS sees its roles as helping to ensure that the regions have 
processes in place which show that public funds are being spent appropriately. While the 
DHCS has always had fairly tight financial controls over the health regions, the 
relationship between the two institutional levels has matured over the years. One 
provincial official reported, previously "we said to the boards - do not over exceed your 
budget, but don ' t deny services ... fwe] really gave them an impossible task because you 
can't do one without the other, necessarily." The situat ion is now one in which health 
regions are suppose to balance their budgets, but that they can come back to DHCS and 
make the case for additional resources if needed. These requests can be made at any time, 
but are usua lly made as part of the regular budgeting process. There is a greater level of 
understanding of the issues being faced by the health regions and the greater sense of a 
shared responsibility fo r addressing shortfalls in resources. The reduction in the number 
of health boards may also improve the working relationship between the two institutional 
levels. 
Participants in the regions did express some level of support for the way the DH 
determines the region ' s budget. These participants also said that keeping spending within 
their determined budget, delivering what they claim to deliver and being very open and 
honest with the provincial government has helped make this relationship work between 
the two organizations. The Department a lso seems to respect the requests that come from 
the regions. One departmental official said the department still does not have a good 
understanding of the spending within the specific regional programs. One possible 
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reform is for DHCS to start assessing spending at the program level within the regions. 
This would give the department a better sense of any problems earlier on. The 
information about the regional structure is reviewed in Table 5.1. 
Table S.l: Regional Structure (Newfoundland) 
Number of health regions 
in the province 4 
Current health regions 2005 
established 
Scope of regions Acute care, long-term care, home care, 
health promotion, prevention 
activities, cancer care, rehabilitation 
and social services 
Method of funding Primarily historical-based, global 
budgeting. Requests for additiona l 
funds for new or expanded programs 
are made directly to the provincial 
government. DHCS or cabinet would 
decide on major allocation decisions . 
5.2 Region B 
Region B is the regional health authority responsible for providing a full range of 
services, including acute care, long-term care, home care, health promotion, prevention 
activities, rehabilitation and social services. In 2005-6, the four regions in Newfoundland 
shared total revenues of over $1.4 billion. Region B received approximately $2000 for 
every person in its region. For 2006-2007, the four health regions received an increase in 
their operating budget of approximately 7 .5%. 
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5.2.1 Governance Structure 
Region B is governed by a board of trustees. Trustees are appointed by the Minister of 
DHCS and are usually fairly prominent members of the local community. The board 
reviews the region's activities, provides strategic direction to the region, releases an 
annual report and chooses the CEO. Board committees examine specific activities of the 
region, e.g., finance. 
The CEO oversees the region's day-to-day operations and is instrumental in setting the 
region ' s budget and operational goals. In Region B, the CEO is supported by a number of 
vice-presidents who have responsibility for both corporate and clinical program areas. 
Reporting to their respective vice-presidents are the leadership teams of the various 
corporate departments, e .g., human resources, corporate communications, and the 
different clinical programs. C linical programs have a leadership team consisting of a 
cl inical chief and a program director. The clinical chief is responsible for quality of care 
and other physician issues. The program director is responsible for the overall 
administration of the program, including some of the human resource issues and 
budgeting. While all programs are run on a regional basis, some clinical program areas 
have division managers who manage issues relate to their particular site and report to the 
regional program' s leadership team. 
Another important part of the management structure at Region B is its Medical Advisory 
Committee. This committee is made up of senior physicians, including all the clinical 
chiefs, the vice-presidents for c linical areas, and the C EO. The Medical Advisory 
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Committee is the forum where issues affecting quality of care are discussed. Resource 
allocation issues could also be discussed. As one member of the Medical Advisory 
Committee said: "It's a good forum for discussion before recommendations come forward 
to the executive and then on to the board in terms of resource allocation, or new 
technology, new programs, [or] new services." This Committee reports to the board of 
trustees during each board meeting to outline any of its concerns regarding the delivery of 
care. 
Figure 5.1 provides an overview of Region B 's governance structure. 
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Board Committees -7 
DHCS 
Board of Trustees 
CEO 
Medical Advisory 
Committee 
Senior Executive Team 
Vice Presidents (Corporate Areas) Vice-Presidents (Clinical 
Areas) 
Regional Corporate Departments Regional Clinical Programs 
Leadership Teams 
(Clinical Chief I Program Manager) 
Division Chiefs 
Figure 5.1: Governance Structure at Region B 
Table 5. 2 summarizes some of the information presented in the previous two sections 
about Region B 's financi al status and management structure. 
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Table 5.2: Region B Financial Data and Management Structure 
Total revenue (four regions) $1.4 billion 
Revenue per capita $2000 
Increase in operate costs 7.5% 
(2006-2007) 
Management structure Regional programs 
5.3 Resource Allocation at Region B 
Budgeting is currently based on adjusting the previous year's budget for likely changes in 
services for the coming year. In 200 I , the part of Region 8 which was previously 
responsible for acute care performed a review of all its programs and readjusted the level 
of funding for each program. Funding was adjusted using a clearly stated method, based 
on national benchmarks for providing care in each program area. This review was an 
attempt to move away from historical patterns of funding which had existed before the 
acute care region was established. This review also looked at which services programs 
were providing to identify services which may be outside of the region ' s mandate. One 
participant suggested that a similar review may be conducted once Region 8 is better 
integrated. 
In Region 8 , the capital and operational budgeting processes are independent exercises. 
There has been a move in the last few years to more closely tie the two processes so that 
the two budgets are produced at the same time. The attempt to more closely integrate the 
two budgeting processes is hampered by the provincial government keeping its capital 
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and operational budgets separate. For proposals w ith large operating and capital cost , 
e.g., the purchase of an MRI , they may be submitted to the DHCS as one proposal. 
Region B reports a trend towards increased targeted budgeting by the provincial 
government. Another trend is that funding increases are more often tied to achieving 
specific operational goals. The increased use of targeted funding is meant to improve the 
transparency and efficiency of how funds are spent. 
Sources of Requests for Additional Resources 
Participants identified numerous sources of requests for additional resources. Physicians 
often request additional resources, either in terms of requesting to perform new services 
or requesting the purchase of new equipment. Operational reviews have been conducted 
both internally and by external consulting firms. These reviews have resulted in 
recommendations regarding spending priorities. Accred itation reviews have influenced 
resource allocations. Compatible data on utilization, usually on a national basis, is a 
driving force. Internal data on utilization patterns and wait times was also sighted as 
be ing important. Patient knowledge of new treatments, gained e ither through TV or the 
internet, is another important source of demand for new services. Participants pointed out 
that public pressure for new services can often detem1ine resource al location, even if 
there is no or little evidence of benefit. Newfoundland's geography was mentioned by a 
number of participants as creating demands for resources, as rural areas demand service 
be allocated in their area. People feel that they should get the service close to home, 
even if it is not very economical. The location of services is also an important issue in 
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regard to maintaining economic infrastructure and employment m rural areas of the 
provmce. 
The Budgeting Process 
The budgeting process begins with the region 's finance depa1tment sending out a budget 
template to the leadership team of every program , usually in the early fall. The use of a 
standard template helps a llow for consistent data collection across the program areas. 
The template helps the programs identify their cost centers and unavoidable costs. The 
budgeting template also asks about gaps in service, services which should be added and 
what operational changes are likely for the program in the near future. The programs 
would have internal discussions to identify what their service pressure are, what gaps 
there are in service and what their spending priorities should be for the coming year. The 
focus of these di scussions would be on what is required to meet the needs of the 
population and to ensure quality services. The program directors and clinical chief also 
try to forecast what are going to be the main cost pressures for the coming year within 
their program area. A budget analyst from the finance department wi ll then met with the 
program manager and assists him or her in completing the budget template. The template 
for each program is submitted to the finance department. Based on the budget templates 
submitted by the programs, the department of finance develops a three-year budget plan, 
w ith the primary focus being on the coming fi scal year. A three-year plan allows the 
senior decision makers to begin financially planning for expenditures which wi ll need to 
be made in the near future. A summary of the templates submitted by the programs and 
the three-year budget p lan are presented to the executive for discussion. 
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In parallel to the development of a budget plan, the program leadership teams would 
discusses their budgetary requests with the vice-president responsible for thei r program 
area. These program priorities would a lso be discussed in Medical Affairs Committ e 
throughout the year. Although the budgeting process is in the fa ll , tlu·ough these 
discussions, the senior physicians and the executive have a good idea of the coming 
budgetary requests before the budgeting process has begun. The region has been trying to 
le t a wider range of staff members provide information in the budgeting I priority setting 
process. This is usually through contact with the vice-president responsible for their 
clinical area. Region B also has leadership days and strategic planning sessions with 
senior management which physicians and other management members can attend to 
express their views on what the region' s spending priorities should be. 
Participants described the budgeting process as having a good deal of communication 
across the different levels of decision makers, e.g. , Treasury Board officials, DHCS 
officials, regional executives, and officials from the region' s depa11ment of fi nance. One 
reason for this level of communication is the need for the region ' s budget to be in line 
with DHCS 's budget. As one participant said , " if you built your proposal so rich that 
government doesn't even look at it, you've kind of defeated yourself. " Both officials from 
both DHCS and Region B felt that they had a good working relationship and that they 
have a good sense of what each other priorities are. The budget guidance given by DHCS 
would influence both the development of the budget plan and the discussion the executive 
have about it. 
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For new program initiatives, the regton would first try to fund the initiative from 
resources they already have by shifting resources from other programs. When there are 
not sufficient resources available internally, they would then put forward a request for 
additional resources to the DHCS. No large program would likely be establ ished by the 
region without the approval of the DHCS. In some years, Region B has had decreases in 
their global budgets which have made the introduction of new techno logy, as one 
participant said, "exceptionally difficult unless the new technology can save you money 
in other areas." 
In late fall , the executive would discuss the budget plan developed by the finance 
department, including all budget submissions from the different program areas. The aim 
is reach a consensus on the region ' s operation and capital priorities amongst the executive 
members. If consensus cannot be achieved, the CEO would make the final determination. 
The executive would then submit their budget requests to the DHCS. 
In the end of March, once the provincial cabinet and DHCS have determined the region s 
annual budget, the region's executive would then finali ze its annual budget. The 
executive would then inform the specific clinical programs of any increases in their 
budgets for the coming year and which of their specific budgetary requests have b en 
approved. 
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Figure 5.2 provides an overview of Region B's priority setting and resource allocation 
cycle. 
Executive 
Program Leadership Team 
Frontline Requests 
PRIORITY 
SETTING 
Budgeting Process 
(Sept. to Mar.) 
Provincial 
Budget 
(Mar. I April) 
Allocation of 
Funding to DHCS 
RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION 
Finalizing Region' s Budget 
(After Budget) 
Figure 5.2: Priority Setting and Resource Allocation Cycle at Region B 
DHCS does have some di scretion to fund initiati ves outside of the budgeting process. It 
may even request additional funds from Treasury Board outside of the normal budgeting 
cycle. 
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Factors Influencing Budget Priorities 
Participants identified a number of factors which influence the region's priorities. The 
factors identified are listed in Table 5. 3. At the regional level, what is in the best interests 
of the patient population is the most important factor in determining budget priorities. 
Cost and available funding are also factors which have a big influence. If cost increases 
are seen as unavoidable in the delivery of care, e .g., increases in the cost of pharmaceutics 
which are provided in hospital , they will be fulfilled. A number of participants reported 
that the region 's executive's philosophy tries to "give everybody [i .e., every program] 
something ... but not [necessarily] equal. " The idea is that no program area is left without 
having at least one of its priorities fulfilled. This requires, of course, that additional 
funding is made available by the province . Whether the investment in technology or new 
service allows for offsetting savings is an important factor. Another key consideration is 
whether the saving can actually be recouped or whether pent-up demand will u e the 
resources which are saved. Resource a llocations tied to retaining or recruiting physicians 
is another issue. Wait lists and other internal operational measures clearl y influence 
priorities. Meeting national standards of care was mentioned by a number of participants 
as an important factor. There is a consideration also of whether there is a gap in service 
or whether it is a service the region should be providing and currently is not. Finally, 
there is a concern with whether the money is going to be used effectively to address the 
problems facing the region. As one participant said, the executive always ask " Is it going 
to be effective in saving money? Is it going to be a better service? Is it going to addres 
one of the issues we have facing us now?" 
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Table 5.3: Factors Identified as Determining Budget Priorities 
• Best interest of the patient 
• Cost I Institutional impact 
• Available funding 
• Unavoidable costs 
• Operational pressures (Waiting lists I Wait times) 
• Provincial I National initiatives 
• National standards of care 
• Re ults in resources which are saved and not 
used for other services 
• Gaps in service 
• Needs identified by frontline staff 
• Technology I Changes in clinical practice 
• Offsett ing savings 
• Retention and recruitment issues 
• Effectively address the region's needs 
Procurement 
The procurement of new equipment is primarily managed at the program level. Once 
there is a budget allocation for new equipment, the program leadership team would 
establish a working group, whose job it is to recommend the most appropriate piece of 
equipment to purchase. This working group would usually consist of a physician working 
in the area, technicians who would work on the equipment and someone on the program s 
administrative side. There would be discussions around the necessary requirements for 
the equipment and a list of added features it would be desirable for the equipment to have. 
There would usually be some opportunity for everyone in the program area to contribute 
their opinions on what features they would like the equipment to have. This program-
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wide consultation would be usually through e-mails or during a general departmental 
meeting. 
Once the basic requirements of the equipment are determined by the working group the 
program leadership team would then contact the vendors. There are two ways vendors 
can be contacted. Sometimes vendors are asked to provide information on the type of 
equipment they have available. Other times the working group would develop a RFP and 
send it to the prospective vendors. Once the vendors identify the avai lable equipment 
options, the working group would assess the different options. The sales people for the 
di fferent vendors may be brought in to make presentations to the working group. The 
working group would then shortlist two or three pieces of equipment which meet both the 
program ' s needs and the resources allocated for the equipment. For expensive equipment 
purchases, the department may select a small group to do site visits to see the equipment 
operating in a clinical environment. For smaller purchases, the working group may ask 
the vendor to bring the machines in for a trial. After assess ing the performance of the 
equipment and considering other factors, such as compatibility with other equipment, the 
working group would recommend one piece of equipment to the program's leadership 
team. Once the leadership team approved this selection, the recommendation is 
forwarded to the department of finance, who, if they approve the selection, wi ll arrange 
the purchase. 
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5.4 Resource Allocation Issues at Region B 
The executive of Region B are ultimately responsible fo r a ll the resource allocations 
made within their region. In determining the region' s budget, the executive would 
allocate resources across the diffe rent program areas. It would make program level 
decisions which have a substantia l impact on the region' s operations or have substantial 
costs associated with them. The executive may also decide on any issue which is 
particularly contentious and in this way could be involved in decisions concerning the 
care individual patients receive. For Region B, the DHCS may also become involved in 
making some of these decisions. 
The executive ' s decision making can be described as closed-door I top-down, in that it is 
only the executive who makes the decision and its decisions are then imposed on the 
other levels of the region. The executive does aim however to bring in numerous other 
perspecti ves into the budgeting process. 
5.4.1 Region Band Need 
At the executive level, determinations of need would be based primarily on estimates 
from the clinical departments. As one management partic ipant said, " the system has 
typically . . . left it up to the physicians to determine the patient population foremost in 
these things." Inte rnal utilization data is a lso used. It is sometimes difficult to determine 
the level of demand for a new service or new piece of equipment. ln these cases, the 
region' s management may contact other regions in the country which a lready perform the 
service in order to discuss current usage and tre nds in usage patterns. Participants also 
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reported that the reg10n has in the past used formal needs assessments to help in the 
planning of services for particular parts of the region. 
5.4.2 Region B and Evidence 
The type and amount of evidence looked at by Region B's executive in making resource 
allocation decisions varies depending on the service under consideration. One participant 
said that in the past there have been cases in which "clinical effectiveness wasn't 
clinicall y assessed or appraised" before a serv ice was approved . This si tuation is 
becoming rarer in Region B. For new technologies, the executive may ask for an 
evaluation report to determine what is known about the effectiveness and impact of the 
technology be fore it is adopted, especially for a technology the executive are not fa irly 
fam iliar with. 
The executive may rev1ew evidence from numerous sources. They would look at 
independent technology assessments, existing research studies, and the experiences m 
other centers across the country. Another important source of evidence is internal data, 
especially when it is compared with national standards. Region B ' s internal data 
col lection system has been described as "fairl y sophisticated" and is able to calculate the 
number of patient days of each program, the average hours of care per patient day, 
workload per patient and anticipated workload. The opinions of clinical staff are also 
seen as an important source of evidence. 
237 
Some participants criticized the quality of research which is available to base decisions 
on. One participant said that a lot of research does not easily translate in to operational 
outcomes, e.g., readmission rates, which are important for regional health authorities. 
Another participant pointed to the quality of research as a problem, especially the lack of 
double blind studies and the short duration of many research projects. 
Participants also touched on the political nature of evidence. One participant complained 
that advocacy groups often simply dispute research evidence that does not support their 
views. Often the political pressure of these groups wins out over contrary evidence for 
effectiveness. Another participant talked about the importance of evidence fo r putting the 
brakes on physicians' demands for new services. Other participants painted a less 
fractious re lationship between the executive and physicians over evidence, based on 
ensuring the best quality of care. As one participant said, 
" if you can show the evidence is there, then they'll go with the evidence. Doctors, 
pharmacists and these people- they're generally ... they think like scientists. They 
have a patient advocacy role as well, but they' ll still do so in the sense of the 
scientific thinking. They don't want to give their patients something that's not going 
to work or prescribed a benefit. " 
5.4.3 Region B and Cost 
The region has in the past tried to do some cost-impact analysis for certain decisions. 
One regional official admitted that the region does not do as much of this type of analysis 
as it should. The focus of any analys is is on the budgetary implications of offering new 
services or in purchasing new equipment. A key focus would be on whether there can be 
238 
operational savings or efficiencies gained. Formal cost-effectiveness studies are rarely 
considered. 
While not explicitly activity-based budgeting, in that budget a llocations are not tied 
directly to activity outcomes, the department of finance closely watch output data for each 
program and will investigate if a program is not meeting its expected level of out put. 
Budget analysts meet with the program manager every month. Variance analysis is 
performed for every depar1ment. 
Costs are determined mostly by using internal data, although sometimes vendors wi ll be 
contacted. Operational costs are often compared with other regional authorities across the 
country to identify levels ofvariance. 
5.4.4 Region B and Accountability 
Provincia l officials and Region B ' s management both stressed the need to be accountable 
for the allocation of public funds. A good deal of this accountability is provided by the 
overall government structure . The provincial government appoints a board of trustees 
who monitor the region 's operations and issue an annual report on the region' s activities. 
Funds for the region come from the provincial governm ent, which provides a number of 
controls. The provincia l budgeting process is fa irly transparent and is overseen by the 
provincial legislature. At the departmenta l level, DHCS officials consult with community 
stakeholders and other interest groups about their wants and concerns wi th the health care 
system as a part of its budgeting process. The provincial Auditor General has the 
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authority to review all government spending, including the spending of the regional 
health authorities. Likewise, the Minister of Health can inquire about any aspect of the 
health care system, including about the region's operations. The province is in the 
process of passing the Transparency and Accountability Act (2004), which is meant to 
give, as one participant described it, the "public has a better sense and understanding of 
what are we really doing." One of the requirements of this new legislation is for all 
government departments and agencies, including Region B and DHCS, to submit three-
year business plans outlining their operational objectives. The new legislation also aims 
to clarify the roles of the departments and the regions. Finally, a ll purchasing by Region 
B needs to be done in accordance with the Public Tendering Act ( 1998). 
The region itself has a number of measures which further help to ensure accountability to 
the public. The region has worked with stakeholder groups to determine their concerns 
about the delivery of care in their loca l communities. The resource allocation pilot 
project, described in section 5.4.6, a lso hopes ultimately to engage the public. 
Participants said, however, that the other side of accountability enta ils ensuring public 
concerns, expressed by interest groups, do not drive the agenda, overriding evidence for 
effectiveness or what is in the best interest of the entire patient population. The region 
has also used external firms to audit the region 's operations and evaluate the region ' s 
spending controls. 
A number of participants discussed the region ' s move to tic funding more c losely to 
outcome measures as increasing accountability throughout the organization. One 
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participant said that this focus on outcome measures is needed because the executive have 
no day-to-day control over how services are delivered in the frontline departments. Two 
other partic ipants pointed out that while there is a focus on production measures, there is 
nothing which ties spending to health outcomes. Focusing accountabili ty on health 
outcomes may force more funding into prevention and community care. 
Participants said that Region B is usua lly very open to sharing information with the 
public. There are annual general meetings outlining the region 's finances and its strategic 
plan. One participant suggested that current wait lists for MRI and other services will be 
soon publi shed on the region ' s website. Another participant said, " if somebody calls and 
asks anything financi al, I keep saying it's one set of books, public information anybody 
can know this anytime so, you know, judge yourself accordingly when you're spending." 
5.4.5 Region B and Ethics 
One participant described Region B as basically "an ethics-based organization." 
Participants often said that the region's corporate values do have a practical import, with 
the region' s executive often being criticized when the organization has fai led to meet the 
ethical standards they have set for themselves. 
There has been some di scussion at the executi ve level about the principles which shou ld 
be used to a llocate resources and about the fa ir a llocation of resources. The executive has 
also discussed other ethical issues related to resource allocation. For example, should the 
region give preferential access to Workers Compensation patients because they're paying 
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for their care? To what extent should a person 's li festy le affect the type of treatments 
they should be eligible to receive? 
One member of the executive team is respons ible for the region 's ethics committee. 
Beyond dealing w ith ethical issues relating to clinical practice, the committee has been 
particularly concerned with ensuring that resource are allocated fairly across expensive, 
high profi le programs, e.g., diagnostics, cardiac care, and programs with lesser profiles, 
e.g., mental health, health promotion. The committee has also reviewed some of the 
allocation decisions the region has had to face in the past. The region 's board of trustees 
asked the ethics committee to try and develop an ethical framework for making resource 
allocation decisions. The pilot project discussed in Section 5. 4. 6 came out of this attempt 
to establ ish an ethical framework. The ethics committee has also organized workshops 
with the program leadership teams which consider how to fairly allocate health care 
resources. One participant said that one of the challenges for the region is that there 
really has not been a wider public discussion about the principles which should be used to 
allocate health care resources and what should be in and out of the Medicare basket. 
5.4.6 Initiatives Improving Resource Allocation at Region 8 
Resource Allocation Pilot Project 
Region B is currently conducting a pi lot project to Improve its resource a llocation 
processe . The pi lot project has been developed from an ethical perspective. It was the 
region' s ethics committee which call ed for a more systematic approach to resource 
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allocation and for a better articulation of the principles which should drive the allocation 
of resources in the region. 
Traditionally, some programs have ignored their program's budget limits, refusing to 
limit care to patients. The pilot project aims to make the programs more accountable for 
any cost overruns within their program area. As one participant said, "anyone can run the 
ship if you have unlimited resources; but you don't have unlimited resources, so now 
manage that." The new pilot project requires that programs stay within their assigned 
budgets. The programs can shift resources around their program to release resources for 
new initiatives. 
The pilot project began with a facilitator meeting with the managers of each progran1 to 
discuss their budget situation and how they currently set priorities. A particular concern 
was with any recurring deficits . There was also a discussion of the ethical principles used 
to make allocation decisions. This discussion focused on whether the program is listening 
to vulnerable people and what principles are dri ving its resource a llocations. The pilot 
project aims to bring these ethical considerations to the forefron t in discussions about 
how resources are a llocated at the program level. Following the e discussions the 
facilitator developed an ethical template which will , in coming years, be incorporated into 
the region 's standard budget template. 
Another key feature of the pilot program is that requests for add itional resources need to 
be di scus ed and agreed to by the clinical chiefs of all programs. These interdepartmental 
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discussions are meant to help the program management teams to agree on priorities which 
are often hard to compare. The goal is for some level of consensus, across the program 
areas, about what the region 's priorities should be going forward. The pilot project also 
aims to better manage the institutional impact of changes in program areas by alerting 
other affected programs before the changes are implemented. 
Physician impact analysis 
When programs request to bring in a new physician, the clinical chief is required to fill 
out a physician impact analysis form. All of the programs affected by the new physician 
need to sign off on the form. 
5.4.7 Overview of Resource Allocation at the Executive Level of Region B 
Table 5.4 summarizes some qfthe information presented in sections 5.4 to section 5.4.6. 
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Table 5.4: Overview of Resource Allocation at the Executive Level of Region B 
Resource Allocation Across program areas; within programs and occasionally, in 
Decisions clinical circumstances. Inclusive, but ultimately closed-door, 
top-down. Often the DHCS in involved. 
Need Determined by staff, stakeholder reports, internal data, 
consultations w ith other provider regions, and the use of 
formal needs assessments. 
Evidence Varies depending on issue under consideration. New and 
innovative technologies usually require a good deal of 
information. Internal data and expert opinion are important 
types of evidence. Evidence can be contested and politicized. 
Cost Primarily concerned with budget impact, determined primarily 
by internal data, although sometimes vendors are contacted. 
Cost comparisons often made with other health regions. 
Accountability General government structure; annual reports and public 
reporting; increasingly tying funding to operational output, 
although not health outcomes; openness to requests for 
information. 
Ethics Sees itself as an ethics-based organization; a good deal of 
reflection by the ethical aspects of allocation decisions; a pilot 
project is attempting to identify the principles which resource 
allocations and priority setting in the region should accord 
with. 
Innovations for • Resource Allocation Pilot Project 
Improving Resource • Physician impact analysis 
Allocation 
5.5 Resource Allocation within the Diagnostics Program 
In a ll three regions, endovascular coiling and MRI are both budgeted through the 
diagnostics program. As with Region A, it is useful to begin our discussion of resource 
allocation in these two areas in Region B by examining how resources are allocated 
within this program generally. 
245 
Decision Structure 
The diagnostics program is responsible for providing diagnostic services throughout 
Region B. The program has capabilities in most modalities of diagnostic imaging. There 
are less than 30 radiolog ists currently working in the program . 
The program's leadership team is made up of a c linical chief and a program manager. 
'1 he cl inical chief is responsible for all c linical and quality of care issues. The clinical 
chief is supported by four divisional chiefs, who report on the operations at different si tes. 
The program manager has responsibility for the administrative aspects of the program, 
including managing the human resources aspects of program, equipment, delivery of 
service, and the location of service. Although they have different responsibilities, the 
leadership team works c losely together on most important issues for the program. Both 
the clinical chief and the program manager report to the vice-president responsible for 
medical and diagnostics services. 
Because radiologists work purely on a fee-for-service basis, they have a great deal more 
autonomy then many other physicians who work in the reg ion. For example, the 
radiologists would identify the need for another radiologist within their program and 
would not have to seek approval from the region. Radiologists a lso have a good deal of 
autonomy in how they o rganize their work. As one participant said, the radio logists are 
"pure fee for service- just happen to work in the hospital." The region identifies the level 
of work they need done, and the leave it to the radiologists to determine how that work is 
actually carried out. 
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The program's decision making structure is outlined in Figure 5.3. 
VP for Medical and Diagnostics Services 
Program Manager- Diagnostics Clinical Chief- Diagnostics 
Divisional Chief 
Frontline Staff ------------' 
Figure 5.3: Decision Making Structure of the Diagnostics Program 
Priority Setting 
The clinical chief, the program manager, and divisional chiefs meet regularly to discuss 
the program' s resource needs. The various sites are small enough that informal 
discussion amongst the radiologists is suffi cient for the divisional chiefs to identify their 
division's resource needs. Some physicians will a lso discuss their resource need di rectly 
with either the program manager or the clinical chief. There are also staff meetings in 
which resource concerns are discussed. 
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The program maintains an ongoing five-year priority list for both the expansion of 
services and replacement of equipment. The priority setting process is fairly consensus-
based, in that the priority list is usually agreed to by the entire leadership team. In terms 
of resource allocation, the two main issues the diagnostics program deal with are: 1) 
managing wait lists and patient demand and 2) trying to keep up-to-date with equipment. 
Keeping up-to-date equipment has implications for other areas, e.g., accreditation, staff 
retention. Another consideration for the diagnostics program is that it often cannot 
control the demand for its services, due to the fact that requisitions come internally 
through other clinical programs. As one participant described the situation, 
"We have a difficulty containing the refeiTal rate and so, as a result, our only option 
to reduce our expenditures either is not provide the service, which is not looked 
upon favourably by the public or the patient who' s waiting to have an 
examination ... the only other way to do is push our wait times so we do less ... you 
know, we do less over a period of time, so it spreads out the expenditures." 
Because demand for diagnostic services often originates outside of the program area, it is 
often the case that added demand comes before there is a budget allocation to fund the 
additional service. In some cases, the department may try to juggle its resources and 
provide the service, waiting until the next budgeting cycle to request additional resources. 
Other times, the diagnostics program will not provide the service until there is additional 
funding already in place. 
Another factor influencing demand is that radiologists are continuing to do more 
procedures which were traditionally performed in other areas, e .g., endovascular coilings, 
which were traditiona lly treated in surgery . While increasingly the e services a re being 
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provided by the diagnostics program, funding for these services has not usually flowed 
back to diagnostics from the other programs, resulting in a further deficit for the 
diagnostics program. There is a recognition that often the diagnostics is not given 
sufficient resources to carry out a ll of the services it is asked to do. The region requires 
the program to provide the service, so that the program often shows a deficit at the end of 
the fiscal year. 
The leadership team would forward to the finance department its requests for resources 
for the coming fiscal year as part of the region's annual budgeting process. The program 
also forwards an emergency list of resource requests the program leadership team sees as 
necessary to maintain a level of core services, e.g., funds needed to replace equipment 
which has broken down. These emergency requests may be made at any point during the 
year. Because of resource constraints, new services usually take a number of years to be 
approved. Often the new service has to be recognized as the Canadian standard of care or 
be demanded by an external accrediting agency before resources are approved. 
The executive may identify a couple of new services which it is considering funding. It 
may then ask the program's leadership team to develop the business case for these new 
services, especially if the executive are not sufficiently familiar with the service. The 
business case would include the clinical indication, the expected patient populations, 
costs, and the expected efficiencies gains. In some cases, this business case needs to 
include some account of how savings in operational funds will offset the costs of the new 
program. Often the business case would not include evidence of effectiveness because, as 
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one participant said, " the thing about here in Newfoundland is what happens in other 
places becomes standard before it's here... . Everybody else had one . So it's common 
knowledge [that it is effective]." 
Once an allocation is received for a new piece of equipment, the program leadership team 
will meet with specialists in the area the equipment is for. Through these discussions, an 
assessment team will be identified by the program and a wish list for that piece of 
equipment developed. Once the specifi cations for the new equipment have been 
identified, the vendors will be contacted either through informally or using a RFP. The 
assessment team will then analyze the options. Vendors may be invited in to demonstrate 
their equi pment. A short list would be determined. For major equipment purchases, si te 
visits may be arranged. The equipment that best meets the programs need w ithin the 
ass igned budget wi ll be recommended by the program to the region' s administration, who 
then arrange for the purchase. 
5.6 Endovascular Coiling at Region B 
Region B currently does not offer endovascular co iling. There has been, however, a good 
deal o f d iscussion late ly about whether the region should establish a program . One 
participant summed up the current situation by saying " the tide is pushing towards there 
[being a program established here]. I would a rgue that. If we're not there already, we' re 
very clos to that - to saying, okay, well , this is not an option anymore. We need to be 
doing this." Another participant was less certain, saying that 'the volumes and the cost to 
provide neurocoiling is still questionable w ith regards to, do you send them to Halifax? 
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Do you spend the money and set up a program here?" The establishment of a program 
will depend on the provincial government being w illing to provide funding, given that it 
is beyond the capacity of the region to establi sh the program itself. As a member of the 
executive said, " it [endovascular coiling] might be the right thing to do - [but] we have 
no ability to get that kind of money. So unless the ministry bites, we'r not going there." 
5.6.1 Resource Allocation for Endovascular Coiling 
The request for an endovascular coiling program was first raised by neurosurgeons who 
were seeing cerebral aneurysm patients they felt were better treated through neurocoiling. 
Radiologists a lso supported the establishment of an endovascular coiling program. The 
formal proposal for the new program was sent to the executive from the diagnostics 
program as part of its annual budgetary request. The neurosurgery program also sent a 
letter to the vice-president of Medical Affairs, outlining their program ' s support for a 
coiling program . The reasons identified by frontline staff for the establishment of an 
endovascular coiling program are listed in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5: Reasons Cited by Frontline Staff in Support an Endovascular Coiling 
Program at Region B 
};> These are critically ill patients in desperate need for care. 
};> These are medically unstable patients, who it is often risky to transport. 
};> Legal issues around not providing the best care. 
};> There are an abnormally high number of Newfoundland patients needing 
treatment for cerebral aneurysms. 
};> Family travel costs not sufficiently covered by MCP. 
};> Dangerous situations have been experienced locally when transporting 
patients. 
};> Accepted practice across the country. 
};> The trend in neurosurgery is towards less invasive procedures. 
};> Recommendation from colleagues in Halifax about the likely increase in 
numbers. 
};> Trained staff already working in the organization. 
};> Another tool which is needed in dealing with neurological cases. 
Once the executive received the request to start an endovascular coiling program, they 
met with the neurosurgeons and interventionalist radiologists to discuss the proposal. The 
executive committed to examining the proposal more closely. Part of this examination 
was the development of internal document outlining the evidence, pros and cons, costs 
and options regarding endovascular coiling. The executive included this planning 
document in its submission to the DHCS for funding for the program. 
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The discussions amongst the executive and between the executive and officials from 
DHCS have focused on a number of issues. Participants said that the most important 
factor is qual ity of care. Currently, patients who need to be coi led are sent to either 
Halifax or Ontario. These patients are in critical condition and there are concerns about 
the effect sending them away for care may have on their overall health. There are issues 
about whether travel difficulties, e.g. , snowstorms, may delay care, again adversely 
affecting patient outcomes. The province has had a couple of nearly disastrous situations 
with moving aneurysm patients in the past. For medically unstable cases, the patient may 
be le ft with no treatm nt option if the service is not provided locally. 
Another factor discussed is the level of need. It is estimated that the potential patient 
population for coiling will be very small. One participant estimated that the province 
currently sends less than ten people out o f province to be coiled annually. Based on 
discussions with other health regions, it is estimated that Region B would likely coil 
between twenty and thirty patients annually if it establ ishes a program. The potentia l 
patient population affects the quality of care. There is a good deal of discussion about 
whether the potential patient population is great enough so that rad iologists will be able to 
maintain their skill set. 
Another important consideration is the cost implications of either having or not having 
the program. If the program is not provided locally, the region and the province have to 
pay for patients to be sent and cared for in another province. There are also the cost 
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saving resulting from the fact that patients recover faster from endovascular coil ing than 
from open brain surgery, so that they are able to leave hospital faster. These costs will be 
saved if Region B decides to establish the service. But the costs of establishing a 
program are considerable. The region would have to purchase a new bi-plane 
angiograph, which is estimated to cost between two and three million dollars. The ini tial 
inventory of coils would cost in the range of $300,000 to $500,000. 1 here is the cost of 
training staff. There is also the issue of cost savings not being realized fo r the region, 
because of pent up demand fo r the surgery time saved by treating the aneurysms outside 
of the operating room. There are considerations about the added pressures on the home 
care system by having patients rehabilita te longer in the community. Another factor is 
the cost implications of having a new angiograph machine. Only a small percentage of 
the angiograph' s time is going to be used doing coilings. One participant said that the 
new angiograph may have another $500,000 in operating costs associated wi th it outside 
of the costs from doing coilings just because it would be idle and avai lable for other 
services. 
Apart from the cost implications, a range of system impacts fo r establishing an 
endovascular coiling program were considered . For example, service implications, 
support implications, and impacts across programs were all considered. An important 
consideration is how the establishment of an endovascular coil ing program may affect the 
use of anesthesio logists. 
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The DHCS are currently analyzing the region 's proposal. The department's medical 
people will examine the level of need for the service. They will determine the level of 
ongoing funding and one-time funding required to establish and to run the program. If 
approved, the department may fund the program immediately. They may fund it in the 
coming budget year. They may have to go to Treasury Board to approve add itional funds 
for the program. There is also some consideration given by the region to asking its 
hospital foundation to pay for the angiograph, thereby limiting the initial cost of the 
program to the province. 
There is a sense on the part of the executi ve that the discussion around endovascular 
coiling represents an advancement in how the region allocates resources. As one 
participant said, " in the past. ... I think we would've started ... we would've come up with 
a way to get a bi-plane [angiograph]. ... then all of a sudden we could do neurocoiling; 
and then, all of a sudden, well , where the hell did that [an endovascular coil ing program] 
come from.' The level of di scussion with the province and frontline staff, and especially 
the use of an internal document to review the evidence and major implications of the 
different options, was seen as adding a level of sophi stication to how resources for new 
programs are allocated. Participants also felt that the process has been fa irly evidence-
based. 
There has been, however, a level of frustration on the part of some of the physician staff 
with the region's refusal to approve the program. Some physicians said they were 
considering directly lobbying the provincial government and media over this issue. In 
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other words, they are considering taking their concerns outside of the region's priority 
setting process. 
5.6.2 Resource Allocation Issues around Endovascular Coiling 
The main resource allocation question for Region B is whether to begin an endovascular 
coiling program. This decision is focused on the combined decision of whether to 
purchase an inventory of coils and a new bi-plane angiograph, as well as cover the 
operational costs of the program. 
5.6.3 Endovascular Coiling and Need 
Need is determined by examining interna l data on the number of aneurysm cases treated 
annually by the region and the number of patients sent from the region to other provinces 
to get th ir aneurysms coiled. Estimates from frontline staff and discussions with other 
health regions are also used to help estimate the demand for the serv ice. Next to 
estimating the likely demand fo r the service, the executive also considered what the 
maximum demand for the service could be. Often a program starts by doing only the 
most serious cases, but once the service is established, it is used for a much wider range 
of cases. 
5.6.4 Endovascular Coiling and Evidence 
In evaluating whether the region should start an endovascular project, Region B 
developed an internal planning document to help focus the d iscussion between fron tl ine 
staff, the regional executive and the provincial government. This document reflected the 
256 
key areas the executive wanted information about in making its decision: the likely 
patient population, the number of patients being sent out of the province fo r the service, 
the pros and cons of coiling vs. alternative treatment options, evidence for the 
effectiveness of endovascular coiling, what costs are associated with the different 
treatment options, and what are the national standards of care. Essentially, the document 
tried to capture what the main system impacts would be for starting an endovascular 
coi ling program. 
There seems to be an increased use of evidence in the decision making around 
endovascular coi ling, especially at the regional executive level. One part icipant said that 
" We spent some time gathering a lot of evidence on that in terms of the value of 
neurocoiling to make sure that it simply once of those issues that was being 
promoted a particular physician. I think we've gotten a bit gun shy over the years 
that we've jumped too quickly in bringing things in and found out that maybe the 
value that we see wasn't great or the numbers weren't large enough." 
A number of executi ve participants said the reason for this increased focus on evidence 
was an attempt to improve the decision making around resource allocation. 
The front line staff were invited to review the planning document and contribute to it. 
One of the executive ' s findings is that there is relatively little clinical trial data on the 
effectiveness of endovascular coiling. This has caused some tension wi th frontline staff 
who see coiling as a standard and proven practice. From the perspective of expert staff, 
the coiling is safe and often preferable option for treating cerebral aneurysms, so there 
was no question for them about its effectiveness, even given the absence of research data. 
257 
5.6.5 Endovascular Coiling and Cost 
Cost is determined by internal data, estimates of frontline staff and discussions with other 
health regions and vendors. For the basis of comparison, costs have also been calculated 
for sending patients out of the province for treatment. 
5.6.6 Endovascular Coiling and Accountability 
Given that the program has not been established, there are no special accountability 
measures for endovascular coiling. The decision whether to establish an endovascular 
coiling program would be made in accordance with the accountability measures put in 
place by the provincial government and Region B outlined in Section 5. 4. 4. 
5.6.7 Endovascular Coiling and Ethics 
Generally, there has been little discussion of the ethics of specifically starting an 
endovascular coi ling program. One participant did raise the issue of whether resources 
should be directed to a few criticall y ill patients or whether those resources would be 
better sp nt in other c linical areas. But this issue has not been raised in the discussions 
about whether the reg ion should establish a program. 
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5.6.8 Overview of Endovascular Coiling 
Table 5. 6 provides an overview of the usage of endovascular coiling in Region B and how 
the six component elements are handled by Region B with regard to endovascular coi ling. 
Table 5.6: Overview of Endovascular Coiling 
Usage Currently not available. 
Resource Allocation Whether to begin performing endovascular coiling within 
Decisions the region. This decision is focused on the combined 
decision to purchase an inventory of coils, a bi-plane 
angiograph and train staff. 
Need Determined by internal data, estimates of frontline staff and 
discussions with other health regions. 
Evidence The executive have developed an internal report to examine 
the evidence for the treatment's effectiveness and the 
program's likely impact on the region. Seen as an effective 
treatment by frontline staff, even though there is an absence 
of research on the procedure. 
Cost Determined by internal data estimates of frontline staff and 
discussions with other health regions and vendors. 
Accountability No measures specific to program. 
Ethics Not discussed in deciding whether to start a program. 
Wider consideration of whether resources should be directed 
to a few critically ill patients or whether the resources would 
be better spent in other clinical areas. 
5. 7 MRJ in Newfoundland 
Newfoundland has two MRI scanners. MRI capacity has been a long standing issue for 
the province, due to the low number of machines compared to other provinces. As one 
participant said, "we're behind the path, probably, if you look at the number of MRis that 
are in other provinces, you know. We have, well , two now; but if you can go to a centre 
like Halifax and there's four ... and then a private one besides that, we're clearly behind 
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the path." In 2005, Newfoundland ' s scan rate was the lowest in the country at 8.5 scans 
for every I ,000 people in the province (Cl HI, 2005). A review by the provincial 
government recommended that the province should have at least four MRl. The province 
is planning to use federal funds from the Health Care Accord (2003) to purchase a third 
MRI in the near future. 
MRI in Region B 
Region B operates one of the province's two MRis. It performs around 5000 MRI scans 
annually. 
5. 7.1 Resource Allocation for MRI 
The decision whether to expand MRI capacity would be made by the provincia l 
government, with some input from the health regions. Part icipants said that the decision 
to purcha e a new MRI involves three questions. The first is the decision to fund a new 
machine. This decision is made by the provincial cabinet. Given the shortage of MRI 
scanners in the province, there is always a great deal of pressure on the provincial 
government to purchase new MRis. There are also a number of groups who are regularly 
lobbying the government to expand MRI capacity in the province. These groups would 
include physicians, the executive of the regions, provincial and national medical societies. 
When the provincial government feels that it may have available funding to purchase a 
new MRI , officia ls from the DHCS would discuss the possibility of a new MRI with the 
executive of the appropriate health region. The region's executive would then ask the 
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diagnostics program to develop a proposal for a new scanner. The proposal would 
identify the current level of the need and the approximate cost, including human resources 
costs, installation costs and the cost of the equipment. There will be some discussion 
with vendors to estimate the cost of the machine to be included in the proposal. 
Consideration would also be given to the site where the machine is proposed to be 
located, due to the influence the site may have on the overall costs and ultimate which the 
machine is purchased. 
"1 he second question is where to locate the MRl . This decision is seen as a politically 
sensitive one in the province. The provincial cabinet would decide which health region 
and probably which city a new scanner will be located. The decision would be based on a 
number of factors. Political considerations, including perceived fairness in the allocation 
of health care resources across the province would be a major consideration. The fact that 
the main teaching and most te11iary care services, including all te11iary pediatric care, are 
provided in St. John 's is another consideration. Physicians, patients and municipal 
politician would also likely lobby government for their preferred location. 
If there are two possible sites within a city, the region would decide which site makes the 
most sense to locate the scanner. The region would consider what is best for the patient 
population, the cost of locating the machine at different facilities , personnel 
considerations, the time it wi ll take to install the machine at different sites and issues 
related to space. pace issues are important in deciding on the location of an MRI. As 
one participant pointed out, ' one of the things we have to look at with MR is the field .. . or 
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the magnetic field around it - so that one can't put it too close to an elevator, too close to 
where cars or trucks are moving at loading docks or stuff" Radiologists in the region 
would be consulted about where they think the MRl should be located. Outside 
consultants may be used to evaluate the different sites. On participant summed up the 
decision about which facility to locate a new machine as one in which the executive ask 
" is there a direct clinical issue that says one site should have it over another? And if 
there's not a clear, clinical benefit, then it'll go ... to the facilities that can most easily 
accept it. " 
The third decision is the procurement of the MRI. The purchase of an MRI would 
generally follow the method of procurement identified in Section 5. 3. 2 and Section 5. 5 . 
There are, however, a number of issues unique to MRI. Large capital purchases, like the 
purchase of an MRJ, involve questions of whether it is better to lease or buy the 
equipment and whether it is best to sign extended service agreements. The finance 
department will likely assist the program manager in making these types of decisions. 
There are also issues around the type of magnet which is purchased. The power of the 
magnet determines the type of cases the machine is able to scan. The power of the 
magnet will also affect the rate at which cases can be scanned . Before purchasing an 
MRI , the diagnostics program would develop a plan of the type and number of cases it 
plans to scan with the new machine. Many of these parameters would be determined by, 
or at least discussed with, the executive in advance of the sending out of an RFP. 
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In Region B, there is little discussion about changing the operational level of the current 
MRJ. The machine currently operates 16 hours a day, five days a week. The region fe lt 
that this is currently its maximum capacity due to human resource constraints, most 
notably the staffs unwillingness to regularl y work longer hours. There are also issues 
re lating to collective agreements, which make expanding the service beyond the current 
operating time difficult and inefficient. 
The schedule for the MRI is determined by the program's clinical chief. The divisional 
chiefs are also involved in determining the schedule. The radiologists would determine 
the type of cases they fee l need to be scanned on the machine, e.g. , head, chests, and 
allocate so many scans to each type. The schedule would also allow for a particular 
number of emergency MRI scans. 
There were a number of other issues raised during the interviews regarding the allocation 
of resources for MRI. One participant said that too much emphasis is placed on MRI in 
the region. The participant said that ' 'I'll say thi s almost facet iously, but I think there's a 
substance of truth to it - the MRI ... is more important than the patient. ... we spend more 
time and energy try ing to fit the schedule of the MRI than the schedule of a sick patient 
who goes through to that MRI." Another issue is that there is a perception amongst some 
staff that micro-level decisions can be too easily influenced by political or media 
pressure. Some front line radio logists complained that even at the level of scheduling 
they felt that they did not have much innuence on the decision making process. Another 
issue mentioned numerous times was the level of pent up demand for MRI . Staff said 
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that many cases which are commonly diagnosed with MRI in other provinces are not 
scanned in this province, due to a lack of MRI capacity. As one participant said , 'I don't 
think the hospital realizes how much we're not doing." This need to increase the scope of 
MRI usage raises a difficult allocation question when new MRI capacity becomes 
available. As one participant said, "should we continue not doing stuff that we should be 
doing to address the wait list or should we try to do some things that we're not doing that 
should be done at the expense of maintaining a long wait list. " As MRI capacity is being 
expanded across the country, there is also an is ue of ensuring the appropriate number of 
technicians is available within the region. 
Guidelines for MRI 
There are no formal guidelines on MRJ usage in Region B. Patients need a referral from 
a specialist to obtain a MRI scan. These requisitions are then reviewed by a radiologist. 
The reviewing radiologist classifies the scan as either emergency, urgent, or regular. 
These classifications are used to prioritize requisitions. In making these categorizations, 
radiologists solely rely on the requisition orders forward by physicians. These 
categorizations thus depend to some extent on the requisitioning physicians being wi lling 
to not manipulate the requisitions to ensure faster service for his or her patients. The 
region has considered putting in some type of practice guidelines at the source of 
ordering, but there has been no action taken due to the complications involved in trying to 
use and enforce the guidelines. There are guide lines from the Canadian Association of 
Radiologists which are used by the radiologists in Region B to determinate the most 
appropriate modality for different conditions. 
264 
5. 7.2 Resource Allocation Issues around MRI 
Two of the most important decisions regarding MRI are I) the decision whether to 
purchase a new scanner and 2) where to locate a new MRI scanner. Both of these 
decisions are primarily made by the provincial cabinet. The provincial cabinet would 
decide whether the province buys a new scanner. The provincial cabinet would decide 
which health region and probably which city a new scanner will be located. If there ar 
two possible sites within a city that can house an MRI scan, the region would most likely 
decide which site it makes the most sense to locate the scan in. These decisions would 
involve discussions w ith a number of stakeholders, but in the end would be c losed-door, 
top-down. Procurement would be mostly determined by the diagnostics program and the 
regiona l executive. 
Because the current MRI is seen as working at human resource capacity, Region B does 
not face a question about how many exams to perform . Specialist physicians make 
requisitions for MRI. Radiologists review these request and determine their level of 
priority. The clinical chief and the other radiologists determine the scheduling of cases 
across types of scans. 
These resource a llocation decisions, who is responsible fo r making them and how the 
decisions are made are summarized in Table 5. 7. 
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Table 5.7: MRI Resource Allocation Decisions at Region B 
Resource Allocation Decision Maker Type of Decision Making 
Decisions 
Determine whether to invest Provincial cabinet Inclusive, but ultimately 
in new equipment. closed-door, top-down. 
Determine where to locate Provincial cabinet and Inclusive, but ultimately 
equipment regional executive closed-door, top-down. 
Procurement of equipment Diagnostics leadership team Bilateral 
and regional executive 
Scheduling cases Clinical chief, divisional Bilateral 
chiefs and radiologists 
Determine whether to order Specialist physicians Clinical circumstances 
an MRI 
Prioritize MRI requisitions Radiologists Clinical circumstances 
5.7.3 MRI and Need 
A lmost a ll participants recognize that MRJ capacity in Region B is insufficient to meet 
the level of need. This calculation of need is based primarily on examining internal wait 
lis ts for service. As one participant said "no one is going to question too much that we 
need a new MRI... The wait list is strong enough that you can kind of look at it ... the fact 
you got to wait all this time for an MRI, and that doesn't seem right." Another important 
factor influencing the recognition of need for new scanners is benclunarking with the 
level of service provided in other regions, either through published studies, e.g. , CIHI 
(2005), or through informal discussions with counterparts in other regions. 
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5. 7.4 MRI and Evidence 
Participants fe lt there was little need to review the evidence for the effectiveness of MRI. 
As one partic ipant said, " MRis are proven technology. The question around MRI has 
more to do with how many do you need [than evidence for effectiveness]." Participants 
said that the scope of use for MRI in Region B is not current ly meeting what is currently 
accepted as the Canadian standard for the range of cases which should be scanned using 
MRI. Participants said that there were no issues for Region B about expanding MRI 
usage into what could be seen as experimental usages. 
5.7.5 MRI and Cost 
The operational cost for MRI is determined by examining internal utilization data. There 
were no reports of considering the cost-effectiveness of different modalities. The cost of 
purchasing a new MRI would be determined primarily through d iscussions with vendors. 
5.7.6 MRI and Accountability 
Region B is moving towards tying new diagnostics funding to specific num bers of 
increased scans. For example, the diagnostics program would now likely commit to 
do ing so many new exam s as a pa11 of an y request for increased funding. These 
commitments are tied to the number of cases performed, rather than reductions in wait 
times. The focus on the number of scans is due to the uncertainty of changing wait times 
because of pent-up demand for MRI in the system. It is still unclear what the 
ramifications will be fo r not meeting the operational commitments. 
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Region B plans to start publishing wait times for MRI on its website. Participants 
expressed the view that if not done by their own accord, the region would likely soon be 
required to publicly post wait times as part of the federal - provincial accountability 
initiatives, e.g., the new federal Health Council. 
Participants expressed the view that there is not sufficient MRI capacity to currently meet 
public expectations or to address problems around wait times. One participant said that 
this lack of capacity amounted to a fai lure of being accountable to the public. 
5.7.7 MRI and Ethics 
There was little discussion about the ethics of MRI allocations. One participant identified 
the main ethical question was about where to draw the line with regard to limiting MRI 
use or around how long people need to wait for a scan. The same participant also raised 
the issue for who is advocating a MRI scan as an ethical issue, but that the person did not 
think there were many ethical concerns with the running of the current program. Other 
participants said they never saw any ethical issues specifically related to the MRJ 
program in Region B. 
5. 7.8 Overview of MRI 
Table 5.8 provides an overview of how the five component factors are hand led by Region 
B ' s MRI program. 
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Table 5.8: Overview of MRJ 
Need Determined by internal usage data and management' s 
judgment of the impact of the numerous factors 
impacting on MRJ demand. Benchmarking with other 
centres. CIHI data. 
Evidence While it is recognized as a technology which is 
expanding both in capabilities and range of use, it is 
generally seen as an accepted, familiar technology. No 
use of research on effecti veness. 
Cost Analysis of internal costing and usage data; discussions 
with vendors. 
Accountability Some plans to establish public reporting of wait times. 
A good deal of media and political. 
Ethics Little ethical considerations. 
5.8 Powered Upper Arm Prostheses in Newfoundland 
This section examines the issues of I) the prescription of powered upper arm prostheses 
in Newfoundland, 2) coverage for prostheses in the province, and 3) the allocation of 
resources within Region B 's prosthetics clinic. 
5.8.1 Getting a Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis in Newfoundland 
In order to receive a powered upper arm prosthesis, the patient must first be referred by a 
physician or physiotherapist to meet with a prosthetist. The physician or physiotherapist 
may suggest either the prosthetics clinic in Region B or a private prosthetist, but it is up to 
the patient to whom he or she goes. The prosthetist would then make his or her initial 
assessment of what prosthetic is best suited to the patient. One provider said that during 
an initia l assessment, 
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"I look at the person's disability or maybe I should say their abilities. What they've 
got left, what they can do with it, and then how can we make them the most 
functional with the existing components. You look at that. Then, I guess, the 
price ... you do look at the price. I certainly wouldn't. .. once you do your assessment 
of the patient, you don't say to them, this is what you're going to get. You do have 
to look at the reality of it and then balance that with an ultimate decision." 
Another important factor in determining the most appropriate prosthesis would be the 
person's lifestyle before the loss of a limb. Prostheses aim to restore functionality. It is 
important to try to match the prosthesis to the type and level of functionality the person is 
used to. 
Once the prosthetist determines with the patient what is the most appropriate type of 
prosthetic, the prosthetist and the financial support staff with look at what coverage the 
person has or how much he or she can afford. One participant said that a lot of patients 
are lost at this point in the process. Some patients have too much pride to go through the 
application for funding. Some patients have no coverage and cannot afford a prosthesi . 
As the same participant said regarding powered upper arm prostheses, unless the patient 
has " insurance, is covered by worker compensation or has a big bank account," they 
likely will not be able to get one. Based on cost considerations, the prosthetist and the 
patient would revise what is the best type of prosthesis for the patient. Once the most 
appropriate prosthesis has been identified, the prosthetist would been build and fit the 
prosthesis and bill either the patient or the third-party insurer. 
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5.8.2 Coverage for Powered Upper Arm Prostheses in Newfoundland 
In Newfoundland, coverage for powered upper arm prostheses is provided through a 
patchwork of programs. There is no provincial program which covers the cost of medical 
devices for all residents. Unless the person has private insurance or is covered through 
third-party programs designed for selected populations, it is likely they will have little or 
no coverage for prostheses. Workers ' Compensation Commission of Newfoundland and 
Labrador (WCC) provides coverage for employees hurt at work in the province. If the 
wee case adjudicator agrees that a myoelectric prosthesis is in the best interest of the 
client, wee will pay for the full cost of the prostheses, for training, and provide the client 
with a clothing allowance, due to the damage the prosthesis can have on clothing. Other 
patients may be covered by private insurance or by national programs, e.g., War Amps, 
NlHB. Adults receiving provincial family income support payments can access coverage 
for medical devices under the DHCS' Special Assistance Program. DHCS may make the 
person pay for a portion of the cost for their prosthesis if the person is deemed to have the 
financial means to contribute. 
Table 5. 9 summarizes the coverage given through the vanous programs for powered 
upper arm prostheses in Newfoundland. 
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Table 5.9: Coverage for Powered Upper Arm Prostheses in Newfoundland 
Program Who is Eligible? Coverage 
wee Employees injured at work Full coverage 
DHCS - Sp cial Recipients of provincial family Full or partial coverage 
Assistance Program income support 
Private insurance Depends on policy Depends on po licy 
War Amps - CHAMP People up to 18 years of age. Full coverage 
Program 
War Amps - Adult People over 18 of age. 15 % toward the cost of 
Amputee Program prosthesis up to $1500.00 
once every three years 
Non-Insured Health First Nations and Inuit Full coverage 
Benefits (NIHB) 
Participants expressed some level of frustration that prostheses are billable to the patients, 
but similar services are not. Participants also reported that patients fi nd it hard to 
reconcile the fact that services are often provided in a hospital, but they have to pay for 
the prosthesis and the cost of installation. When patients ask why medical devices are not 
covered, one participant said "I don't have an answer for it." There were some talks about 
providing universal coverage for medical devices a few years ago but it deemed by the 
provincial government to be too expensive. There has been little recent discussion about 
expanding coverage. 
5.8.3 The Allocation of Resources in the Prosthetics Division 
Region B 's prosthetics clinic is part of the division of prostheses and orthopedics. The 
clinic provides a full range of prosthetic and orthotic services, including myoelectric 
prostheses. The di vision estimate installing two or three powered upper arm prosthese 
annually. The division of prostheses and orthopedics is part of Region B's rehabil itation 
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program. The divi ion manager for orthopedics reports to the program director of 
rehabilitation. There is also a clinical chief for the program. The decision structure of the 
program is set out in Figure 5. 4. 
Program Manager 
Divisional Manager 
(Prosthe es and Orthopedics) 
1' 
Prosthetics Cl inic 
Clinical Chief- Rehabilitation 
Figure 5.4: Decision Making tructurc of the Rehabilitation Program 
As part of the region s annual budgeting process, physiotherapists, occupational 
therapists, physicians and pharmacists working with prosthetic patients will all put 
forward requests for add itional resources to the manager of prosthcs s and orthopedic . 
The division manager and the program director of rehabilitation will meet to discuss what 
the appropriate level of request is for the division. The amount requested is usually 
between 30% to 50% of the amount requested by frontline staff. One participant said th 
aim of the budgeting process is to provide "mo t comprehen ive benefit" with the 
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available resources. This request for additional resources will be s nt forward to the 
executive as part of the overall budgetary request of the program. 
Because of the relatively little resources requested in the area of prosth ses, the amount of 
funding going directly to prosthetic work would not be discussed by the executive. The 
executive would determine how much resources are going to the r habil itation program 
and the program's leadership team would allocate resources to the diffe rent divisions. 
The amount which flows through to th prosthese and orthopedics program depends on 
what is ultimately granted to the rehabilitation program. 
Three are three main costs for the division of prostheses and orthopedics. The first is 
staff costs. The second is the di vision's budget fo r prostheses and other medical supplies. 
1 he supply budget is not divided by type of prostheses, e.g. , orthopedic or upper arm 
prosthesis. The third major cost is for the r placement of equipment. Purchases of 
equipment over $2000 go through the capital budgeting process. Part icipants also 
identified the need for some renovations to make for a safer work environment. Although 
this reque t had been sent fo rward to the executive for three consecutive budgeting 
cycles, it has not been fulfilled. The ho pita! foundation has indicated that it is 
considering making the improvement. The division would also be expected to recoup a 
certain level of it expenses from pati nts. 
With regard to treating individual patients, the d partment often runs into situations in 
which resource limits negatively impact on care. As one participant said, 
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"Well, what you do - you rob Peter to pay Paul. So we're constantly doing a 
budgetary shuffle; when it comes to need - to a demonstrated need - I still think, 
when it gets around the table for discussion, the patients who have the greatest 
needs gets it. I really believe that still happens, and we probably do it better in this 
province that way." 
Because of the shortage of resources, there is some level of shifting budgets at the 
divisional level to ensure as many patients as possible receive appropriate care. 
5.8.4 Resource Allocation Issues around Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis 
The decision of who should receive a powered upper arm prosthesis is made by the 
prosthetist, based a clinical circumstance and lifestyle of the patient. The prosthetist 
would involve other providers, funders and the patient in making their final decision on 
what is most appropriate for the patient. This decision would be an example of collegial 
decision making. 
The second question relates to the coverage of powered upper ann prostheses. 
Newfoundland does not have universal coverage for powered upper arm prostheses. 
Coverage for powered upper arm prostheses is provided for through a number of 
programs. There is little communication between these programs to ensure that all people 
are fully funded for their prostheses. 
Region A reported that there was little concern with how resources are allocated around 
powered upper arm prostheses, due to the fact that the cost of providing care is paid for 
by third-party insurers and that there are so few installed. The division of prostheses and 
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orthopedics has made requests to improve the prosthetic clinic and to hire new staff, but 
these requests have not as yet been fu lfi lled. 
5.8.5 Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis and Evidence 
Powered upper arm prostheses are seen as a proven technology and there is little concern 
expressed about their effecti veness. In terms of who receives a myoelectric prostheses, 
there are a number of factors looked at. These factors primarily focus on determining the 
ability of the patient to wear a myoelectric arm, the li kel ihood that he or she wi ll benefit 
from a myoelectric prosthesis, and desired functionality for the patient. The information 
about a ll of these factors comes from examinations and discussions with the patient. 
5.8.6 Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis and Cost 
Because of the small number of people requiring myoelectric prostheses, there is no 
consideration of cost-effectiveness. For budgeting purposed, the net cost of equipment i 
calculated by examining internal data, checking with suppliers and through discussion 
with prostheti sts. 
5.8.7 Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis and Ethics 
The only ethical is ue identified by participants was the lack of universal coverage and 
the fac t that some people have to fo rego getting a prosthesis based solely on cost. 
Participants fe lt that the exclusion of medical devices from publ ic coverage was based on 
an arbitra ry and hi storical decision not to extend coverage. In other words, there is no 
ethical reason for limiting public coverage for medical devices. 
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5.8.8 Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis and Accountability 
There is some discussion within Region B about developing meaningful indicators in the 
area of prosthetics to evaluate the program's performance, e .g. , some scoring system to 
gauge improvements in patient functionality and quality of service. The indicators need 
to reflect factors important to the patient. As one participant said, "our system should be 
around what the patients' needs are, and the outcome measures should reflect the 
important things in their life." The development of performance indicators is still in the 
early stages. 
Participants expressed frustration at the fact that political and media can sometimes 
influence the resources which are made available to different projects or to particular 
patients. 
5.8.9 Overview of Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis 
Table 5.10 reviews the main components e lements relating to powered upper arm 
prostheses in Newfoundland. 
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Table 5.10: Overview of Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis in Newfoundland 
Usage 2 to 3 annually for province 
Resource Allocation 
Decisions I ) Clinical circumstances, collegial 
I) Prescription 2) No universal public coverage 
2) Coverage 3) None specific to powered upper arm prostheses 
3) Region A 
Need Number who present, patient population small 
and stable 
Evidence Clinical circumstances of patients. Seen as an 
effective treatment. 
Cost Internal data and vendor supplied data. 
Accountabi I i ty Move to develop quality indicators. 
Ethics Lack of coverage. 
5.9 Recommendations made in Newfoundland 
Participants in Newfoundland identified numerous best practices and made a number of 
suggestions about how to improve the allocation of health care resources. Resource 
allocation decisions are complicated because, as one participant said, "no one person has 
all the data." One area in which participants thought Region B perform well is in making 
its priority setting processes fairly inclusive, at both at the regional and program levels. 
There are a number of forums where staff can make an input into the allocation process, 
e.g., executive meetings, the medical advisory committee, departmental meetings, 
regional planning days. Region B also tries to build a consensus amongst the providers 
about what the region 's spending priorities should be. Time constraints were seen as an 
impediment to consensus building. One participant said that the key is working to build a 
consensus over a number of budget cycles. Part of the value of having a consensus is that 
it allows everyone to see the reasons why a decision was reached and why, perhaps, their 
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request was rejected. Others expressed some concern that "we can over do the consensus 
process." At some point, a decision has to be made and it is not always possible to satisfy 
all providers. 
In terms of who should be involved in the allocation of resources, participants said there 
is a value in involving technicians and recognizing their experti se, especially in the 
procurement of new equipment. Another participant said that there is an advantage of 
lower level decision makers, e.g., divisional chiefs, frontline physicians, seeing the 
request that is actually sent from their program area to the executive, as kind of a double 
check. Another participant said that it is important for the executive and board members 
to consult directly with frontline staff. As the participant said, budget requests "may lose 
the flavour and it may lack some crispness" by the time it reaches the executive or board 
level. The participant said that discussing allocations with frontline staff can give the 
executive a renewed sense of the level of need. There is also a morale bonus which can 
come from better engaging frontline staff. The same participant went on to say that , 
"As long as you've really had input and a decis ion has been made, you can 
understand it; but if a decision is made that concerns you but that you were never 
asked about, then that's not fair. " 
The advantage of engaging frontline staff in resource allocation continues even after the 
budget allocations are made. Discussing the reasons why particular budget allocations 
were made was seen as an effective way to lessen the negative impacts on staff morale of 
program level requests which are not fulfilled . A lthough there is a benefit to involving 
frontline staff, there was some frustration that there is still not sufficient interaction 
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between the executive and frontline staff. As one participant complained, "the only time 
you see people [executive members, board members, politicians] is when their family 
members are sick." 
There was a good deal of discussion about the skills decision makers need to make good 
resource allocation decisions. One participant said that, "[decision] tools are only as good 
as the people that use them; and I think that what we have in health care is a real lack of 
people with that critical skill." Another participant said that, "one of our problems in the 
management of our system is that people are in very big management roles, but they're 
not... they don't have a business I training]." 
Other participants mentioned that managers needed to have better ethics training and 
more frontline clinical experience. Participants also suggested better education for the 
region ' s board with respect to resource allocation. The challenge is that making good 
resource allocation decisions require a wide range of skills, which decision makers may 
not have acquired before they got to their current position. This lack of qualifications is 
partly the result of how people rise to management positions within the health regions, 
essentially risi ng from the front line departments. Given the range of skill which is 
needed to make good resource allocation decisions, it is imp011ant that a range of p ople, 
with various backgrounds, are involved in the allocation process. 
Many participants spoke about the need for a clear process for allocating resources. One 
participant said the process should identify criteria which should be used to prioritize 
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resource requests across divisions, programs and the region as a whole. Given the 
number of people involved in the allocation of resources, other decision makers expressed 
the view that outside of the factors which should be used to allocate resources, there is a 
value in having a process that people are familiar and comfortable with. Participants 
expressed the view that transparency in budgeting is very important and that the region 
does do a fairly good job of keeping the budgeting process fai rl y transparent. All the 
programs in the region know what is spent by other programs. Programs also know if 
other programs are running a defi cit. 
Another reason why having an a llocation process which everyone is fam iliar with is 
preferable that a priority setting exercise needs to fit w ith the cul ture and people wi thin an 
organization. A prio rity setting exercise which works in one region may not work in 
another because of the people who are in the other region. Numerous participants said 
that the key to good priority setting is trust and respect, and a process in which everyone's 
opinion is accepted. The attitude of the physician leadership team is important, in term 
their willingness to listen to other requests. 
There has been an improvement in Region B fo r keeping requests for resources wi thin an 
established allocation process. One participant said, 
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"I think now what we've really tried to change here - and I've seen a change - is 
gone from, I guess, the power politics ... [where the] powerful [groups] get what 
they want to sending priority lists and feeding that whole process of educating 
people up along the way and the decision-make tree." 
As another participant said, 
"there was a day that a lot of decisions were made in the back hall but now, you 
know, we have regular [program] wide meetings and that's made a big difference .. . 
it allows everybody to have their input.' 
Ensuring requests for resources stay within the established allocation process still, 
however remains a challenge. Participants complained that often the region will go 
through a priority setting exercise and once the exercise is completed, physicians whose 
requests have been denied will contact the DHCS directly to request resources. 
Circumventing the allocation process undermines the value of the entire process. It also 
creates a level of animosity amongst programs that work within the established allocation 
process. The executive of the region and officials in the DHCS have tried to address this 
problem by rerouting requests which programs or frontline staff make to the department 
back to the region. But it is difficult within the current decision making structure, where 
elected officials are the ultimate decision makers, to completely stop requests being 
fu lfilled outside of the region's regular budgeting process. The aim should be to limit the 
number of ca es which avoid being fulfilled through the process. 
Given the close connection between the levels of governance in Newfoundland, a number 
of participants focused on how to ensure that there is an effective working relationship 
across organizations. Some participants said that the keys to a good relationship are that 
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there is a good flow of information, an efficient administration and that people understand 
the context in which budget requests are being made. One participant said that it is 
important for there to be honesty across the different levels of decision makers, with 
limited budget overruns and little manipulation of data. Another pat1icipant said that 
better coordination between the regions and provincial governments across the country 
could also help resource allocation. 
There was some di scussion that Region B should refocus its operations more on the needs 
of the patient. A number of factors were pointed to as distracting from a patient focus . 
One issue concerned maxi mizing the use of scarce technology to the detriment of the 
patient, e.g., around the importance placed on a MRI machine. Concerns were also raised 
that employee issues often override what is best for the patient. As another participant 
said, " the right of the patient care needs to supersede the right of the worker." Another 
participant said that the region needs to address the restriction union contracts place on 
the hours employees can work, which can be detrimental to care patients receive. 
There were a number of recommendations participants had about the use of evidence in 
the allocation process. Some participants stressed the need to impartia lly evaluate the 
research evidence to help inform funding decisions. This participant stressed that 
evidence reviews should report any research findings , but also any gaps in available 
research. Another participant said that looking at the research evidence is useful because 
it allows decision makers not familiar with a particular intervention to see that it ts 
actually a standard of care, rather than just a "pet project" of a particular physician. A 
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third participant argued that using evidence to challenge and slow down the introduction 
of new technology may be beneficial for the region, g iven its relati ve lack of new 
resources. Participants also reported that there is a need to get beyond the emotions 
involved in allocating resources around certain areas of care, e.g., cancer care, child 
health . The focus on the evidence is one way to help overcome this emotion. There was 
a concern about how best to vet research evidence. It was suggested that this be done by 
letting local experts review the literature and see if it is applicable locally. Participants 
also felt that there could be a greater use of national health technology assessments. 
There was also a call for better monitoring of the effectiveness of new procedures once 
they have been adopted by the reg ion. Finally, participant felt that evidence should look 
at the total system impact funding a new intervention has on the region, not just whether 
the intervention is effective. 
Another recommendation was to increase the level of decision support. In pa11icular, 
decision makers suggested increased research in areas where there arc opportunities to 
increase efficiencies. The discussion of decision supports also touched on encouraging 
reallocation of resources within the programs and the use of efficiency measures. 
Two participants identified a need to increase the focus on the ethics of resource 
allocation. Participants thought there has been insufficient discussion at the societal level 
about the level of coverage there should be for medical care. One participant suggested 
there needs to be a discussion about the level that should be spent on any one person, 
e ither during one intervention or over the life of the patient. The participant expressed the 
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vtew that this public engagement should perhaps occur at the national, rather than 
provincial or regional level. Another participant said that measures need to be taken to 
ensure that these public discussions do not turn into "advocacy conversations," in which 
the public engagement is taken over by groups who are only interested in getting their 
particular concern funded. It was also suggested that user fees may be an option for 
those with the financial means to pay, so as to limit unnecessary usage of the system. 
Another best practice identified is to be constantly looking at what is commg on the 
horizon. This recommendation focused on a number of stakeholders. One participant 
suggested CADTH need to be focused more on emerging technologies in order to k ep 
their assessments current. It is important for the health regions to be forward looking so 
that they are able to position themselves to address future demands. The use of three year 
budget planning is one way to help force decision makers to recognize future 
expenditures. 
There were a number of other best practices identified . Because of the lack of resources, 
participants suggested that they need to be " persistent" in making resource a llocation 
requests. Knowing people across the decision making structure was considered 
imp01tant, e pecially having people supporting requests who are not seen as having 
vested interest in the allocation. Having people adopt the proper perspective was seen a 
crucial. Another participant said that the challenge is getting people to look at budget 
allocations from the system's perspective. Similarly, participants mentioned the need to 
get those engaged in the allocation process to "get rid of ' me first' [attitude]." Another 
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participant said that improving resource allocation required getting everyone to focus on 
"what's the best thing for the provision of service across the entire program." It is also 
important for everyone to get educated about the needs of the program and the processes 
for setting priorities. Benchmarking across regions and national was seen as an important 
source of information. Finally, communicating with colleagues in other regions about 
resource requests and the factors which need to be considered, especially when 
developing new programs, was seen as very beneficial. 
Table 5.11 summanzes all of the recommendations made by key informants m 
Newfoundland. 
Table 5.11: Best Practices Identified in Newfoundland 
• Better education for decision makers 
• Use of teams of decision makers 
• Clear budgeting process 
• Familiarity with budgeting process 
• Transparency in budgeting 
• Maintaining a good working relationship between 
provincial government and region 
• Focus on patient care 
• Improve the evaluation of evidence 
• Increase decision supports 
• Engage public about coverage limits 
• More focus on emerging issues 
• Adopt proper perspective 
• Persistence in making requests 
• Communicating with others. 
• Make process inclusive 
• Aim for consensus 
• Maintain trust and respect 
• Keep requests within established priority setting process. 
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5.9.1 Decision Aids Identified in Newfoundland 
Participants were fairly skeptical about the use of decision tools for improving resource 
allocation. Many expressed the view that priority setting is too complex to use some type 
of model which you work through to make allocat ion decisions. Participants also felt that 
institutional culture plays a large role in successful resource allocation, so that having an 
established resource allocation process is more important than adopting the right model. 
One participant who had examined decision support tools, including accountabi lity for 
reasonableness and PBMA, found that they were not applicable to the institutional 
problems faced by Region B. The corporate ethics committee does use case studies to 
help clarify and "work through options and appropriate values and so on." The pilot 
project described above in section 5.4.6 aims to increase considerations of the ethical 
aspects of resource allocation, by asking departments to consider the ethical implications 
of their requests as part of the region ' s budgeting process. 
5.9.2 Challenges Identified in Newfoundland 
Participants in Newfound land identified a number of challenges to improving the 
allocation of health care resources. One issue which was often raised is the need to 
provide more fu nding for prevention. As in Alberta, the problem of the double 
investment required for preventive care was mentioned. Even within a health region that 
is responsible for everything from acute care to social services, the transfer of more funds 
into preventative and community is difficult. As a participant said, 
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"Even if we transferred the money and saved the money, we still can't cross that 
barrier that says we will give you the money to do that in the communi ty because 
it's cheaper to do it the community, because what happens then is that bed that is 
now vacant will just belong to somebody else." 
There is the recognition that the only way to do increase funding for prevention or other 
community support programs is to take funding from the institutional acute care side. As 
another partic ipant said, 
"There's no way that a communi ty will be developed without it [better pr vention] 
coming out of institutions. So we know ... I mean, the writing has to be on the wall 
that there is only one way to build a community service up, and that is to take it out 
of our current system." 
Yet given the level of unmet needs already w ithin the acute care area, there is a fee ling 
that there are little resources which can be spared from acute care. 
Participants felt that while there is a lot of data, the data is often not presented in ways 
which easily supports decision making. As one participant described it, "we are data rich, 
but info rmation poor." The participant suggested, while the region has made some 
improvements in this area, there needs to be a greater investment in information 
technology. Part of the challenge is that given the level of unmet need in the system, it is 
hard to get additional resources for informational technology and management support. 
The relative lack of resources in the province was pointed to by a number of participants 
as another impediment to the improved use of resources. As one participant said, "we 
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were too poor to be efficient because you needed to step up. You know, you had to put 
an investment in to get to the next level, and we couldn't afford to get there." 
Some of the participants from the program level felt they need to more effectively make 
requests for additional resources. Participants felt that there is a real challenge 
communicating the nature of their requests and the level of need associated with some 
requests once requests are sent forward to the executive level. Part of the challenge is to 
communicate program level requests to decision makers who do not have expertise in the 
area under consideration. 
There are a number of challenges about the adoption of new technology. [n other areas of 
the economy, the adoption of new technology leads to the replacement of older 
technology which helps recoup the investment in the new technology. In health care, as 
one participant said, "quite often what happens you bring in new technology and jt doesn't 
become a substitute for an obsolete technology, but it becomes an addi tional technology.'' 
A good example of where technological innovation did not lead to offsetting retiring of 
older technology is in diagnostics . The development of CAT scans did not make x-ray 
technology obsolete. The deve lopment of MRI did not make either CAT or X-ray 
obsolete, but simply added another diagnostic modality. 
The physicians do seem to have a number of opportunities in Region B to bring resource 
issues to the attention of the executive and the board of trustees. For example, there are 
internal discussions within their programs and there are opportunities to discuss issues 
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with the vice-president of Medical Affairs. Clinical chiefs can bring issues to the Medical 
Affairs Committee. Still some physicians expressed the view that they do not feel they 
have much of a voice when it comes to how resources are allocated in the region. While 
the regional authority tries to a llow physicians to be involved in the resource allocation 
process, their power has clearly declined from when the health care system was organized 
on a hospital basis. Physicians who were not a part of the leadership team for their 
program fee l particularly a lienated from the process, which seemed to negativel y impact 
on physician morale. 
The leadership team of one department complained that if they save money in their 
operating budget, they should be able to use those savings for any purpose they wish. 
Under the current budgeting rules those savings have to be used in their operations, e.g. , 
they cannot purchase equipment. 
In order to realize savings across a reg ion, it IS sometimes required to reinvest funds 
across programs. An issue about this type of reinvestment IS with programs usmg 
resources which have been reinvested in other areas. For example, as a participant said, 
"the dilemma is so I free the bed; the physician thinks I can fill the bed again, not 
appreciating the fact that the money that was... half of the money that was 
associated with that bed had to still care for that client and that client is cared for in 
another environment." 
Another participant said that in order to realize the savmgs which could come from 
reinvestment, savings need to be sufficient so as to actually c lose down a block of service. 
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There is an issue about how resources are allocated between rural and urban areas, where 
some participants felt that there a re clear disparities in how the two areas are treated by 
government funding. In terms of resource allocation, there is always a di vided between 
the main urban area in St. John ' s and the rest of the province. Technologies are usually 
first adopted in the health region in St. John ' s. Often then there is pressure from other 
areas to expand the number of sites in the province which can offer a service. The 
distribution of seats in the prov incial legislature gives a good deal of power to the rural 
areas. 
Participants recognized that the health region is ultimately responsible to the publ ic. 
Public pa11icipation can be problematic, however especially regarding when and how the 
public should be involved. While Region B did feel that they have had good 
consultations with the public they serve, one problem mentioned was that often public 
participants have a singular aim they are trying to achieve and are not open to any other 
suggestions. The participant suggested that this problem can be partly addressed by 
sharing suffi cient information so that participant see the fu ll picture faced by the region, 
but it still remains a problem. 
Another problem for the region's administration is that health care workers are 
government employees. Their pay level and working conditions are determined through 
negotiation with Treasury Board, not the health board . Yet these decisions have large 
implications for the resources available to the region. 
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The question of allocating resources around orphan drugs was mentioned by a couple of 
participants. One of the issues raised was that 
" these drugs that are so selective for such rare diseases that the number of people in 
the world who actually would benefit from the drug is so small that you really don't 
have enough critical mass there to do proper research on; and so that becomes a 
challenge, as to how you can do that." 
Another difficulty the lack of research opportunities for orphan drugs raise is that often 
they are only effective for a small portion of patients who have a condition, but because 
of the limited opportunities for research, it is di fficult to determine the characteristics of 
patients for whom the treatment is effective. The inability to determine who treatments 
are most effective for can greatly undercut the cost-effectiveness of using these 
treatments. 
Another challenge identified related to the tendency of different provmces, using the 
same scientific information, to reach different decisions regarding the implementation of 
a treatment. The fact that certain provinces decide to cover a treatment puts pressure on 
the other provinces to follow suit. 
orne frontline staff felt that there is an increase in the amount of health care 
administration, but not in the amount of resources going to frontline staff. As one 
participant said, "if you look at health care in this country, administration has grown 
exponentially. Physician resources and nursing resources, the patient care re ources have 
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stayed flat, which is interesting." Newfoundland's recent regional reorganization was 
pointed to as an example that the province could get by with less administration. On the 
other side, some administrators complained that 
"Physicians just believe that there's an endless pot... and the reality is that, as good 
as they are in some ways of working with us around utilization and trying to get the 
best practice and actually improving costs, there is very little buy-in in that 
community with respect to resource allocation. And the only reason why we were 
probably as far as we are is not because of physician leadership. It's because of 
program leadership groups and the managers that we've got working, who know 
that they have a budget to manage and, not that they're on the chopping block fo r 
that, but they know that there were no other resources, and so in the last couple of 
years we've gotten them to appreciate the need for reallocations within their own 
portfolios." 
While understanding that health regions do not always have money for new programs, 
frontline staff and program leadership teams expressed some frustration about the lack of 
resources for "bread and butter" requests. There was also frustration expressed that 
requests for basic program requirements are considered along with requests for the 
expansion of new programs. To paraphrase a complaint from one participant, because a 
program got new beds should not affect whether their program area is expanded. 
Some of the other challenges identified in Newfoundland include: It is difficult to keep 
the process systematic, as opposed to getting taken over by political forces. Programs 
which garner a good deal of media and public attention are still likely to get more 
resources. Likewise, programs which have dynamic, persuasive and persistent managers 
often get more resources. Certain participants said that because of lack of resources 
physicians sometimes manipulate wait times to ensure that their requests receive a high 
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priority. Some participants identified a tendency not to make tough decisions at the 
program level, but to "push the problem higher" and let the executive make decisions 
which limit care, even though the executive are more removed from the program area. 
Changes in programs or service delivery can have large impacts on other departments, but 
often the other affected departments are not consulted or advised of the change ahead of 
time. In gathering information, decision makers felt they need to better ensure that they 
have all the information, not just one side. Participants expressed the view that the region 
does not plan well enough for the future, especially regarding the replacement of 
equipment. While there is a sense that decision tools focused on resource allocation will 
be applicable, there is a sense that there needs to be more education on resource 
allocation. As one participant said, "we don't know enough about it [resource 
allocation]." 
Table 5.12 summarizes challenges identified by key informants in Newfoundland. 
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Table 5.12: Challenges Identified in Newfoundland 
• Increasing prevention funding 
• Need for better information support 
• The need of resources to improve efficiency 
• The need for programs to improve their resources 
request 
• Difficulties in replacing old technologies 
• Physicians feeling alienated from allocation 
process 
• Programs not able to use savings for any purpose 
• Programs using resources which have been 
reinvested in other areas 
• Political tensions about urban I rural divide 
• Public participation dominated by single issues 
• Decisions with large resource implications outside of the 
region's control. 
• Orphan drugs 
• Allocation decisions in other provinces 
• Too much administration I physicians not supportive 
• Bread and butter requests not fulfilled 
• Allocation decision too political 
• Persuasive managers 
• Manipulating of wait times I wait lists 
• Pushing up tough decisions 
• Impacted departments not always informed of 
changes 
• Ensure all sides of an issue are considered 
• Better planning for the future 
• More education on resource allocation 
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Chapter 6: Saskatchewan 
This chapter examines the three cases in Saskatchewan. It fo llows the structure of the 
previous two chapters. The chapter begins by examining the decision making structure of 
Region C. The next sections examine decision making in the three areas of care. As in 
the previous chapters, there are subsecti ons focusing on the six embedded elements of 
resource allocation decisions, need, use of evidence, cost, ethical considerations and 
accountability for Region C and each of the three areas of care. The final s ction 
di scusses the recommendations, decisio n too ls and challenges identified during the 
interviews in Saskatchewan. 
6.1 Regional Structure 
ln 2002, Saskatchewan restructured its regional boards, moving from 32 health districts to 
12 regional health authorities. The regional authorities are responsible fo r providing 
acute care; emergency services; long-term care ; palliative care; support programs fo r 
patients with disabilities; home care; community health, mental health and rehabilitation 
serv ices. Cancer care is provided by the Saskatchewan Cancer Agency. 
The regional authorities are funded primarily through a combination of global budgets 
and targeted funding from Saskatchewan Health. In June or July, Saskatchewan Health 
receives an indication from the Department of Finance about the likely size of their 
budget for the coming year. Based on this financial guidance, Saskatchewan Health' s 
Regional Accountability branch informs the health reg ions of the like ly changes in th 
size of their budgets for the coming year. Through thi annual provincial budgeting 
296 
process, the health regions have the ability to identify new services they would like to 
offer. If large capital purchases are required, they are identified through the province's 
capital budgeting process. Officials from Saskatchewan Health visit the regions to 
discuss the budget requests from the indiv idual regions. The Department then synthesizes 
the regional requests and makes their budget submission to the Department of Finance 
and Treasury Board. The Department's submission would identi fy where the service 
pressures are and make the case for why more resources are required in different areas. 
The allocation to the reg10n includes both a g lobal budget and some targeted funds. 
Equipment purchases are often targeted. The an1ount of targeted funding within the 
budget varies over time. Even in their g lobal budgets, a lot of the resources would 
already be accounted for because of the expectation to maintain current levels of services. 
Some participants said that the level of targeted funding has increased recently and that 
the provincial government retains a good deal of control over the operational areas in 
which funds are spent, even though it has supposed to have transferred that authority to 
the health regions. Although the province would have a good idea of what specific 
purchases the region would make, the province provides the r gion with a lump sum for 
capital costs. Certain large purchases, e.g. , a MRI , would be decided on directly on by 
the province. 
One of the influences on resource allocation in Saskatchewan is status quo budgeting, i.e. 
funding regions to maintain ex isting service levels. Because the provincial government is 
more c losely monitoring certain indicators and has more service targets, there i more 
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targeted fund ing. As one participant said concerning targeted funding, 
"sometimes we know government may have an agenda, right - federal government 
[or] provincial government- that says, here's some money. You know, here's what 
it's for. It wouldn't necessarily be where we intend to spend the money, no; but 
when you got so much on that. It's not that it doesn't represent a need. It just might 
not be as high on our list as someone else's; but that's fine, we'll take it. You know, 
we' ll put it to good use, right, and we'll be accountable for it." 
Because of the need to negotiate service levels, an activity which can carry on for some 
time in the budget year, the region may not know on budget day the total amount of 
funding that will be provided in the coming year. This uncertainty can create difficulties 
regarding the region ' s abi lity to forecast. 
The province allocates across pools of areas. The regions are allowed to make small 
adjustments to how resources are allocated across pools. There is an attempt to use a 
needs-based funding model to help in the allocation of resources. The province has also 
used needs-based models to examine how closely the region ' s allocation of resources 
meets the needs of the community. This model incorporates seven or eight factors, e.g., 
current utilization, cross-regional flows of services, mortality rates. The model still needs 
to be developed further, e.g. , developing accurate costing for a ll services. Part of the 
reason why the province needs to develop this costing information is that the Department 
of Health stopped recording specific costing information when it moved to global 
regional funding. This tool may be used in the future to help al locate resources. 
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Information about the regional structure is summarized in Table 6.1 . 
Table 6.1: Regional Structure (Saskatchewan) 
Number of health 12 regional authorities + 1 province-wide 
regions in the province board for cancer care 
Current health regions 2002 
established 
Scope of regions Acute care; emergency services; long-term 
care; palliative care; support programs for 
patients with disabilities; home care; 
community health, mental health and 
rehabilitation services 
M thod of funding Combination of global budgeting and 
targeted funding. 
6.2 Region C 
Region C i one of Saskatchewan's larger health regions. It directly serves a population 
of approximately 250,000 people and provides specially services to other health regions. 
The region is responsible for providing a full range of services, including acute care, 
long-term care, home care, health promotion, prevention activities, and rehabilitation. In 
2005-06, Region C had revenues of over $600 million or approx imately $2200 per capita. 
From 2004-05 to 2005-06, Region Chad just over a 10% increase in its operating budget. 
Most participants from Region C, while recognizing that the region is not perfect, were 
very proud of their organization. For example, one participant said, " T think it's a real 
good competent organization compared to others that I've worked in or been a part of or 
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done some work for. I think they've got valuable staff." This sentiment was common 
among the people interv iewed from the region. 
6.2.1 Governance Structure 
Region C is organized in terms of regional programs, but some sites retained some 
governance and reporting structures. For example, some of the ho pitals retained their 
own boards of trustees. In some cases, programs may report to both the regional board 
and the hospital board. In other cases, facilities are sti ll owned by outside groups. There 
are, however, affiliation agreements in place which ensure that the region has operational 
control so that operationally there is no difference between the fac ilities owned by other 
entities and those owned by the province. Participants did not see the retention of some 
site-based governance as undermining the regional nature of the programs. The regional 
manager for the program areas would manage budgets and human resources across all the 
sites which offer services under their area across the entire region. 
Region C is governed by a twelve-member community board of trustees. Members are 
appointed by the provincial Minister of Health . The board works with the senior 
executive team to set both the short and long term strategic direction for the organization. 
ft also hires the CEO and approves the region ' s budget request to government. 
The senior leadership team, which includes the region ' s CEO and senior vice presidents, 
has respon ibility for the overall daily operations of the region. Based on the strategic 
plan approved by the board, the executi ve team develops a more detailed operational plan 
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for the organization, with shorter timeframes and more specific operational objectives. 
Developing an operational plan based on a strategic plan approved by the board was seen 
to be driven in part by management concerns about accountability and transparency in 
their operations. There is a move within Region C to further involve the board in 
operational planning to help ensure greater accountability . 
There are v tce presidents for particular servtce areas and specific corporate functions. 
There is also a vice president of medical affairs, who acts as the chief physician for the 
region. Under the vice presidents are regional directors for specific programs. At the 
department level, there are general managers and, usually, a physician lead. They are 
responsible for the administrative and medical side respectively, but they're expected to 
work together in making decisions for the program area. Figure 6.1 outlines Region C ' s 
governance structure. 
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Board ofTrustees 
1' 
CEO 
1' 
Vice-presidents 
Directors 
Managers 
Supervisors 
Frontline Staff 
V.P. (Medical Affairs) 
~ -7 Physician Program Lead 
Figure 6.1: Region's C Decision Structure 
Some participants felt that there are too many layers of decision making authority within 
the organization and that decision making is not close enough to the point of care 
delivery. The multilevel of decision makers also hampers accountability because it blurs 
who has responsibility for making certain decisions. 
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Table 6. 2 summarizes some of the information presented in the previous two sections 
about Region C's financial status and management structure. 
Table 6.2: Region C Financial Data and Management Structure 
Total Revenue $600 Mi llion 
Revenue per $2200 
capita 
Increase in 10% 
operate costs 
(2006-2007) 
Management Regional programs, although 
Structure retains some of the o ld site-based 
governance structures 
6.3 Resource Allocation at Region C 
Region C makes its annual request fo r increased resources to Saskatchewan Health as part 
of the regular provincial budgeting process. Saskatchewan Health works closely with all 
the regions throughout the year, so that there are generally no surprises in the priority 
request put forward. Regions are expected to provide, at a minimum, the level of service 
that they performed the year before. Almost three-quarters of a region ' s annual fundi ng 
is targeted to labour costs. These labour costs are determined by provincial government 
negotiation with the unions representing the di fferent bargaining units of health care 
workers. That a very large proportion of the region 's budget spending is outside of its 
control greatly limits the freedom the region has to set its own spending priorities. 
Another issue affecting the region 's budget is that there have not been large increases in 
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funding over the last few years. As one participant said, "it's different if you're in growth 
mode and you've had a lot new money and kind of decide how to spend it. It's not the 
situation here." 
One participant described the priority setting at the executive level as identifying program 
requests informally as either an "A," "B," or "C" category priority. 
"The "A" li st is things that are basically already happening. It's kind of down the 
pipe. We're spending the money so we'd better incorporate it into this year's 
budget. The "B" list is sort of- these are high priority things that are going to mean 
money so we know if we have resources, we'd like to do these. We'll get to those. 
Then there's the "C" list, which is clearly wish items. You hate to put things on that 
I ist because you know they're just going to get tossed aside." 
The participant went on to say that the "A" list requests are usual crisis management kind 
of requests e.g., where equipment has broken down. The participant pointed out that 
sometimes it is unclear whether the "A" list requests are truly urgent or are on the list 
"because the crisis was created." 
The senior leadership team considers a number of factors in approving new programs. 
Usually reque ts come from staff, who see a new program as a way of better serving a 
particular patient population. As one participant said, the senior leadership team then 
considers whether the program " intuitively makes sense." Is the program in line with the 
region ' s priorities? Is it affordable? Are there staff concerns? This test of intuitive sense 
is only the first screen. Just because the add ition of a new program makes intuiti ve sense 
304 
to the region's executive does not mean that there necessarily will be funding fo r the 
program. 
Factors Determining Budget Allocations 
In setting spending priorities, the senior leadership team considers a wide range of issues 
including the impact on the work environment, the implications from a collective 
bargaining perspective, public perception, provincial government policy, ethical and I gal 
issues, along with patient safety and patient care concerns. The strategic plan is also seen 
as something which directly guides resource allocations. The general managers of the 
di fferent programs will also meet to develop a priority listing. This list is often driven by 
what necessarily needs to be replaced and is forwarded to the executive team for 
consideration in the budgeting process. A list of all of the factors identified is presented 
in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3: Factors Identified as Determining Budget Priorities 
• Clinical need I Best interest of the patient 
• Current standard of practice 
• Patient safety 
• Necessary equipment replacement 
• Expected clinical need I Clinical trends 
• Cost I Institutional impact I Impact on the work 
environment 
• Requests from general managers 
• Collecti ve bargaining implications 
• Public perception 
• Provincial government policy 
• Ethical and legal issues 
• Strategic plan 
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Capital Budgeting Process: 
Capita l budgeting is separate from operating funding . Any purchase over $5000 is 
considered as part of the capital budgeting process. There is a director of capi tal 
financing within Saskatchewan Health which the region would discuss their capital 
requests. Saskatchewan Health gives the regions two fundi ng envelopes for capital 
funding. One envelop is for the clinical capital fund and the other is for infrastructure. 
Participants from the region reported that these funds have, in the recent past, been well 
be low the level of need in the system. Region C did report that they are in a much better 
position regarding the level of knowledge they have around their capital needs, the 
measurement of these needs, and the risks associated with having these shortcomings. 
This increased level of knowledge has helped the region made a stronger case for 
increased resources. Still capital expenditures were generally not seen as a top priority by 
the decision makers. The accord money was influentia l and had its own a llocation 
process, focused on identifying priorities which matched the federal priorities. 
Region C separates the decision making process around capital equipment purchases 
between replacement of equipment and new equipment. For the replacement of 
equipment, Region C has developed an inventory of assets and a process for assess ing the 
sta te of a ll the equipment the hospita l has . The criteria used to assess equipment includes 
its use, age, level of risk to patients and staff, volume of usage, is the equipment a newer 
technology or older technology, and whether it requires a high level of maintenance. 
These criteria are then weighed to classify equipment as e ither in good, fair or poor 
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condition. The goal for the senior leadership team is for the programs to maintain 40% of 
their equipment in good condition and to use this 40% mark as a guiding principle in 
making capital purchases. On their initia l assessment, Region C found that 45% of their 
capital equipment was in good condition. Allocations for replacement are generally very 
small. For a capital asset pool of over $140 million dollars, approximately five million a 
year is allocated for equipment replacement. As one participant said, "we can have a 
piece of diagnostic equipment that takes the whole year's a llocation to replace." Because 
of the expense that comes from capital purchases which can overtake the entire resources 
available, Region C has begun presenting to government two priority lists: one for large 
capital purchases, the other for smaller capital purchases . 
Because often the replacement of equipment entai ls purchasing equipment wi th expand d 
capabilities, in some cases, the senior management team has to decide whether a capital 
equipment request should be treated as a replacement of existing equipment or the 
acquisition of a new technology. For example, for a new biplane angiography, the region 
submitted a request for additional resources to the province as an equipment replacement. 
For new purchases, Region C is planning to establish a technology assessment committee, 
which will have support to evaluate some of the evidence and make recommendations 
around new technologies. While the province is aware of what the capital purchases are 
likely to be for the coming year, the funding for the capital purchases are given to the 
region in a hump sum so that provincial officials do not have to be involved in each 
capital equipment purchase. 
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Region C used to have a medical equipment committee that reported to the MAC. 
Physicians would score requests for new resources and prioritize in that way. In practice, 
management felt that it really was a case where every department essentially got their top 
priority filled regardless of the scores given to requests across programs. The current 
process tries to be based more on need, urgency and regional priorities. The process also 
tries to be more data driven and priority setting has a much greater role for administrative 
and operational leads. 
Region C has a health foundation which funds some equipment purchases. Although it 
has not a lways been the case, the re lation between the region and its foundation is more 
attuned now, with the foundation ' s funding ini tiatives more closely a ligned with the 
region 's funding priorities. The executive is mindful to propose projects which make for 
good funding opportunities . 
Procurement 
The procurement process is managed by the clinical program for which the equipment is 
intended. For large purchases, the procurement process starts wi th the development of a 
RFP. The RFP would be developed by the clinical program and distributed publicly . 
Most vendors would know ahead of time that the region is considering purchasing a 
particular piece of equipment. Bids arc received . Depending on the equipment being 
purchased, vendors may be asked to make a presentation. An evaluation committee is 
selected and evaluates the bids. Again, depending on the type and value of the equipment 
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purchase, there may be site visits. The region is moving more to bundle tenders across 
sites or for all of the equipment needed by a program for a nwnber of years. 
6.4 Resource Allocation Issues at Region C 
The executive of Region C are responsible the resource allocations made within their 
region. The executive would allocate resources across the different program areas. It 
would involve in making program level decisions which have a substantial impact on the 
region's operations or have substantial costs associated with them. The executive may 
also decide on any issue which is particularly contentious and in this way could be 
involved in decisions concerning the care individual patients receive. Participants did, 
however, give the impression that Saskatchewan Health can, at times, become very 
involved in making a wide range of the resource allocation decisions. In certain areas of 
care, e.g., diagnostics, the province would make specific decisions concerning levels of 
activity and purchase of new equipment. 
As with Region A and Region B, the executive's decision making can be described as 
closed-door I top-down, in that it is only the executive who makes the decision and its 
decisions are then imposed on the other levels of the region. The executi ve does aim to 
bring in as many perspectives as possible into the budgeting process. 
6.4.1 Region C and Need 
Region C has used community needs assessments to assist 111 program plmming and 
resource allocation. The use of needs assessments is an approach the executive plan to 
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use more in the future. Internal utilization data and reports from frontline staff are also 
important sources for determining the level of need for a service. 
6.4.2 Region C and Evidence 
Region C has recently conducted a survey looking at the degree to which research and 
evidence get used in decision making. The overall conclusion is that evidence is 
sometimes used to support decision making but barriers remain, e.g. , the lack of relevant 
evidence. Regarding the use of evidence in resource allocation decisions, one participant 
said, 
" it varies department to department.. . in some cases this year, there was a 
difference in the understanding of evidence and where to get it. Jn other cases, the 
evidence just didn't exist. . .. When you ask though in the final analysis when the 
decisions get made at the regional level, how much evidence? Well, I have to say, 
with some of the bigger costs, high impact decisions, a fair bit of evidence is being 
looked at in making the recommendation." 
The participant went on to say that this does not always mean that evidence is the most 
important factor in making many resource allocation decisions. Sometimes other facto rs 
trump evidence. 
The region has a planning group which provides statistics and other decision support to 
the different program areas. The region a lso reports having a good deal of recent data, in 
terms of local needs asse sments, satisfaction surveys, which are used in planning. 
Participants said that they need to tap into more rigorous, objective technology 
assessment before expanding into new services. 
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6.4.3 Region C and Cost 
Costs are dete rmined mostly by using internal data, a lthough sometimes vendors wi ll be 
contacted regarding the cost of capital equipment. Budget increases are often tied to a 
program doing a specified number o f new procedures. None of the programs looked at in 
this project reported considering the cost-effecti veness of interventions. 
6.4.4 Region C and Accountability 
1 he provincial government has written agreements with all of the regions that set out the 
required levels of service. There are a lso specific indicators the province uses to assess 
the regions' performance. As a part of the provincial budgeting process, the regions 
submit operational plans to the department. In some case, individual programs would 
directly report their performance to Saskatchewan Health . One participant said that, 
"I think, in fairness, the government here has done some reall y good work. I think 
they have been ... if not as the head of the pack - we're the head of the pack in terms 
of very detailed accountability throughout the health region." 
But the participant went on to point out that there are often compromises which have to 
be made in terms of meeting targets, e.g ., patient safety vs. volume. 
Region C has a network of community advisory panels, which represent different 
geographical communities within the region. The use of these panels is mandated by the 
provincial government. The panels give advice on broad planning di rections. There was 
a feeling from some partic ipants that these networks could be better u ed in the planning 
3 11 
of services. In the past, other types of public forums were used to engage the public. For 
example, a researcher was hired to work with a committee of public representative. 
Through community focus groups and analys is of data about the region, the group gave 
the region recommendations on priorities and investments. Although there was some 
concern within the region 's management about the process, it was generally seen as a 
success. There was no clear connection, however, between that approach and priority 
setting within the region. 
The region has taken a number of other steps to help ensure accountabili ty to the public. 
Developing an operational plan based on a strategic plan approved by the board of trustee 
was seen to be driven in part by management concerns about accountability and 
transparency in their operations. The board of trustees meets regularly with public. In 
terms of transparency, one participant said that " I think there's been tentative steps in that 
direction and a consistent desire to find a way to do that better - to involve more people 
and players . .. [but at the most] of the transparency is in sort of the lower manager and 
upper management level." The same participant also said that there was a good level of 
transparency and communication between the region and the provincial government. The 
region has worked with an expert in resource allocation to develop a resource allocation 
process which could be seen as more accountable. While some work was done the 
project is currently on hold as other management initiatives are being pursued . 
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6.4.5 Region C and Ethics 
There was little direct discussion of the ethical aspects of resource allocation at Region C 
within the participant interv iews. Region C has, however, run a pilot project to see if 
Accountability for Reasonableness could be operationalized within the region to improve 
overall resource allocation. While preliminary work has been done, the pilot project has 
not been used to directly support the allocation of resources. Part of the difficulty has 
been with trying to determine the most appropriate level at which to use the 
Accountability for Reasonableness framework, e .g. , at the executive level or at the 
program level. 
6.4.6 Initiatives Improving Resource Allocation at Region C 
In the last couple of years, Region C has done a good deal of work in the area of resource 
allocation. They have brought in experts in the area to examine the region s a llocation 
processes and make recommendations. They have tried developing a more formalized 
process fo r allocating resources. One of the difficulties the region encountered when 
try ing to u e a more explicit approach was determining the best level for using a more 
methodologically fixed a llocation process. 1 he region had attempted to employ a variant 
of accountability to reasonableness at the regional level , but the full process was never 
completed and the project has now been put on hold while the executives deal w ith other 
reforms. One participant suggested that the accountability to reasonableness approach, 
modified to include opportunity cost considerations, would best be employed at the 
specific program level. Region C has not tried to employ the accountabi lity to 
reasonableness beyond the regiona l level. 
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Reviews of Region C's experience with Accountability fo r Reasonableness have been 
mixed. Some participants said that they thought the exercise "was a really good process 
to force us through clarity around what were the key elements in terms of setting 
priorities." There was, however, also a level of discomfort with the priority setting 
exercise, especially for groups whose programs were on the bottom of list of priorities. 
There were concerns that if a priority setting exercise did identify a program area as a low 
priority, but it was a high priority for the province, so that the region was forced to fund 
the program. lt was felt that this would cause some tension with the people who 
participated in the priority setting exercise. The view was also expressed that some of the 
clinical and scientific people found difficulties with the vagueness around the priority 
setting exercise. One participant said that they fe lt that the exercise "just added another 
level of complexity." Another participant said, 
" I think there's thi s assumption that all you have to do is set in place a process for 
decision making for resource a llocation issues, and then you just fo llow the process 
through, whether it be some kind of logic model or critical decision making, and 
then you just pour things through the process and that's it, whereas the reality is 
there may be demands coming forward from professional bodies and the public that 
weigh into that, despite your decision. Maybe it's attached to a recruitment issue for 
a special physician . Maybe it's a high-profile community member that needs this 
and a letter gets sent to the Minister of Health, and then for a variety of other 
reasons, there may be a trumping of a regional decision." 
In other words, the promise of the Accountability for Reasonableness approach never 
lived up to the reality. 
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6.4. 7 Overview of Resource Allocation at the Executive Level of Region C 
Table 6.-1 summarize some ofthe information presented in sections 5.4 to section 5.4.6. 
Table 6.4: Overview of Resource Allocation at the Executive Level of Region C 
Resource Allocation Across program areas; within programs and occasionally, in 
Decisions clinical circumstances. Inclusive, but ultimately closed-
door, top-down. Saskatchewan Health is sometimes 
involved in specific decisions. Saskatchewan Health is 
closely involved in the management of the diagnostics 
program. 
Need Determined by staff, internal data and the use of needs 
assessments. 
Evidence Varies depending on issue under consideration. New and 
innovative technologies usually require a good deal of 
information. Internal data and expert opinion are important 
types of evidence. 
Cost Primarily concerned with budget impact, determined 
primarily by internal data, although sometimes vendors are 
contacted. Cost-effectiveness not considered in the areas of 
care being studied. 
Accountabi lity General government structure; annual reports; public 
reporting; good internal transparency; advisory network. 
Ethics Little direct discussion of ethical considerations. An 
attempt to use Accountability for Reasonableness to 
improve the process of allocation resources. 
Innovations for • Resource Allocation Pilot Project (Accountability 
Improving Resource for Reasonableness) 
Allocation 
6.5 Resource Allocation within the Diagnostic Imaging Program 
As in the other two regions, in Region C, both endovascular coi ling and MRI are 
budgeted through the Diagnostic Imaging program. It is useful to begin our discussion of 
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resource allocation in these two areas by examining how resources are allocated across 
this program. 
Decision Structure 
In Region C, Diagnostic Imaging has responsibility for MRI, CT, nuclear medicine, 
general radiology, ultrasound, lithotripsy, interventional and vascular imaging. The 
program is run by a clinical chief and program manager. Both report to the executive 
through the Vice-President of Medical Affairs. There are supervisors for each of the 
modalities across the region. 
VP for Medical Affairs 
Program Manager - Diagnostics Clinical Chief- Diagnostics 
Supervisory by Modality Frontline Radiologists 
Figure 6.2: Decision Making Structure of the Diagnostics Program 
Budgeting 
One participant said that the annual budget for Diagnostic Imaging is built up " by site and 
by modality." The program looks at the number of tests it runs by modality at each site. 
It then determines what changes in activity it plans for the coming year. The budget 
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request would also take into account any changes in cost drivers for the program. The 
program keeps detailed budget records by site and by modality, which can be further 
broken down by worked hours, salaries, benefits, medical remuneration to our staff. The 
program is thus able to fairly accurately match increases in funds to the likely increase in 
activity. Although any budget requests are usually tied to performing a specific level of 
service by modality, there is some flexibility around shifting budget allocations across 
modalities if adjustments are needed throughout the year or if there are changes in 
circumstances. Remuneration for physicians to read scans is part of the region's global 
budget. Capital costs are treated separately in coordination with Saskatchewan's 
Diagnostic Imaging Network. 
Diagnostic Imaging Network 
In 2004, prompted by years of under funding and the rapid changing nature of diagnostic 
technology, Saskatchewan Health (2004) conducted a province-wide review of its 
diagnostic imagining capabilities to determine what strategy the province should take 
going forward regarding diagnostic imaging. The review recommended the establishment 
of a provincial Diagnostic Imaging Network to advise the government concerning 
diagnostics imagining. Soon after, the Minister of Health ( askatchewan Health, 2005) 
accepted the review committee's recommendation and established a Diagnostic Imaging 
Network, as an attempt to make the provision o f diagnostic services more transparent and 
consistent across the province. 
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Although it was orig inally meant to be advisory in nature, the effect of the Diagnostic 
Imaging Network is that, to a large extent, the management of diagnostic imaging can be 
seen as being taken out of the regions. As one participant said, in diagnostic imaging, 
" the priorities are set for us" by the provincial council. Through the Diagnostic Imaging 
Network Saskatchewan Health receives monthly reports on activi ty levels and wait lists 
for every diagnostic imaging department in the province. These reports info rm the 
province of any tests targets which are being missed. As one participant from the region 
said, 
" We work with the government every year to plan targets for next year, so they 
continually track and monitor monthly through us what our wait times are and what 
our prioritization system is. So they have their finger on the pulse to see how much 
MRI serv ice are we doing, what are the service pressures so that they can then build 
their budgets and their targets for us for the next year." 
The provincial committee would also determine what capita l purchases are made across 
the province. The individual diagnostic programs would receive their funding as part of 
the region' s g lobal budgets, but the province determines the service levels the reg ion 
would have to mainta in. Through these targets and the province' s close monitoring of 
these targets, even though the funds fl ow through the region's g lobal operational budget, 
the funding is in essence directly targeted by the provincial government for diagno tic 
1magmg. 
Participants asked about the provincial strategy fe lt that it was a good approach, giv n the 
size of the province and the need to have consistent diagnostic imagining standards, given 
that patients are often transfe1Ted for care across reg ions. 
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6.6 Endovascular Coiling at Region C 
Region C does not currently offer endovascular coiling. Patients who reqlllre the 
procedure are presently sent to A lberta or, in a few cases, Ontario. There is however 
some debate about whether an endovascular coi ling program is going to be established by 
the reg ion . In fact, there seemed to be some level of animosity among some decision 
makers around this issue. Some decision makers said establishing an endovascular 
coiling was not an issue being considered by Region C. One participant in particular said 
that he was opposed to the establishment of a program due to the fact that there are no 
trained staff, no bi-plane angiography, no budget for coils, and likely not a sufficient 
volume of cases to justify a program or to maintain physicians' ski ll set. Other decision 
makers said that the program has been agreed to and was expected to be establ ished in the 
coming year. Still others at the senior executive level said that no discussion has yet 
occurred about whether to establish a program or not. 
Much of the confusion over whether Region C w ill start an endovascular coiling program 
results from the di fferent components required for a program: trained staff, a bi-plane 
angiography, an inventory of coils, and dedicated operating funds. Region C is in the 
process of purchasing a new bi-plane angiography. Because of construction at one of the 
hospital si tes, the existing angiography suite had to be moved. Cost compari ons showed 
that it made sense to replace the old angiography suite with a new suite, rather than move 
the old one. In buy ing an angiography suite, the assessment team from Diagnostic 
Imaging conside red what future needs there may be on the equipment, including the 
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possibility of starting an endovascular coiling program. As one part icipant said, the 
purchase of a new bi-plane angiography, 
" is the replacement of an existing system . o while we're upgrading to a new 
system, we looked at what our current and future c linical needs are going to be and 
we've assessed that we're going to buy a bi-plane neuro system." 
Region C's executive has approved the purchase a new bi-plane angiography as a 
replacement of the old sing le-plane ang iography sui te. 
That the purchase of a new bi-plane angiography was presented to the executive as a 
replacement of current equipment, rather than as a way to deliver a new service, likely 
influenced their decision to purchase the expanded bi-plane capabili ties . A number of 
participants fe lt that after years without suffic ient funds being put into capital purchases, 
" in many cases we're just in replacement mode; but if when you're going to replace, 
you know, it is absolutely the time that you're looking at what you're going to 
replace it with, and how can we get the best bang for your dollar. So I th ink most of 
the decisions here are basicall y looking at replacement but there is an upgrade do 
that, just because technology is changing." 
Members of the region' s executive also recognize that departments often are expanding 
the capabilities o f their equipment when old equipment is being replaced. As one 
member of the executive said about the bi -plane angiography, 
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" It would be still presented that way to us with the explanation - say, look, we had 
to replace this anyway - and the request may have come fo rward then. Replacing 
this machine with a similar machine we can get would cost x and this is what we' ll 
be able to do with it . Our option is to replace w ith a plus. Here's what it would 
cost, and we could get these efficiencies out of it, and a decision is made based on 
that, and that' s happened quite frequently. So it appears on the "A" list because it's 
something we have to replace. ' 
A decision has also been made by Region C to train a new staff member in endovascular 
coiling. A Saskatchewan-born radiologist was being recruited by Region C. As part of 
the recruitment agreement reached with the rad io logist, the vice-president of Medical 
Affairs agreed to send the radiologist on a fe llowship to learn how to perform 
endovascular coiling. This radiologist will be back working in the region in 2007 and at 
that point will be trained in the coiling procedure. 
Based on the purchase of a bi-plane ang iography and the train ing of staff it seems that the 
region is moving towards starting an endovascular coiling program. In fact a number of 
participants fe lt that the endovascular coiling program would be established soon due to 
the momentum of a lready having a bi-plane angiography and a trained physician. One 
participant said about the decision to purchase a bi-plane angiography that "the region 
definite ly has staked the ground that this is a service we want to provide." Yet the 
decision to purchase a bi -plane angiography and tra in staff were both made without any 
explicit decision on the part of the executive whether or not to start thi s program. The 
purchase of a bi-plane angiography suite was made in the context of replacing a piece of 
updated equipment. The decision to send the new radio logist for training was part of a 
recruitment agreement reached with the new physician, a decision the executive was not 
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made aware of until after the radiologist was on his fellowship. As a member of the 
executive said of the movement towards an endovascular coiling program that "it 
wouldn't get to this point now, but it got to this point because of the last couple of years 
of how we operated." All of the members of the executive said that they have not yet 
considered the establishment of endovascular coiling program, but that they were aware 
of the possibility of starting the program. The executive have also not yet begun to 
formally assess the pros and cons of starting the program. 
Fee-Code for Endovascular Coiling 
The Saskatchewan government has not previously paid for endovascular coiling. There is 
not even a fee code for endovascular coiling within the physician fee schedule. In order 
for a new service to get a fee code, it likely would be first requested by the Saskatchewan 
Medical Association as part of regular negotiations on the province's physician fee 
schedule. These negotiations would include a discussion of whether the provincial 
government believes there is a need to cover the new service on an ongoing basis. The 
regional health authorities may also put forward the program as a service they would like 
to start offering. The regions would be involved to some extent in the discussion around 
any new service, because it is the region that ultimately provides support to any new 
service. 
6.6.1 Resource Allocation Issues around Endovascular Coiling 
The main resource allocation issue for Region C is whether to begin an endovascular 
coiling program. The decision to start this program would be made by the region ' s 
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executive. Once it is considered, this decision will be greatly influenced by the fact that 
Region C are in the process of training staff and purchasing a new bi-plane angiography 
suite. The decision to establish a program focuses then primarily on whether to purchase 
an inventory of coils and about dedicating operational funding. Another key issue is 
whether Region C have sufficient patient volumes to allow physicians to maintain their 
skill levels so that a sufficient level of patient care can be maintained. The initial 
inventory of coils would be seen as a capital cost and captured within the regular capital 
budgeting process. The executive have not begun to consider whether it will begin an 
endovascular coiling program. 
6.6.2 Endovascular Coiling and Need 
Because the region has not begun to look at whether it wi ll start performing endovascular 
coilings, there have been as of yet no formal attempts to determine the level of need for 
this program. So far, the need for this program has been determined informally through 
staff estimates of the likely patient population and the number of patients sent from the 
region to other provinces for coilings. 
Another issue raised regarding the need for endovascular coiling is that it is not just the 
number of patients requiring care which determines need. There is also a patient safety 
issue. Some frontline participants said that because of the risk to critically ill patients 
associated with sending them out of province, there is a need for a local endovascular 
coiling program even if the number of patients who avail themselves of the program is 
relatively small. 
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6.6.3 Endovascular Coiling and Evidence 
The executive have yet to consider whether or not to establish a coiling program. When 
the executive does move to consider establishing this program, participants said that they 
will focus on operational data, rather than focusing on research evidence about the 
effectiveness of coiling. As one participant said, "the main evidence is about the 
volumes, not the effectiveness. The impact on us and the community, as opposed to 
effectivene s in evidence." All of the frontline staff interviewed felt that endovascular 
coiling was a safe, effective and well-established procedure for treating cerebral 
aneurysms. 
6.6.4 Endovascular Coiling and Cost 
Program cost has not yet been considered by the executive. The new bi-plane 
angiography was purchased through the regular capital budgeting process. 
6.6.5 Endovascular Coiling and Accountability 
G iven that the program has not been establi shed, there are no special accountability 
measures for endovascular coiling. 
6.6.6 Endovascular Coiling and Ethics 
There has been no specific discussion around the ethics of starting an endovascular 
coiling program. 
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6.6. 7 Overview of Endovascular Coiling 
Table 6.5 provides an overview of the six factors relating to endovascular coi ling m 
Region C. 
Table 6.5: Overview of Endovascular Coiling 
Usage Currently not available. 
Resource Allocation Decisions Whether to start an endovascular coiling 
program. The executive have not 
considered whether it will begin an 
endovascular coiling program. 
Need Only informally considered at program 
level, based on estimates of frontline staff 
and the number of cases sent out-of-
province for the procedure. Patient safety 
also seen as a determinate of need. 
Evidence Not yet considered by executive. Seen as 
an effective treatment by frontline staff. 
Cost Program cost not yet considered by 
executive. Bi-plane angiography 
purchased through regular capital 
budgeting process. 
Accountabi lity No specific measures. 
Ethics Not discussed. 
6. 7 MRI in Saskatchewan 
Saskatchewan has four MRI scanners and a scan rate of 20 scans per I 000 (CTHI, 2006). 
One participant said that in terms of the G7, Canada is below the average number of MRI 
scans per capita, and that Region C is well below the national average. This is partly the 
result of the provincial situation . Large proportional debt and years of difficult fiscal 
situations led to insufficient provincial funding going to the purchase of capital 
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equipment. The financial situation in Saskatchewan has improved in recent years. There 
is also new funding for diagnostic equipment under the federal-provincial health accord. 
In terms of the use of MRI within the province, one participant descri bed how the use of 
MRI was becoming more investigative as a wider range of cases, and often time less 
serious cases, are scanned. For example, previously only patients with a history of lower 
back surgery would be scanned using an MRI. Now all patients with prolonged lower 
back pain are scanned. One of the results of this wider scanning range is that there is a 
significant increase in the number of scans which are coming back normal. 
Diagnostics Imaging Network 
The province has recently developed a diagnostic imaging network, which is intended to 
determine the level of need for new equipment and examine ways to maximize the use of 
ex isting operational capacity on a province-wide basis. The diagnostic imaging network 
is developing a tool to help identify the best diagnostic modality for particular patients. 
This tool should improve both wait time management and decision making at the point of 
delivery. 
MRI in Region C 
Region C has two MRl machines. One runs on extended hours to 11 :00 PM on weekdays 
and half days on weekends. The other site does not have capabilities to book outpatients 
after hours because the faci li ty it is located in is c losed. 
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6. 7.1 Resource Allocation for MRI 
For operating costs, MRI usage and other costs associated with MRI are tracked on a 
monthly basis for each site and for the to tal for the modality. Average cost fo r MRI scan 
is also measured. Monthly usage is compared to usage for the previous year to identify 
any variation. Capital depreciation is calculated through the hospital' s capital budgeting 
process. One of the reasons for this separation is that the provincial government is 
directly involved in decisions to purchase major new capita l equipment, e.g. , a new MRI, 
so that there is no need to include it on the operating side. As with the Diagnostic 
Imagining budget as a whole, the entire budget request around MRI would be built up 
from site, based on the previous year's activity. 
Because of its sensitive political nature, MRI performance is closely measured by the 
provincia l government, both in terms of service volumes and wait times. Trends for both 
measures are also closely watched. If government targets are missed, askatchewan 
Health would hold discussions with the region and the Diagnostic Imaging etwork about 
how to address the problem. In determining Diagnostic Imaging's budget for the coming 
year, Saskatchewan Health would work with Region C ' s finance department to identify 
any infl ationary pressures and the cost of any planned service increases. As one 
participant said, "government usually knows line by line what the inflationary" pressures 
are. Saskatchewan Health would then submit its request for diagnostic services funding 
for the coming year as part of its annual budget submission. 
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One issue around determining the level of need for diagnostic serv ices is the impact other 
programs have on Diagnostic Imaging. For example, cancer care in Saskatchewan is 
delivered through the Saskatchewan Cancer Agency. A large proportion of the MRI 
usage is for cancer care. Previously, Region C would bill the Cancer Agency for that 
activity. Allowances for the impact of other programs on Diagnostic Imaging, including 
for cancer care, are now included in the region 's global budget. Sti ll Diagnostic Imaging 
can be adversely impacted by other areas adding new programs which require diagnostic 
resources. Participants said that there needs to be a better process in place to gauge the 
impact of new programs on Diagnostic Imaging. 
All Diagnostic Imaging funding is targeted by the province through the region's global 
budget. The provincial government would set its targets for the level of service fo r 
different diagnostic modalities. While there is some flexibility to adjust funding acros 
different modalities, the province would identify specific increases for each modality. As 
one participant described "they send a letter with a cheque to the finance department. 
They add that to our global budget and they add it to our accountabi lity targets. o, fo r 
the most part, we're g lobally funded, but there is line by line accountabil ity back." The 
provincial budget cycle starts in ei ther September or October. The budget is publicly 
re leased by the government in Apri l, but usually funds do not flow until June. 
Internally within Diagnostic Imaging and wi thin the executive, there would be 
discussions about how many MRI machines the region needs and where these new 
machines should be located across the region. The executive would make its 
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recommendations to government on these topics. The Diagnostic Imaging Network also 
would be involved in any discussion around the purchase of a new MRJ. The provincial 
government, however would make any decisions around the purchase of an MRI. This 
decision would be made at the cabinet level. Region C is soon getting a new MRI. 
Saskatchewan Health has also indicated that Region C may get a second new MRI. The 
department has even indicated the likely site for this second MRI. Diagnostic Imaging 
starts planning for the new staff as soon as the purchase of a new scanner is announced, 
so that there are sufficient people in place to read the exams once the new scanners come 
on-line. 
Guidelines 
There are currently no guidelines on MRI usage in Region C, next to the requirement that 
they have to be ordered by an appropriate physician. There is a process for prioritiz ing 
requests for MRI, where they are reviewed by radiologists and classified into three 
classes: Emergency, Urgent, and Elective. Wait times for elective MRis used to be 16 
months, but the time has since improved to 6 to 7 months. Wait times for urgent MRis 
are one week. Emergency MRI wait times are the same day. 
Participants fe lt that there would likely be more formal guidelines adopted around MRI 
usage in the future , particularly around when MRI tests should be ordered. One 
participant warned, 
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"The government would probably want to be careful what they wish for [around 
new diagnostic guidelines]. You know, they a lways want to ensure that we're using 
them ... the right modalities for the right tests for the most part . If we fo llow the 
guidelines, it would probably drastica lly increase our use of high-end modali ties 
and probably drive up the costs further." 
This likely increase is due to the fact that most of the guidel ines being developed 
recommend wider usage o f MRI than are currently being perfo rmed. 
Another problem identified around the use of guidelines is that their ability to effectively 
influence usage is dependent on the ordering physicians. The physicians need to respect 
the guidelines and recognize their importance or they will not be effective. Without 
physicians buying into the system, there are few constraints on a physician' s abil ity to 
order diagnostic tests, regardless how the guidelines are structured. This is partly due to 
the limited information a radiologist has to evaluate requi sitions, a ll of which comes from 
the ordering physicians. For example, one participant said " how do you te ll a 
neurosurgeon you don't think that it is an appropriate MRI without ever seeing the 
patient." 
Another participant recommended an a lte rnative approach to diagnostic guidelines, which 
be tter informs physic ians about the budgetary implications of ordering unnecessary tests. 
He said, 
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"As long as you give them [the ordering physicians] the information ... all of the 
information to understand the pressures, right; and a lot of times, physicians don't 
have the information in front of them that, you know, it doesn't make sense to do 
that test because it adds very little to the patient, the patient visit or the patient 
outcome or the patient. You walk them through the fact that, by doing that test, it 
really adds no value and we now have no money to do x, y and z and if you 
communicate openly with them and keep them in the budgetary system, I find then 
they make appropriate decisions; but if we don't g ive them information, they don't 
know where we sit financially." 
Participants also said identifYing high users of MRl and reviewing their ordering on a 
one-on-one based may be another approach more likely to allow for more appropriate 
MRI usage whi le avoiding some of the difficulties of systematic guidelines. 
6.7.2 Resource Allocation Issues around MRI 
The decision whether to purchase a new scanner would be made by the provincial 
cabinet, with input from the Diagnostic Imagining Network and Region C. The location 
of an MRI to a region would also be made by cabinet, but the location of an MRI within 
the region would be more bilateral, between the government, the Diagnostic Imagining 
Network and Region C. Procurement would be mostly determined by the diagnostics 
program and the regional executive. 
Saskatchewan Health determines the annual budget for MRI and thereby determine the 
number of scans to perform annually. Specialist physicians make requisitions for MRI. 
Radiologists review these requests and determine their level of priority . The radiologists 
and the program manager for Diagnostic Imagining determine the scheduling of cases. 
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These resource allocation decisions who is responsible for making them and how the 
decisions are made are summarized in Table 6. 6. 
Table 6.6: MRI Resource Allocation Decisions at Region C 
Resource Allocation Decision Maker Type of Decision 
Decisions Makin~ 
Determine whether to Provincial cabinet Inclusive, but ultimately 
invest in new equipment. closed-door, top-down. 
Determine where to 
locate equipment 
A. To which region Provincial cabinet, Inclusive, but ultimately 
Diagnostic closed-door, top-down. 
Imagining etwork 
B. Within region Regional executi ve Inclusive, but ultimate ly 
and Diagnostics closed-door, top-down. 
leadership team 
Procurement of Diagnostics Bilateral 
equipment leadership team and 
regional executive 
Scheduling cases Radiologists and DI Bilateral 
program manager 
Determine whether to Specialist Clinical circumstances 
order an MRJ physicians 
Prioritize MRI Radiologists Clinical circumstances 
requisitions 
6. 7.3 MRI and Need 
Because Saskatchewan Health makes the decisions around serv1ce levels, within the 
region there is little formal consideration of MRI need. The region, however, recognizes 
the need for added MRI capacity. Diagnostic Imaging program does keep detailed 
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records regarding service levels, wait times, and cost which it regularly shares with 
Saskatchewan Health. This data is used by Saskatchewan Health to determine the level 
of MRI need for the province. 
6. 7.4 MRJ and Evidence 
There was little di scussion of evidence regarding MRI. Participant never expressed any 
questions about the usefulness of the technology or about its range of application within 
Region C. 
6. 7.5 MRI and Cost 
The operational cost for MRJ is determined by examining interna l utilization data. There 
were no reports of considering the cost-effectiveness of different modalities. The cost of 
purchasing a new MRI would be determined primarily through di scussions with vendors. 
6. 7.6 MRI and Accountability 
In providing operational funding for MRJ, Saskatchewan Health uses activity-based 
budgeting, i.e., it links new diagnostics funding to specific numbers of increased scans. 
Saskatchewan Health also closely monitors wait times and service levels for MRI. M RI 
usage is partia lly determined within a province-wide diagnostic imagi ning strategy. MRl 
spending must meet a ll guide lines regarding government spending and reporting. 
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6.7.7 MRl and Ethics 
There was little discussion about the ethics of MRI allocations. In general , partici pants 
felt that there were few ethical issues directed related to MRI. 
6. 7.8 Overview of MRJ 
Table 6. 7 provides an overview of how the fi ve component factors are handled by Region 
C's MRI program. 
Table 6.7: Overview of MRI 
Need Determined by Saskatchewan Health using 
internal usage data provided by regions. 
Evidence No question of the effectiveness of the 
technology or its range of application. 
Cost Analysis of internal costing and usage data; 
discussions with vendors. 
Accountability Activity-based budgeting. General government 
accountabi lity. There is a province-wide strategy 
regarding diagnostic imagining. 
Ethics L ittle ethical considerations. 
6.8 Powered Upper Arm Prostheses in Saskatchewan 
Powered upper arm prostheses make-up a fa irly small proportion of all prostheses in the 
provmce. Myoelectric cl ients account for only about I% to 2% of client visits. 
Participants fe lt, after reviewing their records, that the number of new myoelectric clients 
for the entire province would be "around one a year at most." 
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6.8.1 Getting a Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis 
The process for getting a myoelectric arm begins with the client requesting a myoelectric 
or inquiring about a myoelectric to their local orthotics lab or prosthetics clinic. In some 
cases, providers may suggest to the patient that they would likely be a good candidate fo r 
a powered upper arm prosthesis. 
Once an interest is expressed by the pati ent, a team would assess the patient. The team 
would usually include a physiatrist, a prostheti st, a physiotherapist, and may, but not 
u ually, include a psychologist. If there is no psychologist, the physiatrist may do a 
partial psychological assessment as part of the ir wider assessment. A socia l worker 
would be involved if the patient is a Nati ve Canadian. This is due to the fact that Native 
Canadians have coverage for myoelectri c prostheses under federal government funding 
arrangements. 
The case for a myoelectric prosthesis is built upon a number of considerations. The 
ability to demonstrate that the upgrade to a myoelectric would result in an improvement 
in functiona lity and an improvement in the person 's quality of life is important. Th 
psychological impact of using a myoelectric arm , e.g. , on self-esteem, is considered. A 
number o f clinical issues are assessed, includ ing the physical abi li ty to be fitted for a 
myoelectric , a patient ' s ability to fol low instructions, and thei r ability to successfully go 
through the tra ining to use a myoelectri c. The issue around training is important. Many 
of those who need prostheses are e ither very young or very old . There may be other 
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health issues which need to be considered. For trauma patients, there may be Issues 
around neuropathic pain, which can make fitting a myoelectric arm difficult. 
Myo-electric prostheses are high level prostheses . In Saskatchewan, even though there is 
universal coverage, patients have to graduate to be able to apply for one. This graduation 
would be through the demonstrated use of a conventional prosthesis. The reason for this 
graduation to a myoelectric is to help ensure the value for money. In particular, requiring 
a patient to wear a conventional prosthesis first is meant to help ensure that the patient has 
sufficient skills to be able to learn how to use a myoelectric arm and has a pattern of using 
a prosthesis. Given the costs involved in providing a myoelectric, participants felt that 
some protection needs to be in place to ensure that only people who are likely to regularly 
use their myoelectric prostheses get one. 
Many of the participants in Saskatchewan felt that myoelectrics are not for everyone. As 
one provider has said, 
" many people wi ll do way better with a traditional hook device than they will with a 
myoelectric hand. A myoelectric hand looks beautiful but it's, practically speaking, 
not very functional. The body powered devices are way more functional. They 
don't look nice and our society kind of has thi s Captain Hook mentality about it, but 
they' re way more functional in terms of daily living." 
Another participant said that "I think a lot of people have an image in their minds. They 
look nice and they have an image that they work well, and they're very disappointed ." 
There are a number of other shortcoming participants expressed. While there have been 
improvements, powered upper arm prosthesis re main a signifi cant weight. Trad itional 
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prostheses do have more suspension. Children do not seem to like any type of prostheses. 
Myoelectrics can be hard to clean. Often the client has no interest or will indicate they do 
not want one. The team need to believe the client would be successful with, and regularly 
use, their myoelectric before the team recommends a myoelectric. For many clients, a 
traditional hand hook is preferred because it is better for continuing manual labour. This 
is an important consideration for rural farmers , who are injured on the job, but want to 
continue farming. There have been developments in myoelectric prostheses over the 
years. They are now easier to use. They are lighter. Their battery life is longer. They 
are more powerful. They can be made waterproof. There is the prosp ct of even fu rther 
developments in myoelectric arms. The war in Iraq has increased the number of patients 
needing myoelectric arms. Related to this, the United States government has recently 
made significant investments into research in prostheses, including myoelectric. Still 
participants felt it is important to manage expectations. A myoelectric arm " is not a 
miracle or bionic arm which people see on television." 
6.8.2 Coverage for Powered Upper Arm Prostheses in Saskatchewan 
The Saskatchewan Aids for Independent Living (SAIL) Program provides universal 
1 00% coverage for myoelectric prosthesis to those not covered by other insurance 
programs. There are some criteria the patient needs to meet before getti ng a myoelectric 
arm. In terms of the assessment criteria, participants said that they are based on historical 
practice. The government had always agreed to fund myoelectric prostheses. In fact , 
there was little discussion of whether or not to cover it. As one participant said, " is it just 
Saskatchewan's culture ... We're the founders of Medicare." The SAIL criteria are there to 
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ensure that there are some limits on inappropriate use. The criteria include a requirement 
that the client demonstrate first an ability to function with a non-myoelectric prosthesis 
and demonstrate that there are some long-term benefits to using a myoelectric prosthesis. 
The AIL program only covers the device that fits the client's basic need. The 
government is examining options to change its policy so that people can pay the 
difference between the basic and higher-cost options. Clients are e ligible for a 
replacement prosthesis for a broken prosthesis or a prosthesis they have out-grow. 
The program funds the two workshops that provide all the prosthetic work in the 
province. The Saskatoon Abilities Council is provided with direct funding to cover their 
staff and some overhead costs. The Wascana Rehabilitation centre is funded through the 
Regina Qu'Appelle Regional Health Authority. SAIL has fee-for-service schedules that 
reimburse these two centres for the cost of component materials. 
Previously, the SAIL program used a provincial committee to determine whether 
someone received funding for a myoelectric prosthesis. This committee disbanded in the 
mid-eighties, due in part to the lack of numbers. Now applications are reviewed by the 
SAILs program on a case-by-case basis. The application is in the form of a letter from 
either a physiatrist or orthoped ic surgeon outlining the cas of the client to receive a 
powered upper arm prosthetics. Although SAIL program may request further 
information, it is very rare for a request to go forward to SAIL and be rejected. This lack 
of rejections is primarily due to the fact that participants felt that providers in the province 
do not usually submit frivolous requests. As one provider said, "we recognize that we 
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have excellent coverage in this province and we have a responsibility to the taxpayers, 
and we're all taxpayers." 
Follow-up and training are also covered by the SAIL program. Good follow-up is 
important for myoelectric prostheses because it can increase compliance, e.g., addressing 
simple problems which may be uncomfortable for the patient. The only thing not covered 
by SAIL is sports prostheses. 
While there is universal coverage for all prostheses in Saskatchewan, there are other 
funding sources. These include the Workers ' Compensation Board (WCB), the 
Saskatchewan government-sponsored motor vehicle insurance (SGI), and national First 
ations programs. For the SGI and WCB, the client is assigned a case worker who 
coordinates his or her care. The physiatrist ' s involvement with advocating for a 
myoelectric on behalf of their patient would be similar across all of these programs. The 
documentation is in the form of a letter from the physiatrist and the prosthetist. The 
reason for the lack of formal documents to apply for coverage is that the cases depend 
very much on the independent circumstances. While residents of Saskatchewan are 
eligible for the War Amps programs, because of the SAIL program, there are few 
applications to War Amps from Saskatchewan. 
Table 6. 8 summarizes the coverage given through the various programs for powered 
upper arm prosthe es in Saskatchewan. 
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Table 6.8: Coverage for Powered Upper Arm Prostheses in Saskatchewan 
Program Who is Eligible? Coverage 
SAIL Recipients not covered by Full coverage 
other insurance programs 
wee Employees injured at work Full coverage 
SGI Injuries resulting from auto Depends on policy 
accidents 
Non-Insured First Nations and Inuit Dissent Full coverage 
Health Benefits 
(NIHB) 
War Amps- People up to 18 years of age. Full coverage 
CHAMP Program 
War Amps- Adult People over 18 of age. 15 % towards the cost of 
Amputee Program prosthesis up to $1500.00 
once every three years 
6.8.4 The Allocation of Resources in the Prosthetics 
The assessment for a myoelectric prosthesis would be conducted at either a hospital with 
an amputee clinic or the facility fitting the prosthesis. Prosthetics would be built and 
installed on fee-for-service basis with the bill going to the agency responsible for 
coverage in the case involved. There are two accredited facilities that have billing rights 
to Saskatchewan Health: Saskatchewan Abilities Council or Wascana Rehabilitation 
Centre . Both of these facilities change the SAIL program for services according to a set 
fee guidelines, with support also given by the province to suppot1 the general operations 
of the two facilities. 
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6.8.5 Resource Allocation Issues around Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis 
The decision of who should receive a powered upper arm prosthesis is based on a team 
recommendation, with a physiatri st or orthoped ic surgeon making a request for coverage. 
Funders and the patient would also be involved in recommending what is most 
appropriate prosthesis for the patient. This decision would be an example of collegial 
decision making . 
The second question re lates to the coverage of powered upper arm prostheses. Whi le 
there is little communication between these programs to ensure that all people are fully 
funded for the ir prostheses, the provincial government does operate a program of last 
resort which ensures universal coverage. 
Region C reported that there was little concern with how resources are allocated around 
powered upper arm prostheses, due to the fact that the cost of providing care is paid for 
by third-party insurers and that there are so few installed. 
6.8.6 Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis and Evidence 
Powered upper arm prostheses are seen as a proven technology and there is little concern 
expressed about the ir effectiveness. In terms or who receives a myoelectric prostheses, 
there are a number of factors looked at. These factors primarily focus on determining the 
ability of the patient to wear a myoelectric arm, the likelihood that he or she wi ll benefit 
from a myoelectric prosthesis, and desired functionality or the patient. The information 
about a ll of these factors comes from examinations and discussions with the patient. 
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6.8.7 Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis and Cost 
Because of the small number of people requiring myoelectric prostheses, there is no 
consideration of cost-effectiveness. For budgeting purposed, the net cost of equipment is 
calculated by examining internal data, checking with suppliers, through di cussion with 
prosthetists and through the established fee schedule. 
6.8.8 Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis and Ethics 
Beyond the considerations about age and the likelihood of completing training identified 
in the other two provinces, there was little discussion of powered upper arm prostheses 
and ethics. 
6.8.9 Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis and Accountability 
There was a real concern with accountability and the wise use of resources reflected by 
all of the participants in Saskatchewan. One participant said that providers in the 
provmce, 
" recognize that we have excellent coverage in this province and we have a 
responsibility to the taxpayers, .. . we have a re ponsibility to use funds 
appropriately and to be accountable for the funds we're using .. . and there's all kinds 
of ways we can be accountable. There's all kinds of formal ways - through audit 
processes and through criteria and prior approval and requisitioning authorities and 
there's accountabi lity built into this, but we also have .. . we have a responsibility to 
be accountable in individual deci sions that we each think every day in the shop. So 
I think that that again is our culture. It's built up over many years of a relationship 
where we don't mess with one another." 
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6.8.10 Overview of Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis 
Table 6. 9 reviews the main components elements relating to powered upper arm 
prostheses in Saskatchewan. 
Table 6.9: Overview of Powered Upper Arm Prosthesis in Saskatchewan 
Usage I new case provincial a year 
Resource Allocation Decisions 
I) Prescription I) Clinical circumstances, collegial 
2) Coverage 2) Uni versal, last resort , public coverage 
3) Region C 3) None specific to powered upper arm 
prostheses 
Need Number who present, patient population very 
small and stable 
Evidence Clinical circumstances of patients. Seen as an 
effective treatment for some patients. 
Cost Internal data, vendor supplied data, fee 
schedule. 
Ethics No specific concerns identified. 
Accountability Providers careful with public funding. 
6.9 Best Practices Identified in Saskatchewan 
There were a number of recommendations and best practices identified on how to 
improve resource allocation within Region C. Many of these best practices related to the 
working relations between people and to ensuring that all the appropriate people are 
involved in making a decision. It was generally recognized that when it comes to making 
resource allocation decisions, no one person has all the answers or a ll the required 
expertise. 
343 
Participants felt that Region C has good working relationships with the other mam 
stakeholder groups in the province, e.g., the provincial government, physician groups. 
One of the reasons for th is close relationship is the relatively small number of people 
working in the health care sector in Saskatchewan. Many people are familiar with the 
people they work with in other organizations and likely regularly work with them on a 
number of projects. This good working relationship has created a lot of good will 
between stakeholders and was seen as an important factor in helping Region C to push 
forward its strategic agenda. 
A number of participants fe lt that as many decisions as possible, both resource allocation 
decisions and policy decisions, should be made at the program level. As one senior 
executive member said, 
" We have enormous trust and belief in the knowledge and the good 
intentions of the people who are closest to the ground, and I think they're 
in a far better position [to make many decisions about programs]." 
The participant went on to say that ideally the senior executive should be only involved in 
decisions which require more resources than are available within the program area, a 
major shift in policy or if shifts in resources that would require a cut in some services. 
In order to involve front line staff more in resource allocation decisions, the organization 
need to ensure a good level of communication across the organization and the ability for 
staff to easily inform the senior leadership team about their concerns. Participants 
suggested that new information technologies are an excellent way to al low staff to engage 
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the senior leadership team, anonymously if they want. One of the senior executive said it 
is especially important to listen to frontline staff who work with vulnerable populations. 
Collaboration and discussions between colleagues in other health regions and other 
provinces was seen as very valuable m reducing workloads and in making better 
decisions. As one participant said, 
"There isn't a week that goes by that we do not share documents and 
information with one another. We no longer recreate the wheel kind of 
thing, right, and it saves us thousands of consulting dollars." 
One manager said that this inter-institutional and inter-provincial collaboration is good in 
capturing and adopting best practices across the country in their program area. 
A number of other best practices were also mentioned. These include that decisions are 
made using good information about the needs of the local community. Some participants 
recommended the w ider use of CADTH' s quick literature reviews on emerging 
technology. Standardized monitoring and other measures were seen as important to 
running consistent and efficient programs. Although there are c learly problems with wait 
times getting too long, the focus on wait times was seen as another good mechanism for 
improving the efficient use of resources. Leadership and a clear champion were 
identified as important factors in bringing about change. One participant said that bett r 
fundamental business practices, like improvements in running meetings, are needed to 
improve management efficiency. Another participant said that there needs to be some 
limits and some criteria placed around demand. It was also suggested that a zero-based 
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budgeting exercise carried out across the region may be useful to readjust resource levels 
across the program areas. Another participant recommended an advisory group of 
physicians on coverage decisions. 
When making decisions in one area about how to improve care, participants pointed out 
that you have to recognize that these resources have to be used wisely because they can 
be used to benefit other people in other program areas. R cognizing the wider use of 
resources is important to seeing a ll the diffe rent e lements of an allocation decision. One 
participant said that " if you're only try ing to make decisions to keep everybody happy, 
you will fail. ... and you usually never make everybody happy." Clear strategic decisions 
made transparently and clearly identifying who has accountability, is often seen as being 
acceptable, regardless of which programs ultimately get funded. The wider adoption of 
these principles was seen as something which cou ld a lso improve the process of resource 
allocation. 
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Table 6.10: Best Practices Identified in Saskatchewan 
o Good working relationship with other stakeholders 
o Program level decision making 
o Good level of communication across the organization 
• Communication with other organizations and provinces 
o Good information about needs of the community 
o CADTH literature reviews 
• Standardized monitoring I Measuring wait times 
• Strong Leadership I a clear champion 
o Limits and criteria placed on demand 
• Zero-based budgeting 
• An advisory group of physicians on coverage decisions 
• Considering all the different elements of a decision 
• Clear strategic decision making 
• Increased transparency and accountability 
6.9.1 Decision Aids Identified in Saskatchewan 
A lthough there are no decision aids currently be ing used in Region C to help direct the 
allocation of resources, participants were generally supportive of the idea that a more 
structured process was needed. One of the difficulties identified around resource 
allocation is the fact that higher profile programs, e.g. , cardiac care or child health, are 
more likely to be seen as a priority than other programs, e.g., programs focused on the 
disadvantaged or mental challenged, even though the need may be greater in the lower 
profile areas. The region has discussed establi shi ng a process which evaluates requ sts 
fo r resources on a more equal basis as a way to avoid thi s bias towards funding high 
profile programs. 
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There was a feeling that some type of standard scoring system for new requests could also 
be an educational opportunity for the public. Although it is expected that there would be 
a great deal of public debate and challenge by those whose requests were ranked lower on 
the list, explaining to concerned groups why certain programs were ranked lower was 
seen as a way to get the public to appreciate how decisions are made by the health region. 
Educating the public and debating what the criteria should be used for making resource 
allocation decisions takes time, but it is seen as a way of better involving the public and 
ensuring greater accountability. This type of public engagement around resource 
allocation could also be a way to show government the level of public support for certain 
funding decisions. Engaging the public in such a program would also make it harder for 
government to overturn the choices identified by the process. Finally, it would give the 
government a means of counteracting particular interest groups who come to the Minister 
w ith their one off concerns. 
A more structured process has not, however, been adopted by Region C. One area of 
concern has been about the effectiveness of the process. As one participant said, a 
standardized review of requests for new resources " would be ideal ; but there are so many 
ways for these decisions and promises to get made that things sti ll end up on that "A" 
li t." In other words, given the numerous levels of decision makers involved in making 
resource allocations, there are numerous opportunities to sway decision makers and 
circumvent the process. Another participant expressed concern that the process is only 
applicable at a particular insti tutional level, and that higher levels of governance may not 
respect the decisions arri ved at by the process. The pat1icipant said, 
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" You can come up with what on the surface seems to be a very robust set 
of questions and criteria on which to score a very good process of variety 
of people scoring and averaging and, you know, the case. I've been 
involved with several strategic planning reorganizations within different 
departments and a few different provinces where we've come up with very 
good tools to score relative priority in programming and in programs -
very robust tools. The challenge, as you say, comes in its level in 
decision-making where there may be an unpopular decision that occurs in 
your ranking. It makes logical sense but the person looking at it says, r 
can't cut that program even if it's the right one to cut; or it might be you 
send it forward , only to be told by the next level that you cannot [cut that 
pro gram]." 
Thus while a good deal of time and effort can be put into the priority setting process, it is 
likely that the process can be circumvented and all of that effort and public good will be 
lost. 
Participants generally liked the accountability for reasonableness model as a possible 
basis for improving resource allocation decision making. One participant, based on hi s 
experience in another province, said that decision aids need to be supported by staff and 
modified to the particular decision making environment. One of the delays in further 
adopting accountability for reasonableness is deciding at which management level it is 
most productive to adopt the approach within Region C, e.g., at the program level 
generally or at the senior level just for new programs. 
6.9.2 Challenges Identified in Saskatchewan 
Participants in Region C identified a number of challenges the region faces in improving 
resource allocation. One pa11icipant talked about the lack of clarity in the roles and 
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responsibilities between the provmce and the regional health authority. Often the 
provincial government was seen as overstepping its role by try ing to unduly influence the 
operation of the region. Another participant complained that the provincial bureaucracy 
has not really adjusted to the reality that they are no longer directly responsible fo r the 
delivery of care. 
The lack of substantial new resources was seen as another obstacle. Given that in 
Saskatchewan there has been a fairly long period without substantial increases in health 
care funding, budgeting has usually focused on maintaining current levels of service. 
Related to thi s lack of new resources is the fact that a large proportion of resources are 
already accounted for so that there is not much fl exibility to shift resources between 
programs. For example, increases in the cost of labour and drugs are fixed by the 
prov incia l government. A lthough they greatly impact the region's operating costs, the 
prices arc established outside of the region ' s control. Participants also said that it is very 
hard to make substantial shifts in resources given the insti tutional culture within the 
health care system. 
While Region C has had a fairly low turnover in its senior management team, there was a 
feeling that because of the transition period around having a new CEO that it has been 
difficult to establi sh a new process a round resource allocation. On the other hand, 
another participant said that there is real need to bring in more new people into the 
organization. Although the staff are seen as hard working, very dedicated, and talented, 
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the participant pointed out that a large proportion of the staff have never worked in any 
other health care setting. As the participant said, 
" they had limited exposure in some cases to practice elsewhere, and that is 
important evidence .... We need to open those windows to expose folks to 
what other regions are doing, what some of that best practice is, help them 
to learn to access the evidence and apply it." 
It seems then that there needs to be a balance between having some leadership stabil ity 
and encouraging staff exposure to a variety of health care settings. 
The difficulties around the execution of new policies were discussed. One participant 
talked about the need to have the idea, the will and the resources to bring about a change 
in policy. There was a feeling that it is difficult to have these three elements come 
together within most health care organizations. 
Region C has seven levels of decision making. While management reported valuing the 
input of frontline staff, a number of participants recognized that there are too many 
management levels to efficiently allow for free flowing communications. Because of the 
multiple levels of decision making, it is also difficult to have a clear idea on who is 
responsible for making a decision. Often difficult decisions are transferred up for others 
to make. As one participant said, 
" this organization ... the people [of this organizationl reall y care about what 
they do. l may have some major issues about processes and support; but in 
terms of basic mitigation and people wanting to contribute and trying to 
get health care... We need to constantly leverage that. The challeng is 
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how do you do that in an organized way so that people are comfortable 
making uncomfortable decisions and making tough choices." 
As another participant said, "if it's an unpleasant decision to make, it will be delegated 
upward in the organization and it will be delegated outward to the funding," i.e., the 
provincial government. 
Regarding diagnostics, one speci fie challenge identified was in communicating to other 
government departments (such as Saskatchewan Finance) the nature ofMRI services, i.e. 
that there is constantly expanding demand, the range of technological advancement, and 
that older modalities do not get replaced even once more MRis become available. 
There was a good deal of discussion about the difficulty with making inter-provincial 
comparisons and about variations in the level of service in different provinces. One 
challenge with MRI is that even though the capacity for MRI is expanding in 
Saskatchewan, national benchmarks for the number of scans per population are increasing 
at an even faster rate. In discussion comparing A lberta to Saskatchewan, one participant 
pointed to the fact that the two provinces have very different histories and social 
mentalities. These cu ltural differences were seen to be exacerbated by Alberta's recent 
financial wealth. The participant said that these differences make it very hard to compare 
the health care systems in the two provinces. Another participant mentioned that one of 
the issues around new standardized wait times is that it will highlight differences in the 
level of services across provinces and will put further pressures on the federal 
government to address the inequality in services. 
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Participants pointed to the fact that there is insufficient management and a great deal of 
scrutiny of managers within the system. In particular, participants said that the level of 
management is proportionately less in public health care than in other industries of 
comparable size. As one program manager said, "you show me an industry that has a 26 
million dollar budget and there' myself - and I have two managers - managing a 26 
million dollar operation with 400 some employees." Similarly, participants talked about 
the relatively lack of investment in information technology in public health care 
compared to other industries. Participants a lso pointed to the workload that is placed on 
managers, which both undermines good management and may put too much strain on 
managers' health and family lives. 
One participant suggested that decisions around drug coverage need to be tied into a 
larger process at both provincial and national level decision making, so as to avoid health 
regions making various decisions or facing the pressure from drug companies alone. The 
problem is that while there are national organizations which do analyze new technologies, 
as one participants said , 
"when you look at many of the provinces, there's a very limited staff that's 
capable of doing that kind of ana lysis or even interpreting the evidenc , 
and to what extent would their recommendations be taken anyway in 
politica l context for funding a llocation decisions. " 
Region C has considered whether it needs to hire people with expe11ise 111 health 
technology assessment or to give managers better training in critical assessment, cost-
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effectiveness and technological assessment. But there are a number of issues around 
these types of investments. Most regions would not be able to maintain or afford such 
expertise. There is a question then in terms of whether larger regions should take 
responsibi lity for these functions for smaller reg10ns. There are a lso Issues around 
interregional variation in coverage. 
The dilemma around public engagement was mentioned by a number of participants. 
Pa11icipants recognized that the public should be engaged in decisions around coverage 
and resource allocation. The problem of concentrated interest, where only those directly 
affected by a decision become involved, was often identified. Often these people are only 
engaged in the proces to bring about a particul ar outcome or advocate for a particular 
issue. One participant recommended a wide public engagement exercise, li ke the one 
conducted in Oregon, as worth considering. Another participant said that he has been told 
by the provincial government officia ls that for a particular program request to be 
approved, it needs to be shown to have public suppo11. The participant pointed out that 
often time the only available demonstration or public support are letters to the editor or to 
the Minster, submitted by a very small group o r people. 
Another cha llenge re lates to programs creating an apparent crisis so as to force their 
priorities on to the budgetary agenda. There is a lways a level of uncertainty about how 
much this actually occurs wi thin any organization. But a number or participants 
identified cases were thi s had occurred w ithin Region C and other health regions. One 
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participant said that there needs to be greater transparency to ensure that the level of need 
for a resource request is not over sold. 
The determinants of health model of health presents another challenge to health care 
organizations. While health care organizations recognize their g reat level of need, there 
is also a need not to short change other areas of government spending which positively 
impact on health, e.g., education, social services. The resource question is about what is 
the most appropriate size of the funding envelope for health. The level of fund ing for 
health re lates to another issue of how funding for areas which help primarily the less 
advantaged, e.g. , social services, should be balanced against the demands for health 
programs the benefit of which are seen to be more equally distributed to all groups, e.g., 
cardiac and cancer care. As one participant said "the fear is that you' ll end up getting 
things that the rich or the middle class need at the expense of the issues that would help to 
fund the f-u rther determinants of health on that end of the spectrum." 
Another challenge re lates to the institutional history of the health care system. One 
participant said that " if we were starting from scratch" we would not build a health care 
system like the one we have now. For example, an ideal system would a llow for greater 
investment in prevention. But we have to delivery care and make resource allocation 
decisions within the current system. The participant said that we should be guided in how 
we a llocate resources more by the vision of how we would ideally like to construct the 
system and aim to move our current system towards that vision. 
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Other challenges identified include : insuffic ient data to properly evaluate the value of 
some programs; manager sometimes making decisions with fairly large resource 
implications that should be made by the executive team; organizational difficulties in 
implementing policy changes; the inabili ty to access information in a timely manner; that 
appealing to evidence can make greater claims on resources than are available ; that there 
is no clear process for retiring equipment or fo r transferring a service out of the system; 
and that o ften time changes in resource requirements do not result in savings because it is 
too difficult to stop other programs using the reso urces. 
Finally, the amount of resources requi red to do good resource allocation, in terms of the 
cost of involving the public, management time and administrative supp011, was seen as 
another impediment to improving resource a llocation. The request for resources to set up 
an a llocation process is seen as another resource request which needs to be approved. 
Table 6. 11 summarizes the challenges to improving resource allocation ident ified by 
participants in Saskatchewan. 
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Table 6.11: Challenges Identified in Saskatchewan 
• Lack of clarity between the roles of the province and the region 
• Lack of new resources I Status quo budgeting 
• Resources already accounted for 
• Institutional Culture 
• Leadership stability I Varying work experiences 
• Difficulties executing new policies 
• Too many levels of decision making 
• Lack of accountabi lity 
• Transferring difficult decisions 
• Communicating the specific nature of new health technologies 
(e.g., MRI) 
• Problems w ith public engagement 
• Difficulties in inter-provincial comparisons 
• Insufficient management staff 
• Insufficient investment in Information Technologies 
• False crisis 
• Institutional history 
• Difficulties in making cross provincial comparisons 
• Insufficient data to evaluate programs 
• Manager making decisions without consulting the executive 
• Difficulties in implementing policy 
• Lack of timely access to information 
• Appealing to evidence requires resources 
• No process for reti ring equipment 
• Investments often do not result in savings, because resources are 
used by other programs 
• Good resource allocation requires resources 
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Chapter 7: Discussion of the Findings 
Throughout this chapter, key findings are highlighted and then discussed. The chapter 
begins by presenting and discussing some findings common to all the key informants 
across the provinces and regional health boards. Next, provincial and regional differences 
are examined, including a comparison of the regional differences and similarities in the 
three areas of care: endovascular coiling, MRJ and powered upper arm prostheses. The 
next section compares the embedded factors identified in the literature review, i.e. , need, 
use of evidence, cost, ethical considerations and accountability, as they were applied to 
the three areas of care. The last section reexamines the proposed methods for improving 
resource allocation reviewed in sections 2.4 . I to 2.4.8 to determine their likely usefulness 
for the resource allocation decisions encountered in the last three chapters. 
7.1 General Findings Across Provinces, Regions and Areas of Care 
Fl. Key informants are generally satisfied with the current allocation 
processes used within their organizations. 
The key informants interviewed for this project work in different provinces and different 
service areas. Still there was a good deal of commonality in how these decision makers 
view health resource allocation. First of all , key informants were al l generally satisfied 
with the processes for allocating health care resources currently used by their heal th 
regions and provincial governments. While no one felt these processes were perfect, thei r 
main concern was most often with a lack of resources, rather than how available 
resources are allocated. To the extent that key informants directly complained about the 
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allocation process, it was that some participants, most often at the program level, felt that 
people in their position shou ld have greater say in how resources are allocated. Two 
participants expressed concerns about the amount of management time that already goes 
into budgeting and making resource allocation decisions. 
This finding (Fl) is important because it points to a disconnect between (a) the extent of 
the problems presented in the resource allocation literature and (b) the concerns regarding 
resource allocation decision making reported by participants in the three provinces. 
While recognizing the importance of spending public funds efficiently, ethically and in an 
accountable manner, participants interviewed for this project felt these goals can be 
achieved, and to a large extent are being achieved, by current allocation proce ses. 
Participants were generally negative in their assessment of proposals to employ more 
structured I explicit approaches or in using decision tools for allocating resources. There 
are a number of reasons for this negative assessment of more structured approaches, 
including institutional and stakeholder barriers to changing current allocation processes 
and the unique nature of many resource allocation problems. These reasons are similar to 
concerns raised by Hunter (1995) about making resource a llocation processes more 
explicit. But another important factor this project has identified is that decision makers 
do not see an urgent need for change. 
However, the academic work in this field (Daniels & Sabin, 1997; Daniels 2000a; 2000b; 
Mitton and Donaldson, 2004; Peacock, Ruta, Mitton, Donaldson, Bate, & Murtagh, 2006) 
is having some influence on health care organ izations. Although participants were 
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generally satisfied with current decision making approaches, they also recognized 
resource allocation as an important part of their management role and there was a good 
deal of interest in ways to improve al location processes. Because of this interest, decision 
makers are quite open to proposals for improving allocation processes. However, rather 
than adopting any particular model, decision makers are taking some of the concerns that 
are articu lated in these models, e.g., for fairness, accountability, efficiency, and trying to 
address them within their own institutional context. Thus, while these models are not 
being adopted as is, they do provide guidance to decision makers. For example, at least 
one decision maker in each of the three regional health authorities studied said they had 
conducted some type of review of these models when considering how to improve their 
own allocation processes. 
Another important consideration is that these models are not meant to respond solely to 
decision maker needs, but are also developed to address concerns of those outside the 
system who want to make health resource allocation more transparent and open to the 
general public. Many of the ca ll s for reform are made on behalf of people outside the 
system who are not comfortable with cuJTent allocation processes and want more input 
and greater understanding into how health resource allocation decisions are being made 
(Ham, 1995; Coast, 1997). It seems then that those who are making allocation decisions 
are satisfied with current, mostly implicit, methods of allocating health care resources. It 
is not necessarily the case that this comfort is shared by the wider public. 
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F2. Participants were familiar with the factors associated with good 
resource allocation. "The best interest of patients" wa 
unanimously identified by key informants as the most important 
factor in determining health resource allocations within their 
organizations. The institutional impact, including budget impact 
and staffing implications of allocation decisions, was widely seen as 
the second most important consideration. 
Participants showed a fa irly good understanding of the factors identified in the literature 
as important to good resource allocation, i.e., decisions should be evidence-based, cost-
effective, transparent, accountable to the public, and ethical. This is not to say that the e 
factors exclusively dete rmine how health care resources are allocated. There was some 
leve l of resignation by participants that there are situations in which health resource 
allocation decisions are based on considerations other than factors associated with good 
resource allocation, e.g., y ielding to media, economic, political or stakeholder pressure. 
Teng, Mitton and MacKenize (2007) found a similar mismatch between decision makers ' 
understanding of good resource allocation practices and how resources are actually 
allocated in British Columbia. Most key informan ts in this project were of the opinion 
however, that the vast majority of resource allocation decisions are based on factors 
associated with good resource a llocation and are made w ithin the regular budget I 
allocation process. 
Although health care organizations have numerous goals they ar trying to achieve, and 
face various pressures, key informants unanimously identified the best interest of health 
care users as the most important factor in determining the allocation of health care 
resources within their o rganization. The belief that concern for patients is the driv ing 
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force behind the majority of budget decisions is likely one reason for the high level of key 
informant satisfaction with current allocation processes. Much of the difficulty in 
determining resource allocations is related to determining which allocations actually are 
in the best interests of a range of patients across numerous program areas and patient 
conditions. 
The institutional affect, including budget impact and staffing implications of allocation 
decisions, was widely seen as the second most important consideration. One explanation 
for the mismatch between the level of comfort decision makers within the system have 
with current resource allocation processes compared with the level of discomfort of those 
outside the system may be the sense by those outside the system that budgetary concerns 
and concerns about institutional impact, not patient well being, drive most health 
allocation decisions. 
F3. Key informants recognize the need to make difficult allocation 
decisions, but sometimes frontline providers feel isolated from the 
decision making process. 
None of the participants in this project expressed any doubts about the necessity of health 
care rationing. A good deal of participants ' time is directed to making difficult rationing I 
budgeting decisions due to limited health care resources. Whether or not there is 
sufficient wealth within Western countries to ultimately negate the need for limiting 
access to effective medical care, as Angell (2000) and Reiman (1990a) suggest, 
participants in this project on a daily basis experience the chal lenge of resource 
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constraints within the Canadian health care system. For participants, health care rationing 
is very real. 
Like other decision makers, frontline providers showed a good appreciation of the fact 
that resources are scarce within the public system and that they have a respons ibility to 
use resources wisely. No participant, including the physic ians interviewed, expressed any 
ethical concerns about providers having to limit care to some patients. The finding points 
to another disconnect between the allocation li terature and the views of the key 
informants, in this instance relating to the debate concerning the ideal advocate model of 
the physician-patient re lationship (Danie ls, 1987). Concerns about physicians' primary 
obligation being to their patients, which are supposed to preclude any participation in the 
ra tioning of care, the driv ing force beyond the ideal advocate model, were not expressed 
by any of the partic ipants. In fact , given the lack of establi shed guidelines, it is frequently 
left to indi vidual prov iders and program managers to determine what care they feel is of 
sufficient benefit to warrant providing it to patients out of public funds. 
Some frontline physicians complained that they were not suffic iently involved in the 
resource allocation process and that this sometimes had detrimental effects on staff 
mora le . With the provincia l budget cycle usuall y starting in September and ending in late 
March, and frontline staff involvement usually being only at the beginning of the process 
and then usually only in a consultative role, a feeling of isolation among fron tline 
providers is perhaps not surprising. This feeling of isolation illustrates that not only are 
physicians not morally opposed to being invo lved in rationing I resource a llocation 
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decisions, as is suggested by (Boyle (1984), Daniels (1 987), and Angell (1993; 2000), 
they also do not need to be encouraged to be more involved in these types of decisions, as 
suggested by Ubel (200 I). Within the three provinces examined, institutional barriers 
appear to be the main limitation on further physician involvement in resource allocation. 
As per those who advocate greater physician involvement in rationing, e.g. Hall (1994), 
physicians interviewed for this project appear very willing to take on this role. 
F4. Minor reforms of allocation processes are more likely than major 
restructuring. 
In each of the three provinces, projects are underway to improve resource allocation, 
usually aiming at making aspects of the process more evidence-based, more transparent 
or more ethical. None of the organizations studied are considering, however, major 
reforms of their allocation processes. Major reforms would likely requtre some 
reallocation of authority within the health care system, either between the provincial 
government and the region or between the regional executive and the program I frontline 
level. Furthermore, major changes would likely require changes in how provincial 
budgeting is conducted. There seems to be li ttle chance that provincial governments 
would substantially alter their current budget processes solely to improve health resource 
allocation, especially with the level of comfort health care decision makers have with the 
current arrangement. Unless affected by wider political forces (Tuohy, 1999), it is not 
unreasonable to expect that health care resources will continue to be allocated through the 
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basic structure of the current provincial budgeting process. Proposals fo r improving 
health resource a llocation should then be made in accordance with these processes. 
7.2 Provincial Comparisons 
FS. The level of resources in a health care system can affect how 
resources are allocated within it. The richer province, Alberta, uses 
less targeted funding and consequently there is less provincial 
government involvement in specific allocation decisions as 
compared to the less affluent provinces of Newfoundland and 
Saskatchewan. 
In a ll three provmces, the regional health autho rities are funded almost exclusively 
through the provincial budget. There are, however, differences in the methods used 
across the three provinces for determining the stze of each region' s g lobal budget. 
Alberta has the most structured approach, with a clear population-based formula for 
de termining most g lobal funding to its regional health authorities . Saskatchewan Health 
reported using a population-based formula to examine the proportion of their global 
funding going to the different regions, but they have in practice relied only on h istorical 
funding allocation with increases targeted to specific programs. Newfoundland has also 
primarily used historical funding patterns and targeted funding to determine each region' s 
g lobal budget. 
Participants in A lberta said that Alberta Health and Wellness explic itly tries not to 
"micro-manage" their health care system. This philosophy i reflected in their more 
structured approach for determining the region ' s global budgets and deceased use of 
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targeted funding. As one participant from Saskatchewan said, the need to micro-manage 
health care resources comes from the historical scarcity of financial resources and that 
Alberta's choice not to do so simply reflects its strong financial s ituation. In other words, 
the level of resources in the health care system affects how resources are allocated within 
a provmce. 
In companson, m Newfoundland and Saskatchewan, there is greater provincial 
government involvement in making specific resource allocation decisions and greater use 
of targeted funding. In those two provinces, the provincial cabinet is regularly involved 
in making large spending decisions about specific program requests. As discussed below, 
the decision of whether to purchase a new MRI scanner is a clear example of this cabinet 
level involvement. While all health care systems are ultimately accountable to the 
provincial cabinet, the regular involvement of the cabinet in making specific allocation 
decisions brings another level of decision making in which specific requests can be 
fulfilled. It also risks increasing the influence of political concerns in determining which 
program requests get funded. For example, political calculations played a large part in 
de termining where Newfoundland's latest MRI was located. 
One reason for initially choosing to examine different areas of care in three provinces was 
to see if there was any inter-provincia l variation in how health care resources are 
allocated. Aaron and Schwartz ( 1984) and Aaron, Schwartz and Cox (2005) had found 
variation in attitudes towards rationing between Great Britain and the United States. This 
project is the first to identify variations in how health care resources are allocated across 
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Canadian provinces or that there is a connection between the level of resources a province 
has and the process by which it allocates resources. 
7.3 Regional Health Authority Comparisons 
F6. Differences in available resources across the three regions studied 
presents a challenge to the ideal that Canadians have equal access 
to health care. 
Region 8 (Newfoundland) has a w ider scope of responsibil ities than the other health 
regions, having the added responsibility fo r delivering both cancer care and social 
services. Even though it has the widest responsibilities, Region B also has the least 
amount of resources per capita.22 Another key difference between the regional authorities 
studied was that Region A ' s (Alberta) size (over a million clients) and financial strength 
(an annual budget of $2.5 billion) were far greater than the other two authorities. In fact , 
Region A ' s client base and overall budget is greater than the entire health care system of 
either Newfoundland or Saskatchewan. Region A ' s size allows it to more easi ly absorb 
large equipment costs into its global budget without having to request increased funding 
from the province. 
These differences in s1ze and financial strength are ref-lected in whom the different 
regions see themselves benchmarked against. In Region 8 (Newfoundland) and Region 
C (Saskatchewan), participants ta lked about the need for their programs to meet the 
22 The economic data on the three regional authorities is summarized in Appendix B. 
367 
Canadian standard of care. In Region A (Alberta), participants said that they often 
benchmark their level of care by looking at what is being done at leading international 
centres, e.g., Mayo Clinic or the Houston Heart Centre. Only one participant in Region A 
mentioned Canadian standards of care and that was in the context of the role their region 
plays in sett ing what is the standard of care in Canada. 
The fact that all of the provincial health care systems act in accordance with the Canada 
Health Act and are partially supported by the federal government may lead one to think 
that people in different provinces and di ffe rent regions receive relatively the same level of 
care. Outside of the question of variations in clinical skills, which most participants ~ It 
did not exist across the country, the decision makers interviewed in thi s project recognize 
that there are clear vari ations in the level of resources different provinces and regions 
have at their disposal to provide care. We see these provincial and regional differences in 
coverage and access to care in each of the three areas of care exan1ined in this project. 
Romanow (2002, p. xvi) claims that "equal and timely access to medically necessary 
health care services on the basis of need as a ri ght of citizenship." While none of the key 
informants went so fa r to say there are geographical variations in patient care, it seems 
that the clear variations in the resources available, level of access to care, and who the 
regions benchmark themselves against identified by the key informants presents a 
significant challenge to the ideal that all Canadians truly share equal ace ss to the same 
level of medical care. 
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7.4 Regional Health Authority Comparisons (Areas of Care) 
7.4.1 Endovascular Coiling 
Table 7.1 summarizes data presented in Chapters 4-6 regarding how the embedded 
elements of the resource allocation issues faced, need, evidence, cost, accountability and 
ethical considerations are treated in regard to endovascular coiling within the three 
regions. 
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Table 7.1: Overview of Endovascular Coiling 
REGION A (AB) REGION B (NL) REGION C (SK) 
Resource Clinical Whether to begin Whether to start an 
Allocation circumstances, performing the endovascular 
Decisions collegial decision procedure, including coil ing program. 
making. No the purchase of coils, a Most requirements 
rationing of care. bi-plane angiography in place. Program 
suite and training. start decision not 
yet considered by 
executive. 
Need Determined by Determined by internal Informall y 
internal usage data, estimates of considered, based 
data. front line staff and on estimates of 
discussions with other frontline staff and 
health regions. cases sent out-of-
provmce. 
Evidence Clinical An internal review of Not yet considered 
circumstances of evidence fo r by executive. Seen 
patients. Seen as effectiveness and as an effective 
an effective institutional impact. treatment by staff. 
treatment. Seen as an effective 
treatment by staff, even 
though lack of 
sufficient research . 
Cost Analysis of Determ ined by internal Program cost not 
internal costing data, estimates of yet calculated. Bi-
and usage data. frontline staff and plane angiography 
discussions with other suite purchased. 
health regions and 
vendors. 
Accountability None specific to None specific to None specific to 
program . program. program. 
Ethics Few ethical issues. Not di scussed in Not d iscussed. 
deciding whether to 
start a program. Wider 
consideration of 
whether resources 
should be spent on a 
few cri tically ill 
patients. 
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F7. How institutional approvals for a new service are achieved can 
differ depending on the institutional circumstances regarding that 
particular service. 
The key difference between the regions concerns the type of resource allocation decision 
each faces regarding endovascular coiling. Specifically, the regions differ with respect to 
where they are in the process of adopting endovascular coiling. Region A (Alberta) has 
pe rformed the procedure for about eight years. It has also recently established a formal 
endovascular coiling program with dedicated staff. Region B (Newfoundland) has 
identified endovascular coiling as one of its operational priorities and has requested 
funding from the provincial Department of Health to start performing the procedure, 
including purchasing a bi-plane angiography suite. Region C (Saskatchewan) has a 
number of the components in place for establishing a program, e.g., it is installing a bi-
plane angiography suite and is currently training staff. Yet Region C's executive report 
neither hav ing formally considered endovascular coiling nor having received a request 
from the ir Diagnostic Imagining program to begin performing the procedure. 
Furthermore, the executive are undecided about whether or not the program will be 
eventually established. 
While both Region B (Newfoundland) and Region C (Saskatchewan) are moving towards 
starting endovascular coiling programs there are clear differences in the way proponents 
of a program are proceeding in the two regions . In Region B, the Diagnostic Imaging 
program, in partnership with the Neurosurgery program, brought forward a proposal in 
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2004 to the executive to establi sh a program based on concerns about patient safety, 
particularly re lated to having to fl y critically ill patients out of province. The executive 
conducted an initia l review of the evidence supporting the technology. Even though the 
existing literature on the effectiveness of endovascular coiling was considered to be th in, 
the region 's executive sided with the opinion of local c linical leaders and, in 2006, made 
a proposal to the provincial government for the extra funding to cover all of the elements 
required for endovascular coiling, including purchasing a new bi-plane angiography suite. 
For Region B, it is generally accepted by the executive, the radiologists and the 
neurosurgeons that there is a suffic ient patient population to support a program in the 
provmce. The main issue fo r Region B is securing the necessary capital and operating 
costs. 
In Region C (Saskatchewan), there is not unanimous support for start ing an endovascular 
coil ing program. Even amongst the radiologists there is a good level of debate about 
whether starting an endovascular coiling program is a wise investment and whether the 
case load will be sufficient for staff to mainta in their skill level. It is possible that 
because of the lack of unanimous support amongst the clinical staff that the management 
team of the Diagnostic Imagining program, while supportive, did not make a fo rmal 
proposal to the region ' s executive to approve funding fo r endovascular co iling. Based on 
the interv iews, a more like ly explanati on for why the Diagnostic Imagining program has 
no t yet approached the executive is that the management team believes that the region has 
already indicated its support for the program. As one proponent of endovascular coili ng 
said , " the region definitely has staked the ground that this [endovascular coi ling] is a 
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service we want to provide." While recognizing that some staff are opposed, the same 
participant said that "definitely it's [starting an endovascular coiling program] going to 
happen." This feel ing that the region has shown its support for endovascular coiling is 
partly derived from the decision to replace an old angiography suite, which needed to be 
replaced, with one which had bi-plane capabilities. While the capi tal purchase would 
have been approved by the executive, the selection of which angiography sui te to 
purchase would have been made by an expert team within the Diagnostic Imagining 
department. The other factor which supported starting an endovascular coiling program 
is the decision to allow a new physician who is interested in getting training in th is area to 
go for training. This decision was made by the Medical Director as part of the 
negotiation to recruit thi s radiologist. These two decisions have led the management team 
of the Diagnostic Imagining program to believe that the region supports the program and 
has a lready laid the ground work for establishing an endovascular coiling program. 
Yet these were independent decisions. While some consideration of starting an 
endovascular coi ling program in the future were likely part of the discussion, these 
deci sions were made for other reasons than to establish an endovascular coi ling program. 
It is also the case that neither of these decisions, about which angiography sui te to 
purchase and the conditions used to recruit a physician, were made by the reg ion ' s 
executive. Thus while the program fee ls these decisions show the region ' s support for 
starting an endovascular coiling program, the region' s executive say they have never 
discussed the 1ssue. In order to start performing coi lings, Region C currently only 
requires an inventory of coi ls and funds to cover operational costs. Key informants at the 
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program level strongly expect the executive to provide these operational funds, but the 
executive report not even being aware that they are going to be asked to provide them and 
are skeptical that such resources would be currently available. It is perhaps not surprising 
then, given the situation in the two regions, that Region B has shown a greater 
institutional commitment to establishing an endovascular coiling program, even though it 
faces greater costs in order to establish a program . 
F8. The difficulty of the resource allocation decision faced by a region 
often depends on where an organization is in the establishment of 
the service. 
The decision to establish a program requires the consideration of numerous factors and 
substantial commitment of resources. Once a program is established, the nature of the 
resource allocation decision changes. In Region A, once the decision to invest in 
performing the procedure was made, the executive were no longer involved in the 
decision making decisions. Rather the main resource allocation question, i.e., whether or 
not to treat a patient, was made by the health care providers. In other words, there was a 
shift from meso- to micro- level decision making once the decision to establish a program 
was made (Lomas, 1997). 
One of the dilemmas which the project initially identified regarding endovascular coiling 
is how to balance the high cost of establishing a program for a small patient population 
against the fact that it is a potentially li fe-saving procedure. We can see this dilemma 
play out in the type of resource issues faced by the different regions. Once the initial 
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infrastructure is in place and a program is established, the cost of performing an 
individual procedure is not significant when compared to the benefit received by the 
patient. In Region A (Alberta), which already had an endovascular coiling program, no 
consideration is g iven to cost-effecti veness or to rationing access to the procedure. Given 
the lack of rationing, in Region A, partic ipants felt that there were no r a! ethical issues 
specifically related to endovascular coiling. Only in Region B (Newfoundland) did one 
participant discuss the need to look at spending substantial resources to treat a small 
number of acute care patients rather than seeing whether the resources could be more 
efficiently and ethically used to serve other patient populations. It was also only in 
Region B that a review of the existing research evidence for effectiveness was conducted. 
F9. Variations in existing institutional capacity cause regions to 
perceive resource allocation decisions differently; and in some 
cases, ask different resource allocation questions. 
Variations in existing capacities and infrastructure put some organizations 111 a better 
position to develop new programs and serv ices. These variations in starting points can 
also cause regions to perceive resource allocation decisions differently, even when two 
organizations are at the same point in regard to the establishment of a new program. In 
the cases reviewed, we can perhaps even say that these variations in capabil ities result in 
the regions facing different resource allocation problems. For example, even though 
Region B (Newfound land) and Region C (Saskatchewan) are both considering whether to 
establish an endovascular coiling program, they face different costs. Region C is 
considering whether to purchase an inventory of coils and cover ongoing operational 
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costs. Region B is considering whether to train staff, purchase a bi-plane angiography 
suite, purchase an inventory of new coils and cover operational costs. For Region C, the 
further cost of starting an endovascular coiling program is in the hundreds of thousands of 
dollars. For Region B, the costs are in the millions. The differen t focuses in the 
discussions in the two regions, e.g., on the ability to maintain staff ski ll levels (Region C) 
and initial capita l costs (Region B), are in part likely due to the difference in the total 
budget impact of starting a program for the two regions. 
Fl 0. The greater the financial cost of starting a program, the more likely 
participants will be concerned with the available research evidence 
and wider ethical considerations. 
Region B faces the biggest cost in establishing an endovascular coiling program. It is the 
only region which conducted any review of existing research literature. It is also the only 
region in which any participant expressed any ethical concerns about spending so much 
money for a small group of patients. It should be noted, however, that even in Region B 
the evidence for and ethics of endovascular coiling were not seen as crucial aspects in the 
discussion around a llocating resources to the program. Alternatively, it may be the case 
that these concerns for evidence and ethics only re flect the concerns of particular staff and 
that they are not directly re lated to the size of the required financial commitment. 
Fll. A better institutional starting point is not the most important factor 
in resource allocation decisions with respect to Endovascular 
Coiling. 
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The fact that a region is in a better position to start a program may not equate to a greater 
institutional commitment to establish that program. Other fac tors, such as staff opinion, 
whether clinical staff unanimously support a proposal, the emphasis placed on the need 
for a program, and other executi ve priorities also greatly affect a region ' s likelihood to 
push for the establishment of a new program. Although Region C (Saskatchewan) faces 
fewer costs in starting an endovascular coiling program due to its already having a bi-
plane angiography suite and trained staff, Region B (Newfoundland) is cunently more 
committed to the establi shment of a coil ing program. 
7.4.2 MRI 
Table 7. 2 summaries how the embedded elements are treated with regard to MRI. 
Because each region faces the same types of resource a llocation decisions around MRI , 
the table only summarizes the elements of need evidence, cost, accountability and ethical 
considerations. 
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Table 7.2 Overview of MRI 
Region A (AB) Region B (NL) Region C (SK) 
Need Determined by Determined by Determined by 
internal usage internal usage data, Saskatchewan Health 
data and management's using internal usage 
management's judgment, and CIHI data provided by 
judgment. data. regions. 
Evidence Effective Effective Effective technology 
technology which technology which is which is expanding 
is expanding both expanding both in both in capabilities 
in capabilities and capabilities and and range of use. 
range of use. range of use. Research on 
Research on Research on effectiveness not 
effectiveness not effectiveness not considered. 
considered. considered. 
Cost Internal costing Internal costing and Internal costing and 
and usage data; usage data; usage data; 
discussions with discussions with discussions with 
vendors. vendors. vendors. 
Accountability Alberta Wait Plans to establish Activity-based 
Time Registry; public reporting of budgeting; General 
public reporting wait times; a good government 
of usage data by deal of media and accountability; 
region and site; political concern. Diagnostic Imagining 
activity Network. 
budgeting. 
Ethics Few ethical Few ethical Few ethical 
considerations. considerations. considerations. 
F12. While MRI resources are managed similarly at the program level, 
there arc differences between the regions in terms of who makes 
purchase decisions and the importance of federal transfers in 
purchasing new MRJ scanners, due largely to the comparable size 
of these purchases in relation to each region's overall budget. 
While there are substantial variations in MRI capacity across the three regions (CIHI , 
2005), the management of MRI resources is fair ly similar at the program level. In fact, 
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across the three regions, there are few differences in how the five embedded elements 
outlined in Table 7. 2 are treated. In all three regions, only specialists are able to order 
MRI tests. In all three regions, radiologists prioritize MRl requisitions. The criteria for 
prioritizing and priority classes are similar in each region. In both Region A (Alberta) 
and Region C (Saskatchewan), wait time guidelines are determined by the region and the 
provincial government. Region B (Newfoundland) did not report having formal wait time 
guidelines, but it and the provincial government both closely watch MRJ wait times. A 
number of participants said that they soon expect national guidel ines and standardized 
reporting for MRI wait times. The booking of cases was managed at the program level 
across the three regions. 
There are a number of reasons why MRI is managed fairly consistently across the 
regions. Decisions around MRls have a greater degree of public, political and media 
scrutiny than most other service areas, which ensures a certain degree of management 
focus. Diagnostics, including MRJ, are one of the five funding priorities identified by the 
2003 Health Accord, which also helps focus management attention to the area. There are 
efforts by CIHI (2005) and the Health Council of Canada (2007) to better measure and 
standardize the measurement of MRI capacity and MRI wait times. There are other 
projects developing national guidelines around wait times and the type of cases for which 
MRI should be used. For example, two participants said that the Canadian Association of 
Radiologists is currently working on guidelines to determine which cas s should be 
examined by MRI. The focus of federal funding, the move to better measure MRI 
capacity and wait times, the development of national usage guidelines, and the nature of 
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the technology itself, all help to limit the variation in the management of MRI resources. 
Participants also said that there is a good deal of information sharing around MRI usage 
and management across provinces at the program level, especially between managers of 
Diagnostic Imaging programs. 
The main difference in MRI resource allocation across the three regions relates to the 
expansion of MRl capacity, and in particular, the purchase of MRI scanners. Region B 
(Newfoundland) and Region C (Saskatchewan) rep01ted that the purchase of MRJ 
machines is often dependent on federal funding programs. For example, the 2003 Health 
Accord money was often mentioned by participants and did increase MRI capacity in 
both regions. No participants from the Alberta region mentioned Health Accord fund ing 
directly. In Region Band Region C, the deci sion to purchase an MRl machine would be 
made by the provincial cabinet. For Region A (Alberta), participant in both the 
provincial government and the regional executive reported that the decision to purchase a 
new MRI machine would be made solely by the region ' s executive. For small er health 
regions in Alberta the situation may be different, but Region A was seen to have 
sufficient resources to internally decide to purchase an MRI machine without 
significantly distorting its overall budget. 
F13. Once a technology is adopted and providers and decision makers 
become familiar with it, there is much less scrutiny of the expansion 
of the technology into new areas. 
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MRI is expanding both in its capabilities (Fuj ita, 2007; Strijkers, Mulder, van Tiborg & 
N icolay, 2007) and in the range of cases being recommended for MRI scans (e.g., 
Bagarinao, Nakai & Tanaka, 2006; Lima & Desai, 2004; Richard, Bowtell, Mader & 
Melia, 2005 ; Zur, Holland, Yuan, & Choo, 2004). The expanding use of MRI technology 
was not reported to be an important issue for Region B (Newfoundland) and Region C 
(Saskatchewan). Radiologists in both regions said that current usage of their MRI 
machines stayed well inside the range of recognized standard practice. Region A 
(Alberta) reported that they looked to "centres of excellence" around the world to help 
them determine the range of cases for which MRI should be used. MRI is widely seen as 
an established, effective technology, which is the standard care for numerous medical 
situations. 
While a ll participants with management responsibilities for MRI recognized the 
developing nature of MRI, no participant expressed the need to review evidence of 
effectiveness for these new applications. Once a technology is adopted and providers and 
decision makers become fami liar with it, there seems to be much less scrutiny of the 
technology even if its use is extended to areas not considered when the technology was 
first adopted. Once adopted into the system, the usage creep of the technology is not 
rigorously evaluated, even though it affects the amount of resources a program requires. 
As one participant from Region B said, what often happens with expanding MRI into new 
types o f scans is that physicians start ordering the test for the new condi tion and, after 
while and some internal di scussions between the radiologists, the radiologists start 
conducting tests in the new area. The only barrier, used in al l three regions, to limit the 
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expansion of MRI usage into new conditions is a budget limit on the overall number of 
scans a region wi ll perform. With only a finite number of scans to be performed by a 
program annually, new applications need to compete with more established uses of the 
technology for scans. 
7.4.3 Upper Powered Arm Prostheses 
Table 7. 3 summaries how the embedded elements of need, evidence, cost, accountabi lity 
and ethical considerations were treated in regard to powered upper arm prostheses across 
the three regions. 
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Table 7.3: Overview of Powered Upper Arm Prostheses 
Region A (AB) Region B (NL) Region C (SK) 
Need Determined by N umber who present, Number who 
program usage patient population present, patient 
data. small and stable. population very 
small and stable. 
Evidence Clinical C linical Clinical 
circumstances of circumstances of circumstances of 
patients. Seen as patients. Seen as an patients. Seen as 
an effective effective treatment. an effective 
treatment for some treatment for some 
patients. patients. 
Cost Internal data and Inte rnal data and Internal data 
vendor supplied vendor supplied data. vendor supplied 
data. data, fee schedule. 
Accountability Pro fessional Move to develop No specific 
standards and quality ind icators. concerns identified. 
general 
government 
accountability 
requirements . 
Ethics Ag -based Lack of coverage. Providers careful 
restrictions on care. with public 
funding. 
F14. Programs with small patient populations and relatively small costs 
often do not get on the regional or provincial agenda, creating 
significant barriers to major program reform. 
While there is insuffic ient coverage fo r powered upper arm prostheses in two of the thr e 
regions stud ied, there was very little consideration g iven to this issue at either the regional 
executive or the provincial government level. fn fact, in al l three regions, on ly 
participants who were directly involved in the management of rehabi li tation programs 
report giving any consideration to powered upper arm prostheses. Not only were 
powered upper arm prostheses not on any of the regions or provinces ' current agendas, 
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but most pat1icipants felt that coverage and program structures reflected decisions made 
in the past about how to handle prosthe tics generally. Alberta did report conducting a 
recent review of funding levels for myoelectrics, in which funding levels were increased. 
But overall , decision making around power upper arm prosthetics is limited to cli nical 
decisions at the program level. 
The li terature on agenda setting (e.g., Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Bryan, 2005) suggests 
that there are numerous ways issues can get on the po litical agenda. These inc lude 
institutional focus on changing standard indicators, sudden catast rophes or interest group 
pressure. Part of the reason for the lack of hi gh level attention to prosthetics, and power 
upper arm prosthetic in particular, is that none of these factors currentl y favor prosthetics. 
None o f the regions studied rep011 indicators on the quali ty of care given to people with 
myoelectric prosthetics. There are a very small number of people who need myoelectric 
prosthetics. As one participant said : 
" if we had an epidemic o f upper extremity amputees, we probably would need to 
seriously look at which people get m yoelectric limbs. Since there are o few, I 
don't think it's a lot of money from the provinc ial budget." 
Because of the small number of patients, there a re no strong interest groups for patients. 
Furthermore, the number of people needing prosthetics is decreasing due to a substantia l 
reduction in the number of birth de fects and accidents across the population. Participants 
in Region C (Saskatchewan) reported that they previously had a committee to review all 
myoelectric cases in the region, but that the committee has disbanded due to the 
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decreased number of cases in the region. Unlike cerebral aneurysms, powered upper arm 
prosthetics are not life saving. In fact, many people who experience upper extremity Joss 
choose not to have one. Some participants expressed the v iew that causalities with 
extremity Joss from the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan could push greater technological 
advancements in the area of prosthetics. It is unclear whether these events will a lso help 
to focus greater regional I provincial government attention on coverage fo r myoelectrics. 
Not making it on a reg ion' s agenda above the program level has implications for the 
underlining structure of prosthetics programs. Without being considered by higher level 
decision makers, it is difficult to make major program changes or extend coverage once a 
public insurance program has been established. 
7.5 Comparison of Embedded Factors 
Table 7. 4 presents a summary of the key findings pertaining to the embedded factors of 
need, evidence, cost, accountability and ethics re lated to the three areas of care examined 
in thi s study. 
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Table 7.4: Embedded Factors by Areas of Care 
EMBEDDED AREAS OF CARE 
FACTORS Endovascular MRI Powered Upper 
Coiling Arm Prostheses 
Need Determined by Determined by Determined by 
internal usage data, internal usage data, program usage data 
estimates from CIHI data and and the number of 
frontline staff and management patients who 
discussions with judgment. present. 
other health regions. 
Evidence Seen as an effective Effective Clinical 
treatment. Region technology which is circumstances of 
B conducted an expanding both in patients. Seen as an 
internal review of capabilities and effective treatment 
evidence for range of use. for some patients. 
effectiveness and Research on 
institutional impact. effectiveness not 
considered. 
Cost Analysis of internal Internal costing and Internal data and 
costing and usage usage data; and discussions with 
data, estimates from discussions with vendors. 
frontline staff and vendors. 
discussions with 
other health regions 
and vendors. 
Accountability None specific to Activity-based Professional 
program. budgeting, general standards and 
government general government 
accountability, and accountability 
public reporting of requirements. 
wait times 
Ethics Few ethical Few ethical Lack of universal 
concerns raised. concerns raised. coverage, age-based 
restrictions on care. 
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7.5.1 Need 
FlS. In the three areas of care, need is determined primarily by internal 
usage data and requests from stakeholders and staff. However, 
other factors also drive perceived need for the diagnostic service 
examined in this study. 
While there is a live ly academic debate about the definition of need in health care (see 
Chapter 2, Section 3 .I ), there was no doubt amongst participants about how need is 
defined in the three areas of care: patients who have been prescribed or present for a 
particular service. Thi s definition perhaps best matches Witter and Ensor's (1997) 
de finition o f need defined in terms of the health services a person requires, but it also 
matches elements of Donabedian 's ( 1973) definition, which re lates need both to the 
patient 's desire to have care and the physician's o pinion that care is needed . 
Following Donabedian ( 1973), physician opinion clearly affects the level of need in the 
area of power upper arm prosthetics. Key info rmants in Newfoundland reported there 
be ing, on average, only two or three pati ents receiving their fi rst myoelectric prostheses 
annually. This is the same number reported for A lberta and double the number reported 
in Saskatchewan, even though these provinces have more comprehensive insurance 
coverage and substantia lly larger populations. This variation in demand for the service 
appears to be based on variations in clinicians' opinions of the benefi t of the technology. 
Many prosthetists and physiatrists fe lt tha t very few people with upper extremity loss will 
benefit from myoelectric prostheses, so they are only rarely o rdered. This was especial ly 
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the case in Alberta and Saskatchewan. In Newfoundland, providers viewed powered 
upper arm prostheses more positively. 
It may, however, a lso be the case that clinic ians are more mindful of ensuring a suffic ient 
level o f bene fit when spending public health care dollars. This concern for spending 
public funding was expressed by physicians in both Saskatchewan and Alberta. If thi is 
the case, ironically, wider public coverage may result in Jess access as providers become 
more apprehensive to prescribe myoelectrics knowing a fixed amount of funding al o 
covers other types of assistant devices. In comparison to endovascular coiling and MRI, 
it was very noticeable how careful providers and managers in this fi ld were wi th 
resources and ensuring that patients will benefit from care befo re providing treatment. 
With powered upper armed prosthetics patients must be able to convince providers they 
will bene fit from a myoelectric prosthetic before providers agree that a patient need one. 
Program need was similarly determined fo r two of the services: endovascu lar coiling and 
powered upper arm prostheses. Because both services have extremely small and fa irly 
stable patient populations from year to year, estimates of need are determined primari ly 
by analyzing internal usage data from the previou year. For regions which do not offer 
endovascular coiling, estimates for thi s ervice were developed from contacts with other 
regions, examinations o f the number of cases sent out of province, and estimates from 
frontline staff. 
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While internal usage data for the previous year is the main source of determining the need 
for MRI, the expanding nature of demand for the technology also forces decision makers 
to identify drivers of demand and estimate their likely impacts. As one decision maker 
said, with MRI, estimating demand is "a layering process." Unlike the other two services 
examined, decision makers know that in detern1ining their budgets they are not allocating 
sufficient MRI resources to meet all of the demand for the technology. In the other two 
services, budgets much more closely match the level of need in the population. 
While two of the regions reported the importance of usmg needs assessments for 
determining the health needs of specific communities, these assessments have been used, 
to the extent that they have been used at all , more for public health and social services, 
rather than acute, diagnostic or rehabilitative care. At the regional level, requests from 
frontline taff and key stakeholders, e.g., politicians, community organizations, were 
generally taken as valid indications of the need for the requested service. 
7.5.2 Evidence 
F16. Different kinds of evidence are considered in resource allocation 
decisions relating to the three areas of care; research evidence is 
not the major source of evidence utilized. 
Evidence of effectiveness, as confirmed by research studies, was not a substantial 
consideration in allocating resources in any of the areas of care examined. The va t 
majority of participants in each area already saw their particular services, I.e., 
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endovascular coiling, MRI or powered upper arm prostheses, as an effective treatment 
option. A review of the research evidence was conducted for one area of care 
(endovascular coiling) in one region only and that review did not appear to have much 
influence on the decision whether to ask the provincial government for increased 
resources for the program. 
Rather than looking at the effectiveness, decision makers in the three areas of care were 
more concerned with the need to make the " business case" fo r resource r quests. S imilar 
to a jury system, the executive in all three regions consider a number of factors and types 
of evidence, not just research evidence, when deciding on whether to approve a request. 
The specific factors considered depend on the request being proposed and concerns the 
executive have with it. While facto rs such as cost, patient and operational impact were 
common for a ll requests, other requests for info rmation would re flect executive members 
concerns with a particular request for resources. Although not as formal as some 
proposals fo r constructing deliberati ve processes, e .g., C uyler and Lomas (2006), there is 
a clear melding and weighing of d ifferent types of evidence in making allocation 
decisions across the regions within each area of care. 
For the three areas of care, internal operational data is the most important source of 
evidence when making resource allocation decisions. 1 hi s refl ects the importance of 
institutional impact in deciding how to allocate resources. Decision makers suggested 
that they need to improve on their use of the info rmation their organizations generate in 
order to make better, more evidence-based, allocation decisions. The experience of other 
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regional authorities with a service is also considered a key source of information. This 
was especially the case for endovascular coiling, which two of the regions do not provide. 
Searching the literature for evidence of effectiveness is usually only done for more 
unfamiliar technologies. 
Dobrow, L mieux-Charles, and Black (2006) have shown that the use of evidence in 
decision making changes depending on the decision making context. One of their 
findings is that there is a change in the underlyi ng question which evidence is used to 
address as a technology becomes more established. There is a move from a general 
concern with whether the technology is effecti ve to the more context-specific question of 
whether it would work in a specific operational environment, i.e., will it work for us? 
The primary concern for participants in this study, determining operational impact of 
enhancing an area of care (rather than determining effectiveness) seems to accord with 
Dobrow, Lemieux-Charles, and Black' s findings. The problem with this move to see a 
technology as effective, as noted above with respect to MRI , is that a famil iar technology 
can be expanded into innovative uses, which should a lso be evaluated in terms of 
effectiveness, but are not because people fee l that they are fami liar with a technology. 
Decision makers across the provinces and regions felt that they do a fa irly good job in 
using evidence and that they strive to ensure their decisions are evidence-based. This 
partly refl ects the numerous sources of evidence decision makers see themselves drawing 
on. For example, some regional executive members ho ld that the opinion of frontline 
staff and program management are suffi cient to determine effectiveness. As one 
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participant said regarding endovascular coiling, the leadership of a department "wouldn't 
be out there suggesting we should do it unless there's good documented proof that it is 
viable." In other ca es, appeals to evidence are sometimes used to defer requests from 
frontline staff, putting another step in the review process and allowing fo r some "push 
back" for certain resource requests. 
7.5.3 Cost 
F17. In none of the areas of care across the three regions examined was 
cost-effectiveness analysis considered in allocating resources. 
Cost considerations across the three areas of care almost exclusively focus on the budget 
impact to the decision making organization. In other words, from a cost perspective, the 
three regions are concerned primarily with the impact of their decisions on their available 
financial resources. Indirect costs related to human resources, space and time on shared 
equipment were also considered to some extent, depending on the specific allocation 
faced and the level of focus on the decision. For example, all of these issues were 
discussed in Region 8 (Newfoundland) concerning the starting of an endovascular coi ling 
program. Added costs for other stakeholders, particularly patients, were also sometimes 
considered, but had much less impact on actual allocations. In most cases, costing is 
based on historical costs adjusted for known inflationary factors , e.g. , wage increases or 
increases in service levels. For services not already provided by a region, e.g. , 
endovascular coiling m Region 8 (Newfoundland) and Region C (Saskatchewan), 
estimates from frontline staff, communications with other provider organizations who 
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already provide the service, and contacts with vendors are used to determine the likely 
capital and operational costs for a new program. For neither of the areas of care was the 
cost-effectiveness of the treatments considered. 
7.5.4 Accountability 
F18. Although there is a good deal of concern with accountability, 
actions aimed at increasing accountability mostly occurred outside 
of the program level for each area of care. There is a much greater 
focus on accountability measures for MRI than for endovascular 
coiling and powered upper arm prostheses. 
Accountabi lity in health care has number of diffe rent aspects. A wad, Flood, and Abelson 
(2004) point to the need for greater transparency and public engagement as mean of 
increasing health care accountabi lity. Neumann et al. (2005) call for more explic it 
decision making processes. Reiman (1998) closely ties calls for increased accountabi lity 
to improvements in the measurement and assessment of health care services. Whil 
decision makers in the three areas of care all felt that accountability was important in the 
spending of public funds, there was less uniformity in actions taken to improve different 
aspects of accountabi lity across each area of care. In terms of accountability, participants 
usua lly pointed to features of their wider corporate structure as helping to ensure 
accountability, rather than pointing to program specific measures. Decision makers 
identified their boards as representing the public and defending the public interest. Limits 
and requirements placed on government agencies, including regional health authorities, 
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were also often identified as helping to ensure accountability to the public. For example, 
because the regional health authorities are provincial government entities, they are subject 
to public accountability legislation, government procurement guidelines, and audits by the 
auditor genera l. 
There is a good deal of work being conducted on developing indicators for MRI , both 
around wait times and appropriateness of use. One participant in Region B expressed the 
view that their prosthetics department needs to develop better performance measures. 
Next to that, no participant felt that better performance measures were required in either 
the area of prosthetics or endovascular coiling. This reflects the very small patient 
numbers for both programs and the lack of public I political attention focused on these 
two areas of care compared with MRI. It is interesting that the push for improved wait 
time and appropriateness measures for MRI are coming from a number of agencies and 
groups, e.g. , FPT Ministers, the Health Council of Canada, Canadian Institute fo r Health 
Information, the Canadian Association of Radiology and are not being initiated at the 
program level itself. Similarly, we see an increase in public reporting around MRI, but 
not for endovascular coiling and prosthetics, again being pushed mostly by the federal 
and provincial governments. In neither of area of care did participants fee l that more 
explicit decision making processes or directly engaging the public about their service was 
necessary, although some participants felt that higher level discussions with the public 
about service priorities could be useful. 
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7.5.5 Ethics 
F19. While participants identified the importance of the ethical 
implications of how they allocate health care resources, explicit 
considerations of ethics played only a minor part in the allocation 
of resources in the three areas of care studied. 
Like accountabi lity, participants all recognized the importance of allocating resources 
ethically. Participants identified concerns about how patients are treated and the need for 
a fair and transparent process for al locating resources as key factors in how their 
organization makes allocation decisions. General concerns were expressed in all three 
regions about the bias towards funding high cost acute care programs as opposed to 
funding more community-based programs, prevention programs or less high profi le 
programs, e.g., in a reas like mental health. Region 8 (Newfoundland) has started a pilot 
project which requires a ll programs to consider the ethical implications of their budget 
requests in terms of who is not getting services. Region C (Saskatchewan) has examined 
Accountability for Reasonableness framework as a possible means of explicitly 
incorporating key ethical considerations into their a llocation process but has not yet used 
the framework in the process of allocating resources. 
Still there were no program specific measures to ensure that allocations were ethical 
within any of the three areas of care. It is also unclear how much weight ethical concerns 
have in making a llocation decisions or even whether ethics is made an explicit 
consideration, as the pilot project in Region 8 a ims to make them. With that said, none of 
the participants in either area of care expressed any concerns about how ethical their 
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method of allocating resources is. One particular ethical concern raised by the researcher 
was that, in Region A (Alberta), coverage for powered upper arm prostheses under the 
provincial plan is limited to those under the age of 65. This ra ises the issue of age-based 
rationing, at least hypothetically. Participants sa id, however, that this restric tion has 
never been applied in practice because the program has never had a person over the age of 
65 assessed for, or request, a myoelectric prosthesis. 
Ubel (200 I) points out that our choices around values a lways play an important part in 
making a llocation decisions. For each of the three areas of care studied, this may be the 
case, but these value determinations seem to be o ften left as an implicit part of the 
de liberations, rather than being a focus of how resources are allocated. 
7.6 Decision Making Approaches Revisited: Challenges and Opportunities 
Chapter 2, Sections 4.1 to 4.8, examined eight proposed approaches fo r im proving 
resource allocation . The approaches studied were rat iona l decision models, c linical 
practice guidelines, needs-based capitation models, screen models cost-effecti veness 
analysis, program budgeting and marginal analysis (PBMA), accountability for 
reasonableness, and calls for increased public participation . This section reexamines 
these approaches to determine the ir likely usefulness for the different resource a llocation 
decisions identifi ed by this project. Be fore examining the e ight proposed approaches 
individually, it is useful to make some general observat ions which impact the possible 
application of all formal decision making models seeking to improve resource a llocation. 
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7.6.1 General Observations 
F20. The multiple decision points within regionalized health care 
systems, the transferability of decision making authority, varying 
institutional structures and the lack of transparency in decision 
making for higher level decision makers, e.g., provincial cabinets, 
present challenges to all decision making approaches due to the fact 
that these approaches need some level of decision making stability. 
Not all resource allocation decisions, however, face these problems. 
This project is umque m that it is the first in Canada to compare resource allocation 
decisions across di fferent provinces and across di fferent service areas. It is also unique in 
that it traces the decision making processes across four levels of decision makers: 
frontline providers, departmental managers, regional authori ty executives, and provincial 
government offic ia ls. This expanded examination of resource a llocation decision making 
brings to light a number of new di fficul ties for those trying to improve health resource 
allocation through the use of more structured decision making approaches. Many of these 
di fficulties are often overlooked by the academic literature. 
Perhaps the most difficult challenge a rises from the multiple points of decision making 
authori ty within current regional structures. Most priority setti ng models do not account 
fo r the fac t that there is a hierarchical structure with multiple decis ion points w ith in the 
regionalized Canadian health care system. Along with these mul tiple points of decision 
making, there is transferabili ty and instability regarding who makes the ultimate decision 
regarding specific a llocations. For example, in a case mentioned by one of the 
pa11icipants, a M inister of Health was di rectly involved in booking a MRI time for a 
patient whose case was the focus of a good deal of media coverage. The heavy 
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involvement of Saskatchewan Health in the running of diagnostic programs is another 
example of the ultimate decision making authority not resting with the decision makers 
who one would think are responsible for resource allocation decisions in an area. 
Most of the proposed decision making approaches require decision making stability. 
Without stability in who makes a decision and in what factors are being considered, there 
is always the possibility that the effort and resources put into a priority setting exercise at 
one level will be wasted as higher level decision makers sequester a decision and decide it 
on their own terms. There is no guarantee that higher decision points wi ll respect, or even 
consider, priority work done at other levels. The relevant factors for a decision are also 
likely to change for different sets of decision makers with divergent managerial and 
governance responsibilities. Participants reported that this transfer in decision making 
authority can happen without notice and without any reasons being given why it has 
occurred. In the real world, there is a greater uncertainty and irTegularity in who actually 
makes different resource al location decisions than is suggested in the resource allocation 
literature. 
There is also a lack of transparency which arises due to the involvement of provincial 
governments, and in particular provincial cabinets, in the al location process. Cabinet 
level decisions, advice from Treasury Board to cabinet, discussions between different 
levels of government, e.g. , federa l-provincial negotiations, all of which can have large 
impacts on health resource allocations, have an inherent lack of transparency. Decision 
making approaches which rely on transparency thus cannot be applied to these higher 
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levels of decision making authority. For example, the Accountability for Reasonableness 
model holds that the reasons for why decisions are made should be made available to the 
public. This approach does not seem to be viab le for this higher level decision making. 
Likewise, it seems that this lack of transparency limits the opportunities for public 
engagement. 
A third barrier to the applicabi lity of these decision making approaches is that the 
processes for allocating resources in each organization are developed in response to the 
unique history and culture of the institutions in question. It is a lso the case that whi le the 
institutions examined each shared similarities, they all had at least slightly d ifferent 
decision making structures. These structures seem more receptive to some of these 
decision approaches than others. For example, Region A (Alberta) has Community 
Health Councils, which are a good conduit for public consultations. Region B 
(Newfoundland) has a regional ethics committee, part of whose mandate is to examine the 
ethics of how resources get allocated. These institutional differences make it harder to 
make blanket recommendations for the use of any one approach across all institutions. 
While there are clearly difficulties related to the transferability of decision making 
authority, the lack of transparency re lated to some decisions and the various h al th 
organizational structures, there is still the opportuni ty for these decision making 
approaches to improve resource a llocation. There is always the risk of an unexpect d 
transfer of decision making authority, but nonetheless a large number of health resource 
allocation decisions are made year after year by the expected decision makers, e.g., 
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program managers do often make program level decisions without any interference from 
higher level decision makers. In these si tuations, there is clearly an opportunity for 
formal decision making models to make a contribution to improving resource allocations. 
Table 7. 5 reviews the eight decis ion approaches in terms of their likelihood of being able 
to address the a llocation questions identified in the case studies. Further discussion of 
each approach fo llows. 
Table 7.5: Applicability of Decision Approaches 
Applicability Comments 
Rational Not Applicable Not Likely to be Applicable. 
Decision Models 
Clinical Practice Not Applicable for Not Likely to be Applicable. 
Guidelines endovascular coiling or 
powered upper arm prostheses. 
Some attempts to apply to 
MRI, but with limited success. 
Needs-Based Not Applicable, beyond the Not Likely to be Applicable. 
Models general allocations of 
resources 
Screen Models Not Applicable Not Likely to be Applicable. 
Cost- Not used in any of the cases. Not Likely to be Applicable. 
Effectiveness 
Analysis 
PBMA Difficulties around setting Could be applicable to some 
weighting criteria; difficulty resource allocation decisions. 
weighing preferences. 
Accountability Not sufficient to determined Could be applicable to some 
for allocations resource allocation decisions. 
Reasonableness 
Public Some times impractical ; Could be applicable to some 
Participation Unable to meet expectations. resource allocation decisions. 
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7.6.2 Rational Decision Models 
Chapter 2, Section 4.1 summarized the strengths, weaknesses and likely appl ication of 
rational decision models. These models were seen as being like ly inapplicable to health 
resource allocation decisions. Nothing in the cases examined has changed this 
assessment. In general, the allocation decisions examined are too multi-factorial and 
complicated to be effectively modeled in the manner that rational decision models 
reqUire. 
7.6.3 Clinical Practice Guidelines 
Clinical practice guidelines help limit health care demand by placing restrictions on what 
procedures physicians can order. It is unlikely that clinical practice guidelines would 
work in the areas of either endovascular coiling or powered upper arm prostheses. In 
both cases, there are a number of factors which need to be assessed on an individual basis 
in determining the most appropriate care. This need for individualized assessments and 
also the very small patient numbers do not make the development of clinical practice 
guidelines viable in these areas. 
There was, however, a good deal of interest in clinical guidelines for MRI usage. 
Guidelines for MRI have been proposed for both choosing MRI as the most appropriate 
modality and around MRI wait times for di ffe rent conditions. As an access measure, all 
of the regions have guidelines around acceptable wait times for MRI and two of the 
regions, Region A (Alberta) and Region C (Saskatchewan), have publicly reported 
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benchmarks. These guidelines identify system pressures that can affect resource 
allocations. 
In te rms of which diagnostic modality to choose, some guidelines have been developed. 
The most prominent have been produced by the American College of Radiologists, 
although participants report that the Canadian Association of Radiologists is about to 
re lease new guidelines. Part icipants felt that there was some possibi lity of using these 
guidelines for training new physicians, but that the di fficu lties in changing established 
physician practice and with the enforcement of these guidelines make their wider 
application impractical. 
7.6.4 Needs - Based Population Models 
Needs-based population models a re used by the Alberta government to determi ne a large 
proportion of the regional health authori ties ' global budgets. Saskatchewan Health has 
also experimented with using such models to evaluate how resources are allocated to its 
regions. These models are best used fo r broadly distributing health care resources across 
populations, particularly geographically d isbursed populations. They have a more limited 
application to decisions made within health regions, where the regional executives are 
accountable fo r addressing needs for an a lready defined population, often in a reasonably 
small geographic area. 
Needs-based population models also do not seem to be helpful at the program level, 
similarly due to limited population size. Thi s is especia lly true fo r endovascular coili ng 
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and power upper arm prostheses. Because of the very small patient population requiring 
a highly specialized service, it makes sense to centralize resources for these types of 
serv ices rather than to distribute resources fairly across a geographic area. There is not 
sufficient service need to sensibly try to allocate resources on a population basis. For 
power upper arm prostheses, one participant reported knowing on a first name basis 
almost everyone in the region who had a myoelectric prosthesis. In fairness to those who 
advocate these models, they are not intended to be used at either the meso and micro level 
of decision making. 
7.6.5 Screen Models 
Screen Models, like Deber' s four-screen model, are better suited to making coverage 
decisions than for making allocation decisions. The screen models which have been 
proposed also seem bet1er suited to making " in or out" coverage decisions rather than 
decisions about the extent of coverage, as is illustrated in the case of partial coverage for 
power upper arm prostheses. Screen models are therefore likely not useful for assisting in 
the resource allocation decisions identified in this project. 
7.6.6 Cost Effectiveness Analysis 
While cost-effectiveness analysis is a valuable tool in evaluative some resource a llocation 
decisions, it does not appear to be particularly useful with respect to the a llocation 
decisions in the three areas of care examined in this study. Diagnostic imaging, including 
MRI, is a difficult area in which to apply cost-effectiveness (Weinstein, 1998). For 
endovascular coil ing, the seriousness of cerebral aneurysms and the relatively small cost 
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difference between the two mam treatment options, endovascular coiling and 
endovascular clipping, greatly limit the applicability of cost-effectiveness analysis in that 
area. For powered upper arm prostheses, cases a re so rare that th e budget impact can be 
easily considered on a case-by-case basis. Cost-effectiveness analysis was not used in any 
of the cases considered in this study. 
7.6.7 Program Based Marginal Analysis (PBMA) 
PBMA could perhaps be used at the program level across all three areas of care 
examined. In fact , one of the strengths of the PBMA approach is that it c losely models 
how resources a lready are a llocated at the program and regional levels. PBMA can be 
performed as part o f a region 's annual budgeting process. Requiring all requests for 
resources (both established and new requests) compete against each other and focusing 
the discussion on implications of marginal cases can increase efficiency. One of the 
shortcomings with PBMA is that it depends on defined evaluation criteria in order to 
evaluate di ffe rent funding proposals. As with rational decision models, often defining 
these criteria requires deciding on one ' s preferred options beforehand, undercutting the 
use of the model (Lindblom, 1957). It is a lso unc lear what train ing decis ion makers at the 
program level would need in PBMA before they could use this approach effectively. Still 
it may be possible to modify the PBMA to address some of these problems. 
7.6.8 Accountability for Reasonableness 
Daniels' Accountability.for Reasonableness operationalizes key e thical considerations to 
he lp ensure a fa ir process for evaluation of health care resources. The rationale for why 
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particular allocation decisions were made should be widely communicated to all those 
concerned throughout the organization. A formal mechanism for appealing resource 
a llocations should also be establi shed. Both of these measures, along with a clear and 
open process, will likely help those whose requests for additional resources have been 
rejected, to better under tand why resources were not directed to their area. 
Accountability for Reasonableness is not applicable to all health resource allocations in 
part because of the inherent lack of transparency with some levels of decision making 
(particularly at the political level). This approach is also not sufficient on its own to settle 
resource allocation questions which are in dispute, even after the proposed reasons are 
publicly available and challengeable. While Accountabi li ty for Reasonableness does 
offer a way to improve the ethical basis of some resource a llocation decisions the 
approach does not give sufficien t guidance in a number of allocation decisions. Finally, 
this approach may be more effective in determining the region ' s overall budget, rather 
than at the program level, where there may be very few stakeholders interested in the 
allocation decision, many of who would already be involved in the decision making 
processes, e.g., endovascular coiling and prosthetics. 
7.6.9 Public Engagement 
In this project, no direct public engagement was sought with respect to resource allocation 
decisions in the three a reas of care examined. Two of the regions have in the past 
engaged the public to help set priorities, primarily for a defined community or sub-
regional level. These priority setting exercises did not seem to have a large effect on the 
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al location of resources within either region. It is possible, however, that meaningful and 
effective public engagement could be incorporate into some program level decision 
making through the use of some type of deliberative process. A number of participants 
within each area of care said they would be open to some increased level of public 
involvement, if it was structured to reflect the public ' s concerns, rather than the concerns 
of a small group of people with vested interests in the outcome. 
7.7 Summary Comment 
This chapter d iscusses some of the key findings made throughout the project. Many of 
these findings show a disconnect between what is suggested in the resource allocation 
literature and what was reported by the key informants. Chapter Eight applies some of 
these findings to challenges relating to resource allocation identified by participants. The 
aim is to develop a set of recommendations which regional health authorities and other 
decision mak ing organizations can use to improve resource allocation processes. For 
example different aspects of three decision approaches identified above as possibly being 
applicable to the cases examined in this project are adopted to work within the current 
budgetary structure. 
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Chapter 8: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Project Summary 
This project aims to foster a better understanding of how health care resources are 
allocated across Canada. It does this primarily through an empirical examination of how 
resources are allocated within a number of health care organizations. Rather than 
focusing generall y on the allocation processes within these organizations, the project 
concentrates on the resource allocation issues re lated to endovascular coi ling, MRJ, and 
powered upper arm prostheses in one health region within three selected provinces: 
A lbe1ia, Newfoundland, and Saskatchewan. Thi s approach a llows the project 1) to fo llow 
allocation issues across various decision making levels within health care organization , 
i.e. , from initial frontline staff requests, through the program leadership' s budget 
submission, to the regional health authori ty's executive team; 2) to fo llow allocation 
issues across decision making organizations, i.e. , from regional health authorities to 
provincia l Departments of Health; 3) to compare how resources are allocated across 
different health service areas; and 4) to identify regional I provincial diffe rences in how 
health care resources are allocated . 
In studying resource allocation across these di fferent service areas and provinces, the 
project avoids initially using any of the proposed frameworks fo r improving resource 
allocation based on the view that it is important to fi rst determine how allocation 
decisions are currently being made, what factors are usually driving these decisions, and 
what similarities and differences there are in the decision making processes across ervice 
areas and across various health care organizations, before applying frameworks founded 
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outside the health care area, e.g., in ethical theory or economics. In fact, by identifying 
current resource allocation issues for a number of service areas, the project is able to 
assess the likelihood that the approaches proposed for improving resource allocation 
would be useful across a range of real world resource allocation decisions. 
The nine case studies were developed based on 43 key informant interviews and reviews 
of publicly avai lable documents. Interviews were conducted between March 23rd, 2005 
and March 161h, 2006 with a range of decis ion makers, from frontline physicians to senior 
officials within provincial Departments of Health. 
A lthough the project avoids using any pre-existing framework, the case studies did 
require some focus in order to both limit their scope and allow for comparisons across the 
cases. Five factors often identified as important to resource allocation were examined 
across all the cases. The five elements focused on were need, use of evidence, cost, 
accountability and ethical considerations. By focusing on these elements, the project was 
able to provide sufficient structure to the case studies to allow for comparisons without 
biasing them towards only one area of concern. 
8.1.1 Conclusions 
Chapter Seven identifies 27 speci fie findings related to the case studies. In terms of the 
cases, it has been shown that resource allocation decisions regarding the same service can 
vary from region to region depending on existing staff capabilities, operational capacities 
and capital infrastructure, as well as where an organization is in the establi hment of the 
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service. Some health care organizations are in a better position to develop new programs, 
although this initially better starting point cannot always be equated with a greater 
organizational commitment to establishing these programs. These differences in 
capabilities also influence which factors are considered in making resource allocation 
decisions. Across the service areas, resource allocation decisions vary in terms of their 
ability to get on the decision making agenda and who, in the end, decides on how 
resource are allocated in the area. In short, resource allocation is clearly affected by the 
institutional setting in which it is carried out and by the area of care the decision is about. 
This project was motivated in part by the belief that not a lot is known about how health 
care resources are allocated and that these processes could be improved by clearly 
identifying the principles by which allocation decisions are made. In the introduction, 
Colleen Flood (2002) was quoted, claiming that resource allocation and coverage 
decisions in Canada "appear haphazard ," based on either "non-existent or not transparent" 
principles. This project found that decision makers wi thin the health care system did not 
share this view of allocation processes. In fact, the study found that decision makers are 
reasonably satisfied with the processes currently in place for allocating health care 
resources. While they may not be able to provide set form ulas specifying how they 
allocate resources, decision makers are unanimous in their beliefs that a) concerns for 
what is best fo r the pa tient and b) the impact decisions have on their organization are the 
main factors driving most resource a llocation decisions. Decision makers also fee l that 
annual budgeting exercises do allow for a clear process for allocating resources, one 
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which many people within their organizations are famil iar with and are comfortable 
us mg. 
The basic structure of these allocation processes are fairly similar across each of the 
regions and provinces studied. Each level of decision makers, from frontline staff, the 
program leadership team, the region s executive team, the region's board, officials in the 
provincial Department of Health, the Minister of Health, Treasury Board officials, and the 
provincial cabinet, all have their own spending priorities. As resource allocation requests 
pass through the budgeting proce s, each level of decision maker has some infl uence on 
how health care resources will and will not be used. The sense of a lack of transparency 
and accountability reflected in Flood's comments perhaps refl ect the various levels of 
decision makers who influence how resources are ultimately spent. Although the 
Minister of Health and the provincial cabinet have the ultimate say, decision makers at 
each level have some impact on which services will be funded. The fact that so many 
groups of decision makers all have some influence on the allocation process makes it 
difficult to determine who is actually making specific allocation decisions. Further 
complicating thi s situation is the fact, pointed out in Chapter 7 Section 4, that there is no 
decision making stability across this decision making structure, i.e. , the per on(s) or level 
which assumes decision making authority for a particular resource allocation decision can 
change depending on the circumstances surrounding the decision. 
Another reason why resource allocation decisions appear 'haphazard" or based on either 
"non-existent or not transparent" principles relates to how allocation priorities are set by 
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each level of decision maker. As has been recognized throughout this project, resource 
allocation decisions are complex, depending on the consideration of a number of factors, 
factors which are often unique to the specific a llocation decision at hand . Rather than 
us ing a fixed formula, decision makers at each decision making level examine the overall 
case for different resource requests, consider the pros and cons, compare them with other 
requests, and decide what their funding priorities should be. The decision making process 
is thus very much akin to the way juries make decisions within the legal system. As with 
legal juries, it is often unclear to those who were not involved in the deliberations what 
factors led to a decision, even though those involved in the deliberation may feel there 
was a clear and legitimate process used. Thus while decision makers familiar with the 
budgeting process and who are involved in helping to set priorities generally feel 
comfortable with current allocation processes, fo r those outside the health care system 
(and even for many within the ystem) these processes can appear chaotic, poli tical ly 
driven and impenetrable. Part o f the value of thi s project is that it presents how resource 
allocation is seen by those involved in making these diffi cult decisions. 
8.1.2 Recommendations 
In each of the three provinces, part ic ipants identified a number of challenges to improving 
health resource allocation. This section examines some of these challenges and 
recommends ways of addressing them based on the lessons learned throughout th is 
proj ect. 
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Hierarchical Decision Making Structure of the Health Care System 
Many of the problems decision makers see with the current method of allocating health 
care resources relate to hierarchical decision making structure within the Canadian health 
care system. While all participants report that "what is in the best interest of the patient" 
is the main factor driving how they set priorities, decision makers at various decision 
making levels have dissimilar responsibilities and subsequently face different choices. 
What resource allocation decision ultimate ly best serves the interests of the patient is 
likely to be seen differently by a radiologist who performs the test, a physician who on a 
daily basis sees the wait times her patients face for a particular service, a regional 
executive member who has to balance a wide range of program requests or a Minister of 
Health who has to respond to requests from a number of health regions. Although 
everyone one says that their allocation choices are driven by the best interests of the 
patient, each decision maker interprets what is in the best interest of the patient from their 
own perspective within the decision making structure. Not recognizing the variation in 
the perspectives from which different decision makers make their allocation decisions 
often leads to cynicism as to why particular funding decisions were made. 
Some of the other challenges re lating to the hierarchical decision making structure 
include that there is no guarantee that higher decision points will respect, or even 
consider, priority setting work completed at other levels. As those closest to the patient, 
but also commonly the people with the least amount of decision making authority 
frontline staff often feels left out of the process. This is perhaps not surprising given that 
frontline staff, to the extent that they are involved, are usually involved in the process in 
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the early fa ll and then do not usually hear whether their requests for resources are funded 
until a fte r the provincial budget is announced in the spring. By being removed from the 
process for such a period of time, frontline staff often feel that their requests and the 
needs of their patients are not being taken seriously, which can negatively impact on staff 
morale. Another related problem is that requests from frontline departments are often 
developed by people with expertise in the area, but these requests are ultimately decided 
on by people who are likely not experts in that particular area. This raises the issue of 
how best to trans fer knowledge across decision makers wi thin the same organization. 
Rl. Establish a clear process for allocating resources within a 
health care organization, one which people are comfortable 
with. 
R2. Keep requests for new resources within the process. 
There is no easy way to overcome many of the problems associated with the multiple 
levels of decision makers and the amount of time the budgeting process takes. There 
appears to be little chance that the overall decision making structure of the Canadian 
health care system is go ing to change in the near future. Perhaps most fundamental to 
good resource allocation decision making is to establish a clear process, one with which 
all people in the organization are familiar. Although there are problems with the current 
budget approach, it is a process which many people within the health care system are 
fami liar with and one which is li kely to continue. Ensuring that requests for resources 
fo llow the budget process would be a positive step. Given the political nature of the 
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decision making structure, it is often easy for physicians and others working within the 
health care system to circumvent any priority setting or budgetary process by appealing 
directly to the Minister. This was especially seen to be the case in the two smaller 
provinces studied. It is important that these requests get evaluated along with other 
requests within the budget process. This can be achieved either by generating buy-in 
from front line staff so that they do not try to circumvent the process or by encouraging 
higher level decision makers to reroute requests they receive directly back into the regular 
budgetary process. For example, in Newfoundland, the Department of Health now sends 
any resource requests they directly receive from physicians back to the regional authority 
to be considered as part of the regular budgeting process. 
R3. Increase training on resource allocation decision making 
processes for decision makers at all levels, especially around 
the types of resource allocation decisions faced by different 
decision makers and the factors driving decisions at various 
levels. 
R4. Develop a clear communication strategy with staff about the 
resource allocation process and allocation decisions. 
RS. Before submitting the region's request for resources to the 
province, the regional executive should review its submission 
with the program leadership and interested frontline staff. 
Accepting that the current structure of how heal th care resources are allocated is likely to 
remain intact, there are other actions decision makers can take to reduce some of the 
frustration and some of the di sconnect within the process. Many of these actions aim to 
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keep staff mor engaged in the overall process and allow for better communication across 
the decision making levels. First, increased education surrounding how health care 
resources are allocated across the di fferent decision levels and how requests for new 
resources tie into the overall provincial budgeting process would be helpfu l. I wa 
surprised by how many part icipants who are involved in determining funding priorities, 
especially at the frontline or program level, did not understand how their requests for 
resources were handled once they had been submitted to the person they directly report to 
within their organizations. In particular, di fferent levels of decision makers were 
distrustful of the criteria other levels of decision makers use to evaluat funding requests. 
Through out the interviews, frontline staff complained that higher level decision makers 
never took evidence into account and that they made decisions based on poli tical 
considerations, while some higher level decision makers fe lt that fro ntl ine staff believe 
that "there' s an endless pot [of money]." either characterization reOects what the 
project found regarding the factors decision makers at either level use to base most of 
their allocation decisions. Beyond general education around how resources are allocated 
across the budgetary cycle, there should be more interaction between di fferent levels of 
decision makers throughout the entire budgetary cycle. 
One point where thi s could occur is before the regional executive submits their budget 
request to the provincial government. It may be useful at that point fo r the executive to 
meet with the program leadership of all the programs to explain what spending priorities 
have been decided on fo r the region and allow the programs one more chance to advocate 
for their priorities before the region submits its budget submission to the province. The 
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advantage of this meeting is that it shows the programs what requests are being put 
forward by the region across all of the programs, it lets the programs know which of their 
funding requests are being recommended to the province, it allows the programs one last 
chance to advocate fo r their requests, it a llows the executive to explain why it has chosen 
to recommend the priorities it has, it provides another opportunity for engaging the 
program leadership teams further within the allocation process, and finally, it encourages 
further communication across decision making levels regarding resource requests. All of 
these benefits may lessen the disconnect and frustration some participants felt with 
current allocation processes. 
Ensuring A Comprehensive Assessment of Resource Requests 
Decision makers report being comfortable making resource allocation decisions. One of 
their concerns, however, is that they base their decisions on a comprehensive and realistic 
view of the impact of the service, especially for new services. What decision makers 
hope to avoid is committing to a new program only to find out that the program costs 
twice as much as originally expected, that the service is not as effective as it was initially 
presented or that the new program is unexpectedly impacting on other program areas. To 
he lp ensure these problems do not occur, frontline staff must present an honest and fair 
assessment of the pros and cons of their resource requests. This will require a level of 
staff buy-in so that they do not try to game the system to help ensure that their requests 
are funded. 
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In terms of ensuring a comprehensive assessment of requests, Table 8.1 presents a 
template which the researcher has developed covering a number of the areas which 
requests for resources, especially for new services, should consider. The first section asks 
for a description of the problem the new service is meant to addressed, what the current 
treatment options are, what the new proposed treatment is and the advantages and 
disadvantages of the proposed treatment. The second section asks for a review of the 
evidence supporting the new procedure, including a review of the academic literature, the 
experience of other jurisdictions and the views of local experts. The third section 
suggests the like ly patient population. The fourth section examines the cost and 
institutional impact of delivering the new treatment, including capital equipment costs, a 
review of any cost-effectiveness studies, operational costs, staffing requirements, training 
requirements, time required on existing equipment, any space issues, and any possible 
cost saving associated with the new treatment. The next sections ask about the likely 
impact on other departments, the ethical implications, and potential risks. The section on 
ethical implications follows the pilot project in Region B (Newfoundland), which asks 
regional programs to explicitly consider who is not being served by budgetary requests. 
The idea of the template is that it can either be formally implemented as a requirement for 
requests for new services or it can be communicated to the program leadership team as a 
guide of the type of information they should provide to allow for fair assessment of their 
funding requests. 
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Table 8.1 Template for Evaluating New Services 
1.0 Introduction 
1.1 The Problem to be Addressed 
1.2 Current Options 
1.3 Proposed New Service 
1.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Proposed New Service 
2.0 Overview of Existing Research 
2. 1 Experience of Other Jurisdictions w ith the Procedure 
2.2 Local Expert Opinion 
3.0 Estimated Patient Population 
4.0 Budget and Organizational Considerations 
4.1 Capital Equipment Costs 
4 .2 Cost-effectiveness 
4.3 Operational Costs 
4.4 Staffing Requirements 
4.5 Training Requirements 
4.6 Time Required on Existing Equipment 
4.7 Space 
4.8 Possible off-setting cost savings 
5. Likely Impact on Other Departments I Programs in the Region 
6. Ethical Implications 
7. Risks 
8. Other Issues 
In recommending use of this template, I am aware of the time and resources required to 
complete it. There are clear trade-offs in terms of the amount of management time 
required and the benefits which come from improved management processes. The 
template can be used as a guide that should be used to address particularl y contentious or 
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costly allocation decisions, where a systematic review of the issues is undertaken. Given 
the amount of resources and management time this may require, it is likely that this could 
only be done for a few decisions a year. The template could also be used informally as a 
means of communicating with programs the type of information they should considering 
in determining their allocation requests, without expecting a written report outlining a ll of 
the different issues. 
Towards a Process for Developing Reso urce Allocation Priorities 
Initially thi s project aimed to recommend and develop a more structured approach for 
allocating health care resources. Although several participants said that there was some 
value in having more structured allocation processes, generally participants were doubtful 
about the applicability of any universal approach due to the variation in resource 
allocation requests; the various, and often unique, facto rs involved in different decisions; 
concern that establishing a new process does not ensure that that higher level decision 
maker will respect the decisions an-ived at by the process, especia lly when the outcome of 
the process is unpopular; and the importance of insti tutional culture and existing decision 
making structures on how resources are allocated. Tn fact , some participants fe lt that 
maintaining their existing resource allocation process, in which most people in their 
organization are familiar, is more important than adopting an unfamiliar model which 
may align more closely with how the academic literature suggests health care resources 
should ideally be allocated. 
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R6. To the extent possible, communicate the rationale for allocation 
decisions to other decision makers. 
R7. Ensure that requests for resources are considered together so 
as that requests compete for resources. 
R8. Involve a team of people with a range of backgrounds in the 
allocation process. 
Even though most partic ipants felt a universal structured approach would not be 
beneficia l, it is still possible to make some general recommendations about how resources 
could be a llocated based on our eval uation of the eight proposed approaches for 
improving resource a llocation. Following Dani els' Accountabili ty for Reasonableness, 
there is an advantage to having a process that is as transparent as possible. Clearly 
reporting the rationale fo r various resource a llocation decisions, especia lly contentious 
decisions, is like ly to help lessen some of the di sappointment of those whos requests for 
additional resources are denied. The rationale for why particular allocation decis ions 
were made should be widely communicated to a ll those concerned throughout the 
organization. A mechanism for appealing resource allocations can a lso be established, 
perhaps as part of the fo llowing year' s budgeting process or before the region submits its 
budget submission to the provincial Department of Health. 
The program budgeting approach also offers some valuable assistance, in that it m irrors in 
many ways how several resource allocation requests are currently considered. Permitting 
more open and transparent competition among budgetary requests could improve priori ty 
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setting and increase efficiency within an institution. One of the shortcomings with 
PBMA IS that it depends on defined criteria in order to evaluate different funding 
proposals. Rather than usmg defined criteria, the competition between programs can 
simply be a forum where the different programs make their case for additional resources 
in front of various decision makers and through discussions with the other programs 
seeking resources. The Medical Affairs Committee within most regional health 
authorities may be a good venue for this discussion. If consensus cannot be reached, the 
ultimate decision will have to be made by the executive team. But at least all the 
concerned part ies with in the organization wi ll have been able to make the case for their 
request. Structuring the process in this way will also allow decision makers to see the 
opportunity cost of the requests they chose to fund. A more open approach in which 
program requests compete against other requests for resources and the rationale for 
decisions are communicated across the organization will provide a more comprehensive 
picture of the impact of allocation decisions, whi le allowing for a more efficient use of 
health care resources. 
Finally, numerous partic ipants felt that good resource allocation depends on the right 
people, with the right ski ll s, being involved in the process. Because of the complicated 
nature of the problems faced no one person has all of the required knowledge. lt is 
important than that teams or groups of decision makers be involved in making allocation 
decisions. 
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Ensuring a fai r, ethical and accountable a llocation processes 
R9. Increase public reporting, activity budgeting, and the greater 
use of performance indicators to improve the accountability of 
allocation processes. 
Decision makers were concerned w ith showing that their resource allocation processes 
were fair, ethical and accountable to the public. Some of the general trends in public 
governance have also positively affected the processes fo r a llocating resources. For 
example, health regions are usua lly covered under any new government accountabili ty 
legislation. There is a trend towards greater public reporting of both the fi nancial and 
system perfo rmance of the health regions, as well as the greater use of business planning 
to publicly present what a region 's future plans are. Activity budgeting and greater use of 
performance indicators also ti more c losely the use of resources with system 
performance. 
RIO. Ensure a fair and ethical allocation process by mandating 
consideration of both the fairness of the allocation process and 
how health care resources are ultimately distributed. 
In terms of evaluating the fa irness of allocation exercises, although not applicable for all 
situations, Accountability fo r Reasonableness does offer a framewo rk which has been 
used for evaluating the fairness of a llocation process. While Accountabi lity for 
Reasonableness can evaluate the fa irness of process, the qu stion of who is not getting 
served still needs to be addressed. Region B reported having a pilot project which 
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requires the program areas to consider the ethical impl ications of their budget requests, 
particular in terms of the services which are not being funded. Forcing programs to 
explicitly consider the opportunity costs of their resource requests is another way to help 
ensure that a region 's distribution of resources is fa ir and ethical. 
Public Engagement 
The dilemma around public engagement was mentioned by a number of informants. 
Participants recognized that the public have a legitimate role and should be engaged in 
decisions around coverage and resource a llocation. Yet the problem of concentrated 
interest, where only those directly affected by a decision become involved, was often 
identi fied. 
Rll. Decision makers need to be selective in what questions they 
engage the public about. 
R12. Decision makers should aim for meaningful public engagement 
when involving the public in resource allocation decisions. 
The Basket Grant research team examined how best to engage the public around resource 
allocation. It found that public engagement is not guaranteed to be successful and 
decision makers need to be selecti ve in what questions they engage the public about. The 
aim of public engagement should be meaningful public involvement, in wh ich the publ ic 
are honestly informed of the reason for the engagement exercise, the level of deci ion 
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making authority which will be given to the exerc1se, and what will be asked of 
participants. Decision makers also need to consider the extent to which members of the 
public should be involved in determining the structure of the a llocation process. The 
basket grant team has developed a framework which can hel p decision makers work 
through some of these difficult issues (Chafe, R., Neville, D. , Rathwell , T., Deber, R., 
Kenny, N., Nestman, L., et. a l. , 2007). 
8.2 Limitations 
This project faced a number of limitations which may have affected its overall results. 
Some of these problems have already been identified in the methodology chapter, e.g. , the 
breaking of the interview tape and differences in how participants in different provinces 
were identified and contacted. Another important limitation was the low level of 
participation from provincial Departments of Health. In Newfoundland and Alberta, 
attempts were made to invite the Minister of Health to participate in the project. Given 
the important role the Minister and the provincial cabinet hav in the overall allocation of 
health care resources, they would have been able to provide a valuable perspective on 
how health care resources are a llocated and could have brought more of a political 
perspective into the analysis. Unfortunately, in both provinces, the M inister declined the 
opportunity to participate. Given that the Minister did not participate in the first two 
provinces, it was decided to limit the project, from the provincial perspective to officials 
within the Department of Health, for the third province as well. 
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Another limitation was the low participation rate amongst officials within the 
Departments of Health. Participation rates for provincial officials were substantially 
lower than other groups of participants. The overall participation rates for each province 
were Alberta (82%), Newfoundland (62.5%) and Saskatchewan (66.6%). For provincial 
officials, participation rates were Alberta (40%), Newfoundland (33.3%) and 
Saskatchewan (50%). Reasons for this variation in participation rates may include added 
time constraints on provincial officials, the number of research requests senior provincial 
officials receive (especially in Newfoundland, where senior officials were also surveyed 
for the larger Basket project), or the perceived lack of connection to resource allocation 
decisions in the three specific areas of care. Even though the provincial participation 
rates were low, interviews were conducted with at least two provincial officials in each 
province. Also, there is a large body of existing material on provincial decision making 
structures and the factors guiding resource allocations at the provincial in each province 
which this project was able to draw upon. 
Another possible limitation for the project was the way cases were selected. While 
criteria were developed to ensuring some level of variabi lity across the cases, in terms of 
choose an acute care, a diagnostic and a rehabilitative service, there was also some level 
of serendipity in how some of the cases were selected. Given that a wide number of areas 
of care and any of the ten provinces could have been chosen, choosing cases that had 
some advantage in terms of conducting the project seemed rational. It also does not 
appear that the choice of this set of cases were in anyway detrimental to the reliability of 
the project's results or to its ability to generalize results to other ci rcumstances. 
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Another limitation is that the project focuses on resource allocation decision making only 
from the perspective of those involved in making these decisions. This focus excludes 
other relevant groups who could also have added their perspective on how healthcare 
resources are allocated, e.g., providers who have chosen not to be involved in allocating 
healthcare resources or groups outside of these decision making organizations who 
affected by the allocation of healthcare resources and who may want to be more involved 
in how resources are allocated. It is likely that such informants would have indicated 
less satisfaction with how healthcare resources are cunently allocated. 
Finally, I could not exhaustively probe all of the concepts which did ans during the 
interviews. It was not possible delve into every topic with the thoroughness I would have 
liked, given the time constraints associated with decision makers who had limited time for 
interviews and a research project which already aimed to cover a range of topic areas 
relating to resource allocation. 
This project is exploratory, not exhaustive. Limiting the project in the way I did resulted 
in a manageable scope for the project. Several topics and perspectives not addressed in 
this study are important aspects of resource allocation which should be investigated 
through future research which could build upon the knowledge gain through this research 
project. 
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8.3 Knowledge Transfer Strategy 
One of this project 's aims is to effectively disseminate its results to interested audiences 
in order to increase the likelihood that its results will be used. There are a number of 
ways to increase the impact of a project' s findings . One way is through a strategy called 
" linkage and exchange" (Lomas 2000). Linkage and exchange is based on the idea that 
contact should be made between researchers and potential audiences of that research 
during the research process; and that there should be an exchange of information between 
these two groups throughout a research project, with the concerns of potential audiences 
helping to guide the research to more closely address 'real-world concerns' (Lomas, 
2000). In fact, Lomas (1997) says that "early and ongoing involvement of relevant 
decision makers in the conceptualization and conduct of a study is the best predictor of its 
utilization" (p. 8). 
This project has two mam audiences. The first are decision makers. The second are 
health services researchers. Early contact was made with both groups. The project was 
discussed with dec ision makers in each province before data collection began. The 
project proposal was presented to a number of audiences of health services researchers to 
garner their feedback as early as the initial planning stages for the project. There were 
also discussions with a number of one-on-one discussions with health services researchers 
about the project. These di scussions with decision makers and health services researchers 
continued throughout the project. The project 's recommendations were presented to both 
audiences of health services researchers and decision makers before being fina lized. 
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Another key for an effective knowledge transfer strategy is to have the proper conceptual 
model of how research is likely to be used. Black (200 I) argues that researchers "need to 
acquire a more sophisticated understanding of the policy process" (p. 277) to improve the 
likelihood that their research will be used. Part of the problem is that researchers do not 
appreciate the number of inputs, e.g., pressure for interest groups, the various forms of 
evidence presented to policy makers, the institutional constraints, etc. , which impact on 
policy decisions. Weiss (1979) describes this situation as the interactive model of 
research use. This model holds that research knowledge is one source of information 
among man y which decision makers access in making a decision and that there is no 
formal method for evaluating these different sources of knowledge. The interactive 
model of research assumes that research has some influence, but that research findings are 
not usually decisive. 
This research project fits well w ith the interactive model of research use. First, the 
project recognizes that there are numerous inputs in the decision making process. In fact , 
this recognition is one of the conceptual starting points of the study. It also recognizes 
that the factors impacting on each decision are sometimes unique. The project has tried to 
build a level of flexibility into its recommendations. This should increase the project's 
overall utility for decision makers. 
Another problem often noted by researchers and decision makers regarding the use of 
research relates to the disconnect in the timelines of the two groups (Lomas, 1997). 
Decision makers often have to make a decision within short timelines, whereas research 
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on a topic often takes much longer to conduct. Given that the main focus ofthis project is 
to develop recommendations for allocating health care resources, the mismatch of 
timelines should not be a problem. Health care organizations will for the foreseeable 
future be faced with making resource allocation decisions. It is expected that 
recommendations in this area will be relevant for some time. 
In terms of a dissemination strategy for this project, a summary of the main results of this 
project will be sent to all participants. These summarizes will be tailored to the different 
types of decision makers who participated, e.g., summaries for participants working in the 
area of powered upper armed prostheses will focus on lessons learned regarding the 
allocation of resources for powered upper armed prostheses. There will also be a number 
of academic articles arising out of this project. The results of this project have already 
been presented numerous times, including the 6th International Conference on Priorities 
in Health Care, Toronto, Ontario (Chafe, Neville, Rathwell , Biden and Tomblin, 2006a), 
the 2006 Canadian Association for Health Services and Policy Research Conference, 
Vancouver, British Columbia (Chafe, Neville, Rathwell , Biden and Tomblin, 2006b) and 
the 2007 National Healthcare Leadership Conference Toronto, Ontario (Chafe, Neville, 
Rathwell , 2007). 
8.4 Concluding Remarks 
Improving how we allocate health care resources will not solve all the problems in our 
health care system. It will not allow public coverage to meet all the existing and 
prospective demands. Difficult choices will sti ll have to be made by decision maker at 
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all levels. It is hoped, however, that better resource allocation decisions will lead to 
improve health outcomes, run our health care system more effi ciently, and make the 
system more responsive to the wants and needs of the Canadian public. Achieving these 
goals wil l a ll contribute to the long term su tai nabil ity of our publicly funded health care 
system. 
Health care resourc allocation is a messy business. There are a number of different 
factors to consider and groups usually have completing interests for a limited pool of 
resources. Even with a good proces for allocation of resources and experienced decision 
makers, sometimes wider economic and political factors will win out. Resource 
allocation w ill never be perfect. But improving resource allocation processes does offer 
the hope of a more efficient, ethical and accountable health care system. It is hoped that 
this project has increased our understanding of health resource allocation in a way which 
will lead to futur improvements in how our health care resource are a llocated. 
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This appendix provides background information and an overview of decision making 
within the Canadian health care system in order to provide further context to the cases . It 
starts with an overview of health care decision making in Canada, including the 
importance of the courts and wider societal trends. 
Health Care Decision Making in Canada 
One of the more interesting aspects of health care decision making in Canada is the 
sometimes complex interaction between the federal government and the provinces. The 
British North American Act ( 1867) gave provincial governments primary constitutional 
authority to regulate in the area of health. Although the federa l go ernment does have 
authority in some areas e.g. , to provide health care to Native Canadians, members of the 
RCMP and the Canadian Armed Forces, as Lavis (2002) points out, the constitution 
makes provincial governments the ultimate decision makers in the Canadian health care 
system. In fact, the Canadian health care system is really a collection of independent 
provincia lly and territori ally run, health care systems. 
In 1867, when authority for health care was granted to the provinces, public heal th care 
spending was fairly insignificant compared to other public spending priorities. Since 
then, the public cost of providing health care has greatly increased, both in absolute terms 
and as a proportion of tota l public spending. Over the last century, the increasing cost of 
health care, and its implications for access to care, has resulted in fundamental changes in 
how health care is funded across the industrialized world (Starr, 1982; Tuohy, 1999). 
Likewise, from the end of the Second War World to the beginning of the 1970s, 
466 
Canadians saw a great transformation in the financing of their health care system (Taylor, 
1978; Tuohy, 1999). By the early 1970s, publicly financed and administrated insurance 
plans for hospital and physician services were established across the country. A lthough 
the provincial governments have the constitutional authority over increasingly expensive 
areas of social spending, like health care and ed ucation, the federal government have a 
much stronger position in terms of its ability to raise tax revenue. This mismatch in 
spending responsibilities and tax revenues creates a situation in which new health care 
initiatives are often dependent on the federal government being willing to transfer funds 
to the provinces to partially cover their cost. For example, public insurance plans for 
hospital and physician services would not have been established in most provinces 
without federal cost-sharing agreements (Taylor, 1978). Health care has thus become de 
facto an area of joint federal-provincial involvement. 
Joint federal-provincial involvement in health care has resulted in numerous clashes 
between the two levels of government. Even the amount of money the federal 
government transfers to the provinces for health care is a constant source of disagreement 
(Deber, 2000). Part of the contention is the resul t of changes in how federal transfers are 
structured. The Hospital insurance and Diagnostic Services Act ( 1957), which first 
offered cost sharing to the provinces for hospital services, and the Medical Care A ·t 
( 1966), which covered physician services, both required the federal government to cov r 
50% of the cost of the services provided. In 1977, the federal government passed the 
Established Programs Financing Act. This Act replaced the 50% federal cost sharing 
arrangements with a combined block grant for health care and post-secondary education. 
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Included with this block grant was the transfer of income tax points from the federal 
government to the provi nces. Essentially what the federal government did was to lower 
its income tax rate but this drop in federal taxes was matched by an equal increase in the 
provincial income tax rate, so that tax payers saw no difference in their overall tax bill, 
but more money flowed to the provincial governments. This combination of block grants 
for numerous areas of social policy and the transfer of tax points help create much of the 
disagreement over the true amount of federal funding directed to heal th care. As Rachlis 
(2005) points out, part of the confusion is that the federal government continues to view 
these tax points as part of its health transfer to the provinces. The provinces, on the other 
hand, do not count the tax points as part of federal transfers. What is clear is that 
following the move to block grants, the percentage of public health care spending paid by 
the federal government dropped significantly (Deber, 2000; Rachlis, 2005). As the 
federal government moved to ba lance its budgets during the mid-1990s, these transfers 
were cut even further. Although the cuts allowed the federal government to balance its 
budget, they also placed a great strain on provincial budgets and produced a good deal of 
tension in federal-provincial relations. 
The last ten years have seen a new phase in federal-provincial funding arrangements 
regarding health. There have been increases in the level of federal funding to the 
provinces. In 2003, the federal government separated the federa l transfer for health care 
from transfers fo r other social programs. The creation of the Canada Health Transfer is 
meant to improve the transparency of federal funding (Health Canada website, 2006). 
The federal government has also begun to increasingly use programs targeted at particular 
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areas of health care as a means of both increasing funding and directing how this new 
funding is spent. Examples of these targeted initiatives include the Medical Equipmenl 
Fund (2000 - 2003), Canada Heal!h ln.foslruclure Parlnerships Program (2000-2003), 
Knowledge Developmenl Exchange Applied Research lnilialive (200 1-2003), Heal!h 
!nfostruclure Supporl Program (1998 - 2000), Heal!h Transition Fund ( 1997-200 1), 
Diagnostic and Medical Equipment Fund (2003 - 2004) and the Primary Heal!h are 
Transition Fund (2000-2006). In 2004, the federa l government announced its Wail Times 
Reduction Fund (2004 - 20 14). Stemming from the 2003 First Ministers' Accord on 
Health Care Renewal, this fund identifies five areas - cancer, cardiac, diagnostic imaging, 
joint replacement and sight restoration - in which the federa l government is committed to 
making strategic investments over the next ten years in order to reduce wait times. 
A lthough health care is constitutionally a provincial responsibility, the federa l 
government retains a great deal of influence through the condit ions it place on federal 
funding transfers. In 1984, the federa l governm ent passed the Canada Health Act, which 
combined and updated previous health legislati on. In order for provinces to receive 
federal transfers, the Canada Health Act requires that all medically necessary hospital , 
physician and surgical-dental services provided to insured persons be covered under 
provincial plans. It requires that these provincial plans universally cover a ll residents of a 
provmce. Coverage has to be portable across provinces. Coverage also has to be 
comprehensive, public administered, and meet certain accessibility conditions. 
Essentially, the federa l government bans any charges which may impede an insured 
person receiving medical care for an insured service. These five conditions are only 
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enforced, however, by the threat of either partial or total withholding funding transfers. If 
a provincial government wants to abandon the principles of the Canada Health Act and 
forego federal funding, there is little the federal government can do to prevent it. 
Although the constitution allows provmces to act outside of the Canada Health Act, 
because of the financial and political consequences of abandoning the principles of the 
Canada Health Act, no province has yet chosen to openly defy to any great extent the 
conditions on federal cost sharing. Coyte (2004) points out that this leads to a cascading 
effect on decis ion making. Higher levels of governments make decisions which limit the 
options open to lower levels of governance, e.g. , the decisions by provincial governments 
limit the actions of regional health authorities. Coyte identified the federa l funding 
requirements set out in the Canada Health Act a constraining the options of all other 
institutions, including provincial governments. 
While the Canada Health Act states that all medicall y necessary hospital and physician 
services must be publicly financed without any financi al barriers to access, it does not 
specify what should be the scope of these services. However, the Canada Health Act is 
silent on many important areas of health care, e.g. , home care, pharmaceuticals. Thus 
provinces have a good deal of di scretion in determining which services to cover under 
their public health plans. This discretion can lead to wide variation in coverage across the 
country. With technological and pharmaceutica l advances, differences in the financial 
capabilities between the provinces, the lack of national guidance, and the lack of strong 
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coordination amongst the provinces, it is likely that differences in coverage will continue 
to increase (Neville, 2005; Gregoire et. al., 2001 ). 
CoUJ1 Rulings 
A recent, but important, influence on Canadian health resource allocations have been the 
courts. Canadian courts have generally left the design of social programs to the 
legislative branches of government. In 2002, the Supreme Court of Canada (Gos elin v. 
Quebec, 2002) ruled that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom ( 1982) does not 
require the government to set up any particular social benefits. In other words, the federal 
and provincial governments are free to establish, or not establish, whatever social 
programs they see tit. 
Once social programs are establi shed, they are subject to constitutional protections. 
Clause 15 of the Charter guarantees "the equal protection and equal benefit of the law 
without discrimination." The Supreme Court has interpreted this condition to include that 
the government must remove any barriers which discriminate against people in terms of 
the ability to benefit from a social program once a program is establ ished. In the Eldridge 
case (Eldridge v. British Columbia, 1997), the Supreme Court ruled that the province of 
British Columbia had to provide translation services to deaf patients in its health care 
institutions. In the opinion of the court, by not providing deaf translation services, the 
province was limiting the deaf patients ' abil ity to benefit from an establish d social 
benefit and that this discrimination was based solely on their disability. 
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In 2004, the court considered the question of health resource allocation directly. The 
A uton case (Auton v. British Columbia, 2004) directly challenged a provincial 
government 's abi lity to deny coverage for med ical care. In thi s case, the families of four 
autistic children c laimed the government of British Columbia's failure to cover Applied 
Behavioural Analysis and Intensive Behavioura l Intervention violated their children ' s 
equality rights as guaranteed under clause 15 of the charter. Two lower British Columbia 
courts ruled that the treatment was ' medically necessary ' and therefore should be covered 
under the provincial Medicare plan. While the government of British Columbia 
acknowledged the importance of early intervention for autistic chi ldren , they did not 
provide funding for Applied Behavioura l Analysis I Intensive Behavioural Inte rvention 
for a ll autistic children. The government' s decision was based on the emergent nature of 
the therapy, the costs ($60,000 annually I patient) and the needs of other people for 
limited medical resources. 
In ovember 2004, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled against the families. The basis of 
the courts ruling was " the benefit claimed - funding for all medically required treatment -
is not provided by Jaw" (Auton v. British Columbia, 2004, section. 35). While the 
Canada Health Act does require provinces to provide med ically necessary care, it does so 
only with reference to services provided by physicians or within hospitals. The Canada 
Health Act does not extend the concept of medically necessary care to care provided by 
allied health professionals, like those w ho provide Applied Behavioural Analy is I 
Intensive Behavioural Intervention services. The court also recognized that a provincial 
health insurance plan is "by its very terms, a partial health plan and its purpose is not to 
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meet all medical needs" (Auton v. British Columbia, 2004, preamble, p. 5). Limitations 
on which services are covered are an intended part of the public health care system. In 
deciding which services are publicly insured, the court ruled that charter violations only 
occur when discrimination can be shown in how provincial governments made their 
decision, but not in what it decides to cover. In other words, in making coverage 
decisions there can be procedural vio lations of the Charter, but not substantive ones. The 
Auton case does show the court's increasing willingness to consider cases which directly 
effect how health care resources are a llocated in this country and it is likely that simi lar 
cases will be brought before the court in the future. 
Key Interest Groups 
Numerous groups have a stake in e ither increasing or redirecting health care spending. 
These actors include health care providers, unions, health technology and pharmaceutical 
companies, and various disease-specific groups. 
Physicians and physician groups, like the Canadian Medical Association and their 
provincial counterparts, have a great deal of influence in the health care system. This 
influence is both in the area of government policy and within health care institutions. 
With the introduction of public medical insurance, provincial governments a llowed 
physic ians to retain control over c linical decisions. Physicians also retained their central 
position in the delivery of care. It was these terms, along with fa irly generous 
compensation, which helped win physician support for a public Medicare plan (Taylor, 
1978; Hutchison, Ableson & Lavis, 200 I). Because of the high regard the publ ic hold 
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physicians, shortages of physicians in some areas and their high level of technical 
expertise in area of health, provincial governments are often reluctant to publicly 
challenge physicians. On particular issues, physicians may be divided along sub-
disciplines. These divisions particularly occur in the areas of fee-scheduling and resource 
allocation (Archibald & Flood, 2004). 
Hospital and regional health board associations (in nine of the ten provinces) are also 
important actors in health policy. These associations represent the interests of large 
institutional providers. Their influence is somewhat limited, however, by the fact that 
their members are often under the direct control of provincial governments and that large 
regions often interact directly with the provincial government. 
Finally, there are a number of other groups from other professional associations, unions, 
organizations representing disease groups, pharmaceutical companies, etc., which also 
participate in the decision making process. Depending on the issue, their influence may 
be quite substantia l. Usually their influence is confined to areas which are seen as being 
of direct concern to that particular group. 
Other Political Factors 
There are a number of other factors which impact on health care decision making in 
Canada. Many of these factors do not arise solely from the institutional structure of the 
Canadian health care system. To conclude this overview of the broader policy 
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environment, other influences on health care decision making m thi s country are 
discussed. 
The Historical Stability of Resource Allocations 
Daniels ( 1986) writes that one of the best aspects of a public health care system, like 
Canada's, is that it allows for a more rational distribution of health care resources. 
Although this may seem to be the case compared to the American system, a lmost a lways 
the historic distribution, i.e., how health care resources are currently distributed, trumps 
more rational distributions. For example, if a new effective Alzheimer' s drug is 
developed, it is very unlikely that a province would say to a group of Cystic Fibrosis 
patients "you cannot have the medication we paid for last year because we have a new 
A lzheimer drug which is more cost-effective and will save the system mon y if w cover 
that instead." In fact , Hutchison, Abelson, and Lavis (200 I) point out that the distribution 
of health care resources, both geographically and across types of services, in many cases 
still reOect distribution patterns which were in place before a public system was 
establi shed in Canada. 
Path dependence is the concept that describes the fact that once political institutions or 
programs have been established, they create conditions which support their continuation 
(Pierson, 2000). The physical equipment and infrastructure are in place. The public and 
users of the service have expectations that the service wi ll be provided. Private 
companies, communities and employees come to depend on the work for their economic 
survival. While decisions about health allocation do affect everyone, people who 
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currently work in an area and those who are currently being served by it are more directly 
concerned and immediately affected by reallocations of resources. It is clear to these 
groups what is at risk in any reallocation of health care resources (Hurley, Lomas, & 
Bhatia, 1994). In many cases, it is less clear to those who are to benefit from reallocation 
what they stand to gain . This creates a situation in which those who currently benefit 
from the allocation of resources are usua lly much more motivated in opposing changes 
than those who will gain from those changes are to support them. As Machiavelli 
(15 13/1992) famously said: 
" there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, 
or more uncertain in its success, then to take the lead in the introduction of 
a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those 
who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in 
those who may do well under the new" (p . 17). 
Few want health care reform which would requi re giving up some of the benefits they 
currently have. T he re-allocation of resources currentl y employed is not always easy. 
That physicians and other service providers have a g reat deal o f influence over how 
resources are d istributed also he lps to maintain hi storical patterns of resource distri bution. 
This historical pattern of allocations is one of the reasons why new services often have to 
wait for new money before they get funded. 
Proportion of Public Spending and Health Care Inflation 
Another fac tor which influences health care decision making is the level of spending 
already directed towards health care. In 2005, Canada spent $ 142 bi llion on health care 
(Canadian lnsti tute for Health Info rmation, 2005). This consti tutes 1 0.4% of the 
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countries total GDP, which puts Canada in the top five countries globally in terms of per 
capita health care spending. While growth in health care expenditures has recently 
slowed, health care expenses are still increasing at around 6% annually. Roughly 40% of 
provincial government program expenditures are currently devoted to health care . The 
size of public expenditures on health means that health care spending decisions have 
significant consequences on other policy fie lds, budget deficits, and on the wider 
economy as well. 
Public Support 
While there is increasing concern about the state of the Canadian health care system 
(Blendon ct al. , 2002), the system still enjoys wide public support . Marmor (2002) fi nds 
that Canadians overwhelmingly support th underlying val ues o f "public finance and 
equal access to health care, regardless of ability to pay" (p. iv). Graves ( 1998) finds a 
similar level of national consensus that the quality of health care services and equitable 
access to care are the two main values Canadians want embodied in their heal th care 
system. Jpsos Research (1998) has found that health care is the number one policy 
concern for Canadians. The public are strongly opposed to increased privatization of 
health care services (Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002). A 
majority of Canadians also say they support more funding, even tax increases, to improve 
the quality of care (lpsos Research, 2002). 
Jpsos Research (2002a) also report Canadians overwhelming (88%) believe that increased 
taxes and limits on care can be avoided if health care resources were used more 
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efficiently. Graves (1998) also reports that most Canadians do not be lieve that health 
care rationing is necessary and that cuts can be avoided if waste was cut out of the 
system. 
This strong public support for the health care system, and the public belief that rationing 
of care would not be necessary if the system was run more efficiently, are key elements of 
the decision making environment in regard to resource allocations. These factors also 
make decisions about the a llocation of resources very political and subject to great public 
scrutiny. 
Pervasiveness of Media Coverage 
It should not be surprising, given all the facto rs listed above, that health care issues 
receive a great deal of media attention in Canada. Health issues receive perhaps more 
media coverage, on a constant basis, than any other public policy area. The vast range of 
health po licy issues, from wait times for MR!s and the SARS crisis to diets and smoking 
bans, help assure that health policy remains on the public agenda. The range of interest 
groups affected by most a llocati on decisions ensures they also receive a good deal of 
media attention, especially in cases where a group of patients is denied care. 
G lobal Political C limate and Privatization 
Health care decision making is not an isolated sphere. ft is subject to prevailing views 
about social policy more generally. Since the early 1970s, most industrialized countries 
have increasing accepted market-based reforms o f their social programs (Micklethwait & 
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Wooldridge, 2004; Stanislaw & Yergin, 2002; Tuohy, 1999). This political shift is more 
pronounced in some countries than others. For example, summing up the current state of 
policy debates in the United States, David Brooks (2004) writes, 
"the fact is that over the next decade - whether we are talking about 
pensions, health care or even schools - the central argument is not going to 
be over whether to apply market competition to these problems. It's going 
to be over how to structure competition to produce the most dynamic 
results" (section A, page 19). 
Although there are groups which do support increased private sector involvement in 
health care, or at least changing the incentive structures within the health care system 
(Gratzer, 1999; Shiell, 2002), the need for market-based health reforms is a less accepted 
view in Canada than in many other countries. 
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Appendix B: Provincial and Regional Data 
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Table A: Demographic, Economic and Health Care Spending Data by Province 
(2005) 
AB NL SK 
Population 3,332,225 512,509 988,980 
Quarterly % change in 
population 0.78% -0.37% -0.20% 
Communities> 100,000 2 I 2 
Communities > 1 Million 2 0 0 
GDP (in billions) $2 15.9 $2 1.5 $42.5 
GDP per capita $64,779 $42,017 $42,963 
Average household $32,603 $24,165 $25,69 1 
income 
Unemployment rate 3.5% 14.8% 4.9% 
Total health expenditures $15.57 billion $2.27 billion $4.38 bil lion 
Percentage change in 
total health expenditures 11.3% 4.8% 6.7% 
Total health expenditure 7.7% 11.0% 10.3% 
as% ofGDP 
Total provincial $1 0.63 billion $ 1.64 billion $2.91 billion 
government spending on 
health 
Health as a percentage of 
total provincial program 37.9% 36.7% 37.2% 
spending 
Percentage change in 
total provincial spending 12.2% 4.9% 6.2% 
Per capita provincial 
government health care $3297.74 $3 183.65 $2920.92 
spending 
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Table B: Structure, Financial Data and Management Structure by Regions (2005) 
Region A (AB) Region B (NL) Reeion C (SK) 
Number of health 9 regional 4 regional 12 regional 
regions in the authorities+ authorities authorities + a 
province provincial boards provincial board for 
for cancer care cancer care 
and mental health 
Region established 1995 2005 2002 
Scope of regions Acute care, long- Acute care, long- Acute care, 
term care, home term care, home emergency services, 
care, health care, health long-term care, 
promotion and promotion, palliative care, home 
prevention prevention activities, care, community 
activities cancer care, health, mental health 
rehabilitation and and rehabilitation 
social services services 
Method of funding Primarily Primarily historical- Combination of 
formula-based, based, global global budgeting and 
global budgeting. budgeting. targeted funding. 
Targeted funding Requests for 
to certain regions additional funds 
for providing made directly to 
high-level care. DHCS. 
Total Revenue $2 billion $1.4 billion $600 Million 
(Est.) (Region A) (All4 NL Regions) (Region C) 
Revenue per $2400 $2000 $2200 
capita 
Increase in 6% 7.5% 10% 
operate costs 
(2006-2007) 
Management Regional Regional programs Regional programs, 
Structure programs and although retains 
site-based some site-based 
governance 
482 
Appendix C: Information Needs for Cases 
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Information Required for Each Case Study 
Area Questions Source of Interview 
Question I Question I 
Concept from Data Source 
Literature 
1. The Case 
Studies 
A. Current State of a. What is the I. 1, I. I a; 
Usage I Coverage current level of 3.2 
coverage I access 
w ithin the institution 
I the province? 
b. What recent I. l d; 
resource I coverage 2.2; 
issues have there 3.2a 
been? 
c. What conditions 1.2; 
are there on 2.1 0; 
coverage I access? 3. 10 
d. How were these 1.2a; 
conditions set? 2. 10a; 
3. 1 Oa 
e. Why were these 1.2b; 
conditions set? 2.1 0b; 
3. 10b 
f. What is the cost of I . l c; 
the program? 
g. How many people l . l b; 
use the program 
annually? 
h. What trends are 1.4; 
there in coverage I 
usage? 
i. How is the Donabedian 1. I e; 
program assessed? ( I 973) 
j . What future I .4a, 1.4b; 
developments can be 
expected? 
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Area Questions Source of Interview 
Question I Question/ 
Concept from Data Source 
Literature 
1. The Case 
Studies (cont.) 
B. Agenda Setting a. How does the Hacker ( I 997) 1.5; 
issue of coverage I reviews theories 2.3, 2 .3b; 
0 0 
o f political 3.3; 3.3 b. mcreasmg resources 
usually get on the agenda setting. 
insti tution' s agenda? 
b. Is there a formal 1.5a; 
process for 2.3a; 
requesting more 3.3a. 
resources? 
c . Who is the prime 1.6; 
advocate for 2.4b; 
expanding coverage? 3.4b. 
d. What other Brooks (2003) 1.7; 
interested groups are 2.4; 
there? 3.4. 
e. Which outcomes Atkins (2005) 1.7a; 
are they trying to 2.4a; 
achieve? 3.4a. 
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Area Questions Source of Interview 
Question I Question/ 
Concept from Data Source 
Literature 
1. The Case 
Studies (cont.) 
C. The Decision a. What is the Singer et a l. 1.8, 1.9; 
Making Process. decision making (2000) 2 .5; 2.6; 
process? 3.5; 3.6. 
b. Are services Mitton (2003) 1.8a; 
considered on an 2 .5a; 
one-by-one basis, 3.5a. 
within programs or 
is there competition 
across programs? 
c. Who is involved Deber ( 1995) 1.8b; 
in the decision 2.5b; 
making process? 3.5b. 
d. What is their level 1.8c, 1.8d; 
of involvement I 2.2b; 2.5c; 
contribution? 3.5c. 
e. Who makes the Deber ( 1995) 1.9a; 
final decision about 2.6a; 
coverage I increased 3.6al 
resources? 
f. What decision 1.1 0; 
tools are currently 2.7; 
used? 3.7. 
g. Is the re an appeal (Daniels 2000) 1.11 ; 
mechanism? 2.8; 
3.8. 
h. How does the 1.12; 
decision making in 2.9; 
this area compare 3.9. 
with decision 
making in other 
areas of care? 
i. How are vendors 1.1 7; 
involved? 2.16; 
3.16. 
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Area Questions Source of Interview 
Question I Question/ 
Concept from Data Source 
Literature 
1. The Case 
Studies (cont.) 
D. Factors Impacting a. Which factors are Deber ( 1995); 1.1 3; 
on the Decision considered in Hurley (200 I) 2.1 2; 
making allocation li st factors 3.12. 
decisions? commonly used 
in making 
allocation 
decision. 
b. Which factors are 1.1 3a; 
unique to this area of 2. 12a; 
care? 3.12a. 
d . Which factors l.l3b; 
reflect the strategic 2.12b; 
direction of the 3. 12b. 
organization? 
e. Which factors Oeber (1995) 1.18; 
have the biggest reviews the 2.27; 
impact? level of 3.27. 
influence of 
factors. 
f. How are the 2.26; 
competing factors 3.27. 
balanced? 
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Area Questions Source of Interview 
Question I Question/ 
Concept from Data Source 
Literature 
1. The Case 
Studies (cont.) 
E. MRis a. Are there 1.3 ; 
guidelines on MRI 2.11 . 
usage? 
b. If yes, what are 1.3a; 
they? 2.11a. 
c . How were they 1.3b; 
decided on? 2.1 1b. 
d. How are priorities 1.3c; 
set for scans? 2.1 1 c. 
e . Is a cost- (Weinstein 1.15e; 
effectiveness 1987) 2.14g. 
analysis done? 
f. If so, how is it 1.15f; 
calculated? 2.14h. 
g. What influence 2. 19; 
doesthelevelof 3.19. 
media coverage 
about MRis have on 
coverage decisions? 
F. Endovascular a. Is the biplane 1.15c. 
Coiling angiography used for 
other procedures? 
b. If so, how does 1.15d; 
this effect the 2.14f. 
calculation of 
program costs? 
G. Powered Upper a. What influence do 1.7b; 
Arm Prosthesis the War Amps' 2.4d; 
programs have on 3.4d. 
coverage decisions? 
b. What influence Ontario 's Aids 1.7c; 
does Workers ' for Healthy 2.4d; 
Compensation have Living 3.4d. 
on coverage Program. 
decisions? 
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Area Questions Source of Interview 
Question I Question/ 
Concept from Data Source 
Literature 
2. Factors in Public 
Policy Change 
A. Ideas a. What influence 2. 17; 
does the wider 3.17. 
public policy 
environment play in 
decision making? 
b. What role does 2. 18; 
public opinion play? 3. 18. 
B. Institutions a. How does the 1.1 3b; 
institutional structure 2.20; 
of your organization 3.20. 
effect decision 
making? 
b. Are there any Diagnostic/ 2.21; 
provinc ial/federal Medical 3.21. 
initiatives relating to quipment 
the area of care Fund 
influencing the 
decision? 
C. Interests a. Which groups 1.7; 
have an interest in 2.4; 
the coverage 3.4. 
decision? 
b. Which outcomes Atkins (2005) 1.7a; 
are they trying to 2.4a; 
achieve? 3.4a. 
c. To what extent did 2. 18a; 
competition amongst 3.18a. 
groups shape the 
decision? 
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Area Questions Source of Interview 
Question I Question/ 
Concept from Data Source 
Literature 
3. Variation in 
Cases 
a. VVhat effectdoes Analysis of 3 
the area of coverage b c,d,e,f,g ,h. 
make? 
b. \Vhat differences 2.4c; 
result from the 3.4c. 
groups advocating 
the change? 
c. VVhat differences 2. 131; 
result from 3.1 3i. 
di fferences in the 
potentia l patient 
population? 
d. VVhat di fferences 2.13k; 
resul t from 3. 13k . 
di fferences in the 
potentia l impact on 
patients? 
e . VVhat effect do Analysis of cases 
differences in cost and questions 1.1 c. 
per case have? 
f. \Vhat differences Comparison of 
are there across interviews across 
provinces? provinces. 
g. To what extent Analysis of cases 
does the institutional and questions 
structure effect the 2.B.a,b,c. 
decision? 
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Area Questions Source of Interview 
Question I Question/ 
Concept from Data Source 
Literature 
4. Specific Factors 
A. Need a. How is the 1.1 6; 
demand serv ice 1.1 5a; 
determined? 
B. Effectiveness a. What is Fuchs ( 1990) 1.1 4; 
considered in includes safety, 2. 13; 
determining the e fficacy, 3.1 3. 
effectiveness of the effecti veness, 
intervention? quality of li fe, 
patients' 
preferences 
change in 
patient status. 
b. What evidence of K itson (1998) 1. 14a; 
effectiveness is includes 2. 13a; 
considered? research, 3. 13a. 
clinical 
expertise and 
patient 
preferences. 
c . Are outside Batti sta ( 1999) 1.1 4b; 
technical 2. 13a; 
assessments used? 3. 13a. 
d. If so, which ones? 1.1 4b; 
2.13c; 
3.1 3c. 
e . Are experts 1.1 4c; 
advisory panels 2. 13d; 
used? 3.13d. 
f. How is evidence Cook and 1.1 4d; 
assembled? Sackett ( 1995) 2.13g; 
3.13f. 
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Area Questions Source of Interview 
Question I Question/ 
Concept from Data Source 
Literature 
4. Specific Factors 
Cont. 
g. How is the Cook and 1.14e; 
research reported to Sackett (I 995); 2.13h; 
others involved in Canadian Task 3.13h. 
the decision making Force on 
process? Preventive 
Health Care 
(2003); 
GRADE 
Working Group 
(2004) 
h. Are ever dispute Atkins (2005) 2. 13e; 
evidence or criteria 3. I 3e. 
for evidence? 
i. If so, how are 2. 13f; 
disputes settled? 3.13 f. 
B. Efficiency I Cost a. How is cost 1.15; 
effectiveness calculated? 2. 14; 
3.14. 
b. What is included Gold et al. 1.15a; 
in cost calculations? (1976) 2.14a; 
c. How is possible 1.16a; 
patient population 2.15a; 
determined? 3. 15a. 
d. Are cost 2.14d; 
comparisons made 3. 14a 
across treatments? 
e. How are 2. 14e; 
comparisons made 3.14b. 
across treatments? 
f. How are costs 1.15b; 
reported, e.g., case- 2. 14c; 
by-case? 3.14c. 
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Area Questions Source of Interview 
Question I Question/ 
Concept from Data Source 
Literature 
4. Specific Factors 
Cont. 
C. Ethics a. To what extent are 2.22; 
values considered 3.22. 
within the decision 
making process? 
b. Are any measures Ubel (200 1) 2.23; 
taken to ensure 3.23. 
equitable access to 
services? 
D. Accountability a. What 2.24; 
opportunities are 3.24. 
there for public input 
into the decision 
making process? 
b. What other ways 2.25 ; 
are used to ensure 3.25. 
the accountability of 
the decision making 
process? 
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Information Questions Source of Source of 
Question Information 
5. Decision Tools/ 
Best Practices 
A. Best Practices a. What is the most 1.19; 
difficult part of 2.28 ; 
making these types 3.28. 
of allocation 
decisions? 
b. What best 1.20; 
practices are there? 2.29; 
3.29. 
c. What 1.21; 1.22; 
improvements could 2.30; 2.31 ; 
be made in the 3.20; 3.21. 
decision making 
process? 
d. Which types of 1.23; 
decision tools would 2 .32; 
be helpful in making 3.32. 
allocation decisions? 
e. Wou ld the use of a 2.32a; 
score I balance sheet 3.32a. 
be useful? 
f. Would a 2.32b; 
standardized 3.32b. 
information form for 
making requests for 
increased resources 
be useful? 
g. Which categories 2.32c; 
should be included 3.32c. 
on such a form ? 
h. Would improved 2.32d; 
practice guidelines 3.32d. 
be useful? 
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Appendix D: Example of Initial Interview Guides 
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Interview Guide 1: Department Head/ Program Manager/ Clinical Chief for Specific 
Treatment 
Usage I Coverage 
I. Briefly describe the program at your institution. 
I a. How many people use the program on annual basis? 
I b. What is the annual cost of the program? 
2. What trends have you noticed in the demand for the program? 
3. Are there any limits on coverage/usage, e.g., limited to certain populations, limited to certain 
conditions? 
3a. How were the e limits set? 
3b. Are there guidelines on MRI scans? (MRl only) 
3c. How arc priorities for scans set? (MRI only) 
4. What is the current state of coverage I investment within your province in this area of care? 
Agenda Setting 
5. How do reque ts to increase resources I expand coverage in this area u ually get on your 
institution ' agenda? For example, are they initiated by staff? Users? Are there sign of 
increased need? Initiated by outside factors? Is there a formal proces ? 
6. Who would you say is the prime advocate for increasing resources I expanding coverage in thi 
area? 
7. What other groups are involved? 
7a. What influence do the War Amp ' and Workers' Campen ation programs have on c 
overage decisions? (Prostheses only) 
Decision Making Process 
8. After the i sue begins to be considered by your institution, what happens next? Describe the 
decision making process. 
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8a. Are deci ions considered on a departmental/program basis? Considered 
individually on a case by case basis? Is there a competition aero s areas I interest 
groups? 
9. How is the final decision made? 
I 0. Who makes the final coverage decisions? 
II. Is there any mechanism for appealing a decision? 
12. What is your role into the decision proces ? 
Factors 
13. In deciding to increa e resources I expand ing coverage in this area, which factors are 
considered? 
13a. Which of these factors do you feel are unique to thi area of care? 
13b. Which ofthe e factors do you feel are unique to your insti tution? 
13c. Which factors are dependent on other institutions, e.g., are there any federal 
government programs? 
14. How is the effectiveness of the treatment determined? What information is considered? 
14a. Are outside technical asse sments u ed? 
14b. Are outside expe11s I panels involved? 
14c. Are vendors involved? 
14d. Are there ever disputes about the ev idence for effectiveness? 
14e. How i evidence assembled and reported to others involved in the deci Ion 
making proce ? 
14f. What measure are used, e.g., number needed to treat? 
15. What influence do the opinions of the local medical communi ty about the treatment have on 
the decision mak ing process? 
16. What influence did the opinions of patients or the public about the treatment have on the 
decision making proce s? 
17. How was cost of providing treatment determined? 
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17a. What i con idered in costs? For example, pace issues, training requirements, staff 
co ts? 
17b. Are costs con idered in terms of 'cost per case' or in terms of overall program co t? 
18. Are there any other re ource considerations? 
19. How is demand for the ervice determined? 
19a. How is the potential patient population for the treatment determined? 
20. Is there any attempt to measure the impact of allocation decisions? 
21. Which factors have the greatest influence on the deci ion? 
Recommendations/ Best Practices 
22. Are there any be t practices which you would recommend ba ed on how your organ ization 
allocates resources in thi area? What seems to work well? 
23. What pos ible improvements in the decision making process would you sugge t? 
24. What pecific recommendations would you make within thi specific area of care? 
25. What type of deci ion tools do you think would be helpful in making similar al location 
decisions in the future? 
26. Is there anything else you would like to add? 
Thank you very much for your time and consideration. 
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Appendix E: Example of Revised Interview Guides 
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Inten·iew Questions 
)> Briefly describe your role and responsibilities at---. 
)> Describe the usual process for allocating resources within ---. 
)> In deciding to increase resources I expanding coverage for a program, wh ich factors do you 
considered? 
)> What role does the provincial government play in the allocation of resources with in ---? 
)> How arc evidence and cost considered within the allocation process at---? 
)> What measures I institutional features are used to ensure the accountab il ity of the budgeting 
process? 
)> What opportunities are there for public input into the decision making process? 
)> What impact do ethical considerations have on the allocation process? 
)> What recent resource I coverage issues have there been for your organization in the area of 
MRis, Endovascular Coiling and Powered Upper Arm Prostheses? 
)> How would you say the process for allocating resources in these three areas of care 
com pare with other areas of care at---? 
)> Are there any best practices which you would recomm end based on how your organization 
allocates resources? 
)> What possible improvements in the decision making process wou ld you suggest? 
)> What type of decision aids do you think would be helpful to you in making re ource 
allocation decisions in the future? E.g., heath techno Iogie assessments, standard ized forms 
for making requests for additional resources, balance sheets of harms/benefits, etc. 
Thank you ve1y much for your time and con ideration. 
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Appendix F: Introduction Letter to Participants 
50 1 
[On Division of Community Health, Memorial University Letterhead] 
[Date] 
Dear Mr. or Mrs. ---, 
I am writing to request your assistance with a research project examining how funding 
decisions for MRis and endovascular coilings are made in our province. This is part of a 
larger research project, entitled an Examination of Three Types of Health Care 
Resource Allocation Decisions, which will look at how resource allocation decisions are 
made in the areas of MRis, endovascular coilings and powered upper limb prosthesis in 
three provinces: Alberta, Newfoundland and Saskatchewan. The overall aim of the 
project is I) to identify how these decisions are currently made and 2) to develop decision 
aids which can help decision makers make similar decisions in the future. 
The project is being conducted by a researcher working in the Faculty of Medicine of 
Memorial University ofNewfoundland as a part of his Ph.D. dissertation. A brief 
description of the study is attached. I would be glad to provide any additional 
information or answer any questions you might have about the project. 
As a key person involved in decisions concerning MRis and endovascular coilings within 
your organization, I am requesting an interview with you to find out more about how 
these decisions are made and to hear your suggestions on ways to improve the decision 
making process. The interview should take around one hour to complete. For your 
information, I have attached a list of the questionss I would like to discuss. 
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Page 2 
[Name] 
[Date] 
Confidentiality of responses and the identities of the people interviewed will be 
maintained at all time. o publications or presentations resulting from this project wi ll 
identify you as a respondent. During the intervi w, you are free to refuse to answer any 
question you wish. This project has passed ethical reviews by Memorial University s 
Human Investigation Committee and the RPAC committee of the Health Care 
Corporation of t. John's. Before the inte rview, I will ask you to sign a consent form . A 
copy of thi s form is included in this package. 
You can either contact me or I will contact you by phone on [Date] to hopefully arrange a 
convenient time for an interv iew. Thank you very much for your consideration and I 
hope that you will be willing to participate. 
Sincerely, 
Roger Chafe, B.A., M .A. 
Rm 2849 - Department of Community Health 
Faculty of Medicine 
Health Sciences Centre 
St. John ' s, NL A I B 3V6 
Tel: 1-709-777-8722 
E-Mail : rogerch@ mun.ca 
Thesis Supervisors: 
Dr. Doreen eville (Memorial Univers ity) 
Or. Thomas Rathwell (Dalhousie Univers ity) 
1-709-777-62 15 
1-902-494-7097 
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Appendix G: Brief Project Description 
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Project Description 
Managers of our health care system often face d ifficult choices about which services to 
cover under publicly funded insurance plans. They also face difficult choices about 
which services to provide within particular health care institutions. This study called An 
Examination of Three Types of Health Care Resource Allocation Decisions, will 
examine particular resource allocation decisions to identify best practices and develop 
decision aids which can be employed in making similar decisions in the future. Using 
interviews and a review of the relevant documents, I will look at how decisions involving 
MRis, endovascular coil ing, and powered upper limb prostheses are made in three 
provinces: Alberta, Newfound land, and Saskatchewan. The overall aim of the project is 
I) to identify how these decisions are currently made, 2) compare how these decisions are 
getting made in the different areas of care and in the different provinces, and 3) to 
develop decision aids I identify best practices which can help decision mak rs make 
simi lar decisions in the future. My hypothesis is that taking a more case-focus d 
approach wi ll allow for the development of more relevant decision making aids than 
those currently being proposed in the academic literature. Once these decision aids have 
been developed and best practices identified, they will be piloted with decision makers to 
b tter ensure their applicability for future resource allocations decisions. 
This project is being conducted as part of the requirements of Ph.D. program m 
Community Health at Memorial University of Newfoundland and Labrador. 
My thesis supervisors are: 
Dr. Doreen Neville (Memorial University) 
Dr. Thomas Rathwell (Dalhousie University) 
1-709-777-6215 
1-902-494-7097 
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Appendix H: Consent Form - Alberta 
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INFORMATION SHEET 
Title of Research Study An Examination of Three Types of Health Care 
Resource Allocation Decisions 
Principal lnvestigator(s): 
Co-lnvestigator(s): Roger Chafe (Ph. D. Candidate - Memorial University) 
Background: As a key person involved in making resource allocation decisions 
regarding [MRis , endovascular coilings, and/or powered upper limb prostheses] 
within your organization, I am requesting an interview with you to find out more 
about how these decisions are made and to hear your suggestions on ways to 
improve the decision making process . 
Purpose: This request for an interview is part of a larger research project, entitled 
an Examination of Three Types of Health Care Resource Allocation 
Decisions, which will look at how resource allocation decisions are made in three 
areas of care- MRis, endovascular coilings, and powered upper limb prostheses 
- in three provinces: Newfoundland, Ontario, and Alberta. The overall aim of the 
project is 1) to identify how these decisions are currently made and 2) to develop 
decision tools which can help decision makers make similar decisions in the 
future. This study is being conducted as a part of Roger Chafe's Ph.D. 
dissertation. 
Procedures: The interview should take around one hour to complete. For your 
information, I have attached a list of the areas I would like to discuss. The 
interview will be carried out in a location suitable to you or over the telephone. 
Possible Benefits: This project aims to develop tools and the identification of best 
practices which may be directly applicable to you when making future resource 
allocation decisions. 
Possible Risks: None foreseen . 
Confidentiality: Personal records relating to this study will be kept confidential. 
However, in addition to the investigators, the Health Research Ethics Board may 
have access to your records in special circumstances. Any report published as a 
result of this study will not identify you by name. 
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Page 1 of 2 
(Abbreviated) Ti tle of Research Project: An Examination of Three Types of Health 
Care Resource Allocation Decisions 
Voluntary Participation: You participation in this study is total voluntary. You are 
free to withdraw from the study, or stop the interview, at any time without having 
to give any reasons. You can refuse to answer any particular question at any 
time during the interview. 
Reimbursement of Expenses: None. 
Compensation for Injury: If you become ill or injured as a result of participating in 
this study, necessary medical treatment will be available at no additional cost to 
you. By signing this consent form you are not releasing the investigator(s), 
institution(s) and/or sponsor(s) from their legal and professional responsibilities. 
Contact Names and Telephone Numbers: 
Please contact any of the individuals identified below if you have any questions or 
concerns: 
Roger Chafe (Ph.D. Candidate) 1-709-777-8722 
rogerch@mun.ca 
Dr. Doreen Neville (Ph . D. Supervisor - Memorial University) 1-709-777-
6215 
Page 2 of 2 
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CONSENT FORM 
Part 1 (to be completed by the Principal Investigator): 
Title of Project: An Examination of Three Types of Health Care Resource Allocation 
Decisions 
Principal lnvestigator(s): 
Co-lnvestigator(s): Roger Chafe Contact Names: Roger Chafe 
Number(s): 1-709-777-8722 
Part 2 (to be completed by the research subject): 
Phone 
Do you understand that you have been asked to be in a research study? 
Have you read and received a copy of the attached Information Sheet? 
D 
D 
Do you understand the benefits and risks involved in taking part in this research 
D 
D 
study? D D 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study? D D 
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time, D D 
without having to give a reason and without affecting your future medical care? 
Has the issue of confidentiality been explained to you? 
Who explained this study to you? 
I agree to take part in this study: YES D 
Signature of Research Subject 
(Printed Name) 
Date: 
----------------------------
Signature of Investigator or Designee 
Date 
-----
D 
NO D 
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Appendix 1: Consent Form- Newfoundland 
5 10 
Consent Form 
I understand that I have been asked to be interviewed as part of a research project enti tled: An 
Examination of Three Types of Health Care Resource Allocation Decisions. This project 
is examining how coverage/resource allocation decisions are made in the areas of MRis, 
endovascular coiling (a treatment for brain aneurysms) and powered upper limb prosthetics. 
The interview should approximately take one hour to complete. 
I acknowledge that I have read the Project Description of the An Examination of Three 
Types of Health Care Resource Allocation Decisions project and any questions and/or 
concerns about any aspect of the project have been answered to my satisfaction. 
I have agreed that: Our interview be tape recorded. _ _ 
Notes be taken of our interv iew. 
Only the primary researcher will have access to the interview notes, recordings or transcripts 
of interviews. All notes will be kept confidential and will be stored in a locked file cabinet in 
the Department of Community Hea lth, Faculty of Medicine, Memoria l Un iversity. Computer 
files will be stored in a password protected fi le in a locked room with limited access also in 
the Department of Community Hea lth, Faculty of Medicine, Memoria l Un iversity. 
I understand that my answers to the interview questions will be kept anonymous and only 
used for the purposes of this research project. I understand that publications and 
presentations are likely to arise from thi s research, but that no in formation will be released 
that would disclose my personal identity without my express consent unless that information 
is already in the public domain, e.g., as a part of media reports. 
I understand that I can obtain additional in fo rmation at any time concerning any part of the 
project from the primary researcher, Roger Chafe, at 1-709-777-8722; or his the is 
supervisor , Dr. Doreen Nev ille (Memorial Universi ty) at 1-709-777-62 15 and Dr. Thomas 
Rathwell (Dalhousie University) at 1-902-494-7097. 
I understand that my involvement in th is research project is completely voluntary and I have 
the right to refuse to answer any questions and to end the interv iew at any time. 
I hereby voluntarily consent to participate in this research project. 
Name: 
Name of Organization: ______________________ _ 
Signature : ______________ _ Date: 
------------
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Appendix J: Consent Form- Saskatchewan 
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CONSENT FORM 
You are invited to participate in a study entitled An Examination of Three Types of 
Health Care Resource Allocation Decisions. Please read this form carefully and feel 
free to ask any questions you might have. 
Researcher(s): This project is being conducted by Roger Chafe, Ph. D. Candidate, 
Department of Community Health and Humanities, Memorial Univers ity of 
Newfoundland. His contact number is 1-709-777-8722. 
His thesi s supervisor is, Dr. Doreen Neville, Department of Community Health and 
Humanities, Memorial University ofNewfoundland. Her contact number is 1-709-777-
6215. 
Purpose and Procedure: This project is being conducted as part of a Ph.D. dissertation, 
which is focused on health care resource allocations. Using interviews and a review of 
re levant documents, this project aims to bette r understand how resource allocation 
decisions are made in three particular areas of care (endovascular coiling, MRl s and 
powered upper arm prostheses) in three provinces (A lberta, Newfoundland and 
Saskatchewan). You are being asked to be interviewed to give your insight into how 
these decisions get made in your province. Interviews should take about one hour to 
complete. 
Potential Risks and Benefits: This project aims to improve our understanding of how 
resource allocation decisions get made across different areas of care, in different 
provinces. It will also hopefully identify any decision aids and/or best practices for 
al locating resources. The risks to participants are minimal. Safeguards are in place to 
ensure confidentiality. Questions are provided in advance and participants are able to 
refuse to answer any questions they wish or to end the interview at an ytime. 
Storage of Data: Interview data will be stored in a locked filing cabinet or on a 
password protected computer, both in a locked office in the Department of Communi ty 
Health and Humanities, Memorial University of Newfoundland. The data will be under 
the protection of Roger Chafe. Thi s data will be maintained in a secure location for five 
years after the completion of the study in accordance wi th the regulations of th 
University of Saskatchewan. 
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Confidentiality: The results of this study will be published and presented at conferences; 
however, your identity will be kept confidential. Any direct quotations used from this 
interview will identified only as a ''respondent" and avoid al l identi fy ing information, 
such as your position. Given that there is still the possibi li ty that persons could be 
identified by their quotations, the researcher will confirm with interviewees their 
willingness to have direct quotes included in published works prior to publication. 
Right to Withdraw: Your participation in this study is wholly voluntary, and you may 
withdraw from the study for any reason, at any time, without penalty of any sort. If you 
withdraw from the study at any time, any data that you have contributed wi ll be destroyed 
at your request. 
Questions: If you have any questions concerning the study, please feel free to ask at any 
point; you are also free to contact the researchers at the numbers provided above if you 
have questions at a later time. This study has been approved on ethical grounds by the 
University of askatchewan Behavioural Research Ethics Board on (insert date). Any 
questions regarding your rights as a participant may be addressed to that committee 
through the Ethics Office (966-2084). Out of town participants may call collect. A 
summary of the results of this study will be sent to all participants. 
Consent to Participate: " I have read and understood the description provided above; I 
have been provided with an opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been 
answered satisfactorily. I consent to participate in the study described above, 
understanding that I may withdraw this consent at any time. A copy of this consent form 
has been given to me for my records." 
(Name of Participant) (Date) 
(S ignature of Participant) (S ignature of Researcher) 
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